WP(C) Nos.17088 & 17962 of 2023 These consolidated writ petitions challenge the denial of development and occupation (D&O) licences by the Mambad Grama Panchayat for proposed quarry operations. The petitioners contend they hold the necessary licences and clearances (environmental clearance, consent to operate, mining permissions) and that rejection solely on public complaints is unlawful. In WP(C) 17088/2023, Ext. P5 records the Panchayat’s denial; in WP(C) 17962/2023, Ext. P13 contains the similar denial. Respondents argue that permitting further quarries would degrade the environment and harm local residents, wells and property; hence, after amendments to the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, the Panchayat’s power is restricted to abating nuisance and averting danger, and public protests cannot absolve officials of statutory duties. The court cites the Full Bench in Tomy Thomas v. State of Kerala (2019 (3) KLT 987 (FB)) to reinforce that post-amendment, Panchayats cannot reject licences on that ground, and Southern Granite Industries v. Pallichal Grama Panchayat (2016 (1) KHC 207) to acknowledge that protests may influence policy but cannot deter statutory discharge. Applying these principles, the court allows the petitions, sets aside the challenged orders, and directs the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat to reconsider the applications in light of the observations made, ensuring compliance with the statutory framework.
R.P.(F.C.) No.136 of 2016 This is a revision petition under Section 125 CrPC (R.P.(F.C.) No.136 of 2016) challenging the Family Court, Irinjalakuda’s order in M.C. No.93/2014, which directed the respondent Sajitha to receive maintenance from the petitioner Biju. Sajitha claimed marriage on 11.04.2010, is issueless, and faced ailments; she contended that she requires Rs.6,000 per month for sustenance as she was driven out of the matrimonial home by Biju and has no means of support. Biju, who is the revision petitioner, defended that the respondent left the matrimonial home without sufficient cause and alleged he did not earn the amounts claimed; he contended that Sajitha was earning Rs.10,000 per month and that the amount of Rs.6,000 per month was not justified. The Family Court, after evaluating pleadings and evidence (PW1 and Exts.A1–A2 for Sajitha; RW1 for Biju), partly allowed the petition by awarding Rs.3,500 per month from May 2014. The High Court, while noticing social-justice under maintenance laws and the practice of determining notional income, upheld the impugned order, finding no illegality. It relied on established precedents that maintenance is a social-justice remedy, and that an able-bodied husband has a duty to provide support. The revision petition is therefore dismissed, with the order to pay Rs.3,500 per month remaining in force from May 2014 onward.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.M.C. No. 5872 of 2023) filed under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the entire proceedings in SC No.1579/2017 arising from Crime No.98/2013 of Varkala Police Station. The accused-petitioners, four individuals, faced offences including 452, 324, 326, 506(ii), and 308 r/w 34 IPC, with a separate allegation under Section 27 Arms Act; the prosecution stance is that the place of occurrence may not be a notified area for Arms Act purposes. The crux is that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution, evidenced by an affidavit from the victim, who also states no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor reportedly expressed reservations about quashing solely on the settlement, but acknowledged the settlement’s existence. The court relies on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019 (5) SCC 688), which summarized when non-compoundable offences can be quashed under 482 CrPC, and cites Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab as foundational authorities. Ultimately, the court finds the dispute private in nature, accepts the settlement, and allows the Criminal Miscellaneous Case, quashing ongoing proceedings in SC No.1579/2017.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed before the Kerala High Court by four accused (petitioners) challenging Crime No.989/2023 of Aryanad Police Station, registered for offences under Sections 294(b), 323 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC. The petition asserts that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution, supported by affidavits from the victims stating their consent to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging the settlement, expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of an arrangement between the parties. The court, after perusing records and affidavits, invokes the Supreme Court guidance in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) 5 SCC 688, which discusses when non‑compoundable offences may be quashed in exercise of 482 Cr.P.C., and cites Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another (2014) 6 SCC 466. The Kerala High Court reaffirms that quashing is permissible for private disputes with settlement, provided the offences are not of a heinous or public‑interest nature or under special statutes, and after considering antecedents and conduct of the accused. Finding the dispute private and the settlement genuine, the court allows the Crl.M.C. and quashes all further proceedings in Crime No.989/2023.
The Kerala High Court heard W.P.(C) No.6982 of 2022 filed by 13 elected members (petitioners) of the Temple Advisory Committee of Veeranakkavu Sree Dharma Sastha Temple, challenging Ext.P5 (9.2.2022) cancelling the election held on 07.01.2022 and Ext.P6 (19.02.2022) directing the temple festival to be conducted directly by the Devaswom Board. The petition sought to quash these orders, allow the petitioners to conduct the annual temple festival as per custom and practice, and prompt consideration of Ext.P7 representation. The 6th respondent had filed a complaint alleging violation of clause 18 of Ext.P1 byelaws by polluting the eligibility of petitioners 10–13. The respondents contended that four elected members were disqualified for having completed two terms under clause 18 of the rules and that Ext.P5 cancels the invalid election; since a Board-directed festival was planned from 13.03.2022, interference would obstruct administration. The Court analyzed Section 31A of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, which enables statutory Temple Advisory Committees, and relied on Chandu K. v. Travancore Devaswom Board (2021) 3 KHC 379, to confirm the statutory character and fixed term of such committees (two years, with limited extensions). Ultimately, the writ petition was disposed of with no order as to costs, upholding Exts.P5 and P6, and directing the 4th respondent to convene a meeting to elect strictly under the rules within set timeframes, while directing the 3rd respondent to examine complaints within three months.
This Kerala High Court criminal appeal challenges the conviction of Shyju and Radhakrishnan under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act by the Additional Sessions Court, Thodupuzha, which sentenced them to six months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh each for possessing illicit arrack. The appeal arises from Sessions Case No. 93/2007, with the judgment dated 22 August 2008. The prosecution’s case rests on seizure of two bottles of arrack near a public road at Maniyarankudy Junction, Idukki Village, on 10 November 2005, and on extending evidence from PWs 1–3 and documentary Exts P1–P10, MO1–MO2. After trial, the accused were convicted under the Abkari Act and convicted accordingly. The appellants contend three principal grounds: (a) the genesis of the prosecution is doubtful because arrest from the scene was not established; (b) the genuineness of the seized sample is unproven; (c) there is unexplained delay in the laboratory analysis of the sample. The court references Santhosh v. State of Kerala and other precedents to stress the need for clear arrest, proper seizure seals, uninterrupted chain of custody, and prompt analysis. It finds that the prosecution failed to prove arrest at the scene, seal details and sample custody, and the link between the contraband and the accused. Accordingly, the conviction cannot stand and the appeal is allowed with acquittal and liberty.
This is a criminal appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants Gireesan and Ani against a conviction recorded by the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram in SC No.1024/2003 dated 06.12.2007. The appellants were convicted for offences punishable under Sections 341 and 308 read with Section 34 IPC, with three years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹5,000 each, while the 341 IPC charge was acquitted. The prosecution case alleges that on 14/08/2002 at 11:30 p.m. on the Karamana–Shankar Nagar road, the accused, driven by enmity towards PW4, restrained him and assaulted him with granite fragments, causing multiple injuries. Ext.P4 FIS and Ext.P7 FIR form the basis of the prosecution, and MO1–MO4 were produced. PW4, the sole injured witness, testified to the attack, while PWs 1–3 were hostile. The trial court relied significantly on PW4, despite discrepancies with medical records and DWs DW1–DW2 offering a different version. The High Court notes the established principle that a single witness can sustain a conviction if credible, but corroboration is essential when the witness is not wholly reliable, citing Vadivelu Thevar and Lallu Manjhi. Finding PW4 not wholly reliable and lacking independent corroboration, the High Court acquits the appellants, sets aside the conviction and sentence, and allows the appeal. The result is acquittal and liberty for the appellants.
OT.Rev Nos. 33/2021, 50/2021, 52/2021, 51/2021, 48/2021, 49/2021 This batch of Other Tax Revision petitions under the KVAT Act arises from common orders of the assessing authority under Section 25(1) and related proceedings, challenging the fixation of compounded turnover tax on a dealer who opted to pay tax under Section 8. The Revenue contends that the assessment for the year 2011-12 is barred by limitation, yet maintains that the compounded rate for the subsequent years (2012-13 to 2016-17) can be computed from the highest tax payable in the three immediately preceding years, as per Section 8(f). The Dealer (Malanad Gold Balussery) argues that the Tribunal correctly set aside the 2011-12 order but erred by extending the effect of that order to later years, and relies on Baiju A A v. State Tax Officer and the Full Bench Reference in S.T. Rev. 21/2014 to support its interpretation of the words “paid” and “payable.” The Kerala High Court, per a Division Bench, interprets Section 8(f) in light of the Full Bench reference, holds that the Tribunal’s approach must align with the three-year highest-concession/payments framework, and ultimately allows the revisions in all six OT.Rev petitions, setting aside the Tribunal’s findings and remitting the matters for fresh disposal. No costs are awarded.
BA Nos. 2408 & 3059 of 2022 This judgment disposes of two related bail applications filed under Section 438 CrPC in Crime No.269 of 2022 of Pavaratty Police Station. The petitioners, Rameez (BA 3059/2022) and Najmal Nazeer (BA 2408/2022), are accused of offences including non-bailable Section 452 IPC and other sections (e.g., 325 IPC). Heard together by a Single Judge, the petitions were argued with the common stand that only the non-bailable offence is Section 452 IPC and that the petitioners are willing to comply with any conditions the court may impose to secure a fair trial. The Public Prosecutor opposed bail but conceded that the sole non-bailable offence is Section 452 IPC. Relying on established bail jurisprudence, including the principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and after considering the facts, the court allowed both applications with stringent conditions. The orders direct the petitioners to appear before the Investigating Officer within two weeks for interrogation; on any arrest post-interrogation, they must be released on bail on a bond of Rs.50,000 with two sureties; ensure cooperation and not influence witnesses; not leave India without permission; refrain from committing similar offences; and appear before the IO on all Mondays until final report. Violation permits cancellation of bail.
OP(C) Nos.546, 547, 549, 551, 552, 554 and 557 of 2022 These original petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution challenge orders that condoned delays in filing applications for determination of compensation under Rule 5 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Rules, 1963 (PMP Rules). The crucial issue is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to extend the outer time limit of 90 days prescribed in Rule 5. The petitioners contend the PMP Rules form a special statute, and the 90-day outer limit should exclude the Limitation Act; they rely on Omana Kunjamma v. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority (Kerala) (2019) 1 KLT 949 and Petronet CCK Ltd. v. Vijayan (2005) 1 KLT 773 to argue that Section 5 is applicable. The respondents counter that Section 5 should apply, arguing the Limitation Act governs the period, and point to the Gujarat High Court decision Gail (India) Ltd. v. Commanding Officer (2016 GLH (2) 7). The court ultimately endorses Omana Kunjamma (holding that Section 5 can be applicable) but dismisses the petitions, stating that the field ratio is unsettled by the Supreme Court’s pending Special Leave Petition, and thus the petitions are to be dismissed with the bundle of authorities guiding the ratio in Omana Kunjamma.
The petitioner, Bharat Advertising and Marketing Associates (BAAMA), filed WP(C) No. 5601 of 2021 seeking certiorari to quash Ext.P20 and mandamus to permit beautification, maintenance and cleaning of the Marine Drive Walkway under Ext.P1, notwithstanding Ext.P20. The contract to beautify and maintain the Marine Drive Walkway was awarded in 2008 and extended subsequently: Ext.P2 (2011) extended the term by 36 months, Ext.P3 (2015) extended for six more years to 2022. BAAMA argues that the respondents initially did not insist on current electricity charges from 2010 onward and that the COVID-19 pandemic caused financial hardship preventing timely payment of electricity charges; Ext.P20 was issued for non-payment. The respondents contend that notices demanding payment had been issued since 2010 and that the due amount as of 02.08.2017 was Rs 15,25,155, making Ext.P20 enforceable. During proceedings, the court had stayed Ext.P20 on conditions, including payment of Rs 6 lakhs staged by dates. The judgment ultimately disposes of the petition by quashing Ext.P20 and directing the petitioner to pay Rs 3,00,000 within one month, with liberty to submit representations for the balance and for extension of the agreement, to be considered in accordance with law. The decision balances contractual obligations with financial strains arising from the pandemic and allows further negotiations rather than a definitive resolution of the contract term.
The appellant is the complainant in CC 629 of 2005, founded on a private complaint under Section 138 NI Act. The trial court acquitted the 1st respondent after holding that the evidence did not establish a debt or liability connected to the cheque dated 25.04.2005 for Rs. 85,000, which allegedly was bounced on 02.05.2005. The core dispute centers on whether the cheque was issued in discharge of a debt arising from the sale of a jeep (registration KL‑7‑E/1573, later claimed as KL‑7‑B/1573) or whether it was a security instrument for a chitty transaction. The appellant contends that the vehicle number was misdescribed in court records (KL‑7‑E/1573 instead of KL‑7‑B/1573) but Ext.P6 shows the vehicle in the appellant’s name and supports the alleged debt; the signature on the cheque is admitted, triggering presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act. The respondent argues no such debt exists and that the cheque was issued to Sabu as security for a chitty, with DW1 denying any sale to the appellant. The High Court, invoking Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa and K.Prakashan v. P.K.Surendran, finds serious discrepancies and holds that the burden shifts to the appellant to prove the transaction. It confirms the Magistrate’s acquittal and dismisses the appeal as meritless.
TR.P(C) Nos. 177 & 194 OF 2021 These transfer petitions under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure were filed by Manjusha T.R., the wife of Sumesh V., seeking to transfer OP No.980/2020 (custody) and OP(HMA) No.896/2020 (divorce) from the Family Court Ettumanoor to the Family Court Irinjalakuda. The petitioner asserts she is suffering severe health problems, including back pain and leg numbness, requiring ongoing medical treatment, and alleges that travel from Chalakudy to Ettumanoor is onerous, especially given that she must also manage care for their three-year-old son born on 26 November 2019. She contends that the current venue imposes heavy hardship and hinders interim custody and access. The respondent-husband counters that the child has been in his custody since three months of age and resides in Kottayam district; he argues that even if the matters are transferred, the child would still need to travel, factoring in the child’s young age and medical needs. He contends the petitioner neglected the child and that the transfer would disrupt stable arrangements. The court emphasizes the welfare of the child, noting the child has resided for three years in Ettumanoor’s jurisdiction. Citing Vidhya Mundekkat v. Akhilesh Jayaram, the court holds there is no invariable rule mandating transfer simply because a wife seeks it. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed, though the court invites the petitioner to apply for dispensation of personal appearance on compassionate grounds if her medical condition warrants.
The petitioner, Claramma Thomas, seeks to quash orders under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a cheque-dishonour matter arising from S.T. No. 92/2014 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kottayam. The crux concerns territorial jurisdiction and the possibility of condoning delay for re-presentation of a complaint after the trial court returned it for lack of jurisdiction, with the matter subsequently being re-presented after the 2015 NI Act amendments. The petitioner argues that the amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, specifically the introduction of non-obstante provisions and Section 142A, permits re-presentation with condonation of delay under exploration of Section 470 Cr.P.C, even after cognizance had been taken and the complaint returned. The respondents contend that condonation principles must follow established case law such as Kannothumkandy Siraj and Anr. v. K Subair and Others and Binoy K. Mathew, and that any condonation would require due process including notice to the accused, with reference to the 2015 amendments and the interplay of 142, 142A and 470 Cr.P.C. The learned Judge discusses the Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod ratio, the Kannothumkandy decision, the 2015 NI Act amendments, and the liberal interpretation doctrine under Sec. 138 of the NI Act, ultimately holding that the petition does not warrant interference and is dismissed. This reflects judicial balancing of jurisdiction, procedural safeguards, and statutory amendments.
This writ petition challenges a Government policy that purportedly bars new self-financing courses in aided autonomous colleges, restricting approvals to only B. Voc programs. The Kerala High Court recognizes that universities like Mahatma Gandhi University enjoy autonomy and are not subservient to Government decisions in determining which courses an autonomous college may offer, a principle reiterated in Vidya International Charitable Trust v. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Technological University and Principal, Rajagiri College of Social Sciences, Kakkanad v. MG University. The petitioners argue that the University acted on Exts. P7 and P7(a) by seeking evaluation and approval through its Boards of Study and Academic Council, and that Exts. P12 and P12(a), denying consideration on merits, are unlawful. The Government’s GO letters Ext. P11 and P11(a) reflect a policy stance, but the Court notes that this is not a statutory constraint binding the University, which must assess courses under the MG University Act and UGC Regulations while considering government views as non-binding input. The Court quashes Exts. P12 and P12(a) and directs the University to reconsider Exts. P7 and P7(a) on merits, with due process, and a hearing, within two months, leaving room for clarification if needed under deeming provisions."
This is a Kerala High Court CRL.M.C. (Criminal Miscellaneous Case) 4148 of 2013, decided by single Judge Bechu Kurian Thomas, J., on 19 September 2022. The petitioner, Best Trading Company, a proprietorship run by Ajith (through its POA), challenged an order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate I, Thrissur in CC No.1171/2004 and MP No.1843/2013, which rejected an application to recall summons and to examine witnesses for the defense in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The trial has dragged on for years—over 18 years—without trial completion. The complainant contends the recall of summons to the witnesses, including himself, as a defense witness, is void because a complainant cannot be summoned to testify for the defense; the NCC proprietor (the complainant) and Best Trading Company are the same proprietor, exposing a fundamental conflict in allowing summons to a complainant to testify for the accused. The court traces prior orders and clarifications from 2009–2011 on the proper procedure for recalling or producing documents, noting several earlier rulings and the need for a proper petition detailing documents. Ultimately, the court held that summoning the NCC proprietor as a witness for the accused is irregular; the summons to the complainant and his wife are quashed. The court directed expeditious disposal of the case within six months. It thereby allows the criminal miscellaneous petition and remits the matter for disposal before the trial court.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed in the Kerala High Court by the 3rd accused Vivekananda Hari @ Sreehari challenging an order of the Special Court, Kochi, in CC 2485/2017 (NDPS/NI Act context). The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in proceeding without joining/impleading the 2nd accused, who represented the 1st accused company, and seeks appropriate direction for proper representation of the 1st accused since the 2nd accused is dead. The respondents argue that a petition seeking such relief is pending before the trial court and that there is a need to implead a competent person to represent the 1st accused. The court cites three-bench Supreme Court decisions to discuss the interplay between Section 138 of the NI Act, corporate liability, and moratorium under Section 14 IBC, while emphasizing that corporate debtors enjoy moratorium, whereas the natural persons implicated under Section 141 continue to be liable. The petition was dismissed with liberty to proceed after impleading a competent person for the 1st accused. The judgment clarifies that moratorium under IBC applies to corporate debtors and does not bar proceedings against persons under NI Act, and it upholds the trial court’s approach of proceeding with representation for the 1st accused under law.
This writ petition challenges the Kerala Public Service Commission’s refusal to grant reservation under the OBC category to the petitioner for the post of District Executive Officer in the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board. The petitioner, a candidate short-listed in 2017, contends that his caste status was Hindu-Chetty (Pappada-Chetty) though his SSLC record shows Hindu-Pillai. He produced Ext.P3 (non-creamy layer certificate) asserting Hindu-Chetty and sought Gazette notification to rectify the SSLC entry (Ext.P4). The Commission, relying on Ext.P6, denied reservation because the Gazette correction was not produced at the time of interview (12.8.2020). The respondents rely on statutory provisions and circulars (Ext.P1 General Conditions with paragraph 13(g)(ii); 2018 Circular No.7/2018), and argue that a Gazette notification correcting the caste entry must be produced before document verification; otherwise reservation cannot be granted. The petition relies on judgments including Shaiji Cherukkattil and the State of Kerala v. Ritha Thomas, arguing the need for timely correction. The Court ultimately finds that the Gazette notification correcting the SSLC entry was effected only in 2020 and that KS&SSR entries (including Entry 73 added in 2022) post-date the interview; hence the petitioner cannot claim OBC reservation. The petition is dismissed.
This petition seeks to quash the final report in Crime No. 67 of 2015 and the ongoing LPC proceeding (LPC No. 22/2020) against the petitioner in Adhur Police Station, Kasaragod. The FIR alleged that on 20 February 2015 the accused, in furtherance of a common intention, restrained the complainant and assaulted him with weapons, attracting IPC sections 341, 323 and 308 read with 34. The trial court acquitted the other accused in SC No. 375/2017 (Annexure-A3). The petitioner’s case rests on the settlement between the parties, evidenced by Annexure-A5 sworn affidavit by the 2nd respondent stating no subsisting grievances and no objection to quashing, with the State and the 2nd respondent’s counsel supporting the prayer. Notably, the prosecution witnesses did not support the case; the substratum of the charge has been lost. The High Court cites Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (2012 (4) KLT 108) and, applying the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., finds that quashing the final report and all further proceedings is appropriate. The CRL.M.C. is allowed, and Annexure-A2 final report and LPC 22/2022 proceedings against the petitioner are quashed.
This is a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court, upholding a writ petition directing the Union of India to grant Swatantrata Sainik Samman Pension (SSS Pension) to Leela Dayanandan, wife of late Dayanandan K, for her participation in the Punnapra-Vayalar freedom movement. The impugned order in W.P.(C) No.26289/2013 dated 11.07.2018 had directed the Union to grant SSS pension along with arrears within a timeframe, while remitting the limited issue of NARC (Non-Availability of Records Certificate) to the District Collector and the State government for fresh verification and records search. The Union challenged this in appeal, arguing that the Central Scheme makes the Union the final authority on eligibility and that State-recommended pension is not binding; it also asserted discrepancies in the petitioner’s documents and relied on decisions like UOI v. Pilli Ramachandraiah and Asarabai, and on revised guidelines (Order No.45/03/2014 FF(P), Clause 1.5). The Court, while noting the State’s reports that no records exist, held that the Central Scheme contemplates centralized eligibility with State cooperation and that a certificate from an alternate certifier could suffice. It relied on a prior judgment (W.A. Nos. 675 and 719 of 2019) to support its position, and found no jurisdictional error in the Single Judge’s order. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed, preserving the writ court’s direction to grant pension and arrears to the petitioner.