Dishnet Wireless Limited, a telecom infrastructure operator licensed for Cellular Mobile Telephone Services in the Kerala Circle, faced criminal proceedings under Section 210 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, in S.T. No. 228/2016 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Perambra. The complaint, lodged by Perambra Grama Panchayat through its Secretary under Rule 27 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj (Taxation and Appeal) Rules, 1996, alleges non-payment of arrears amounting to Rs. 5,253 for 2017–2018. The petition contends that prosecution cannot be sustained without strict adherence to statutory provisions, and that the Panchayat did not provide the requisite information in the demand notice under Rule 14. The petitioner’s counsel argued that prosecution should not proceed unless distraint or sufficient distraint of the defaulter’s property is impracticable and the notice includes the mandatory particulars (period, occupation or property, amount, notice fees, due date, and liability). The court examined Section 210, which allows recovery as arrears of public revenue and permits distraint by the Secretary, with a proviso permitting prosecution if distraint is impracticable, and Rule 14 and Rule 15 of the Rules, which govern notice and distraint. It held that there were blatant Rule 14 violations and that the proceedings were abusive; citing a prior identical view in Secretary, Pozhuthana Grama Panchayat v. T.K. Unni Peravan & Anr. The Court quashed the proceedings but reserved the petitioner’s right to recover the amount lawfully.
The petitioner, a resident devotee of Chettikulangara Devi Temple, filed this writ petition under Article 226 seeking a mandamus to permit Chettikulangara Devi Temple devotees to offer ‘Kettukazhcha’ during the Aswathy Festival on 03.04.2022 without any height restriction. The grievance is that the 4th respondent, Sree Devi Vilasom Hindumatha Convention Trust, as Temple Advisory Committee, imposed a height cap of less than 20 feet on the ‘Kettukazhcha’ brought by devotees, which the petitioner alleges infringes religious freedom. The respondents include the Travancore Devaswom Board, the Assistant Devaswom Commissioner, and the Administrative Officer of the temple; additional respondents 5 and 6 being suo motu impleaded are the Station House Officer, Mavelikkara Police Station, and the District Collector, ALAPPUZHA, to ensure public order. The petition challenges the basis for the restrictions, arguing they impede a religious practice linked to the temple’s annual festival. The statement filed on behalf of respondents 1–3 explains that 13 ‘Kettukazhchas’ (Chariots) are part of the main festival during Kumbha Bharani, with adequate space and underground cables, while the so‑called ‘Aswathy Kettukazhcha’ is a newer offering prone to unhealthy height escalation and law and order issues. It is alleged that legal restrictions are necessary to prevent power outages and public disturbance, and that the restriction is not an infringement of religious freedom. After hearing both sides, the court finds no ground to interfere with the height restriction, noting safety and public order concerns. The petition is dismissed, but with directions to police and power authorities to ensure safe passage and minimize disruption on 03.04.2022, and to maintain power supply.
WP(C) Nos.3538 & 4450 of 2023 These are two writ petitions under Section 27A of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 seeking exemption from payment of fees for Form 6 applications for conversion of unnotified land. Petitioners Sumesh U. and Sudheesh U. (WP3538) and Sareesh Sanker and Rancy Sareesh (WP4450) contend their lands are below 25 cents as on 30.12.2017, and thus qualify for fee-free consideration of Form 6, under Section 27A and Rule 12(9) and the Schedule to the Rules. Respondents—the Revenue Divisional Officer, Village Officer, and Agricultural Officer in WP3538 and the State of Kerala represented by the Secretary of Revenue, the District Collector, the RDO, the Village Officer at Nattika, and the Local Level Monitoring Committee for Nattika Panchayat in WP4450—oppose the exemption, arguing that the concession applies only to specific extents below 25 cents and that lands purchased after 2017 may not qualify; they rely on Exts.R3(a)-(c) including a circular dated 23.07.2021. The court clarifies that the exemption is available for land below 25 cents, and that post-2017 purchases do not automatically forfeit it unless a transaction fragments a larger land into parcels under 25 cents after 30.12.2017. Communications not issued by the Government have no overriding effect. Relying on Baby v. District Collector (2021) (6) KLT 316), the Court holds Ext.R3(c) is not binding. The petitions are allowed with directions to the RDO to decide Form 6 applications without fee, within two months of receipt of the judgment copy.
CRL.M.C. 746 of 2020; CRL.M.C. 947 of 2020 The Kerala High Court, in a common order dated 15 November 2023, disposed of two connected Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (CRL.M.C. 746 of 2020 filed by the State and CRL.M.C. 947 of 2020 filed by the father of the deceased) arising from a sandalwood theft case under the Kerala Forest Act and a murder/related offences case in SC No.262/2010. The crux was whether C.C. No.49/2014 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Devikulam, should be committed to the Sessions Court under Section 323 Cr.P.C. so as to be tried along with SC No.262/2010 before the Sessions Court, Thodupuzha. The learned Magistrate had dismissed the State’s petition under Section 323 Cr.P.C. The Court analyzed Section 323 Cr.P.C., Section 209 Cr.P.C., and Section 207/208, noting that while Section 209 requires commitment when an offence is triable exclusively by the Sessions Court, Section 323 empowers a Magistrate to commit if he believes the case ought to be tried by the Sessions Court, even where not exclusively so. Citing Sudhir v. State of M.P., Nathi Lal, and Amir v. State of Kerala, the court held that cross-cases arising from one incident should generally be tried by the same court, by the same Judge, in a sequenced manner to avoid conflicting judgments. The Court concluded that the two cases are interlinked and must be tried together in the Sessions Court, directing the Devikulam court to commit CC 49/2014 to Sessions, with provisions for splitting charges if necessary, and keeping S.C.262/2010 in abeyance if required. The common order ultimately allows both petitions and sets out the procedure for trial in the Sessions Court under Chapter XVIII Cr.P.C., applying the cross-case principle to ensure consistency and fairness.
W.P.(C) Nos. 9420/2021; 10400/2021; 10661/2022; 8015/2022; 13181/2022 The batch of Public Interest Writ Petitions, though diverse in petitioners, are collectively directed at the constitutional validity of the Special Rules dated 03.03.1959 governing the appointment of personal staff to the office of the Chief Minister, Ministers, the Leader of Opposition, and the Government Chief Whip, and their amendments over the years. The petitions contest entries 9 (State Service) and 10 (Subordinate Service) in the Annexure to the Kerala Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulation, 1957, on grounds of ultra vires to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, demanding consultation with the PSC for appointments, fair notification, and transparent selection. The petitions also attack Rule 9 (pension) and other pension-related provisions as discriminatory, and challenge various amendments to the Special Rules that allegedly circumvent standard recruitment norms. The State and allied respondents defend the Special Rules as a valid exercise of Articles 309 and 320(3) of the Constitution, regularized by the Kerala Public Service Act, 1968, and argue that the personal staff are co-terminus with the tenure of the elected executive and require confidential, cadre-specific appointments. The Hon’ble Court, after hearing, held that the petitions are not made out on the constitutional parameters, upheld the validity of the Special Rules, and dismissed the petitions, while noting the desirability of a cadre in practice.
The High Court of Kerala deals with a Rent Control Revision (RCREV. No. 64 of 2021) filed by the tenant, Bindu K, challenging eviction under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, from a petition schedule building, originally sought by the landlady, Maimoona. The Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff, Kannur) had held the eviction to be bona fide for the landlord's own occupation and had directed the tenant to vacate within one month. The Rent Control Appellate Authority (District Judge, Thalassery) confirmed this order. The revision petition before the High Court argued that the concurrent findings were perverse or illegal and that Ext. B1, a Building Tax Assessment Register, should have been treated differently; it was contended that the first proviso to Section 11(3) should apply and that the second proviso (protecting livelihood) could be relevant but not applicable here. The Court examines the bona fide nature of the need, the evidentiary value of tax entries, and the law laid down in several precedents. Relying on judgments beginning with Adil Jamshed Frenchman and including Panoli Alikutty, Cheruvalath Krishnadasan, and Rukmini Amma Saradamma, the Court concludes that the eviction order is legally sustainable and that revisional interference is unwarranted. It, however, grants six months for vacant possession with conditions due to Covid-19 considerations.
CRL.Appeal No. 948 of 2015 This Kerala High Court Criminal Appeal challenges an acquittal in a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act case arising from a claim that a former colleague misappropriated funds paid toward securing employment for the appellant’s son. The appellant alleges that he paid Rs. 3.5 lakhs to the first respondent, with a gentleman’s agreement that the respondent would arrange private bank employment for the appellant’s son and would repay the amount, including an additional Rs. 1.5 lakhs as compensation for arranging the funds. Of this, Rs. 2 lakhs was paid in 2008, leaving a balance of Rs. 1.5 lakhs. A cheque for Rs. 3 lakhs was issued in mid-2011 and presented for payment, but was dishonoured on the instruction of the drawer. The respondent asserted the cheque was never issued and produced a stop memo created in 2010 due to lost cheques; the bank witness DW1 corroborated that the stop memo existed. The trial court acquitted under CrPC 255(1). The High Court examined the effect of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act, noting that presumption is rebuttable and that the onus shifts to the complainant if a probable defence is established. Relying on Rangappa and Chandrappa, the court held that there were reasonable grounds to doubt the existence of a legally enforceable debt, and thus dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittal.
This writ petition challenges Exts P3–P5, orders issued by the 1st respondent (Revenue Division) under the Kerala Land Utilization Order and Rule 12(17) of Act 28 of 2008, directing the petitioners to make substantial payments for permission to construct houses on their properties. The petitioners’ mother had obtained Ext P1 under the Kerala Land Utilization Order for her property, which was later bequeathed to the petitioners. After Ext P2, a judgment of this Court held that the provisions of Act 28 of 2008 have no application to the petitioners’ property. The petitioners contend that Exts P3–P5 are therefore illegal and warrant quashing, and they seek a correction in the BTR and revenue records without any monetary demand. The court extracts the reasoning in Ext P2, noting the principles from Praveen v. State of Kerala (before entry in BTR, the physical nature of the property must be considered) and Jafar Khan v. K.A. Kochumarakkar (Act 28 of 2008 applies only to land that is paddy or wet land as of commencement). It is observed that the petitioners’ property was converted long before Act 28 of 2008, hence the Act’s provisions do not apply. The judgment ultimately allows the writ petition, quashes Exts P3–P5, and directs the 2nd respondent to reassess basic tax under the Kerala Land Tax Act within two months after receipt of a copy of the judgment, while permitting the petitioners to submit a tax representation accordingly.
ITA Nos. 34 of 2018; 35 of 2018; 25 of 2019; 27 of 2019 The judgment addresses whether two Kerala cooperative banks—Kottayam and Meenachil Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Banks—are entitled to tax deductions under Section 80P(4) of the Income Tax Act where their operations extend beyond a single taluk. In a common judgment for ITA Nos. 34/2018, 35/2018, 25/2019 and 27/2019, a Division Bench of Justices S.V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji disposed of the appeals after finding that the amendment to 80P(4) by the Finance Act, 2006, effectively confines the deduction to primary co-operative banks with an area of operation restricted to a taluk, as per Explanation (b). The banks argued for a broader construction, invoking General Clauses Act 13(2) to permit singular terms to take plural meaning and citing precedents that expand the scope where benign object and industry-wide operations exist. The Revenue, however, urged strict interpretation: ‘a taluk’ denotes a single taluk; expanding to multiple taluks would render the provision otiose and contradict its object. The court relied on the definitional approach to ‘means’ and invoked authorities including West Bengal Warehousing Corp. and various case law to support a narrow reading. Ultimately, the appeals were dismissed, with the court concluding that the assessee banks do not satisfy the PCARDB criteria, and the questions were answered in favor of the Revenue.
This is a Rent Control Revision filed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging eviction orders. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff-I, Kozhikode) had ordered eviction under sections 11(2)(b) and 11(3) while rejecting 11(4)(ii). The Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal under Section 18(1)(b). The revision petition argues that the landlord’s need for demolition to provide access to a new multi-storied building is not bona fide and that the tenanted shop is not required for this purpose, contending that there exists alternative space and that demolition would be for the landlord’s commercial use rather than the tenant’s. The court reviews the bona fide need, the erection of the new building, and the interpretation of Section 11(3) vs. 11(4)(iv) in light of precedents. It notes the landlord’s building permit, plan Ext.A9, and reports Ext.C1-C2, and scrutinizes whether the necessity can be considered a bona fide need to provide access to the new construction. The court ultimately upholds the eviction on the grounds of bona fide need, while clarifying the scope of Section 11(3) and the evolving jurisprudence on reconstruction versus eviction for access. It grants a five-month window for the tenants to vacate subject to conditions and arrears payment.
OT.Rev Nos. 69/2021, 70/2021, 72/2021 These OT Rev Nos. 69/2021, 70/2021, and 72/2021 arise from a common order of the Kerala KVAT Appellate Tribunal Ernakulam, upholding a reassessment/order under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the year 2011-12 in T.A.(VAT) Nos. 224, 225, and 226 of 2016. The revisions are filed by Lloyd Insulations India Ltd., challenging the common order dated 16 January 2020, which the Appellate Tribunal passed in favor of assessing additional turnovers and applying a compounded tax regime for works contracts. The Court treats OT Rev No. 69/2021 as the lead case and indicates that the connected revisions will be disposed along with it. The petitioner argues that the tribunal wrongly assumed suppression of interstate purchases and stock transfers, and that the dealer’s turnover for works contracts should be assessed at the compounded rate without loading other turnovers, contending that inter-state purchases are the awarder’s responsibility and that tax liability under Section 8(a)(ii) should be determined only after proper examination of suppressed turnover. The respondent State counters that suppression was established, interstate purchases and stock transfers were not correctly excluded, and the tribunal misapplied the statutory provisions. The High Court ultimately sets aside the tribunal’s order and remits the matter for fresh adjudication, emphasizing natural justice and that primary facts must be determined before applying tax provisions.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case involving Siji Joseph, the sole accused in crime No.69/2019 of Nedumkandam Police Station, now pending as CC No.148/2019. The applicant faced offences under Sections 21(1) read with 25(i)(1)(b)(x) of the Arms Act, 1959, for allegedly failing to deposit a licensed firearm after expiry. The gun licence (BL 650/U Chola/ID) expired on 28.06.2017, and the accused deposited the weapon only on 17.10.2017 at Samson Armoury, Katappana, triggering prosecution. The police final report forms Annexure-1. The petitioner moved Crl.M.C. seeking quashing of the further proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that, even if Annexure-1 is accepted, no offence would be attracted since the deposit occurred within a reasonable time and the licence renewal shortly after expiry – evidenced by Annexure-3 showing a renewed licence from 29.06.2017 to 28.06.2020. The counsel invoked this Court’s decision in Devasia Mathew v. State of Kerala (2017 (2) KHC 58) to claim a reasonable deposit period (six months, sometimes up to a year). The Public Prosecutor opposed. The Court found the deposit within six months after expiry within a reasonable period and held the proceedings to be an abuse of process, quashing all further proceedings.
CRL.A Nos. 1022 & 1041 of 2016 This is a Kerala High Court judgment disposing of two Criminal Appeal Nos. 1022/2016 and 1041/2016 arising from SC 80/2016 of the Sessions Court, Manjeri. Accused 1 (Jaseentha George @ Jyothi) and accused 2 (Muhammed Yousaf @ Sajid) were convicted under sections 302, 120B and 201 r/w 34 IPC for the murder of Vinod Kumar and the attempt to wipe out evidence on 9/10/2015 at Valancherry, Thrissur, and were sentenced to life imprisonment along with other consequences. The State prosecuted on a long chain of circumstantial evidence comprising: (i) travel and presence of accused 2 near the scene (bus and hotel witnesses), (ii) mobile phone calls and cell-tower data, (iii) alleged poisoning motive and prior statements, (iv) various recoveries under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, (v) the car and hair/blood analysis (FSL reports), (vi) alleged conspiracy between the two accused, and (vii) a dying declaration-like conversation. The High Court scrutinized each link, rejected several evidentiary pillars as inadmissible or unreliable (notably Ext. P24 cell-tower chart, Exts. P20/P21 CDRs, identifications by photographs lacking Test Identification Parade, and hair analysis as not definitive). It parsed the law on circumstantial evidence, relying on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and subsequent case law to underline the necessity of a complete chain. Ultimately, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and allowed both appeals, acquitting the appellants and directing release; MO10 cash matters were addressed in the acquittal order.
This is MACA 1023 of 2018, an appeal by the injured claimant against an award in MACT 272/2016 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta. The appellant, Menish Vas, sustained multiple injuries in a road accident on 12.10.2015 while riding a motorcycle. He challenges several heads of compensation and seeks enhanced relief. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that the tribunal erred in calculating notional income (he had claimed to be a Safety Officer with around Rs.22,000/month, while the tribunal fixed Rs.5,000; the court should adopt Rs.10,000/month as notional income, following Ramachandrappa) and in the duration of hospitalization (Ext.A5 suggests 48 days, not 18). He points to multiple surgeries, head injuries, and extensive injuries documented in Ext.A5, warranting higher awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenities (Rs.40,000 and Rs.30,000 respectively), and argues for longer loss of earnings (5 months). The appellant also asserts that future prospects should be granted where disability is 7%, which the insurer opposes. The respondent insurer’s counsel counters that granting future prospects for a 7% disability is impermissible in law. The court, while enhancing several heads and correcting computations, ultimately holds that future prospects cannot be allowed in this case and allows the appeal to the stated extent. The award is recalibrated to Rs.3,45,630 with interest and payment directions by NEFT/RTGS, including set-off for any prior payment.
This Original Petition under Article 227 challenges a Sub Court order that referred the suit for arbitration after closing the proceedings, and did not order refund of one-tenth court fee paid on the plaint. The petitioner contends that refund is due under Section 69A of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act when a dispute is settled by recourse to Section 89 CPC, even though the settlement occurs via arbitration. The court examines the text of Section 69A, clarifying that refund is triggered only when a suit, appeal or other proceeding is settled by recourse to Section 89 CPC, and that mere reference for arbitration does not constitute a settlement warranting refund. It acknowledges that settlement through ADR mechanisms under Section 89(1) CPC can lead to refund, but emphasizes that Section 69A applies only upon a genuine settlement, not mere referral. The judge discusses a Division Bench decision, Manilal Panicker S. v. Titto Abraham, and distinguishes it, holding that the right to refund accrues only on settlement or compromise, and not simply on reference to arbitration. On the record, there is no material showing actual settlement; hence the petition is not entitled to refund, and the court declines to interfere with the Sub Court’s order. Consequently, the Original Petition is dismissed; the respondent did not appear.
Raji, the sole accused in C.C.1898/2013 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Paravur, challenges the cognizance taken and the summons issued against him in a matter arising from a private complaint registered as Crime No.161/2011. The case concerns alleged offences under Sections 188 and 341 IPC arising from a tenant eviction connected with an interim injunction order by the Munsiff Court, Paravur. The prosecution contends cognizance was validly taken in accordance with Cr.P.C., but the petitioner contends that cognizance of IPC offences under Sections 172-188 can be taken only on a complaint by a public servant, per section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C., and not on a police report under 173(2) Cr.P.C. The petitioner further submits that disobedience of a civil injunction cannot attract section 188 IPC, and that the offence under section 341 IPC requires clearer elements. The petitioner relies on Kunjuraman Asari v. Chellappan Nair (1952 KLT 547) and Poulose K.K. v. State of Kerala (2013(4)KLT 687) to press his argument. The State counters that the revisional jurisdiction under Cr.P.C. 397/401 cannot stall a cognizance order and that the injunction issue may justify the summoning. The judge accepts that the civil injunction does not render 188 IPC applicable and that cognizance based on police report under 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. is improper, citing Amar Nath; consequently, the revision is allowed and cognizance and summons are quashed.
The petitioners, a husband and wife, are accused in Crime No.159/2022 of Alappuzha North Police Station, charged under IPC sections 376(2)(n), 354, 420 and 506 r/w 34, and seek pre-arrest bail under section 438 CrPC. The prosecution claims the first petitioner deceived a 24-year-old survivor by presenting himself as a divorcee and promising marriage, raping her at a resort in 2021, and thereafter exploiting her financially by inducing a Rs.18,00,000 transfer and gold valuables, with further alleged acts of criminal breach of trust. It is also alleged that, upon learning of the survivor’s knowledge of a subsisting marriage of the first petitioner, the couple allegedly conspired to trap her and gained about Rs.20,00,000. The second petitioner is alleged to have threatened the survivor by implying misuse of her photographs and acted jointly in these schemes. The counsel for petitioners contends that the case rests on a false premise; Annexure-II (police statement) and Annexure-VI (an agreement) show the survivor’s attempt to extract financial benefit through false allegations, implying manipulation by the first petitioner. The Public Prosecutor argues that the offences are serious and demand custodial interrogation, with the first petitioner having multiple IPC charges and a prior criminal antecedent. The survivor’s counsel submits that the first petitioner exploited the survivor post-relationship. The court cites Gian Singh to state heinous offences cannot be quashed by settlement and proceeds to evaluate custodial necessity, ultimately denying pre-arrest bail for the first petitioner and granting it to the second petitioner with conditions.
This is a Customs Appeal (CUS.APPEAL No. 3 of 2019) before a Division Bench of Kerala High Court. The Commissioner of Customs, Cochin (appellant) challenges a decision of the CESTAT allowing Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) to treat excess customs duty collected as deposit into an Oil Pool Account under the Administered Price Mechanism (APM) rather than credit to the Consumer Welfare Fund, arguing that this creates a liability under Section 28B of the Customs Act, 1962. IOCL contends that excess duty collected is surrendered to the Oil Pool Account and is not a true “excess collection,” and that various CESTAT decisions from different benches have held similarly, albeit with no challenge by the department, thereby creating a degree of finality. The High Court scrutinizes whether the matter falls within Section 130 of the Customs Act and whether the 28B liability is applicable or correctly raised. It notes that several tribunals had taken a consistent line in IOCL’s favor, and cites Supreme Court and CESTAT precedents to emphasize finality and policy under AP M. Ultimately, the Court holds that the substantial questions do not warrant consideration under Section 130 and the appeal is decided against the appellant on those grounds. However, it leaves the questions arising under Section 28B open for future consideration when actually raised, stating that the present judgment should not be read to constrain 28B’s scope in other contexts.
This is a writ petition under Article 226 by devotees of Lord Subrahmanya, Sree Subrahmanya Swamy Temple, Haripad, challenging the constitution of a seven‑member Ad‑hoc Committee by the Travancore Devaswom Board for renovation of the Koothambalam, claimed to be a heritage structure. The petitioners contend that the Koothambalam cannot be demolished, renovated or altered without approval by a Temple Advisory Committee constituted under Section 31A of the Travancore‑Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, and that the term of the earlier Temple Advisory Committee (elected March 2017) expired in March 2019. The Ad‑hoc Committee’s formation, purportedly under Clause 21 Ext.P1 Rules, was after expiry of the term and among members who were previously on the Temple Advisory Committee, raising concerns of malafide and bypassing statutory procedures. The petition also challenges collection of donations by the Ad‑hoc Committee inside the temple without receipts, and seeks action on Ext.P5 representations. The Board contends the Ad‑hoc Committee was formed to complete urgent renovation works, that renovation falls within the Board’s remit with supervision by Maramath, and that elections to a Temple Advisory Committee will be held in due course. The court exhaustively analyzes Ext.P1 Rules, Section 31A and precedents to hold that the Ad‑hoc formation is unsustainable, directing reconstitution of a Temple Advisory Committee under Ext.P1 and timely elections, with funds recovered and the renovation proceeding after proper governance.
RP 346/2022 (in RSA 853/2021) This is a review petition (RP 346/2022) filed by Laxman Kappacheri challenging the Kerala High Court’s RSA 853/2021 judgment dated 18 January 2022, which confirmed the final decree passed in a partition suit (O.S. 244/2010) before the Subordinate Judge, Thalassery. The suit concerned partition of ancestral property; a preliminary decree was followed by a commissioner’s report and plan (Exts C1–C3, C6). The final decree allotted house and plots to defendant No.2 in terms of Ext C5 and Ext C2/C3 plans. The first appellate court deemed the allotments just, proper and equitable and, in light of the parties’ agreement, directed owelty for the house allotted to the appellant’s share. The appellant asserts there was no express agreement to pay owelty and that renovation expenditures were not considered by the courts. The respondents contend there was no reservation in the preliminary decree for the house and that the final decree was framed with consent of all parties. The High Court, applying the principle that review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is limited and not a re-hearing, cites Kamlesh Verma on the scope of review and Meera Bhanga on review not being an appeal; Madhavikutty Amma is discussed regarding consent decrees. The petition is found devoid of merit and dismissed, thereby upholding the final decree and the allotments despite the petitioner’s contentions.