This is a criminal miscellaneous case (CRL.M.C. No. 810 of 2022) decided by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court. The petitioner, Charley @ Tintu, the husband of the defacto complainant, challenges FIR No.1184/2021 registered at Chavara Police Station and the final report in CP 40/2021 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court (Temporary), Chavara. The offences alleged are punishable under IPC sections 498-A (cruelty for dowry), 326 (grievous hurt) and 307 (attempt to murder). The petitioner contends that the allegations are baseless, the ingredients of sections 326 and 307 are not attracted, the complainant has not suffered injuries, and the registration arose from a matrimonial dispute. It is argued that the parties have settled the entire dispute and are living together as husband and wife. The Public Prosecutor opposes quashing on grounds of the heinous nature of the offences. The defacto complainant, supported by an affidavit, states that the dispute has been amicably settled, with no subsisting grievances and no objection to pretrial termination. The judgment relies on Apex Court guidance in Gian Singh; Narinder Singh; Lakshmi Narayan; and Kapil Gupta, to assess whether quashing is permissible when the dispute is private and settled, while weighing the gravity of the crime and the likelihood of conviction. The Court ultimately concludes that, in the matrimonial context, where settlement removes oppression and the possibility of conviction is remote, quashing is warranted. Accordingly, Annexure 2 Final Report and all further proceedings in CP 40/2021 are quashed.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC No.5854/2013) before the Kerala High Court concerns a challenge under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to proceedings arising from Crime No.746/2012 of Chelakkara Police Station, relating to CC No.595/2013 before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Wadakkanchery. The petitioners, Prakash (driver) and Marimuthu (manager) of lorry KA-05/AA-6923, are accused under Sections 23 and 26 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 for allegedly transporting a juvenile to engage in bore-well construction work. The final report filed in 2012 allegedly fails to show that the juvenile was a child or that the petitioners were in charge or control, and it does not establish the essential elements of Sections 23 (cruelty by those in charge) and 26 (exploitation/bondage). The petition contends that there is no assault, abandonment, exposure, or willful neglect, nor any hazardous employment or bondage alleged, and that the investigation was shoddy, with the owner-accused initially named but later deleted. The State argues that proper investigation shows the petitioners were properly charged and that 482 Cr.P.C. should not be used to prematurely stop the prosecution. Relying on Amal, Eliyas, Faisal and related authorities, the High Court held that the final report does not establish the offences, and quashed the proceedings as an abuse of process of law. The petition was allowed.
WA.No.14 of 2017 & 66 of 2018 This judgment disposes of two writ appeals (W.A. Nos. 14 of 2017 and 66 of 2018) challenging orders suspending the Board of a Co-operative Society under Section 32(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969. The appellants (eight individuals) contended that the Registrar had no power to suspend the managing committee and that only supersession could be invoked. The respondents argued that the combined scheme of Section 32(1), its provisos, and Article 243ZL of the Constitution permits suspension as a temporary measure, with a power to appoint an administrator and to conduct elections, especially where Government assistance or banking involvement exists. The court clarifies that the term “remove” in Section 32(1) includes both supersession and suspension, and that the third proviso to Section 32(1) imposes limits to avoid coalescing supersession with suspension for the same period. It also notes amendments aligning Section 32(1) with Article 243ZL and explains the relevance of banking provisions (Banking Regulation Act, 1949) and Article 243ZK. The court cites Hameed Kutty M.S. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (2017)1 KLT 511, approving the reasoning on suspension. The judgments observe the suspension periods (6 Oct 2016 to 6 Apr 2017 for WA14/2017; 25 Oct 2017 for WA66/2018) and hold that the writ appeals, being largely academic in light of expiry, are infructuous while reserving any challenge to supersession proceedings. The appeals are dismissed with no costs.
This is an Article 227 petition filed by the Federal Bank Limited, challenging Exts.P7 (order dated 20.06.2015 in E.A. No.1011/2011 in E.P. 461/2007 in O.S. 632/2006) and Ext. P8 (communication dated 17.03.2016) issued by the Additional Munsiff-III, Thiruvananthapuram, in a SARFAESI-related execution. The bank had extended a cash credit facility of Rs.35 lakhs to Jayakumar of Solar Opticals in 2005, creating equitable mortgages on two properties in October 2005. After default, the bank invoked SARFAESI, realising a sale amount of Rs.29,33,100 against a due of Rs.42,78,527; subsequent SARFAESI proceeds recovered Rs.30,11,680.95. A decree was obtained in O.S.632/2006; E.P.461/2007 was filed and later E.A.1011/2011 sought deposit of the entire auction sale amount before the executing court. The bank contends that Ext.P7 and Ext.P8 are illegal, without jurisdiction, and violate provisions of SARFAESI (Sections 26(e), 34, 35), the Transfer of Property Act (58(F)) and the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act (31(b)), besides principles of rateable distribution under CPC Section 73. It relies on Madhan S. v. Sub Registrar, Kollam; Keechery Bank v. Sajitha Nizar; Govindan Master v. Janaki V.; and Boban v. Sajith Kumar to support the proposition that attachments after creation of an equitable mortgage would stand effaced and that rateable distribution cannot override mortgage rights. The High Court accepts the petition, sets aside Ext.P7, and closes pending interlocutory applications, holding that the attachment post-mortgage has no effect on the mortgage or SARFAESI sale rights.
The petitioner, P.J. John, challenges Ext. P4, which denied his appointment as HST (Hindi) on the ground that the Manager had not executed the bond as required by G.O.(P) No.10/10/G.Edn. dated 12.01.2010, and due to pendency of related matters before the Supreme Court. He was initially appointed on 01.06.2009 in an additional division vacancy, and his subsequent regularisation from 01.06.2011—by inclusion in the Teachers Package—followed a revision petition later rejected by Ext. P4. The Government argued that appointments in such vacancies must be apportioned 1:1 and that the bond must be executed, with some matters still pending before the Apex Court. The petitioner relies on a line of judgments by this Court directing that even where bonds were not executed, the Manager’s bond can be deemed executed and the petitioner should be approved from the date of appointment, with equalisation from the protected list for appointments during the ban period. The learned counsel for the petitioner urged that Ext. P4 disregards this law. The court, after evaluating arguments, holds that Ext. P4 cannot stand and directs a reconsideration of the revision petition, with the bond deemed to have been executed, and that protected teachers be appointed in proportion to the number of appointments approved during the ban. The court also clarifies that orders remain subject to final Apex Court orders. The petition is disposed of with directions for expeditious action within three months.
This is an appeal under MACA No. 1775 of 2008 against the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta’s award in O.P. (MV) No.638/2001 dated 17.09.2007. The appellant, A.P. Thomas aka Biju Paul, sustained serious injuries when a jeep (KL-10F/7683), driven rashly by the 1st respondent, collided with his car (TN-09E/0598) on 25.10.2001. He was hospitalised from 25.10.2001 to 01.11.2001 with a depressed fracture of the left frontal bone and a fracture of the right maxilla. The jeep’s owner and insurer, and the car’s owner and insurer were arrayed as respondents. Most respondents were ex parte; the third respondent (New India Assurance Company) admitted the jeep had policy, while arguing the accident occurred due to the car driver’s negligence. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 23,950 in total compensation. The High Court re-evaluated the matter, fixing a notional monthly income of Rs. 3,000 (recognising the appellant’s agriculturist/small business status and applicable precedents) and applying the Sarla Verma multiplier (17) for a 28-year-old. It held a 2% disability (supported by Exhibit C1) and awarded enhanced sums for loss of earnings, by-stander expenses, pain and suffering, and loss of amenities, while keeping other heads reasonable. The appeal was allowed in part, increasing total compensation to Rs. 55,690 with 6% interest from filing and costs of Rs. 3,000, to be deposited with the Tribunal within 60 days.
Valsammal, the petitioner in OP(C) 1228/2016 arising from OS 149/2011 of the Sub Court, Kattappana, sought to amend her written statement to set off Rs 5,00,000 received from the respondent as earnest money against the suit claim and to press a counter‑claim for Rs 3,00,000 for damages. The respondent originally claimed Rs 5,21,808 with interest on the plaint schedule property and Rs 50,000 for damages for breach of contract after a monetary advance. The petitioner argued that the Rs 5,00,000 was earnest money, not advance, and that she had used it to secure another property; since the purchaser failed to honour the agreement, the money was forfeited. The trial court allowed the set‑off but rejected the counter‑claim. The petitioner challenged this order, contending that the refusal to permit the counter‑claim and the overall amendment was without due consideration of Section 3(b)(1) of the Limitation Act and that limitations should be considered at the final stage. The respondents countered that the amendment was a strategy to protract the suit and urged that, given the long pendency, permission for amendment after commencement of trial should be refused. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that amendments after commencement of trial require due diligence and must satisfy bona fide grounds; relying on Revajeetu and Sasikala, the court held the counter‑claim barred by delay and res judicata, and thus dismissed the petition.
OT.Rev.131 of 2017; OT.Rev.136 of 2017 This is a common High Court order disposing of two tax revision petitions (O.T.Rev.131/2017 and O.T.Rev.136/2017) filed by the State of Kerala challenging orders of the Kerala Value Added Tax Appellate Tribunal (KVATA) in respect of a furniture dealer, Tiptop Furniture. The core issue concerns the rate of tax applicable to furniture sold by the dealer under the KVAT Act, specifically whether furniture falls under a concessional 5% rate or a higher 13.5% rate. The tribunal had allowed the dealer’s claims for 5% tax on certain items described as wood marquetry and related goods, relying on the interpretation of schedules and HSNs. The Revenue challenged these outcomes, arguing that the tribunal failed to apply the KVAT Act’s Schedule interpretation rules and misclassified goods. The High Court, noting the need to apply the statutory interpretation guidelines for schedules, held that the tribunal’s approach was illegal for not referring to the interpretation of schedules. It observed that reliance on a Supreme Court judgment (Reckitt Benckiser) underscores the necessity of applying the interpretive framework. Ultimately, the court set aside the tribunal’s order and remitted the matter to the KVAT Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law, with liberty for the dealer to place further materials on record.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P7, an order of the District Registrar that cancelled Ext.P3. Ext.P3 purportedly contemplates a partition of properties earlier divided under Partition Deed No.379/1999, and it records that the parties hold certain lands in joint and separate possession thereafter. The petitioners contend that Ext.P7 misreads Ext.P3 and that the documents show only that the earlier partition was operative, not that each co‑owner held separate and independent parcels by virtue of Ext.P3. They seek a cancellation of Ext.P7 and demand a fresh order after reconsideration. Respondents submit that Ext.P3 acknowledges that the properties were held pursuant to an existing partition and that the petitioners’ claims are not well founded; Ext.P7, having regard to those admissions, was properly issued. The petitioner relies on Cleetus v. Sub Registrar (2012) to argue that a document can be set aside by the Registrar even after inter vivos transfers, but the Court notes that Ext.P3’s language is not unambiguous about separate possession by virtue of Ext.P3. On analyzing Ext.P3 and the surrounding record, the Court holds that Ext.P7 cannot stand as issued. It sets aside Ext.P7 and directs the Registrar to reconsider after hearing, taking care to consider Ext.P3’s statements and relevant precedents, and to issue a fresh order within six weeks.
This Regular Second Appeal concerns a land dispute in Thottappuzhassery village, Thiruvalla taluk, involving a 12 cents strip comprising a public thodu (watercourse) and an adjacent way, described as items 3 and 4, lying to the east of the plaintiffs’ properties (plaintiffs 1, 2 and 5; with plaintiff 1 deceased and his legal representatives impleaded as plaintiffs 4–6). The plaintiffs and their predecessors allege that Ext.A5, an order dated 10.08.1988 of the Superintendent of Survey (Re-Survey), Pathanamthitta, cancelled the subdivision 38/4 and included it in 38/5, thereby incorporating the thodu and way into defendant No.5’s registered holding, effectively vesting public land in private ownership. They contend item 3 is a public pathway and item 4 a public stream (puramboke land) used by them for about a century, and seek nullification of Ext.A5 and a permanent injunction against obstruction. The defendants (state authorities and defendant No.5) argue that the re-survey reduced the extent of defendant No.5’s land; Ext.A5 was issued under Section 10 of the Kerala Survey and Boundaries Act, 1961, which would fall under Section 14’s limitation if applicable; and that the land is vested in the local authority under the Kerala Panchayats Act, 1960. The trial court held Ext.A5 void and granted injunction; the First Appellate Court reversed, holding the suit barred by limitation. The High Court, however, holds Ext.A5 not within Section 10’s ambit and that Section 14 does not apply to these facts, restores the Trial Court’s decree, grants the injunction, and declines the private assertion of the land to defendant No.5. The Regular Second Appeal is allowed with costs to the appellants.
This High Court of Kerala hearing ST.Rev. No.156/2009 concerns a Kerala General Sales Tax assessment for the assessment year 2000-01 in which the Malayala Manorama Company Ltd was assessed to tax balance of Rs.59 lakhs following an order dated 05.01.2007. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) modified the assessment to limit the scope of dispute to tax on coconut sales and interest, but the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal held the assessment order time-barred, applying the fifth proviso to Section 17(6) of the KGST Act as amended by the Finance Acts of 2005 and 2006. The Revenue challenged this, arguing that a proviso cannot override the main provision and that the Tribunal, a creature of the statute, lacked jurisdiction to decide on constitutionality or the form of the proviso. The dealer contested that proviso interpretation is proper and that limitations can be considered at any stage; reliance was placed on VKC Footsteps India and other authorities. The Kerala High Court held that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the proviso controls the main section is not tenable and that provisos must be interpreted within the framework of the statute. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, including a determination of limitation, with disposal in accordance with law. The revision is therefore allowed and remanded to the Tribunal for a new decision on the merits and limitation.
OP(C) Nos. 3080/2017 & 3103/2017 This is a consolidated constitutional writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging orders of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, in respect of two revision petitions (RP Nos. 23/2013 and 25/2013) originally filed in 2013. The respondents, who stood as sureties for debts incurred by the petitioners, discharged those debts when arbitration and execution proceedings were pursued. The Co-operative Tribunal later restored the revision petitions after they had been dismissed for default, and this restoration extended to connected matters (as per Ext. P6 and Ext. P7). The petitioners contend that Ext. P7 is a non-speaking order lacking reasoned justification, and that the Tribunal has misapplied its revision powers under Section 84 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969; they seek interference under Article 227. The respondents argue that Section 84 authorizes interference in cases of illegality or impropriety and rely on Rule 114 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 to justify restoration of ex parte proceedings and merits-based restoration of revisions. The High Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s restoration orders and dismissed the petitions, holding that improper dismissals for default can be corrected, but the petitions themselves failed on merits. No costs were awarded.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A. No. 894 of 2008) arising from an Abkari Act case. The sole appellant, Melacheri Sajeesh, was convicted under Section 55(a) of the Kerala Abkari Act for transporting Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) in a goods autorickshaw seized during a police check on 06.07.2004 at Peringadi, Chokli. The contraband comprised 40 cases with 1,650 bottles of liquor labeled “for sale in Pondichery State only.” Samples from bottles were taken, sealed, and Exts. P1–P9 were produced, including a chemical analysis report (Ext. P9). Prosecution witnesses (PWs 1–4) testified to seizure and labelling; however, no independent witnesses were cited. The defence argued multiple irregularities: missing or unexplained seals, lack of a search memo before inspecting the vehicle, gaps in the inventory (Ext. P8), and especially delay (16 days) in producing the contraband for court and questions about sample continuity and consistency with the seized articles. The trial court convicted the accused, but the High Court reversed, citing deficiencies: absence of proper labeling/inventory detail, potential tampering issues, and a crucial delay unsupported by explanation. The court relied on Kumaran P. v. State of Kerala (2016) to emphasize timely production of samples. Ultimately, the High Court allowed the appeal, acquitting the accused and ordering his release, with any bail bond cancelled.
This writ petition, filed by the Secretary of Porur Grama Panchayat, challenges Ext.P8, the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions’ order in appeal No.1010/2013, which held that the respondent was entitled to deemed occupancy under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and directed issuance of an occupancy certificate and building numbering. The background facts show the respondent obtained Ext.P3 building permit on 08.09.2010 for a residential building with a 3-meter setback from Putiyathkunnu Naypally road, as per Ext.P2 plan. After construction, an occupancy certificate was sought but rejected by the Panchayat on 28.09.2013 (Ext.P6) for non-fulfillment of the setback and boundary demarcation. The respondent did not challenge the Ext.P6 order, but later stated that completion certificates and the plan were not produced with the numbering application. Subsequently, the respondent approached the Tribunal, which allowed the appeal and granted deemed occupancy. The petitioner contends that Ext.P6 is final and that the road status was not properly established; it argues the road is not a notified Panchayat road and that the 3-meter setback arose from Sec.220(b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s reasoning, noting lack of clear notification of the road and absence of proof before the Tribunal regarding the road’s status, but declined to interfere with Ext.P8. The petition was dismissed, and the Tribunal’s decision stood.
The appellant-plaintiff Jishi v S seeks partition of a one-fourth share in plaint schedule properties that devolved on Vijayan after his death on 9 April 2006. The suit targets two properties: plaint schedule item Nos. 1 and 2, which defendants 4 to 6 allegedly sold by sale deeds No. 765/2007 (18.600 cents) to the first defendant and No. 764/2007 (29.400 cents) to defendants 2 and 3, in 2007. The plaintiff contends these sales were executed by the minor’s natural guardian without court sanction and without applying the sale proceeds for the minor’s benefit, rendering the deeds void and illegal. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that a sale deed by a guardian for a minor is voidable at the option of the minor and remains valid unless set aside; since the plaintiff did not seek setting aside Exts.A1–A3, relief could not be granted. The first appellate court affirmed. The plaintiff moved to amend the plaint seeking declarations of title and voiding the sale deeds, but amendment was rejected as time-barred. The High Court held that under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, a suit to set aside a guardian’s transfer must be within three years of attaining majority (born 22 May 1991; majority on 22 May 2009). Relying on Ramadas Menon v. Sreedev (2004 KHC 55(FB)), the court dismissed the appeal in limine.
This writ petition, filed by Mohanan Nair, challenges the seizure of his motor vehicle KL-21-C-528 and timber in March 2021, while the vehicle was used to transport timber allegedly cut from private patta land. The petitioner contends that the actions do not fall within the Kerala Promotion of Tree Growth in Non-Forest Areas Act, the Kerala Forest Act, the Kerala Forest Produce Transit Rules, or the Kerala Forest (Prohibition of Felling of Trees Standing on Land Temporarily or Permanently Assigned) Rules, 1995, and that there is no statutory provision for confiscation of the vehicle. He asserts the Forest Act has no application to the facts and seeks immediate release of the vehicle and the seized timber. The respondents maintain that the vehicle is liable to confiscation under Section 61A of the Forest Act for transporting timber otherwise than in accordance with the Rules, and that the timber falls within regulatory controls by virtue of the Rules. On 26.08.2021, this Court, while considering interim relief, directed release of the vehicle subject to confiscation proceedings under Section 61A and reserved liberty for the competent authority to initiate proceedings if warranted. The present judgment dispositions the petition by directing the release of the vehicle subject to 61A proceedings, directs the 2nd respondent to consider Ext.P3 representation for release of the timber, and allows further representations within three weeks, while keeping all contentions open for adjudication.
This is a Kerala High Court Rent Control Revision under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging the eviction order passed by the Rent Control Court (Additional Munsiff-III), Ernakulam, under Sections 12, 12(1) and 12(3) of the Act, and the subsequent judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in RCA No. 56 of 2019 dated 18.06.2020. The Revision Petitioner-tenants faced eviction for alleged arrears of admitted rent from 01.04.2012 onward, with the Rent Control Court directing deposit within 30 days and then invoking Section 12(3) to stop proceedings and evict. The Petitioner asserts lack of opportunity to show cause before the 12(3) order, noting that an extension of time to deposit was filed only on 21.05.2019 (after the 20.05.2019 order) due to inadvertence; the court allegedly failed to consider this and denied a reasonable opportunity, violating natural justice. The petitioner also seeks to justify renovation expenditures as a form of offset, while the respondents contend the arrears arose from 2012 with a fixed rate dispute over fair rent. The court ultimately allows the Revision, setting aside the Appellate Authority’s judgment and the 12(3) order, and directs restoration of I.A. No. 9588/2018 and R.C.P. No. 66/2018 on file to proceed in accordance with law, citing natural justice principles and related precedents.
CRL.M.C.No.3358 of 2021 (Crl.M.C. 3358/2021) Mahesh Lal N.Y., the second accused in Vigilance Case No. 3/2021 (Thrissur VACB), challenged Annexure-2 directing him to furnish a voice sample for comparison in an ongoing bribery investigation. The prosecution alleges the first accused, a contractor, demanded money from the de facto complainant for securing a completion certificate for a building by influencing Choondal Grama Panchayat officials, including the second accused. On 16.02.2021, about 5 PM, the first accused allegedly received Rs. 25,000 from the de facto complainant. The case involves offences under Section 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B IPC against the first accused, and Section 7(a) of the PCA read with Section 120B IPC against the second accused. Annexure-2 directed the petitioner to appear at the Chithranjali Studio for voice sampling as part of evidence gathering. The petitioner moved a Section 482 CrPC petition to quash the notice and any further proceedings. The arguments centered on alleged contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution (prohibition against self-incrimination) and the lack of opportunity of hearing before the voice sample order. The High Court rejected these challenges, relying on established precedents and the necessity of scientific voice analysis in investigations, and dismissed the petition.
This is a criminal appeal (CRL.A.No.72 of 2015) from the Kerala High Court challenging the conviction and sentence of the sole accused for offences under sections 342 and 302 IPC by the Sessions Court, Palakkad, in SC No.44/2014. The prosecution case is that on 16 January 2013 the accused and his father, Kuttikrishna Menon, quarrelled over the purchase of a new autorickshaw. The accused allegedly beat his father severely and confined him inside his bedroom, denying him access to medical care until neighbour PW2 found him in a pool of blood and brought him to hospital. He later died from ante-mortem injuries. The trial court relied on circumstantial evidence, including MO1/MO2, Exts P1–P23, and the statements of multiple witnesses, to convict the accused of murder under Section 302 IPC. The appellant contended that the sole eye-witness (PW15, the wife and mother) provided a defence version that the injuries resulted from a fall, and that the circumstantial chain was incomplete, with no proven motive. The High Court reappraised the evidence and, applying the Pulicherla Nagaraju/Muthu framework for distinguishing murder from culpable homicide not amounting to murder, concluded there was no proven intent to kill. Consequently, it modified the conviction to Section 304 Part II IPC, reducing the sentence to 10 years, while upholding the 342 IPC conviction. The appeal is allowed in part.
This is a motor accident claims appeal arising from a common award by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, concerning a collision on 26-06-2002 where a cyclist (the appellant) was struck by a jeep. The Tribunal awarded compensation on various heads but the appellant challenged the quantum. The court notes that the respondents 1 and 2 were ex parte and the insurer (3rd respondent) contested not only the amount but also the notional income and several heads of damages. Citing the Supreme Court’s doctrine on just compensation, notably Pranay Sethi, the judge holds that compensation must be determined with fairness, reasonableness, and equitability under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The appellate court re-assesses several components: it fixes a new notional income (Rs.3,500/month) guided by Ramachandrappa and adjusts the loss of earnings, loss due to disability, pain and sufferings, and loss of amenities accordingly, while finding other heads reasonable. It ultimately enhances the total compensation by Rs.71,440, directing deposit of the enhanced amount with interest at 7% per annum. The appeal is thus allowed in part, with revised quantum and directions for payment and disbursement by the Tribunal.