This writ appeal challenges the Single Judge’s order dated 21.6.2021 in W.P.(C) No.12041/2021, where the court dealing with SARFAESI Act proceedings directed the appellants to clear the entire loan liability of Rs.5,46,25,726 in eight successive monthly installments starting 21.7.2021, and kept coercive action in abeyance subject to regular compliance. The appellants argued that they should be allowed to regularize the overdraft facility by clearing defaulted installments and avoiding payment of the full balance, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic constraints; they contended that forcing payment of the entire amount was impracticable. The respondents pressed for faithful enforcement of the SARFAESI regime, arguing writ petitions are not maintainable against SARFAESI actions, and that the remedy lies under the Act. The Division Bench (comprising the Chief Justice and the Hon’ble Judge) analyzed the settled law on maintainability of writs against SARFAESI actions, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Mathew K.C. and other precedents, and concluded that the writ appeal does not warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed; the Single Judge’s order directing installment-based repayment and continuation of SARFAESI proceedings stands, with no stay of the underlying recovery process unless installments are paid as directed.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 436 OF 2019 This is a criminal revision petition filed under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by accused Nos.1 and 4 challenging the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in CC 170/2012 (trial court) and the subsequent affirming judgments in CRA 186/2016 (appellate court). The complainant, Air Travel Enterprises India Limited, alleged that a cheque for Rs.5,41,342 dated 23.06.2012, issued towards freight charges, was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The trial court convicted the accused and awarded compensation under Cr.P.C. The High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, reiterates that such jurisdiction is supervisory and not a second appellate avenue; it cannot reweigh evidence unless there is gross miscarriage of justice or perverse findings. Relying on State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri and other precedents, the court upholds the principle that once the complainant discharges initial burden, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act operate, placing a reverse-onus on the drawer to rebut. However, citing modern authority (Kishan Rao, Kalamani Tex, Bir Singh, Kalamani Tex, Oriental Bank v. Prabodh Tehari), the court notes certain decisions as per incuriam, but ultimately holds that the conviction is not interfered with, while modifying the sentence to meet justice by imposing a brief imprisonment for the first accused and imposing Rs.1,90,000 as compensation on both accused, with deferred execution.
This criminal appeal is filed by the 16th accused challenging the Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam’s denial of bail in S.C. No. 1/19/NIA. The grounds for bail include the appellant’s medical ailments following a prior accident requiring Ayurvedic treatment, his obligation to care for aged parents, the long period of custody (over two and a half years), and the prospect of further delay in commencing and concluding the trial. He also notes that a co-accused, A17, who accompanied him, left India and later turned approver, has been released. He contends that the bail should be considered on merits and that the guidelines laid down by this court in Younus Aliyar v. Sub Inspector of Police (2016(3)KLT 877) apply, subject to Supreme Court interpretations of Articles 21 and 22. He also points to Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], asserting that statutory restrictions under S.43D(5) of the UAPA do not extinguish constitutional protections. The Special Court’s order was said to ignore the grounds urged by the appellant. The Special Prosecutor opposed bail, stressing that the offences under S.120B r/w 125 IPC and UAPA sections 38, 39, 40 are grave, with prima facie evidence of ISIS-related activity, and that grant of bail would jeopardize investigation and public safety. After consideration, the High Court finds no compelling reason to grant bail, upholds the impugned order, and dismisses the appeal.
WP(C).No.15455 OF 2020(F) Bank of Baroda, a secured creditor, has filed WP(C) No.15455 of 2020 (F) seeking mandamus to register Ext.P1 sale certificate in favour of the 8th respondent and to efface the encumbrance/attachment created on the property. The property, measuring 3.80 ares (9.39 cents) in Re.Sy.No.387/12, Block No.33, Anchal Village, Kollam, was mortgaged to the petitioner in 2015 for loans availed by the 6th and 7th respondents. Under the SARFAESI framework, Ext.P1 sale certificate was issued on 10.02.2020 in favour of the 8th respondent after sale proceedings under Rule 9 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. Encumbrance certificate Ext.P2 shows an attachment dated 10.07.2018. The Bank contends that post-mortgage attachments do not affect the sale and that the sale certificate may be registered after effacing attachments; it relies on Madhan v. Sub Registrar (2014) (1) KLT 406 and subsequent Kerala decisions like Keechery Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sajitha Nizar and Ali Asharaf M.M. & another v. Sub Registrar, Thrissur to urge that such encumbrances should be erased. The respondents argue procedural prerequisites and that Ext.P1 has already been registered (27.11.2020). The Court ultimately holds that, following the cited authorities, the attachments created after the equitable mortgage are ineffective against the sale and directs the Sub Registrar and Village Officer to efface the encumbrance within six weeks, with no costs awarded.
This Kerala High Court bail petition, B.A.5868/2021, concerns Sesssy Xavier, a 27-year-old accused in Crime No. 474/2021 of Alappuzha North Police Station, alleging offences under IPC sections 417, 419, and 420. The petitioner contends she is not a law graduate and never enrolled as an advocate before the Bar Council of Kerala; she claims she began as a law intern and appeared before courts in an informal capacity. The Bar Association of Alappuzha confronted the matter after an anonymous letter alleged that she practised as an advocate using the enrolment number K/1177/2018 belonging to another advocate from Thiruvananthapuram; the enrolment was used to obtain membership in the Bar Association, after which she allegedly appeared in courts, acted as Commissioner in several matters, and was elected to the Association’s leadership. The Bar Council verified the enrolment discrepancy, prompting police registration of the case. The prosecution argues that she cheated the Bar Association and judiciary by impersonating a qualified lawyer, repeatedly practising under a false identity, with additional possible offences under IPC and the Advocates Act. The court invokes Dataram Singh’s teaching on presumption of innocence and the general rule that bail is the norm, yet emphasises the gravity of the alleged conduct, potential custodial needs, and the risk of tampering with evidence, ultimately dismissing the bail application in consideration of public trust and the integrity of the legal system.
This intra-court appeal (W.A. No. 1147 of 2022) arises from a writ petition WP(C) No. 1455/2022 challenging actions taken by police in relation to a civil dispute over ownership and possession of a Hitachi excavator JS-140. The appellant, Shiju Joseph, the 3rd respondent in the writ petition, contends he purchased the excavator from the writ petitioner (Moni Mathew) and possession, documents, and key were transferred after paying Rs. 16.5 lakhs, but the writ petitioner later alleged theft. The writ petitioner asserts he remains the owner in possession and that civil remedies should govern the matter, not police interference. The Single Judge had observed that the police enquiry revealed the dispute is essentially civil and cautioned that police should not adjudicate ownership or compel handing over the vehicle. The appellant invoked Lalitha Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh to argue that cognizable offences (theft) require mandatory FIRs and investigation, suggesting police action was improper by conducting a petition enquiry instead of registering a crime. The respondents opposed this, maintaining it is a civil dispute and police cannot adjudicate ownership or force transfer. The High Court ultimately disposed of the appeal with directions, leaving open the appellant’s remedies under the law, including possible criminal or quasi-criminal avenues, while clarifying that observations in the writ judgment should not impede legitimate legal remedies.
This Kerala High Court judgment by Justice R. Narayana Pisharadi deals with Crl.A. No. 733/2019 arising from the conviction of the appellant, Sasi (father of a seven-year-old victim girl), for offenses of rape and related POCSO violations under SC No. 99/2013 from the Sessions Court, Kottayam. The trial court convicted the accused under IPC Section 376(2)(f) and POCSO Section 3 read with Section 4, imposing seven years’ imprisonment and fine. On appeal, the High Court undertook a critical appraisal of the evidence, especially the testimony of PW1, the victim, who was seven at the time of the alleged acts but 12 at trial. The court emphasizes that rape convictions of a child require proof beyond reasonable doubt and that the credibility of a child witness must be carefully scrutinized for tutoring and embellishment. It discusses the principles governing child-witness evaluation, corroboration, and the admissibility/effect of previous statements under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 164 Cr.P.C. The court notes suspicious circumstances (delayed disclosures, inconsistent school-class references, and unproved contemporaneous statements) and ultimately holds that the sole or primary testimony cannot sustain conviction without reliable corroboration. Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence are set aside, and the accused is acquitted and to be released, if custody is not required in another matter.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. appeals the Kerala High Court judgment in MACA No. 2823 of 2008 arising from OP(MV) 897/2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam. The claimant (Moni, represented here by the respondents) sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for injuries sustained in a motor-vehicle accident on 21.06.2001 when an autorickshaw – registration KL-5D 3294 – allegedly swerved at Alummoodu bridge, throwing him from the vehicle. The Tribunal partly allowed the petition, directing the insurer (the appellant) to pay Rs.46,700 with interest and costs. The insurer challenged, contending that Ext. A5 wound certificate and Ext. A1 charge sheet show the claimant drove the autorickshaw and that the driver’s negligence cannot be established. It relied on Nishan Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. to argue that a police charge sheet cannot be conclusive proof of negligence, and invoked Kamalesh & Ors v. Attar Singh. The respondents countered that the charge sheet is not to be accepted blindly, but as prima facie evidence of negligence under Section 166 and that collusive charge sheets can be disregarded with corroboration. The High Court, citing Pazhaniammal (New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal), held there was no evidence discrediting Ext. A1 and that the charge sheet can constitute prima facie evidence to expedite justice. The appeal was dismissed, and the Tribunal’s award upheld with costs.
The petitioner, a devotee of Madayi Sree Thiruvarkattukavu Temple, filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking mandamus to compel respondents, especially the District Collector and Malabar Devaswom Board, to take immediate action against the temple’s Executive Officer for not pressing a suit and interlocutory application in the District Court (Vacation Court) at Thalassery. The petition also seeks protection of temple property from alleged trespass and unauthorized soil excavation by respondents 6 to 12, and to halt any alterations or excavations on Re. Sy. No. 54/1B in Eripuram–Chengal Desom. Interim relief, extended repeatedly, prohibited excavation and construction in the temple properties up to 26.08.2021. Respondents 6 to 12 claim ownership and regulatory permissions; the 3rd respondent has filed a Section 94A application and a suit for possession, pending before the District Collector and the Sub Court, Payyannur, respectively. The court relied on Hindu temple protection jurisprudence and ‘parens patriae’ doctrine, citing decisions that the courts protect temple assets. The judgment disposes of the petition by directing the District Collector to decide the 17.05.2021 Section 94A application within two months, while maintaining interim prohibitions and referring contentions to statutory authorities for resolution.
Indira A.V., a practicing advocate, filed Criminal Misc. Case (Crl.M.C. 3129/2020) seeking to quash the FIR in Crime No. 182/2017 of Kuzhalmannam Police Station and the final report in S.C. No. 325/2019 before the Additional Sessions Court, Palakkad. The prosecution alleged that the minor victim, who was pregnant, was subjected to an attempt at settlement rather than reporting the offence under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (PoCSO Act). The petitioner, the 6th accused, asserts innocence and maintains privilege under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act, arguing that as an advocate she engaged with the victim for legal advice and that communications between lawyer and client are protected unless express consent to disclose is given. The respondents contended that the victim does not fall within the category of a client of the petitioner, so Section 126 cannot shield such communications. The court examined the concept of a “client,” the scope of professional communications privilege, and relied on Om Prakash v. Suresh Kumar to affirm that communications made in the course of professional employment are privileged. Finding no express consent to disclose the communications to authorities, the court held the privilege applicable and quashed the proceedings against the petitioner. The Crl.M.C. is allowed; all further proceedings in S.C. No. 325/2019 are quashed.
The petitioner, Rejina C.T., a retired Lower Primary School Assistant in an aided school, challenged the withholding of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) to satisfy liabilities to financial institutions. After retirement on 30.04.2021, she was sanctioned DCRG but the amount remained unpaid because the 2nd to 6th respondents claimed she owed money to KSFE, Balussery Co-Operative Bank and Panangad Co-Operative Urban Society, among others, and insisted on set-off from the DCRG. The petitioner contends that the Payment of Gratuity Act should govern her terminal benefit and that deductions from gratuity on account of private debts to financial institutions are not permissible in the absence of a specific consent or statutory authority. The counter-arguments of the 2nd respondent claim that she had liabilities certified by Ext. R2 (b), that deductions could occur under the Kerala Service Rules and Kerala Education Rules, and that the Aided School teachers are governed by Part III KSR; the petition is supported by decisions including Omana S. N. (2017) and Unnikrishnan Nair (2022) underscoring PGA primacy. The court analyzed the liability certificates, the consent, and the absence of clear consent to deduction from DCRG, and held that withholding the gratuity beyond the extent of consent violates the Act and is unsustainable. The writ petition is allowed with directions to pay DCRG along with interest, and to adjust only to the extent there is proper consent, with any deducted amounts remitted to creditors.
CON.CASE(C) NO. 2265 OF 2019 Contempt Case (Civil) No.2265 of 2019 before the Kerala High Court was heard by a Division Bench comprising Justice Anil K. Narendran and Justice G. Girish on 25 October 2023. The petitioners (petitioners 5, 28, 29 and 43 in WP(C) No.33456/2016) approached under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging willful disobedience of directions contained in Annexure A2 judgment dated 25 February 2019 in WP(C) No.33456/2016, following the 2018 Annexure A1 judgment in WP(C) No.13120/2015 and connected matters. The Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) was embroiled in a dispute over pension benefits under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the related pension scheme, including amendments effected by notification G.S.R. 609(E) dated 22 August 2014. The Supreme Court’s subsequent detailed judgment in Sunil Kumar B. (2022) AIR 2022 SC 5634, read along with 2022 (7) KHC 12, was discussed, particularly paragraph 44 directing validation of the 2014 amendment and extension of options under the scheme, with read-downs of the pre-amendment provisions (e.g., para 11(3) and 11(4)). The court observed that the petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension required reconsideration by the EPFO in light of the 2022 judgment. Accordingly, the contempt petition was disposed of by closing the matter, while reserving EPFO’s right to reconsider entitlement consistent with law and the 2022 decision, and noting the directives in para 44 of the Sunil Kumar B. judgment.
This is an OP(C) under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order that remitted back a Commissioner's report in a suit for recovery of possession, mandatory injunction, and permanent prohibitory injunction (O.S. No. 344/2014, Principal Munsiff, Kasaragod). A survey was conducted; Ext.P3 report was filed; the defendant sought remittance of the report, followed by a supplementary report Ext.P8, and again moved to remit. The trial court allowed remittance of the report, prompting the plaintiff to approach the High Court. The central issue concerns the court’s power to set aside or remit back a Commissioner’s report under Order XXVI CPC Rules 9 and 10, including Rule 10(3), and whether such actions can override, or bypass, the effect of a prior report. The judgment surveys multiple precedents: Francis Assissi v. Sr. Breesiya (2017), Yudathadevus v. Joseph (2021), and Laly Joseph v. Francis (2023), along with binding constitutional decisions in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2005 SC 752) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd (AIR 2016 SC 86). It clarifies that Rules 9 and 10 do not authorize setting aside a commissioner’s report; sub-rule (3) permits further inquiry or a second/third commission, but without discarding the earlier report. The court ultimately holds that remittance/back-remitting lacks statutory support; the petition is dismissed, though the admissibility of the reports remains open for final determination in the suit.
OT.REV NO. 29 OF 2022 (and connected OT.Rev Nos. 30/2022 to 44/2022) This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court consolidates OT.Rev Nos. 29/2022 to 44/2022, challenging orders of the VAT/CST regime on exemptions in the inter-State sale of natural rubber under three CST notifications linked to the KVAT Act. The revision petition, filed by the State of Kerala, challenges an order of the Additional Tribunal of the State Tax in TAVAT 199/2014 and connected cases, which remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer to decide relief in light of the three notifications. The first notification exempted the tax under Section 8 of the CST Act, for inter-State sale, on condition that tax had already been paid under KVAT. The second notification narrowed exemptions to sub-section (1) of Section 8, while the third notification introduced an option for optional payment of CST. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) remanded the matter and the Tribunal confirmed the remand, holding that the dealer can choose between exemption and tax payment, with the Remand to be decided in light of the notifications. The State contends this creates a double advantage and that the second notification supersedes the first; The respondent-dealer argues the second notification is valid, limiting exemptions but allowing the dispute to be considered with the retailer’s choice preserved. The court agrees with the government’s corrective approach, follows Hi-Tek Traders, and confirms the remand while dismissing the revisions without costs.
This MACA relates to a motor vehicle accident on 08.08.2006 involving an autorickshaw in which the appellant Smitha sustained injuries and permanent disability. The MACT Tirur awarded Rs. 1,26,700 as compensation, exonerating the insurer (The New India Assurance Co. Ltd.) due to policy/driver issues, and partly exonerating the owner. The appellate court found fault with the insurer’s exoneration, noting that third‑party claimants are entitled to speedy compensation and that liability cannot be dismissed solely on the insured’s license status. Citing Ramachandrappa and Sarla Varma, the court reassessed quantum: it accepted the appellant’s claimed monthly income of Rs.5,000 (instead of Rs.3,000 used by the tribunal), and recalculated disability compensation for 14% disability with a multiplier of 17 (instead of 18). The court concluded the 3rd respondent insurer is liable to pay the award at the first instance and recover from the 2nd respondent, directing a revised total of Rs.2,07,780 and an order to deposit within three months with proportionate costs. The judgment underscores insurer‑responsibility in third‑party claims and alignment with established SC precedents on income, disability, and multiplier while modernising the award.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 7893 of 2023) filed under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings arising from Crime No.50/2021 at Kilikolloor Police Station and the corresponding CC No.147/2021 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kollam. The petitioners, four accused—Sainulabdeen, Salim, Ramsan alias Appu, and Muhammed Yaseen—are charged with offences including wrongful confinement (Section 341 IPC), common assault (Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC) and acts of obscenity/language (Section 294(b) IPC). The prosecution asserts the injury and offences have been established, but the parties have reconciled, and the victims support quashing. The Public Prosecutor initially expressed reservations about quashing merely on settlement, though he concedes that the matter is settled. The court examined the affidavits, the records, and the private nature of the dispute, noting that the entire dispute has been resolved between the parties. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) 5 SCC 688 and the earlier Gian Singh and Narinder Singh line of cases, the court held that where a non‑compoundable offence is private in nature and a complete settlement exists, CrPC 482 power can be invoked to quash. It cautioned against quashing serious public-interest crimes. Consequently, the court allowed the Crl.M.C. and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners in CC 147/2021.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit on a promissory note for Rs 70,000 executed on 16.11.2000. The plaintiff (Paneer Selvam) claimed the defendant (Siby Thomas) borrowed Rs 70,000 and executed Ext. A1 promissory note. The defendant admitted his signature on Ext. A1 but contended that he did not execute the note as pleaded; instead, he had borrowed Rs 10,000 for business and handed over a signed blank stamp paper later converted into Ext. A1. The Trial Court decreed in favor of the plaintiff, while the First Appellate Court (ASA 37/2005) reversed, holding that the execution of Ext. A1 had not been proved. The High Court framed a substantial question of law: whether, in light of the admission of signature, the First Appellate Court was justified in negating the due execution of Ext. A1. The court discussed the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, citing Rangappa v. Mohan (AIR 2010 SC 1898), Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, Kalamani Tex v. Balasubramanian and others, and the standard of proof of preponderance of probabilities. It held that once signature is established, the reverse onus operates, and a proper finding on probable defence is essential. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed by remand, the FA decree set aside, and the matter remanded to the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Kattappana, for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
WP(C) Nos. 22302/2021, 21572/2021 These are two connected writ petitions challenging actions of the Kerala State Commission for SC/ST and associated Vigilance authorities. In WP(C) No. 21572 of 2021, Thulaseedhara Kurup (Assistant Sub Inspector, VACB, Kottayam) participated in a trap operation against a Kumily Grama Panchayat Clerk accused of bribery. After the arrest, the Kumily secretary lodged a complaint alleging abuse and caste-name references by the petitioners. The SC/ST Commission registered Ext. P4 and directed an enquiry, but the petition contends that the Commission lacks authority to order enquiries by the State Police Chief or to issue press releases, and that hearing was not afforded. The court held that the Commission cannot delegate investigations to police or order disciplinary actions, and that Rule 7/Rule 10 require opportunity of hearing; Ext. P6 enquiry was illegal and Ext. P8 press release was improper for due process reasons. It held that Section 9(b) empowers inquiries into deprivation of rights and safeguards, not into offences under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, and that the Commission cannot encroach on OG powers. The judgment, relying on Vimalan v. KS/ST Commission, clarifies the scope of the Commission’s powers and its constitutional boundaries. In WP(C) No. 22302 of 2021, K. Senkumar challenged the press release and related action; the court dismissed the petition, confirming the outcome in 21572. The decision emphasizes a strict separation of powers and cautions against unwarranted interference with ongoing investigations.
Cont.Case (C) No.2032 of 2021 The petitioner, R. Siva Prasad, filed Contempt of Court Cont. Case (C) No.2032 of 2021 challenging alleged willful disobedience by C.S. Bhavana, Administrative Officer of Thuravoor Mahakshethram, of directions issued by this Court in W.P.(C) No.22291/2021 concerning the Thuravoor Mahakshethram annual festival for 2021. The writ petition directions, reflected in Annexures C–F, mandated structure of a festival committee excluding certain bodies, appointment of an Advocate Commissioner, and governance of donations and arrangements for the festival. The petitioner contends that on 04.11.2021 Bhavana arranged Annadhanam for more than 2000 persons at the temple’s Oottupura, permitted the Bhakthajana Samithi to participate, and thereby violated the court’s orders. The respondent denies wilful disobedience, arguing Annexures C–F issued broad directives and that there was no prohibition on Annadhanam; she asserts the Advocate Commissioner’s reports show only lack of prior notice, not deliberate disobedience. The Advocate Commissioner’s report notes he was not informed about the 04.11.2021 Annadhanam; the respondent claims the food was distributed under medical guidance and to participants, not as a public event. The High Court, applying the well-known wilful-disobedience standard from Sundaram Pillai and other authorities, finds no evidence of intentional disobedience, concludes the conduct was not proven to be willful, and dismisses the Contempt Case. The judgment is delivered by a Division Bench.
The writ petition in W.P.(C) No.23700 of 2024 before the Kerala High Court challenges orders Exts.P7 and P8 of the Kerala State Waqf Board. The petitioners, former office bearers (Secretary and Treasurer) of the Mahallu Committee, argue that they are no longer Mahallu members and thus not liable under Section 61 of the Waqf Act, 1995, and that Exts.P7 and P8 were issued without proper sanction and without proper consideration of the accounts (Exts.P5 and P6). The factual backdrop is that during 2013–2018 the petitioners supervised a mosque renovation; following elections in 2022, new office bearers assumed, while the 1st respondent had filed O.P.No.201/2022 seeking a full enquiry into alleged mismanagement. I.A.No.362/2023 sought production of books; Ext.P3 and Ext.P4 relate to those proceedings. Ext.P5 and Ext.P6 show account statements. Ext.P7 (30.04.2024) directed production of documents, with Ext.P8 (27.05.2024) recalling some changes and issued without notice. The court held that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 because Sec.83(2) provides an alternative remedy before the Waqf Tribunal, and the discretionary writ jurisdiction should yield to statutory procedure. The petition is dismissed, with liberty to approach the Tribunal if so advised."