Cont.Case (C) No.173 of 2020 This Contempt Case (Civil) No.173 of 2020 before a Division Bench of theKerala High Court concerns alleged wilful disobedience of directions in Annexure A1 to the 12 October 2018 judgment in WP(C) No.33244 of 2016 and connected matters. The petitioners, namely Aleyamma A.K., Arya Sringan B., and Sivadathan Pillai G., claim that the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) failed to implement pension-related directions, particularly after amendments and schemes governing pension computation under the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, and the 2014 amendment via G.S.R. 609(E). The respondents contend that any adjustment or disbursal must be undertaken in strict conformity with law and the Supreme Court’s later pronouncements. The judgment discusses the apex court’s 4 November 2022 decision in Civil Appeal Nos.8143-44 of 2022 (AIR 2022 SC 5634), which upheld the validity of G.S.R. 609(E) and directed read-down of certain provisions, with directions on option exercises under para 11(4) and further clarifications for pre‑ and post‑amendment schemes. The Kerala High Court notes that the entitlement to higher pension requires reconsideration by the EPFO in light of the 2022 apex judgment. On 3 October 2023, the court closed the contempt petition, reserving EPFO’s right to reconsider entitlement in accordance with law and the apex judgment, without prejudice to future action.
Pramesh V. filed W.P.(C) No.7033 of 2022 in the Kerala High Court seeking mandamus under Article 226 to protect and maintain the 2.35-acre land of the Kottayil Bhagavathy Temple in Sy.No.163/11 of Alanellur-2, Palakkad, which he asserts is encroached and partly demolished by respondents 5 and 6 and others. The petition relies on Apex Court directions in Mrinalini Padhi v. Union of India (2018 SCC OnLine SC 667) to scrutinize encroachments on temple property and to ensure the deity’s land is protected and used for temple purposes. The petitioner points to prior orders and reports, including Ext.P3 (11.05.2017) stop memo and Ext.P4 (16.05.2017) District Collector directives, and references a pending civil suit O.S.No.94 of 2017 in Mannarkkad. The pleadings describe conflicting property extents (2.35 acres vs. 1.34 acres) and contend that temple remains and deity exist on the land, despite reports suggesting otherwise. The High Court acknowledges the Devaswom’s guardian role and the doctrine of parens patriae, citing decisions such as Gopalakrishnan and Travancore Devaswom Board, but ultimately dismisses the writ petition as not maintainable since a civil suit is pending and a writ is not the appropriate vehicle to determine encroachment. The judgment emphasizes that protective relief must be pursued through proper civil proceedings or statutory remedies, not a bare writ petition.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 5409/2023) arises from CC No. 654 of 2020, on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Angamaly, in relation to Crime No. 1152 of 2019 of Nedumbassery Police Station, Ernakulam. The petitioners—Abhilash, Sunil Mon alias Sunil, Gireesh, Mohanan and Manoj—are accused of offences under sections 323, 341, 294(b) and 506 read with 34 IPC. The accused move under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the ongoing prosecution, contending that the parties have resolved their disputes and do not wish to pursue the case further. The petition is supported by the victim’s affidavit, with the victim’s side also stating the matter is settled and has no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while noting reservations about quashing solely on the basis of a settlement, concedes that the matter is settled between the parties. The court considers the settled private nature of the dispute and examines the governing doctrine under Section 482 CrPC, as elaborated by the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019 (5) SCC 688), and the earlier Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh cases. The court ultimately holds that the dispute is private in nature, the settlement is genuine, and quashing is appropriate. Consequently, all further proceedings in CC No. 654/2020 are quashed.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case (CRL.MC No. 3667 of 2021) filed in the Kerala High Court by Krishnan PuthiYath, the 9th accused in Crime No. 434/CB MPM/2010, Malappuram, seeking to quash the proceedings in CC 242/2021 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Malappuram. The offence allegations involve a large-scale conspiracy to forge official documents, including holograms used for passports and related travel documents, attributed to a gang that manipulated records and supplied forged documents to witnesses for travel documents. The petitioner, an office attendant at the Regional Transport Office, Malappuram, contends that he was not entrusted with holograms and that the materials connecting him to the crime are non-existent or improperly relied upon; the hologram issue register allegedly bears no his signature, and some purported evidence is disputed or unauthenticated. The prosecution relies on materials gathered during investigation and a charge sheet that implicates him under sections including 120B IPC, 420, 409 read with 34 IPC. The High Court reiterates the reluctance to quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. absent overwhelming material of abuse of process or misjoinder, emphasizing that weighing evidence lies with the trial court. The Court ultimately dismisses the petition, leaving the trial to proceed.
Mat.Appeal No.701 of 2021 This is a matrimonial appeal (Mat.Appeal No.701 of 2021) arising from a petition for dissolution of marriage filed by the appellant-husband under Section 10(1)(ix) of the Divorce Act, 1869, in the Family Court, Ernakulam. The petition, instituted in 2018, was dismissed by the Family Court on 31 August 2021. The appellant contends that the respondent left the matrimonial home on 29 December 2013 and has since refused to cohabit, triggering desertion. The respondent defends the petition by alleging that she endured total neglect, mental and physical cruelty, lack of financial support, and mismanagement of matrimonial funds; she also points to rent deficiencies and the appellant’s welfare neglect of the children. The Family Court, after evaluating oral testimony and documentary evidence, held that the respondent’s exit stemmed from the appellant’s fault and that, even if cruelty existed, the petitioner failed to establish desertion as required by Section 10(1)(ix). The court cited jurisprudence on the meaning of desertion, animus deserendi, and the nuance that mere separation is not automatically desertion. The High Court, in turn, agrees that the evidence is insufficient to prove desertion by the respondent and upholds the Family Court’s dismissal of the petition, emphasizing the need to consider the complexities of matrimonial disputes and the requirement of a demonstrable intent to desert the partner.
The petitioner, S. Surekha, is owner in possession of about 19.7 Ares in Sy. No. 98/42 of Azhiyur Village, Vatakara Taluk, Kozhikode. She challenges the National Highways Act-based land acquisition for widening NH 66 (old NH 17). She received Ext. P2 under Section 3E(1) directing vacating the land and threatened to surrender under the 3D notification vested in the Central Government, within sixty days. She contends that the 3D/3D1 notifications do not mention her name or the correct survey number; Exts P5-P6 show different numbers; She argues that such non-inclusion breaches due process and fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, 21 and Article 300A. The respondents, including NHAI and the State, explain that the 3A Notification for 0.0850 ha (RS 98/5A) and 3D vesting, with subsequent expansion 0.0336 ha, plus 0.0306 ha, etc., were issued in 2011-2013; The land is vested in the Central Government for widening of NH 66; The RELIS system in 2017 assignedRELIS sub-division numbers; Petitioner's documents were not produced; The authority proceeded to take possession of the land with compensation deposited in CALA; The petitioner previously challenged similar acquisitions; The High Court held that the acquisition was in compliance with the NH Act and dismissed the petition, citing the Supreme Court in National Highways Authority v. P.V. Krishnamoorthy to emphasize national highway development as a public interest; The petition is thus dismissed, with liberty to apply for compensation.
This writ appeal arises from an order of the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum (CGRF) for Kerala State Electricity Board Limited, Central Region, which set aside a demand for Rs. 23,15,304 raised against the 2nd respondent for alleged undercharging of electricity consumption. The appellants, being the petitioners in WP(C) No.19153 of 2015, challenged Ext.P6, the CGRF’s order, in the High Court of Kerala. The factual matrix centers on a high-tension consumer with contract demand of 360 KVA; July 2010 readings showed a dramatic drop in consumption, while the consumer’s activity continued normally. An inspection on 06.12.2011 revealed that the LT fuse on the R phase of the PT was blown, causing under-recording. After the fuse was replaced, data were downloaded, and the Board proceeded to quantify undercharging by applying an arithmetical adjustment (40-50% enhancement was discussed in the proceedings) under Regulation 24(5) of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code, 2005, issuing Ext.P4. The Forum’s Ext.P6 order cancelling the demand and the learned Single Judge’s order refusing to interfere prompted the appeal. The Division Bench ultimately disposed of the writ appeal by directing the Additional Respondent-3 (Executive Engineer, TMR Division, Pallom) to reconsider the matter afresh, after supplying all relied materials and providing an opportunity of hearing to the 2nd respondent, with a final decision to be recorded within three months. The decision underscores adherence to natural justice in civil consequences and the need for due process in recovery actions."
Petitioner P. Jayakumar, retired Secretary of Kulathupuzha Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Bank No. 1867), challenged Ext.P10 and Ext.P12 orders that restricted his promotion trajectory and denied his appointment as Secretary. The sequence began with his initial promotion from Accountant to Internal Auditor/Branch Manager, then to Assistant Secretary/Chief Accountant, and finally to Secretary, based on vacancies and the Society’s resolutions. Ext.P10 records the Joint Registrar’s approval for the promotion to Assistant Secretary, while Ext.P12 (the Government’s order) rejected the subsequent promotion to Secretary, alleging lack of qualification under Rule 185 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (KCS Rules), and raising objections about the Feeder Category Sub Rules and a need for prior permission under Rule 181. The petitioner contends that (i) being over 52 at the time of the promotion, he was exempt from passing the departmental examination; (ii) supernumerary/post promotions do not violate Rule 185; (iii) there was no need for exemption under Rule 181 since the posts of Internal Auditor/Branch Manager and Assistant Secretary/Chief Accountant were vacant or misaligned; and (iv) Ext.P12 misapplied the law. The court, applying a catena of judgments including Jose Varghese, finds the promotions permissible and not barred by Rule 185, quashes Ext.P10 and Ext.P12, and directs retirement benefits as if he served as Secretary, within four months.
WA 1766/2022; WA 1872/2022; WA 49/2023 These writ appeals arise from a common Kerala High Court judgment concerning the appointment of Laboratory Assistants at Sree Vyasa NSS College, Wadakkancherry, an aided college under Calicut University and governed by the Direct Payment Scheme. The college followed Statute 66 of the Calicut University First Statutes, 1979, which permits private colleges to fill vacancies either by promotion from the next lower grade or by direct recruitment, with a prescribed selection process. Since qualified staff in the lower grade were unavailable, the college recruited directly; appointments were made between 2013 and 2014. Subsequently, the competent authority declined to approve the appointments, on the ground that Attenders Test clearance under Statute 41(12) had not been obtained. The Government proposed downgrading the posts of Laboratory Assistants to Office Attendants for one year, so petitioners could be promoted to Laboratory Assistants after probation and without Attenders Test, relying on the proviso to Statute 41(12). The petitioners asserted harmonious interpretation of Statutes 66 and 41(12). The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petitions, quashing Ext. P10 and directing payment of benefits while requiring Attenders Test within a permissible window. The Division Bench examined these issues, rejected a literal, impractical reading of the Attenders Test, and held the appointments to be in order, dismissing the appeals. The Court thus upheld a workable interpretation that permits direct recruitment and subsequent promotion, with equity in their favor.
This is a criminal appeal by Hima (the de facto complainant) challenging an anticipatory bail order granted to the accused in Crime No. 86 of 2023 registered at Munambam Police Station. The offences alleged span IPC sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 323 (causing hurt), 324 (voluntarily causing hurt with dangerous weapon), and 294(b) (obscene acts), read with section 34, as well as sections 3(1)(e), 3(1)(s), and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The incident, alleged to have occurred on 31-01-2023 around 7:30 pm, describes the first respondent riding negligently in front of the appellant’s house, crude caste-based abuse of her father-in-law, and, later, the arrival of the three respondents who allegedly assaulted her family, removed her husband’s dhoti, pulled her hair, and humiliated her using caste slurs; injuries to the father-in-law allegedly required treatment. Following registration of the crime, anticipatory bail was granted by the Sessions Court on the premise that only the 3(1)(s) offence under PoA Act is non-bailable, and materials did not show other non-bailable offences. The appellant contends that the trial court erred by not applying Section 18 of the PoA Act and by overlooking offences under 3(1)(e) and 3(2)(va), as well as the gravity of injuries. Reliance is placed on Vilas Pandurang Pawar and Bachu Das to require the court to verify prima facie offences under PoA Act before granting anticipatory bail. The High Court is urged to set aside the order and direct a fresh application before the Sessions Court with proper reasoning and due regard to the Act’s provisions.
This Public Interest Litigation challenges the conduct of Kalapoottu (bullock-cart races), Kannupoottu and Maramadi (cattle races) organised by the sixth respondent in Kollam district, alleging cruelty to animals and violation of central and constitutional protections. The petition relies on a chain of authority starting with the Central Government notification (G.S.R. 528(E)) issued under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 (PCA Act) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Animal Welfare Board India v. Nagaraja, which upheld the ban on performing animals such as bulls in Jallikattu and related events. The Kerala authorities (State, District Collector, Police, etc.) are accused of inaction despite complaints and a 26 August 2022 District Collector order prohibiting the events. The petition also cites Kerala High Court’s 2015 decision in Cattle Race Club of India v. State of Kerala (and related circulars Exhibits P2-P7) to contend that such events violate the PCA Act and the Constitution. In response, respondents defend the circulars and orders as consistent with jurisprudence; the court ultimately finds that the district authorities have issued prohibitory measures and makes the interim order absolute, disposing of the writ petition by reinforcing these prohibitions and directing strict implementation by all authorities.
Petitioner C. Pavithran, a former Sub Inspector in CRPF, challenges the retirement date fixed by Rule 43 of the CRPF Rules, 1955, contending that his date of birth (19 January 1959) would make him complete 57 years on 18 January 2016, and hence he would have to retire on 31 January 2016 according to the rule. He submits that, under the later Delhi High Court decision in Dev Sharma and Others v. Indo Tibetan Border Police and Others, CAPFs including CRPF should retire at 60 years and that the calculation of pension and gratuity must include a differential period added to actual service, resulting in arrears. He seeks a notional retirement date of 31 January 2019 and a corresponding pension enhancement, or, at minimum, to be treated as eligible for the same benefit. The respondents maintain that the petitioner retired on 31 January 2016, did not exercise an option to rejoin after retirement, and is not covered by the DIG/DGE guidelines; since he crossed 60 only in 2019, he cannot receive the enhanced benefits. The Kerala High Court examines Rule 43, the Delhi decision and its clarifications, and the general equitable considerations, concluding there is merit to the argument that some beneficiaries may be entitled to the extended benefits. The court disposes by quashing Ext.P4, directing reconsideration with an opportunity of hearing, and requiring fresh orders within three months in light of the law.
CRL.REV.PET NO.295 OF 2023 This is a CRL.Rev.Pet. challenging concurrent judgments in a cheque-issuance case under Section 138 NI Act. Sakthidharan, the accused, stood as guarantor for his brother’s chit transaction and issued a cheque for Rs. 1,03,308 to discharge the liability after the subscriber defaulted. The cheque was dishonoured for funds insufficent. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 138 NI Act and imposed two months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,03,308, with default imprisonment if not paid, and directed payment of compensation under Cr.P.C. 357(1)(b). The Appellate Court (Additional Sessions Court-V, Palakkad) modified the sentence to a day’s imprisonment up to the court’s rising time and allowed four months to pay the fine. The High Court examines whether the evidence establishes the transaction and the execution of the cheque and whether the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act were properly applied and rebutted. It finds the twin presumptions in favour of the complainant were rightly applied, and the accused failed to rebut them. It underscores that the jurisdiction of revision under Section 401 Cr.P.C is not wide enough to re‑evaluate evidence for a contra finding. The petition is dismissed, but four months’ time is granted to pay the compensation; the accused must appear in the trial court on 12.12.2023 for compliance.
This judgment concerns MACA No. 2461 of 2012 filed by Raju, the claimant in OP(MV) 900/2007 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakuda, challenging the Tribunal’s compensation for injuries from a motor-vehicle accident on 25.04.2007 involving autorickshaw KL-8/AB 3972. The Tribunal held negligence on the 2nd respondent and awarded Rs. 2,44,503, allocated across heads: loss of earnings (Rs. 9,000), medical and miscellaneous (Rs. 43,003), transportation (Rs. 500), pain and suffering (Rs. 25,000), permanent disability (Rs. 1,62,000). It rejected some heads and directed associated costs and interest. The insurer admitted the policy but contested the claimant’s age, occupation and income, claimed injuries were not serious and that the claimed compensation was exorbitant. On appeal, the High Court, in a single-judge decision, re-evaluated the award, relying on Supreme Court precedents Ramachandrappa, Raj Kumar Ajay Kumar and others, to avoid a mechanical mapping of disability to loss of earning capacity. The court fixed the notional monthly income at Rs. 6,000 (up from Rs. 3,000), recalculated three months of lost earnings to Rs. 18,000 (vs. Rs. 9,000), and held the claimant’s permanent disability required a broader assessment. Treating the disability as 50% with a 40% uplift for future prospects, the permanent disability award became Rs. 7,56,000; subtracting the earlier Rs. 1,62,000 yielded an additional Rs. 5,94,000. It also granted Rs. 1,00,000 for loss of amenities and Rs. 4,650 for bystander's expenses. The enhanced total is Rs. 7,07,650. The insurer is directed to deposit the amount at 7.5% interest within two months. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
WP(C) Nos. 8803/2022, 5204/2022, 8671/2022, 11889/2022, 23237/2022 Five writ petitions (WP(C) Nos. 8803/2022, 5204/2022, 8671/2022, 11889/2022 and 23237/2022) by advocates with more than ten years of practice challenge the rejection of their memorials seeking appointment as Notary Public under the Notaries Act, 1952 and the Notaries Rules, 1956. After interviews, the Competent Authority recommended the petitioners, who awaited appointment while communications indicated that their applications were decided under Rule 8(1)(c) as rejection. The petitioners filed reviews under Rule 8(3); except for a single petitioner, reviews were also rejected. The central issue is whether the Government may reject applications despite a favorable recommendation without assigning reasons. The Government contends that the Act and Rules vest broad discretionary power to decide and no obligation to give reasons attaches to rejection. The Court examines Sections 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 15 of the Notaries Act and Rules 3, 4, 7(3), 7-A(2) and 8(1), emphasizing that discretion must be exercised in a lawful, rational and non-arbitrary manner. Relying on Sharp v. Wakefield, S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, and Kranti Associates, the court holds that orders must speak with reasons. The petitions are allowed, impugned orders set aside, and the Government directed to pass fresh reasoned orders within three months after considering the interview-board recommendations.
This Regular First Appeal, RFA No. 76 of 2021, arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale Ext. A1 dated 06 July 2005, in which the plaintiff contends the defendant failed to perform. The Sub Court decree for specific performance was challenged by the defendant, leading to a remand by this Court to examine the disputed signature after sending Ext. A1 to handwriting experts. The expert report of Forensic Science Laboratory, Trivandrum (PW3) concluded that the disputed signature bears similarity to the admitted signature; the report was relied upon by the court on remand. The defendant had disputed the signature on Ext. A1 and had not admitted all pages; counsel invoked Chandrasekharan Nair v. Olympic Credit Corporation (2014) (2) KLT 242 to argue that an expert opinion must be supported by data and that the opinion alone cannot sustain proof. The plaintiff contends readiness and willingness to perform, and that the defendant did not reply to Ext. A3 notice; the suit was filed in 2006; time extensions via Ext. A2 were granted; after more than 16 years, the trial court’s reasons for granting specific performance were cogent. The High Court, however, declined to admit the appeal, finding no basis to exercise discretionary relief and dismissing the appeal.
SB Construction & Travels, a proprietary concern, along with its managing partner, sought arbitration under Annexure I and II of Work Orders executed with Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. (BPCL-MSBP site, Kochi Refinery Project). The disputes arose over non-payment despite performance of contractual obligations. Clause 22 of Annexure I requires disputes to be resolved exclusively through arbitration, and the applicants initially urged nomination of a sole arbitrator under the clause. They invoked Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 after relying on jurisprudence including TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd, which, as followed in Tulsi Developers India Pvt. Ltd. v. Dr. Appu Benny Thomas, render MD-nomination problematic. Notices to respondents returned as left, with service by e-mail completed; respondents did not appear. The Court examined Annexures I and II and concluded arbitration is appropriate, allowing the Arbitration Petition. It nominated Sri Abraham Vakkanal as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising from Annexure I and II, directed the Registry to obtain a Disclosure Statement under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1), and ordered the arbitrator’s fees under the Fourth Schedule. The appearance before the arbitrator was scheduled for 24.02.2022, despite respondents remaining ex parte. Appendix lists the Work Orders and related documents.
W.A. No. 1256 of 2022 (and connected cases) These intra-court appeals arise from multiple writ petitions filed by retired employees of Kerala State Financial Enterprises Ltd. (KSFE) challenging non-disbursal of non-statutory service benefits such as Earned Leave surrender, Dearness Allowance arrears, salary revision arrears, festival incentives, and other perks. KSFE contends that liabilities on account of alleged sticky loans/chits and internal circulars justify withholding these benefits, with penalties arising from the company’s Standing Orders and Kerala Service Rules, including rules on disciplinary action after retirement. The writ petitioners allege that no disciplinary proceedings were initiated prior to retirement, there is no rule permitting post-retirement action, and withholding of earned, non-statutory, or statutory benefits (including gratuity or pension) is a deprivation of property contrary to Article 300A of the Constitution. The learned Single Judge upheld the petitioners, directing disbursal within three months, with interest, and held the action ultra vires for withholding. The Division Bench of Justices Alexander Thomas and Shoba Annamma Eapen sustains the basic position that, in the absence of statutory or properly adopted non-statutory rules permitting post-retirement recovery, withholding such dues is not permissible. It calls for compliance within the timeframe to be counted from receipt of the judgment and observes that KSFE may pursue other lawful recovery methods. The judgment also notes the need for KSFE to consider amending Standing Orders while keeping in mind constitutional protections and the employer’s right to seek legal recovery.”
Salini, the appellant, sustained a severe crush injury to the right foot in a road traffic collision on 16 June 2012, after riding as a pillion on a scooter when a bus allegedly drove rashly. She moved the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, under OP(MV) No. 34/2013 seeking Rs 15,00,000 as compensation; the Tribunal awarded Rs 6,12,747. The appellant contends that the Tribunal erred by limiting her notional income to Rs 5,500 per month (ext. A9 leaves certificate) and by not applying future prospects—she argues for 50% future prospects in line with Ramachandrappa and the broader principle in Erudhaya Priya; she also asserts higher compensation under pain and suffering and nourishment given the extent of trauma, inpatient treatment for 27 days, and the plastic surgery necessitated by a 24.2% whole-body disability (exts. A3–A10). Respondents, including the insurer, contend that the Tribunal’s calculations were correct and should stand. The High Court undertook a reassessment, applying Ramachandrappa’s income principle and Erudhaya Priya’s future-prospects doctrine, and found that the appellant’s heads of permanent disability and loss of earning warranted re-determination. The result: the appellate court partially allowed the appeal, enhancing permanent disability and related amounts, while keeping other heads intact and awarding interest at 8% from the date of claim. The decision reflects a careful recalibration of notional income, disability, and future prospects to reflect the injury’s impact on earning capacity.
Lead case WA 676/2020 (and batch of connected WAs) The Kerala High Court delivered a common judgment in a batch of writ appeals (WA Nos. 676/2020, 52/2020, 395/2020, 800/2020, 711/2020, 721/2020, 712/2020, 713/2020, 754/2020, 735/2020, 743/2020, 790/2020, 1382/2020, 765/2020, 801/2020, 773/2020, 774/2020, 805/2020, 1391/2020, 1400/2020, 821/2020, 1363/2020, 1377/2020, 823/2020, 1491/2020, 1416/2020, 1381/2020, 802/2020, 803/2020, 859/2020, 873/2020, 871/2020, 883/2020, 3705/2018, 961/2020, 1036/2020, 1112/2020, 1101/2020, 1338/2020, 87/2022, 1206/2020, 11649/2017, 12570/2017, 12619/2017, 12959/2017, 17753/2017, 19310/2017, 20196/2017, 20283/2017, 1718/2020, 21946/2017, 24228/2017, 1705/2020) challenging the retrospective amendments to Section 42(3) of the KVAT Act, introduced by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016 (Act 18/2016. The core question was whether Section 42(3) could operate retrospectively from 1 April 2005, and how its ‘treated as pending’ mechanism interacts with the existing five-year/ six-year time limits under Section 25(1) of the KVAT Act and the related Rules (Rule 58(20) KVAT Rules). The court examined a broad line of authorities on retrospective legislation and tax procedure, including Ghanshyam Das, Ramdas Laxmidas, Taj Mahal Hotel Secunderabad, Vatika Township, Maruti Suzuki, Essar Teleholdings, Patel Raghav Natha, National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation, West Bengal v. Union of India, Krishan Kumar v. Rajasthan, and Najeem. The bench held that while retrospective legislation is permissible, it must be reasonable and harmonized with existing limits; the “treated as pending” fiction cannot override the statute’s time limits, and a balanced interpretation is required. Ultimately the court dismissed the batch of writ appeals, affirming the preceding High Court’s view that the VKVAT amendment deserves cooperation with time‑limits and decisions on the matter remain with the prior order.
