This Original Petition (Civil) arises from an election petition challenging the election of the petitioner from Ward No.9 of Edakkad West Constituency in Kadamur Grama Panchayat, Kannur District, held on 14.10.2020. The petitioner in the OP(C) 2264/2022, C.P. Sameera, contends that Exts P7 and P8 orders in I.A. Nos.13 & 14/2022 in the election petition (O.P. Ele/No.2/2021) were erroneous and premature. The election petition had been filed by the first respondent, Savithri D.K., alleging double voting by six voters who allegedly cast ballots in two constituencies, which would void those votes and potentially alter the outcome where the petitioner had 448 votes to 445 for the first respondent and 68 for the second respondent. The trial was completed, and the petitioners sought production of the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), VIVIPAT memory chip and controlling unit, along with a technician to testify about the EVM, under Exts P3 and P4. The court below allowed these applications, prompting the present challenge. Relying on decisions like Neelalohithadasan Nadar v. George Mascrene and Noushad M.M., the High Court examines whether prima facie satisfaction suffices to order EVM inspection and whether specific voters can be identified for such action. The court ultimately suspends Exts P7 and P8, directing the Munsiff to determine, on the pleadings and evidence, whether double voting occurred and whether it would materially affect the election, and to proceed expeditiously in accordance with law. The decision underscores that ballot papers and EVM-related inspections must be anchored in concrete findings rather than mere prima facie suspicion.
This is an original petition challenging an order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (OA 1452/2013) that granted retrospective promotion to Sajeev C.S., HSST (Senior) in the Kerala Higher Secondary Education State Service, based on an inter-party judgment (Annexure-A9). The petitioner, Director of Higher Secondary Education, contends that the Tribunal’s grant of retrospective promotion and the corresponding modification of seniority and duties are inconsistent with the relevant statutory rules and precedents. The respondent contends that vacancies after 31.08.2007 necessitated promotion from HSST (Junior) to HSST (Senior) and that the Tribunal’s findings align with Rule 28 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, the Special Rules for the Kerala Higher Secondary Education State Service, and earlier High Court decisions. The petitioner relies on Nirmal Chandra Sinha v. Union of India (2008) 14 SCC 29 to argue against retroactive promotion, while acknowledging the tribunal’s reliance on rule-based principles. The High Court scrutinizes the rule framework (Rule 3 of the Special Rules; Rule 28(b)(i)(10); Rule 28(b)(iA); Rule 28(bb); Rule 23(C) of Part I KSR) and the cited precedents (James Mathew, Varghese, Padmanabhan Nair) to determine whether the Tribunal’s order can stand. Ultimately, the court dismisses the Original Petition, stating that monetary benefits need not be paid and that the department’s position is supported by applicable rules and precedents.
OP (DRT) No. 73 of 2017 (O) This is an original petition (OP) under the SARFAESI framework before the Kerala High Court challenging a common order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) II, Ernakulam in S.A. No.11/2016. The petitioner, a borrower, contends that the DRT erred in holding that a notice of dispossession issued in the course of measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act cannot be challenged by an application under Section 17. The court traces a line of decisions, including Sami v. Bank of India and earlier Supreme Court rulings in Ashok Saw Mill, Satyawati Tandon and Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev, to examine whether the term “measure” in Section 13(4) should be construed liberally to include steps such as approaching a Magistrate under Section 14 and the assignment of possession by an Advocate Commissioner. It discusses Noble Kumar and the tension between post-possession remedies and pre-possession steps, ultimately holding that every step in effectuation of a Section 13(4) measure can trigger an appeal under Section 17. The court sets aside the DRT order to the extent it excludes such steps, directs restoration of applications, and remands for merits adjudication. The judgment emphasizes liberal construction of remedies under SARFAESI and reconciles conflicting precedents to protect aggrieved borrowers.”
OP (RC).No. 172 of 2016 and OP (RC).No. 174 of 2016 Felix Varghese and Cibi Felix, landlords, filed two Rent Control Petitions seeking fixation of fair rent for tenanted premises in Ernakulam. The Rent Control Court dismissed the petitions, and the landlords appealed, but the appeals were not numbered due to a defect—the additional court fee under Section 76(1) of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act had not been paid. The government notified, by G.O. 9/2016/Law, that an additional court fee of 1% of the amount involved (or Rs 100 where not applicable) would be levied for original petitions, petitions, appeals, or revisions to tribunals and civil courts. The petitioners contended that since the petitions were filed before the notification, no extra fee could be demanded in the appeals; the respondents contended that Section 76(1) is non-obstante and applicable to appeals as continuation of original proceedings. The Kerala High Court held that Sec.76(1) is non-obstante and that the notification cannot operate retrospectively; since no fee was exigible when the petitions were filed, the petitioners cannot be liable to pay the Section 76(1) fee in their appeals. It relied on State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd for the non-retroactive effect of such amendments and on other Kerala decisions. The original petitions were allowed; the impugned orders set aside; the court directed numbering of appeals and to decide admission without insisting on the additional fee.
CRL.M.C. No. 8688 of 2023 This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 CrPC in the High Court of Kerala, arising from CC 1632/2018 connected to Crime No.1812/2016 of Kodakara Police Station, Thrissur. The petitioner, Davis Pullan, an accused in the aforesaid proceedings, faced charges under IPC sections 406 and 420 read with 34 and under sections 3 and 17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958. The prosecution contends that the victim is willing to settle the dispute and that a compromise may be permissible to some extent; the matter was discussed with reference to Sajeev & Another v. State of Kerala & Another (2022) 2 KLT 861. The petitioner’s counsel submits that the parties have settled and desire quashing of the prosecution, supported by the victim’s affidavit. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing based solely on a settlement, but acknowledged the existence of a settlement. The court, after examining the records and considering Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and related judgments (Gian Singh; Narinder Singh), held that where the dispute is private in nature, and the offence is not a serious or public-interest crime, the powers under S.482 CrPC can be exercised to quash the proceedings. It concluded that the private settlement was genuine, private in nature, and warranted quashing. Accordingly, the court allowed the Criminal Misc. Case and quashed all further proceedings in CC 1632/2018."
The Kerala High Court heard Criminal Appeal (V) No.34 of 2022, filed by the de facto complainant, challenging an acquittal in SC No.899 of 2014 (Special Court for Trial of Offences Against Women and Children, Thalassery) and CP 72/2014 (Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Koothupparambu). The trial court had acquitted the sole accused of offences under IPC Sections 450 (trespass for rape), 511 (attempt to commit an offence), 376 (rape), and 427 (mischief). The prosecution alleged that on 25.6.2014 the accused trespassed into the complainant’s residence, attempted to commit rape, pulled her to a bedroom, tore her nighty, and caused damage to the door of the room. The High Court undertook a reassessment of the evidence under the principles governing appeals against acquittals, citing Chandrappa and other authorities. It found the complainant (PW1) not wholly reliable, and PW2’s testimony not credible; it highlighted unexplained delay in filing the complaint, and the non-examination of the priest early in the investigation as significant concerns. The court also noted inconsistencies about PW2’s presence and PW5’s (the husband) timing, and relied on authorities such as Harbeer Singh and Vadivelu Thevar to emphasize possible doubts created by delays and credibility issues. Ultimately, the court concluded that two reasonable conclusions were possible on the evidence and upheld the trial court’s acquittal, dismissing the appeal.
The appellant, Vaigai Thread Processors Pvt. Ltd. (in liquidation), filed FAO No. 129 of 2022 challenging an order of dismissal for default in O.S. No. 282 of 2010 before the Irinjalakuda Sub Court. The suit claimed realization of Rs. 4,10,22,240 with interest on Rs. 3,06,60,000 at 12% per annum. It was dismissed for default on 07.11.2015 due to non‑representation. The plaintiff sought restoration under Order IX Rule 9 and a delay condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 via I.A. Nos. 3565 and 3564 of 2019, respectively. The winding up of the company was ordered by the Karnataka High Court on 05.03.2015, after which the Official Liquidator sought permission to engage counsel (granted on 10.08.2018) and assumed charge on 08.11.2018. The Sub Court dismissed the applications on 06.08.2022, finding inordinate delay and lack of sufficient cause, echoing Ramla v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. and related precedents that liberal condonation must be balanced with other factors. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench comprising Anil K. Narendran and P.G. Ajithkumar, allowed the appeal, set aside the common order, condoned the delay, and restored O.S. No. 282 of 2010. It directed expeditious proceedings within four months and scheduled appearance on 16.08.2023. The decision emphasizes a pragmatic, justice‑oriented approach to condonation of delay, acknowledging the Official Liquidator’s role and the overarching goal of timely adjudication.
Mathew C.R., a former teacher at St. Antony’s Higher Secondary School, challenged the denial of retroactive appointment as Principal and related pay benefits. He joined service in 1990, advanced to High School Assistant in 1998, became Headmaster in 2010, and was transferred as Principal of St. Antony’s Higher Secondary School on 14.12.2011. His appointment as Principal was not approved and he continued drawing the pay of a High School Assistant, while juniors promoted as Headmasters earned higher salaries. He sought notional fixation of pay under Ext P6, seniority benefits as on 1.6.2013 and Headmaster scale as on 1.6.2014 with increments that would have accrued had he remained Headmaster, and urgent approval of the transfer-based promotion. After amendment, he challenged Exts P7 and P8 in light of Thomas K.L. v. State of Kerala. The Government argued Exts P7 and P8 were proper and that pay scales and approvals followed statutory rules. The court relied on Thomas K.L. and later decisions (including a 2023 judgment in W.P.(C.) No. 20757/2022) to hold that financial liability cannot govern interpretation of statutory rules and notifications conferring benefits. The court quashed Exts P7 and P8, directed the 3rd respondent to approve the appointment w.e.f. 14.12.2011 within two months, and ordered payment of consequential benefits within two more months, effectively allowing the petition.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges Ext.P5 OA No.12 of 2022, now pending before the Fourth Respondent Deputy Commissioner under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, for appointing the 7th Respondent as hereditary trustee of the Kambar Sree Durga Parameshwari Temple. The petitioners rely on Ext.P4, a 2020 judgment in W.P.(C)No.19935 of 2018, which quashed Ext.P3 order in OA No.4/2014, and contend that the Fourth Respondent ought not to entertain OA No.12 in view of Ext.P4 and the bar under Section 62 MHRE Act. They sought to implead themselves as additional respondents (Exts.P7–P7c) and argued that if OA12 is not maintainable, the proper remedy lies before the Fourth Respondent, after impleadment, rather than via writ. The respondents counter that maintainability concerns must be raised before the Fourth Respondent and not in a writ petition, and that OA No.12 is a valid exercise of power under the MHRE Act. The Court cites Tiny @ Antony v. Jacky and others to illustrate that writ petitions cannot decide landlord-tenant disputes or probe plaints against private parties, and that maintainability should be raised before the proper forum. Ultimately, the Court disposes of the petition by directing the Fourth Respondent to consider Ext.P7 interlocutory applications and decide thereon before further action on OA No.12, with notice to petitioners and the 7th respondent, preserving other contentions for appropriate stage.
Cont.Case (C) No. 2015 of 2019 This Contempt of Court case arises out of a writ petition WP(C) No.30990 of 2016 by several petitioners challenging the implementation of pension-related directions issued by the Kerala High Court in 2018 and the subsequent Supreme Court orders on amendments to the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) pension scheme. The petitioners, identified as petitioners 2, 5, 10, 13, 16, 27, 32, 41, 65 and 66 in the related writ petition, allege willful disobedience of Annexure A1’s judgments and seek enforcement of the directions. The respondents EPFO argue that the 2014 amendment to the pension scheme via Notification G.S.R. 609(E) is legal and that any changes can be implemented in accordance with law, including the read of para 11(3) proviso and para 11(4) post-amendment options. The Apex Court’s 2022 judgment in Sunil Kumar B. v. EPFO (AIR 2022 SC 5634) held the amendment legal and valid and directed read-downs and extensions to exercise options, which the Kerala High Court references. After hearing the parties, the court notes that the Apex Court’s decision necessitates reconsideration of the petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension by the EPFO and accordingly closes the contempt case, while preserving EPFO’s right to act under the law and the Supreme Court’s directions.
The petitioner, Bijin P.J., seeks mutation of revenue records to reflect ownership of a total extent of 10.62 acres (7.01 Ares in Re. Sy. No. 9/2 and 3.61 Ares in Re. Sy. No. 9/3) in the name of his wife, Silja Jose, based on sale deeds Exts. P2, P7, and P8. He argues that under Section 3 of the Land Tax Act, 1961, he is the land holder and that mutation should be granted if the application is otherwise in order, without requiring prior title deeds. The 1st respondent Tahsildar rejected mutation for 3.61 Ares in 9/3 on the ground that it is not included in the prior deed (Ext. P2), and the 2nd respondent Village Officer refused mutation due to lack of valid documents. The petitioner relies on decisions in Synudheen v. State of Kerala, Vijayalakshmi v. Tahsildar, and Renjith District Collector to argue that the Tahsildar cannot adjudicate on title derivation or insist on prior title documents while recording mutations. The respondents contend that the petitioner has not proven his right over 3.61 Ares in 9/3 and that mutation was rightly refused. The court relies on established precedents to hold that revenue authorities cannot verify title derivation in mutation. It directs the Tahsildar to reconsider the mutation of Exts. P7 and P8 afresh, without insisting on prior title deeds, if otherwise in order, within six weeks, and disposes of the petition.
CRL.APPEAL NO. 1284 OF 2019 This is a criminal appeal under Section 378(4) CrPC arising from a Section 138 NI Act prosecution. The Kerala Malanad Karshaka Produce Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd (the appellant) challenged an acquittal of Jelly Sebastian and Vazhakattu Enterprises in ST No.659 of 2016. The appellant alleged that the second respondent (a proprietary firm run by the first respondent) availed a loan and issued Ext.P2, a cheque dated 18-06-2016 for Rs.2,17,751, towards the debt, which was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The trial court found that the execution of Ext.P2 was not duly proved and that there were discrepancies regarding the loan transaction, resulting in acquittal. The appellant argued that the cheque was presented with the drawer’s signature after filling in the columns in the presence of PW1, which suffices to prove execution; reliance on Divakaran v. State of Kerala to negate the signed cheque is misplaced, and the Supreme Court’s Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar provides the proper framework for presumptions in NI Act cases. The appellate court held that Ext.P2 was issued voluntarily and signed by the drawer, that the loan transaction was established, and that the lower court’s application of Divakaran was incorrect. Consequently, the acquittal was reversed, and the respondents were convicted under Section 138 NI Act; the first respondent was sentenced to pay Rs.2.5 lakh as fine, with the amount to be paid to the appellant as compensation.
W.P.(C) No. 33204 of 2023 This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by R. Rajendran, a devotee of Lord Ayyappa at the Sabarimala Sree Dharma Sastha Temple, seeking mandamus to ensure full and effective darshan for all pilgrims. The petitioner recounts that the present darshan procedure requires devotees to move in a tight, horizontal path in front of the sanctum sanctorum, with movement controlled by security personnel, resulting in a split-second darshan and many worshippers leaving without a satisfactory view of the deity. He asserts that the temple is on a higher plane from the temple ground, accessible via Pathinettampadi (the 18 holy steps), Swarna Kodimaram near the steps, and a constrained space between the Chuttambalam and the sanctum sanctorum. To remedy this, the petitioner urges permitting entry through the front door near the flag post and enabling worshippers to proceed by five to ten steps to obtain full darshan. The petition discusses Ext.P1-P3 photographs and relies on earlier court directives in Sajeev Sastharam v. State of Kerala and Suo motu v. Union of India, as well as the Travancore-Cochin Act provisions (Sections 15A, 24, 31) and IT security rules governing the Virtual-Q system. The High Court declines to alter the established procedure at this stage but disposes of the petition with directions to implement the cited decisions during the Mandala-Makaravilakku season (2023-24) for smoother crowd management and darshan.
Cont.Case (C) No. 2383 of 2019 Cont.Case (C) No.2383 of 2019 arises from a contempt petition filed by nine petitioners in W.P.(C) No.3530 of 2019, challenging alleged willful disobedience of directions in Annexure A1 judgment (dated 26.02.2019) following Annexure A2 judgment (12.10.2018) in W.P.(C) No.13120/2015 and connected matters. The Supreme Court’s order on SLP No.9610/2019 was recalled, and a detailed judgment was rendered on 04.11.2022 in Civil Appeal Nos.8143-8144 of 2022 and connected matters (AIR 2022 SC 5634), holding that the Notification No.G.S.R.609(E) dated 22.08.2014 is legal and valid and directing amendments to the pension scheme for both exempted and regular establishments, along with time-bound directions for option exercises and fund transfer. The judgment read with para 44 directs that employees who did not exercise option, or who exercised under a proviso to para 11(3) of the pre-amendment, be given opportunities under the amended para 11(4). The petitioners contend that EPFO has not implemented these directives and seeks higher pension entitlements accordingly. The respondent EPFO submitted that the exercise would be undertaken in accordance with law. After hearings, the court closed the contempt case, noting that EPFO will reconsider entitlements for higher pension in light of the 2022 apex decision, under Article 142 of the Constitution.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case (CRL.M.C.8132 of 2023) under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, arising from a complaint under Section 138. The petitioner, Faizal Abdul Samad, accused in ST No.3117/2019 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chottanikkara, challenges Annexure-A6, an order directing interim compensation under Section 143A NI Act. The complainant alleged a property deal in which cheques issued by the petitioner for the balance sale consideration bounced, and statutory notices were issued. The magistrate, on 5/9/2022, passed an interim award directing 20% of the cheque amount as interim compensation to be paid within 60 days. The petitioner contends that the order was passed mechanically without a speaking order or sufficient cogent reasoning, and that Section 143A does not mandate such an unfounded quantum. The High Court examines the statutory framework: Section 143A permits interim compensation up to 20% of the cheque amount and requires a reasoned exercise of discretion when fixing the quantum. Relying on decisions like Jisha v. State of Kerala, Jahangir Nadaf v. Farooq Abdul Razak, and Nazir Ahmad Chopan v. Abdul Rehman Chopan, the Court holds that while the power can be exercised suo motu, such orders must be accompanied by reasons. The Court ultimately sets aside Annexure-A6, directing the JFCM to reconsider CMP No.1107/2022 in light of the principled dicta and to do so expeditiously, ensuring reasons for the quantum. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
BAIL APPL. NO. 9467 OF 2023 Joshua Mathew, the second accused, seeks regular bail under Section 439 CrPC in Crime No. 809/2023 of Pathanamthitta Police Station. The prosecution contends that, while serving as president and secretary of the Mylapra Service Co-operative Bank, he and the first accused induced depositors to invest substantial sums by representing that deposits would be safe and returned with interest. The informant and his wife reportedly deposited Rs. 10,00,000 on 11.05.2015 into account 104/2015-2016, another Rs. 10,00,000 into joint account 105/2015-2016, and later deposits on 8.3.2016 (Rs. 10,00,000) and 9.5.2019 (Rs. 7,00,000) with terms ranging up to 23 months, aggregating an alleged amount of Rs. 92,18,178 that remained unpaid. The prosecution claims the acts were in furtherance of a common intention and caused unlawful loss to the informant. The petitioner counters that the liability is with the administrative committee, that there is no debtor-creditor relationship with him personally, and that there was no dishonest intent from the inception; he is willing to comply with conditions and cooperate with the investigation. The Public Prosecutor argues the investigation is at a preliminary stage, that the informant’s life savings were deposited on the basis of assurances from the accused, and that the accused—being a powerful politician—could influence witnesses and tamper with evidence, making bail inappropriate at this stage. The court, noting a strong prima facie case yet considering the documentary nature of much evidence and the petitioner’s detention history, grants bail with stringent conditions including reporting, non-interference, surrender of passport, and other safeguards, while authorizing ongoing police recoveries as needed under law.
Bechu Kurian Thomas, J., disposed a writ petition challenging the investigation into Crime No.167/2017 of Harippad Police Station. The petitioner, Binoy V, sought the constitution of a Special Investigation Team and an enquiry into irregularities in the investigation, alleging forgery of signatures and handwriting in a forged Right to Information Act application intended to disrupt his matrimonial relationship with the 5th respondent. The allegations involve the signatures/handwriting of the petitioner and the involvement of the 5th and 6th respondents. The final report, filed on 04.02.2019, described the matter as a “mistake of fact.” The petitioner contends that the investigation was not properly conducted, lacked material, and was malafide to shield the culprits. The 4th respondent asserted that a full-fledged investigation was conducted; the case was referred as “mistake of fact” and, although the Forensic Science Laboratory sought additional samples, the final report was filed after considering available inputs. The court scrutinized the investigation, noting that the requisition for further inputs was not complied with and the specimen-handwriting analyses were not adequately pursued. Relying on Vinay Thyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762, it held that the investigation did not inspire confidence and that the final report was defective. Consequently, the final report (Ext.P6) was set aside, and a reinvestigation by a different competent officer was directed. The writ petition was allowed.
N. Gopalakrishnan Potty, a retired priest (Santhi) of the Travancore Devaswom Board, challenged the Board’s decision to deduct from his retirement benefits an amount of Rs. 1,89,538 on account of an alleged overpayment arising from a prior, allegedly erroneous fixation of pay. The petitioner retired on 30.11.2021; subsequent communications suggested a liability had been fixed against him and that the amount would be recovered from his retiral benefits (Ext. P1 and P2). The petitioner contends that no liability or enquiry was pursued during service to justify such recovery, and that the unilateral deduction violates settled law. His counsel argued that, as per the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer) (2015) 4 SCC 334, no recovery can be ordered from a low-paid employee after retirement when the disputed payment was made lawfully and without misrepresentation or fraud. The petitioner also invoked Jaydev Singh to emphasize that recovery requires an undertaking to refund. The respondent Board asserted the liability originated from an earlier erroneous payment due to pay fixation and could be adjusted against retirement benefits. The High Court ultimately held that, in light of Rafiq Masih, recovery could not be ordered and directed full disbursement of the amount within a month, with interest if delayed, while leaving open other remedies for the petitioner.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 8916 of 2023) before Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan of the Kerala High Court arising from Crime No. 2043 of 2017 of Kilikolloor Police Station, Kollam, in which five petitioners-accused challenge continuation of criminal proceedings arising from SC No.1410 of 2019. The petitioners contend that the dispute with the victims has been settled and the prosecution should be quashed in light of a private settlement. The victims have filed affidavits supporting the settlement and indicating they have no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while expressing reservations about quashing solely on settlement, concedes that the matter is settled. The court examines the governing principle from Supreme Court jurisprudence, notably State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) and its reliance on Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, to delineate the scope of Section 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences where the dispute is private and resolved, while stressing limits such as heinous offences or offences under special statutes. After considering the facts, the settled nature of the dispute, and the law, the court finds the dispute private, the settlement genuine, and the test for quashing satisfied. Accordingly, the Criminal Misc. Case is allowed and all further proceedings against the petitioners in SC No.1410/2019 arising from Crime No.2043/2017 are quashed.
WP(C) Nos. 32717 & 39926 of 2023 These writ petitions relate to Evoor Sree Krishna Swamy Temple, under the Travancore Devaswom Board, and challenge the management of temple affairs by multipe Haindava Samithies (kara committees) that allegedly interfered with temple rituals and festivals. The petitions argue that there was no properly constituted Temple Advisory Committee (TAC) under Section 31A of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, until an TAC was approved by the Devaswom Commissioner in April 2023. The petitioners contend the Haindava Samithies have acted illegally by organizing and funding temple activities, collecting money from devotees without proper receipts, and bypassing the TAC. The respondents maintain that the TAC is statutory (Section 31A) and approved by the Board, while kara committees (Haindava Samithies) continue to play a crucial role in annual festivals and rituals, including boat races funded by grants from the Devaswom. The court surveys the statutory framework (Sections 3, 15A, 31, 31A, and bye-laws including Clause 18) and prior rulings (Chandu K. v. Travancore Devaswom Board; Major Vellayani Devi Temple Advisory Committee v. State of Kerala; Rajalekshmi P. v. State of Kerala; Sunil Kumar C. v. Travancore Devaswom Board) to hold that TAC formation is statutory and that the Board must ensure prompt rites and proper administration. The judgment directs that temple activities be conducted under TAC, restricts fund collection to TAC via sealed coupons, requires audit by the Board, and disposes of the petitions with these directions on 21 December 2023.
