This is a Kerala High Court writ petition by C.K. Jacob Chowallur House challenging Exhibit P4, a February 12, 2020 order blacklisting the contractor and cancelling his ‘A’ class licence for alleged defects in the restoration work of the Chavakkad bypass road. The petitioner, an ‘A’ class contractor since 2003, completed the restoration work on 13.3.2019; during the defect liability period potholes developed and the petitioner contends urgent repairs on 21.9.2019 were done under telephonic directions from an Assistant Engineer due to the Chief Minister’s planned visit to Guruvayur, with no officials available to oversee on a holiday. In September 2019 the department forfeited the security deposit (Exhibit P2). Subsequently, the petitioner was summoned for a hearing, and on 12.11.2019 he submitted a response; Exhibit P4 then issued blacklisting and cancellation. The petitioner argued there was no copy of the 28.9.2019 notice and that the hearing was not meaningful, violating natural justice. The Court cites Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India, and UMC Technologies (P) Ltd. v. FCI to emphasize that fair hearing is essential before imposing severe civil penalties. It held that Exhibit P4 suffers from non‑compliance with natural justice and that the period of blacklisting cannot be indefinite. The order was quashed, with directions to reconsider the action and to decide renewal of the licence in accordance with law. The writ petition was allowed, with costs.
This Regular Second Appeal, RSA No.701/2022, is filed by defendants 1 and 2 (M.R. RadhaKrishnan and Vijayalakshmi RadhaKrishnan) challenging the decree and judgment in O.S.426/2009 of the Ist Additional Munsiff Court, Ernakulam, and the subsequent AS 2/2015 judgment dated 31.01.2022 in A.S.2/2015 of the Sub Court, Ernakulam. The suit sought fixation of the boundary and a permanent prohibitory injunction regarding a 41.40-acre plaint schedule plot, which the trial court adjudged in the plaintiffs’ favor, fixing the south‑eastern boundary and ordering the defendants to remove encroachment, with a prohibitory injunction against trespass and costs. The appellate court confirmed this decree. The appellants contend that the suit, filed after withdrawal of an earlier suit (O.S.57/2008) with liberty to file a fresh suit, cannot widen the scope; they also challenge the survey plan Ext.C2(a) and the Commission report Ext.C2. The plaintiffs/ respondents argue that withdrawal with liberty was unconditional and allowed a fresh suit on the same subject matter. The High Court examines Order 23 CPC, especially Rule 3, and the conditions for withdrawal with liberty to file a fresh suit; it holds that without terms or restrictions, a second suit on the same subject matter is permissible. The court ultimately upholds the concurrent decrees, finds no substantial question of law, and dismisses the Second Appeal, vacating interlocutory orders.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 CrPC by nine petitioners who are accused in CC No.223/2023 arising from Crime No.126/2023 of Nadakkavu Police Station, Kozhikode. The petitioners seek to quash the prosecution on the ground that the parties have amicably settled their dispute, a fact supported by affidavits from the victims and without any objection from them. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing based solely on a settlement but acknowledged that a settlement exists. The court extensively surveys Supreme Court jurisprudence on the power under Sec. 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences, particularly when the dispute is private and civil in character and the entire dispute has been resolved between the parties. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) the Court outlined conditions under which quashing may be warranted, while cautioning that heinous offences (e.g., murder, rape, dacoity) or offences under special statutes and offences by public servants are generally not quashed merely on compromise. The High Court in the instant case finds the present dispute private in nature, with no serious societal impact, and the settlement supported by the victims. Consequently, after examining the record and considering the antecedents and conduct of the accused, the court allows the petition and quashes the proceedings in CC No.223/2023. The ruling aligns with the broader framework laid out in Laxmi Narayan and cited precedents, while emphasising that private settlements can justify withdrawal of non‑compoundable proceedings where appropriate.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from concurrent decrees in OS 503/2015 before the Munsiff, Manjeri and AS 02/2022 before the Subordinate Judge, Manjeri, challenging a perpetual injunction over plaint schedule property described as 2.1 acres. Abdulla, the defendant in the original suits, challenges the plaintiffs’ title derived from Kanam documents and a sale deed, asserting Kanam rights in parts of the land and disputing the plaintiffs’ assertion of title and possession. The plaintiffs contend they hold title and possession over the entire plaint schedule property and that the defendant has attempted to encroach, justifying the injunction. The trial court found that the plaintiffs’ evidence, including Ext. C4(a) plan and a PW1 report, establishes the location and extent of the plaintiff's land, while the defendant’s claim, based on a partition of Kanam rights and a plan, was found to be inconsistent with Ext. C4(a). The first appellate court upheld the injunction. On admission of the RSA, the appellant argued that the property was not accurately measured despite four commissions, that Ext. C4(a) indicates encroachment, and that if the decree stands, the defendant’s rights will be affected. The High Court concurred that the matter does not present a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC and dismissed the second appeal, affirming the concurrent injunctions.
This Transfer Petition (Civil) arises from O.P. No.354 of 2019 and O.P.749 of 2020 before the Family Court, Kozhikode, in a matrimonial dispute between the petitioner, Vidya Mundekkat, and the respondent, Akhilesh Jayaram. The petitioner seeks transfer of these petitions to the Family Court at Chavara on the ground that she and her eight-year-old daughter have since April 2018 resided at a flat in Amritapuri, Karunagappally, a relocation she claims to be permanent and which makes the 330-km journey to Kozhikode onerous. The minor child has been living with the petitioner and studying in Amritavidyalaym, Karunagappally. The respondent argues lack of bonafides, alleging the transfer is a device to harass him, and notes his chronic myocardial disease. He points to past maintenance orders and asserts the petitioner misrepresented her address and employment history. The court recognizes the Supreme Court's guidance that convenience of the wife is a factor but cautions against abuse of transfer petitions and requires a merits-based decision. Citing Anindita Das v. Srijit Das (2006) SCC 197, it emphasizes deciding each petition on its merits. The court finds no proven permanent shift of residence to Amritapuri and upholds Kozhikode’s territorial jurisdiction, dismissing the transfer petition.
The sole accused in SC No.139/2012 before the Additional Sessions Court – IV, Kollam, was convicted for offences under Sections 341, 450, 506(ii) and 376 IPC and sentenced to various terms including life imprisonment for rape. The prosecution examined 16 witnesses; the victim, a widow with two children, testified that on 06.07.2011 the accused stood near her house, trespassed into her kitchen through the back door, embraced her, dragged her to the bedroom, and forced sexual intercourse after threatening to kill her. Medical evidence (Exts. P3, P4, P21) indicated injuries and congested fourchette, suggesting resistance and vaginal penetration; the shirt and dhoti worn by the accused were recovered. The defence contested the rape charges, arguing that hair evidence did not prove rape and that the accused might have been capable or incapable of sexual intercourse; cross-examination suggested a relationship between the parties, and the defense invoked pre-2013 law that required penetration for rape. The Division Bench addressed whether the victim could be a sterling witness per Rai Sandeep and whether penetration was essential, relying on older precedents that penile contact could amount to rape. It upheld conviction but modified the sentence for rape from life imprisonment to 12 years’ rigorous imprisonment, emphasizing the victim’s credibility and the gravity of the offence.
WP(C).No.37385 of 2018(W) This writ petition challenges the University of Kerala Veterinary and Animal Sciences University’s method of regularizing casual labourers and absorbing them as permanent employees under Ext.P4, following Ext.P2 (notification dated 24.04.2013). Petitioners, five casual workers who previously served in the University Livestock Farm and Fodder Research and Development Scheme units, seek a direction to prepare a select list with weightage for prior casual service and to call for the records leading to permanent appointments under Ext.P4, and to quash Ext.P4. They argue the University had no authority to grant permanent posts to individuals in the select list and that the temporary/daily labour appointments lacked transparency, vacancy details, qualification criteria, and a defined selection process. The University counters that the entire selection process was transparent, publicized via Ext.P2, the University website, and newspapers; petitioners participated and were ranked (e.g., 202, 188, 193, 191, 164) but were below the cutoff and the list expired on 26.12.2017. It is stated that several casual workers were absorbed according to vacancies, with Ext.P4 issued on 27.04.2017; seniority lists were prepared and absorption occurred after posting. The court examines Umadevi (3) to evaluate regularization in the absence of vacancies and proper notification, notes petitioners’ participation and lack of corruption evidence, and concludes no interference is warranted under Article 226. The petition is dismissed with a caveat that still-qualified petitioners may be considered for daily/casual posts if positions arise.
This Regular Second Appeal, decided by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, challenges a money-recovery attempt against a property originally belonging to the family of the second respondent. The plaintiff, Naduvatheyath Sulochana, purchased the plaint schedule land by Exhibit A1 (sale deed dated 04.03.1992) and has been in exclusive possession, asserting the sale was genuine and free of encumbrances. The Syndicate Bank sought to recover a loan of Rs.12,000 extended to the wife of defendant No.2, with defendant No.2 as guarantor. The bank contends Exhibit A1 is a sham, designed to shield the property from recovery by portraying the sale as a mere device. The trial court dismissed the suit, deeming A1 a sham; the first appellate court affirmed. The High Court, examining the evidentiary burden to prove sham and the appropriate test for determining sham arrangements, rejected the lower courts’ reliance on the consideration figure alone. It relies on Diplock’s definition of sham in Snook, Rangappa’s articulation of sham essence, and Chow Yoong Hong’s emphasis on proving true nature with evidence. The court held the plaintiff’s documentary evidence (A1–A3) and possession, along with the bank’s inability to establish a genuine sham, favor the plaintiff. The appeal is allowed, the original suit is decreed, and the bank is restrained from proceeding against the property to recover the bank’s debt, with costs. The interlocutory applications are closed.
J. Ramkumar, proprietor of Aryas Hotel at Chengannur, challenged eviction in a Rent Control Revision before the Kerala High Court, arising from an eviction order under Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The eviction followed a long procedural and judicial march: the landlord’s petitions under Section 11 for eviction, the tenant’s challenge to maintainability, and a series of interim deposits of admitted arrears under Section 12(1)–(2) with related IAs. The Rent Control Court initially rejected two applications, and later, the Rent Control Appellate Authority upheld eviction by confirming the Court’s 20.03.2017 order. The tenant pursued multiple revisions and special proceedings up to the Supreme Court, which, in 2018–2019, addressed deposit obligations and remanded certain aspects for expeditious disposal of execution petitions. The High Court’s core task in this revision was to determine whether post‑order deposit of arrears or earlier payments could nullify an eviction ordered under Section 12(3). Relying on a long line of decisions, including Narayanan, Pochappan Narayanan, Sankaran Pillai, Venugopalan, Nasiruddin, and others, the court reaffirmed that Section 12 creates a condition precedent to contest eviction, and that the penal consequence under Section 12(3) follows upon default unless the tenant shows sufficient cause or is afforded extended time with a genuine opportunity. The revision is ultimately dismissed, upholding the eviction and leaving the lower authorities’ orders intact.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal (MACA 662/2014) from the Kerala High Court, challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pathanamthitta, in O.P.(MV) 1870/2005 for the death of Liju in a motor vehicle accident on 13.06.2005. The Tribunal held the accident occurred due to negligence of the tanker lorry driver (6th respondent) and ordered the insurer (appellant) to pay Rs. 7,47,500 in total, incorporating heads such as dependency with future prospects, loss of estate, funeral expenses, and loss of love and affection to parents and siblings. The insurer contested the quantum and pressed three principal issues: (i) future prospects addition should be 40% for a self-employed person, per Pranay Sethi; (ii) the Rs. 2,50,000 awarded for loss of love and affection to parents and sisters was excessive under Satwinder Kaur; and (iii) funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000. The respondents argued the Tribunal’s figures, including a very low monthly income of Rs. 3,000, were reasonable and that the total award was just. The Kerala High Court, while noting the Pranay Sethi principle, declined to reduce the 50% future prospects addition on account of the need to ensure just compensation, especially given the low income figure and the 2005 context. It also observed a balancing of heads like funeral and loss of estate and upheld the overall award as reasonable, dismissing the appeal with costs.
Kunhitharuvai Memorial Charitable Trust, which runs KMCT Medical College at Palakkad, filed this writ petition challenging non-remittance of course, special, and hostel fees for five MBBS students who were reallocated after the Government withdrew permission for the original college. For 2016-2017, Government of India granted permission with an intake of 150; under Exts P1 and P3, the fee payable by SC/ST and other eligible students was fixed at Rs. 2,50,000 per year, with the Government undertaking to remit this amount to the college where the students study. Following the withdrawal of permission, the five students were reallocated to nine other self-financing colleges, including the petitioner's, and the Government was to remit the fee accordingly. The petitioners contend that despite Exts P1 and P3, no payment has been remitted to the petitioner college and that a wrong payment was made to the 9th respondent. The counter-affidavit admits liability to remit the fees and acknowledges erroneous payment to the 9th respondent. The court noted lack of coordination between departments and held that the State must speak with one voice, not multiple policies. It allowed the writ petition and directed the Government to remit the 2nd and 3rd year fees to the petitioner within two months, with a right to recover from the 9th respondent if necessary under the Revenue Recovery Act.
Sunny Jacob, a physically handicapped person with 65% disability, approached this Court challenging the Government’s refusal to provide him regular employment despite repeated requests. He had studied up to Pre-Degree and had registered with the Employment Exchange in 1988; though he worked on a temporary basis during various spells when sponsored by the Exchange, he was not offered regular employment under the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. He pursued remedies through the State Human Rights Commission, which forwarded the matter to the District Collector, Pathanamthitta, for lenient consideration and action. While he had earlier secured a direction in Ext.P10 to the Social Welfare Department to decide in a time-bound manner, Ext.P11 evidenced a recommendation to appoint him, but Ext.P14 rejected the request for untenable reasons. The petitioner challenged Ext.P14 as a reiteration of Ext.P12, which had been set aside by Ext.P13, and sought mandamus to treat his case as a special case for appointment in a Government department, at least as a peon, under Exts.P9–P13. The respondents contended that public employment cannot be opened to “special cases,” citing the Supreme Court’s Umadevi doctrine, and argued there is no direct-appointment scheme for persons with disabilities; the 3% reservation under the 1995 Act meets the disability criterion. The Court upheld Ext.P14’s reasoning and dismissed the petition, holding that there is no basis to interfere with the government’s decision.
The petitioner, E.K. Rajakrishnan, challenges Ext.P10 issued by the first respondent, contending that the 1st respondent’s decision to continue the management of Thrikkottur AUP School by the Assistant Educational Officer (AEO) contravenes this Court's earlier directions and the byelaws of the Thrikkottur Vidyabhyasa Committee. The Thrikkottur AUP School is run by a committee formed in 1951 under the Societies Registration Act; the committee's byelaws vest the office of Manager in the Committee’s President. In 2014, the petitioner, elected as President on 06.07.2014, was approved as Manager by Ext.P1 (28.08.2014). A member, P.P. Rajan, challenged the 2016 approval of the petitioner, leading to Ext.P2 (31.05.2016) recognizing Rajan as Manager; the High Court stayed Ext.P2 and directed reconsideration. Thereafter, a sequence of petitions produced interim orders including Ext.P4 (04.03.2017) appointing the petitioner as temporary Manager until the civil suit was decided, and Ext.P5, Ext.P7, Ext.P9, culminating in Ext.P10 (03.10.2017) whereby the 1st respondent ordered continuation of the AEO as Manager. The petitioner challenged Ext.P10 as illegal, relying on the Court’s Ext.P9 directive to decide temporary Manager status during pendency of the suit and citing Dr. Philippose Mar Theophilus v. State of Kerala (1986 KLJ 1069) for the principle that abdication of jurisdiction cannot be justified. The Court held Ext.P10 unsustainable, set it aside, and directed the first respondent to reconsider in light of Ext.P9 within sixty days, with liberty to approach the Munsiff’s Court for expeditious disposal of the related suit.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.MC No.8008 of 2019) challenges two orders in a Section 138 NI Act proceeding. The accused filed a complaint in ST 1472/2016 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Ettumanoor, which was initially filed in Kottayam as ST 91/2014 and later returned to the proper court, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2014 SC 3519). The complainant refiled on 06.04.2015 in Ettumanoor; a delay of 13 days in refiling was condoned by the Magistrate after an Annexure-A2 order. The petitioner challenged Annexure-A4, condoning delay, and Annexure-A5 in CRL RP 53/2017; a Sessions Court remitted the matter for fresh consideration, and a revision petition was dismissed. The present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. contends the Magistrate had no power to condone delay and questions the legality of the delay-condonation orders. The Court cites Binoy K. Mathew v. Godley Dev John (2015) 3 KLT 784 to affirm the Magistrate’s power to condone delay under Section 470 Cr.P.C and the proviso to Section 142(b) of the NI Act, while noting the later Bridge Stone India decision on Section 142A that could nullify Dashrath. Ultimately, the petition is dismissed, clarifying the magistrate’s power to condone delay but declining to intervene further in this case.
The Kerala High Court, in OP(CAT) No.277 of 2019, examines whether a pension claim of a central employee who had prior temporary/contingent State government service, and subsequent absorption into ESIC, can be counted towards qualifying service for minimum pension under CCS Pension Rules, 1972. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) had allowed the applicant’s pension claim based on two Office Memorandums that extended pension benefits to casual labourers with temporary status. The court held that those OMs relate to casual labourers and do not cover the applicant’s prior government service. The bench then assessed the pension provisions: CCS Pension Rules (Rule 49(3) counting legal fractions of years), Rule 14 (continuity of service under State Government when transferred to CCS rules), and Rule 14A of Kerala Service Rules Part III (50% credit for contingent employment). It noted the Supreme Court’s Gandiba Behera decision, which restricts counting periods beyond three months as multiple halves and rejects the notion that periods beyond six months can be counted as two full halves. While acknowledging Rule 88 enabling relaxation in fit cases, and citing Union of India v Registrar (2012/2015) to permit relief in undue hardship, the court ultimately allowed the Original Petition but dismissed the CAT OA, directing the Central Government to re-consider the issue under Rule 88 and to potentially adjust liability, forwarding the judgment to the Government of India and directing costs to be borne by the parties.
This appeal arises from a Motor Accidents Claims petition (O.P.(MV).No.1002/2012) filed by the respondent for compensation following a 2011 motor vehicle accident in which he, a 38-year-old cleaner employed in a lorry, sustained serious injuries resulting in 90% permanent disability. The III Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, awarded Rs. 23,09,500 as total compensation, including Rs. 11,34,000 under disability, Rs. 4,00,000 for loss of earning capacity, Rs. 5,00,000 for future treatment, Rs. 30,000 for bystander expenses, and Rs. 1,00,000 for loss of amenities, while considering future prospects. The insurer alone contested the award, challenging the quantum, especially under the disability and earning-capacity heads, and arguing that the Rs. 5,00,000 for future treatment lacked basis; it also urged that bystander expenses were inadequately computed and that interest on this head should not be from petition date. The respondent contended that the Tribunal did not adequately account for future earnings prospects and the extent of disability. The Kerala High Court, invoking Pranay Sethi and Sarla Verma, held that for a 38-year-old with 90% disability, 40% future prospects should be added and the multiplier should be 15 instead of 16, re-computing disability compensation at Rs. 15,87,600 and reviewing related heads. It struck down the Rs. 4,00,000 for loss of earning power, treated Rs. 5,00,000 as addressing both future treatment and bystander expenses, and concluded with a modified total of Rs. 25,62,295. Interest was apportioned: Rs. 20,62,295 at 9% and Rs. 5,00,000 at 9% from the date of award, with deposit within three months. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.
This writ appeal challenges a Kerala High Court order dismissing a writ petition (W.P.(C) No.17403/2017) filed by Sajula Sudheer challenging action under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 initiated by Sundaram BNP Paribas Home Finance Ltd for non-payment of loan. The background shows that bank proceedings commenced after notices under Section 13(2) and possession notices dated 11.9.2015 and 16.9.2015; the writ petition had previously been allowed to discharge the entire liability on a condition to deposit Rs.5 lakhs by 25.6.2016, with a warning that failure would allow the bank to proceed. The appellant failed to comply with the condition, and the bank continued enforcing the loan recovery process. The learned single judge held that non-compliance with the prior round of litigation barred relief and dismissed the petition. The Division Bench (Comprising Chief Justice S. Manikumar and Justice Shaji P. Chaly) noted the substantial lapse of time (three years) and relied on settled Supreme Court authority that writ petitions challenging SARFAESI actions should ordinarily be not entertained where an effective statutory remedy exists, emphasizing the public nature of bank funds and the danger of frivolous litigation. Ultimately, the appeal is dismissed, with a caution that any remaining amounts may be adjusted in light of COVID-era moratoriums.
This writ petition raises a stamp-duty dispute arising from registration of a property document. The petitioner, P.M. Balakrishnan, had shown a stamp value of Rs 1,00,100 on a document relating to property valued at Rs 14.30 lakhs. The Sub Registrar Kannur assessed a higher value and demanded an additional Rs 5,25,980 in stamp duty and registration fees, which the petitioner paid to register the document while an appeal was pending. Ext.P6 later reduced the due stamp value to Rs 1,00,100, and the petitioner sought refunds of the excess amount through Ext.P7, which Ext.P8 rejected. The petitioner challenged Exts.P8 and P12 before the Land Revenue Commissioner. The Government Pleader contended refunds are not permissible since registration was effected at the higher value, and waiting for the appeal could have yielded a lower value. The judge observes that the delay in the appeal and the petitioner’s business needs led to the registration, and that the petitioner is a “victim of circumstances” deserving consideration for refunds, though it is unclear whether the Stamp Act provisions apply. Accordingly, the court directs a reassessment by the District Collector under Sections 44 and 47 of the Kerala Stamp Act, citing relevant precedents, and sets aside Ext.P12 while allowing modification of Ext.P8 after inquiry, with action to be completed within four months.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal (MACA) from Kerala High Court, arising out of a Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 claim petition O.P(MV) No. 209/2017 before the MACT, Irinjalakuda, for injuries sustained on 30-10-2016 when the claimant’s motorcycle KL-46/J-8094 collided with an autorickshaw KL-45/J-3679. The Tribunal held the accident was caused by rash and negligent driving by the second respondent (driver of the autorickshaw) and that the insurer was liable to indemnify; it awarded Rs. 4,40,430 with 8% interest from 22.02.2017 and proportionate costs. The appellant challenged the quantum across heads such as loss of earnings, medical expenses, pain and suffering, permanent disability and loss of earning capacity, and loss of amenities. Noting the lack of reliable income evidence, the High Court re-fixed notional monthly income, applying Supreme Court precedents (Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq, Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi) to determine fair compensation under various heads. It found the Tribunal’s notional income of Rs. 9,000 inadequate and re-fixated at Rs. 10,500, extended the loss of earnings period, and adjusted several heads (e.g., transport, nourishment, clothing, bystander expenses). The Court held multiplier 17 applicable and computed additional compensation of Rs. 88,500, with 8% interest, directing payment within two months. The appeal was disposed of with no costs.
RCRev.333/2018; RCRev.337/2018 This judgment involves two Rent Control Revision petitions, RCRev Nos. 333/2018 and 337/2018, arising from common judgments in RCA Nos. 2/2018 and 3/2018, which themselves arise from OP(RC) Nos. 12/2012 and 13/2012 filed in the Rent Control Court, Attingal, by the landladies of a three-storeyed commercial building named M.H. Building. The petitions claim bonafide need to occupy certain shop rooms (AMC II/248, AMC II/249, AMC II/250, AMC II/252) for conducting a furniture and home furnishings business. The Rent Control Court initially allowed the petitions; on appeal, the Appellate Authority set aside that order. This Court remitted the matter for fresh consideration, noting the need to scrutinize the bonafide purpose and the applicability of provisions under S.11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, including the first and second provisos, as well as the burden on the landlord to prove the availability of other suitable buildings. On remand, the Rent Controller granted OP(RC) No.13/2012 and dismissed OP(RC) No.12/2012, while the Appellate Authority affirmed the bonafide need of the landladies. The High Court ultimately held that the landladies’ need was bonafide and genuine; it held that the first proviso to S.11(3) was not hit and that the second proviso was not proven, while upholding the principle that the tenant must prove availability of alternative buildings. The revisions were dismissed, and the lower appellate findings were affirmed. The bench consisted of a Division Bench including Justice A.M. Shaffique and Justice T.V. Anilkumar.
