Vaigai Thread Processors Pvt. Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. State of Kerala & District Collector, Ayyanthole, Thrissur

## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`** ``` PRESENT ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN ``` ``` & ``` ``` THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.G. AJITHKUMAR ``` ``` FRIDAY, THE 14[TH] DAY OF JULY 2023 / 23RD ASHADHA, 1945 FAO NO. 129OF 2022 ``` ``` AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 06.08.2022 IN I.A.NOS.3564 & 3565 OF 2019 IN O.S.NO.282 OF 2010 OF THE SUB COURT, ``` ## **`IRINJALAKUDA`** ## **`APPELLANT/PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF:`** ``` VAIGAI THREAD PROCESSORS PVT. LTD . (IN LIQN) “CORPORATE BHAVAN”, NO.26-27, 12TH FLOOR, RAHEJA TOWERS, M G ROAD, BENGALURU-560001, REPRESENTED BY OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR. ``` ``` BY ADVS.M.GOPIKRISHNAN NAMBIAR ``` ``` K.JOHN MATHAI JOSON MANAVALAN KURYAN THOMAS PAULOSE C. ABRAHAM RAJA KANNAN DOMINIC ANTONY ASHER REVI JOB ``` ## **`RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:`** ``` 1 STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001. ``` - **`2 THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR AYYANTHOLE, THRISSUR-680003.`** ## **`R BY SRI T.K.SHAJAHAN - SR GOVERNMENT PLEADER`** ``` THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 14.07.2023, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: ``` 2 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 ## **JUDGMENT** ## Anil K. Narendran, J. The appellant Company is the plaintiff in O.S.No.282 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, a suit filed against the respondents herein-defendants for realisation of an amount of Rs.4,10,22,240/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal amount of Rs.3,06,60,000/-, from the date of decree till realisation and cost. In the said suit, the defendants filed written statement along with counter claim. The suit was dismissed for default on 07.11.2015, since there was no representation for the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed I.A.No.3565 of 2019, invoking the provisions under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to restore O.S.No.282 of 2010. The application was supported by I.A.No.3564 of 2019 filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay of 1466 days in filing the former application. In the affidavit filed in support of those applications, the plaintiff Company contended that the delay in filing the application for restoration had occurred since the company had wound up by the order dated 05.03.2015 of the High Court of Karnataka in Company Petition No.90 of 2008. Thereafter, the Official Liquidator moved an application before the Karnataka High Court seeking permission 3 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 to engage a counsel in O.S.No.282 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, which was granted by the order dated 10.08.2018. In the affidavit filed in support of that application, it was pointed out that the Official Liquidator assumed charge only on 08.11.2018. 2. The defendants filed counter in both interlocutory applications, by contending that no sufficient cause has been shown by the plaintiff for the delay of 1466 days in filing the application to restore the suit, which was dismissed for default on 07.11.2015, and also for the absence of the plaintiff on the date of dismissal. After considering the rival contentions, the court below, by a common order dated 06.08.2022, dismissed I.A.Nos.3564 and 3565 of 2019. The reasoning of the court below, as contained in paragraph 6 of the common order reads thus; “6. No doubt there was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing the application. The petitioner has produced copy of the order with respect to the winding up of the company and the appointment of the counsel. Admittedly official liquidator was appointed on 05.03.2015. On perusal of the back records, it can be seen from the proceedings that on 18.09.2015 counsel for the plaintiff sought time before the court for filing vakalath for official liquidator. Thereafter, the case was 4 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 adjourned to 28.09.2015. On that day also plaintiff prays and thereafter, posted to 07.10.2015, 31.10.2015, and 07.11.2015. On 31.10.2015 and on 07.11.2015 there was no representation for the plaintiff. Therefore the suit was dismissed on 07.11.2015. The present suit was instituted through the Counsel M/s Menon and Pai, Advocate. As per order dated 10.08.2018 the very same counsel was again appointed for conducting the present case. Therefore, it cannot be said that because of miscommunication between the plaintiff and the counsel no steps could be taken. Apart from that no convincing and sufficient cause was shown for not filing the application even after engaging the counsel. It is settled law that the word 'sufficient cause' receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence, no inaction, nor want of bonafides is imputable to the party. But facts in the instant case shows that, there is gross negligence and laches on the part of the petitioner. In **Ramla and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962** **SC 361]** Hon'ble Apex court held that 'It is however necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. In **Rafeek and Another v. K. Kamarudeer and Another [ILR 2021 (4) Ker. 31]** Hon'ble High Court Held that "In an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court has to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay is one of the guiding principles, but 5 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 such liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to approach the Court – at - will disregarding the time limit fixed by the relevant statute. The acts of negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay, sufficient cause is required to be shown, thereby explaining the sequence of events and the circumstances that led to the delay". On evaluating the facts and circumstances of this case I am of the view that there is deliberate inaction, and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner and the reason stated for the delay of 1466 days lacks bonafide. Therefore I am not inclined to condone the inordinate delay of 1466 days and hence the petition is liable to be dismissed.” 3. Challenging the common order dated 06.08.2022 in the above interlocutory applications, the appellant/plaintiff is before this Court in this appeal invoking the provisions under Order XLIII Rule 1(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. On 03.11.2022, when this appeal came up for admission, this Court admitted the matter on file. The learned Government Pleader took notice for the respondents. 5. The 2[nd] respondent has filed a counter affidavit wherein it is contended that valid reasons have been stated by the court below in the impugned order for dismissing both the interlocutory applications. Therefore, no interference of this 6 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 ## Court is warranted. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and also the learned Senior Government Pleader for the respondents-defendants. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff would contend that valid reasons have been stated in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.Nos.3564 of 2019 to condone the delay of 1466 days in filing I.A.No.3565 of 2019 and for the absence of the counsel for the plaintiff on various dates on which O.S.No.282 of 2010 was listed before the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda. 8. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would contend that in the absence of any sufficient cause stated in the affidavit filed in support of I.A.No.3564 of 2019 for condonation of delay and for the absence of the learned counsel for the plaintiff on various dates on which O.S.No.282 of 2010 was listed before the Sub Court, the interlocutory applications were dismissed by the impugned order dated 06.08.2022. In the said order, the court below has also taken note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in **Ramla and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361]** and the law laid down by this Court in **Rafeek and another v. K. Kamarudeen and another [2021 (4) KHC 34]** . 7 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 9. Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code provides that decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 9, where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the court that - there was sufficient cause for his non appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 9, no order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party. 10. Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code provides for setting aside decree ex parte against defendant. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 13, in any case in which a decree is passed _ex parte_ against a defendant, he may apply to the court which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, 8 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. As per the first proviso to sub-rule (1), where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also. As per the second proviso to sub-rule (1), no court shall set aside a decree passed _ex parte_ merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim. As per the Explanation, where there has been an appeal against a decree passed _ex parte_ under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside that _ex parte_ decree. ## 11. In **G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada [(2000) 3 SCC** **54]** in the context of an application filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, for setting aside an _ex parte_ decree, the Apex Court held that, the word ‘was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing’ occurring in Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code must be liberally construed to enable the court to do complete justice between the parties, particularly when no negligence or inaction 9 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 is imputable to the erring party. Sufficient cause for the purpose of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard and fast guidelines can be prescribed. The courts have wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 12. In **G.P. Srivastava** , the Apex Court held further that, ‘sufficient cause’ for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding _ex parte_ and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If ‘sufficient cause’ is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when _ex parte_ proceedings initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and thereby condoned earlier. In a case where defendant approaches the court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not malafide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the _lis_ decided on merits. ## 13. In **M. Shivananda v. M. Susheela and others** **[2021 (5) KHC 357]** a Division Bench of this Court in which 10 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party held that, Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the court to set the dismissal aside, if the plaintiff satisfies the court that - there was sufficient cause for his non appearance when the suit was called on for hearing. On the other hand, Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code enables the court which passed a decree _ex parte_ to set it aside, if the defendant satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Apex Court in **G.P. Srivastava [(2000) 3 SCC 54]** , in the context of an application filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code, apply with equal force in the consideration of an application filed under Order IX, Rule 9 of the Code. ## 14. In **Peeves Enterprises v. Muhammed Ashraf** **[2015 (3) KHC 981]** , relying on the law laid down by the Apex Court in **G.P. Srivastava** , a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party held that, on an application filed under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court has to find out whether the erring party has made out sufficient cause for setting aside the _ex parte_ decree. When no negligence or inaction is imputable to the erring party 11 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 and the absence was not malafide or intentional, the discretion has to be exercised in his favour, especially when the application is within the statutory time limit. In appropriate cases, the plaintiff can be compensated by adequate costs for the loss of time and the inconvenience caused to him. But any such condition shall not be too onerous. 15. The Limitation Act, 1963 was enacted by the Parliament to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith. Section 5 of the Act deals with extension of prescribed period in certain cases. As per Section 5, any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As per Explanation to Section 5, the fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this Section. 16. It is well settled that the Law of Limitation is founded 12 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 on public policy to ensure that the parties to a litigation do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek legal remedy without delay. In an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court has to condone the delay if sufficient cause is shown. Adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay is one of the guiding principles, but such liberal approach cannot be equated with a licence to approach the court-at-will disregarding the time limit fixed by the relevant statute. The acts of negligence or inaction on the part of a litigant do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay, sufficient cause is required to be shown, thereby explaining the sequence of events and the circumstances that led to the delay. 17. In **Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107]** , in the context of Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963, the Apex Court held that, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. 18. In **Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [(2013) 12 SCC 649]** the Apex Court while 13 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 summerising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay held that, the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. The Apex Court held further that, there is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. Para.21 of the judgment reads thus; - “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: - 21.1 There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. - 21.2 The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. - 21.3 Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 14 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 21.4 No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7 The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 15 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 21.11 It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.” 19. In **Esha Bhattacharjee** , after summerising the principles applicable while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, the Apex Court added some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario, that an application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. Para.22 of the judgment reads thus; “22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:— 16 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 22.1 An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 20. In **Rafeek and another v. K. Kamarudeen and another [2021 (4) KHC 34 : (2021) 2 RCR (Rent) 223 : 2021 AIR CC 2752]** a Division Bench of this Court in which one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was a party held that, though the expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner, which subserves the ends of justice, as held by the Apex Court in **Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC** 17 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 **107]** , the concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play, as held by the Apex Court in **Esha Bhattacharjee [(2013) 12 SCC 649]** . Inordinate delay, which attracts doctrine of prejudice, warrants strict approach, whereas, a delay of short duration or few days, which may not attract doctrine of prejudice, calls for a liberal delineation. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and no court shall deal with such an application in a routine manner. 21. In the instant case, the appellant-plaintiff filed I.A.No.3564 of 2019 in O.S.No.282 of 2010 seeking an order to condone the delay of 1466 days in filing I.A.No.3565 of 2019, the application filed to restore O.S.No.282 of 2010, which was dismissed for default on 07.11.2015. Though the delay sought to be condoned by filing I.A.No.3564 of 2019 is 1466 days, it is an admitted fact that the plaintiff Company went into liquidation and it was wound up by the order dated 05.03.2015 of the High Court of Karnataka in Company Petition No.90 of 2018. Thereafter, the Official Liquidator obtained the orders of the High Court of Karnataka to engage a counsel in O.S.No.282 of 2010 before the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, on 10.08.2018. The Official 18 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 Liquidator assumed charge only on 08.11.2018. When the plaintiff Company is under liquidation, the Company has to be represented in legal proceedings by the Official Liquidator appointed by the court, who has to engage counsel for prosecuting or defending a suit or other proceedings, including pending proceedings, after obtaining necessary orders from the concerned High Court. Therefore, merely for the reason that after the order of winding up, the Official Liquidator engaged the very same counsel to prosecute O.S.No.282 of 2010 on the file of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, it cannot be said that sufficient cause has been shown by the Company in liquidation for its nonappearance before the Sub Court on various dates on which the said suit was listed before the court. After the order of the High Court of Karnataka, whereby the Official Liquidator was authorised to engage a counsel to prosecute O.S.No.282 of 2010 before the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, there occurred a delay of about one year in filing the application for restoration. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the law laid down in the decision referred to supra, we find no reason to sustain the common order dated 06.08.2022 of the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, whereby I.A.Nos.3564 and 3565 of 2019 stand rejected. 19 F.A.O.No.129 of 2022 22. In the result, this appeal is allowed by setting aside the order dated 06.08.2022 in I.A.Nos.3564 and 3565 of 2019 in O.S.No.282 of 2010. Consequently, I.A.No.3565 of 2019 will stand allowed, restoring O.S.No.282 of 2010 to file, after condoning the delay sought to be condoned in I.A.No.3564 of 2019. Since the suit is of the year 2010, Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, shall proceed with O.S.No.282 of 2010 and the counterclaim and finally dispose of the same, as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Both parties are directed to appear before the Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, on **16.08.2023** . Sd/- ## **ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE** Sd/- ## **P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE** AV/19/7