WP(C) NOs. 6510/2011, 27399/2011 These consolidated writ petitions challenge orders passed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 relating to gratuity computation for workers of Indian Rare Earths Limited (IRE) at Chavara, Kollam. The petitioners—former loading and unloading workers and the IRE Loading Unloading Workers Welfare Forum—seek a gratuity calculation based on 15 days’ wages for each completed year of service, accounting for various allowances (Dearness, Cement, Steel, etc.), and mandamus to modify the appellate authority’s directions accordingly. The controlling authority previously rejected claims relying on a 1993 settlement that fixed seven days’ wages for pre-formation service and 15 days’ wages post-formation, with an ex-gratia payment in lieu of gratuity and a clause foreclosing future gratuity claims. The court traces the pre- and post-formation wage calculations, notes the 2002 decision in O.P. No. 798/1995 (Ext.P1) aligning with 7/15-day rates and the 1993 settlement’s terms, and discusses whether workers were directly employed by the principal employer or through contractors. It emphasizes that the Gratuity Controller’s jurisdiction is limited where status is disputed, and that a judgment in per incurium cannot bind beyond its facts. The judgment ultimately dismisses WP6510/2011 and allows WP27399/2011 to the extent of excluding certain allowances from “wages,” holding wages mean basic pay under Section 2(s) of the Act.
This writ appeal challenges the selection process for appointment to the post of Assistant Professor in Constitutional Law/Maritime Law at the Cochin University of Science and Technology, with a Muslim reservation. Applications were invited; the minimum qualification prescribed by the University notification required a Master's degree with 55% marks in a relevant subject, and the shortlist placed the fourth respondent (holding a Master’s in Public Law and Intellectual Property Rights) at rank 1 and the appellant at rank 2. The appellant contends that the fourth respondent is not qualified under the applicable UGC Regulations because those regulations require a Master’s degree in Constitutional Law or Maritime Law, and the notification’s wording should be read as requiring a degree specifically in the relevant subject. The University contends that under the UGC Regulations a Master’s degree with 55% in a relevant subject is sufficient, and the term ‘a relevant subject’ includes subjects related to law; the Scrutiny Committee found the fourth respondent’s degree to be relevant. The appellant argues that judicial review should scrutinize the Selection Committee’s decision; the respondents rely on established principles that courts generally respect expert determinations unless mala fides or illegality is shown. The Division Bench held that the fourth respondent’s degree is a relevant subject, rejected the challenge to the selection, and dismissed the appeal. No interference with the Single Judge’s order was warranted.
This matrimonial appeal arises from the Family Court, Kasaragod, which dismissed a divorce petition filed by the husband under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on grounds of desertion and cruelty. The marriage, solemnized on 15 April 2001, produced two children. The petitioner, a trader who runs two pooja stores at Nileswaram, contended that the wife left the matrimonial home on 30 June 2010 with all her belongings, and that the couple had been living separately since then. The wife contested the petition, alleging mental and physical cruelty, incessant demands for money and gold, and that the husband was a habitual drunkard who failed to protect her. She also approached the Domestic Violence Act and obtained a protection order against him. The Family Court evaluated the evidence and concluded that the husband was cruel and had willfully kept them away; it did not accept the wife’s counter-allegations of cruelty as proven, noting that she had sought protection under the DV Act. It found that the respondent’s staying away without reasonable cause amounted to desertion, which could also amount to cruelty. The High Court, after hearing, held that desertion was established and dissolved the marriage by a decree of divorce. It ordered Rs 2,00,000 to the respondent toward future maintenance and Rs 6,000 toward children’s maintenance from 01.02.2022, with no costs.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (under Section 482 CrPC) challenges the order in CC No.701/2019 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Koyilandy, arising from alleged offences of kidnapping and related acts under Sections 362, 342, 323, 324 and 506 r/w Section 34 IPC. The petition seeks quashing on the ground that the parties have amicably settled the dispute and do not wish to continue prosecution; the de facto complainant states no lasting grievance. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations but notes there are no other crimes against the petitioners. The Court relies on the principle laid down in State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan and the line of cases starting with Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, to hold that quashing under 482 CrPC can be warranted for non‑compoundable offences where the dispute is civil in nature and the entire dispute has been resolved between the parties, provided the offences are not of a heinous nature or under special statutes. After examining gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the amicable settlement, the Court finds no adverse societal impact in quashing and thus invokes its extraordinary power to quash the proceedings. The petition is allowed and CC No.701/2019 is quashed.
A writ petition under WP(C) 27180 of 2020 by 71 petitioners, all retirees/employees of Carborundum Universal Limited, challenges non-processing of their jointly submitted option forms and seeks pension benefits under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the Employees Pension Scheme, 1995. The petitioners contend that they and their employer executed joint option forms (P1–P71) but respondents 2 (EPFO) and 3 (Regional PF Commissioner) have not processed them, depriving the petitioners of pension rights calculated in proportion to their last drawn salary, or, alternatively, on the basis of average 12 months’ salary prior to retirement under EPS 1995. They rely on prior judgments, including P. Sasikumar v. Union of India (ILR 2019 Ker. 614) and RC Gupta v. EPFO (2018 SCC 809), as background authority for pension computation, and furthermore invoke the Supreme Court’s dictum in EPF Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B and Others (2022 SCC online SC 1521). The Kerala High Court disposes of the petition by directing respondents 2 and 3 to re-consider the claims in light of that dictum within four months of receiving a copy of the judgment. The order signals alignment of petitioners’ pension claims with the Supreme Court’s guidance under the EPF/EPS framework.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated Kerala High Court decision involving Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) challenging the regulatory framework for granting No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for petroleum retail outlets along State Highways and Major District Roads. The petitions question Ext.P2 (GO no.16/2020) and Ext.P4 (GO no.67/2020) Guidelines/Orders that prescribed access norms, fees, penalties and other conditions for fuel stations under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002, arguing these executive directions exceed the State’s legislative competence and infringe Article 14, 19(1)(g) and central norms. The Court surveys the Petroleum Act and Rules, the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002, the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999, and related IRC/MoRTH norms. It holds that District Authorities cannot, under Rule 144, rely on Ext.P4 to reject NOCs; access permissions for highways are governed by central statutes and highway authorities. The Expert Committee’s guidelines were improperly framed with insufficient consultation. The Court quashes Ext.P2/P4 to the extent challenged, sets aside district-level rejections, directs reconsideration of NOCs under Rule 144 in line with existing rules (not Exts P2/P4) within two months, and dismisses several related petitions while leaving other issues open. The judgment favors the petitioners (OMCs) and their franchisees, restoring procedural avenues for NOC reconsideration.
Mat.Appeal No. 655/16, RP(FC) No.340/16 This matrimonial appeal and revision petition arise from a common order of the Family Court, Malappuram, in OP No.202/2013 and MC No.148/2013 dated 29 October 2015. The wife, Saheera, and her child filed for return of 30 sovereigns of gold ornaments and Rs. 1,50,000 given at marriage, alleged to be misappropriated by the husband, Sihabudheen, and his mother-in-law, Ayishakutty, along with past maintenance; the husband and mother-in-law countered that the ornaments and cash were not misappropriated and that the wife had voluntarily separated. They further argued the husband’s income to be modest and maintenance should be refused. The Family Court examined the wife (PW1), her father (PW2) and an independent witness (PW3) with documentary Exts. A1–A5, while the husband (RW1) was cross-examined. The court found entrustment of the gems and cash, created a trust in favor of the wife, and held the husband and mother liable to return the value of the ornaments and cash, besides granting maintenance to the wife and child. Both sides appealed. The High Court, by a division bench, upheld the trial court’s findings, relying on decisions in Rajesh v. Deepthi and Leelamma N.P. v. M.A.Moni, and dismissed both the appeal and the revision petition while affirming the maintenance orders.
MACA NOS.539/2009 & 1140/2010 This common judgment of the Kerala High Court (Dy. Judge C.S. Dias) deals with two motor-accident appeals arising from OP(MV) No.1558/2002 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha, relating to the death of Unnikrishnan on 10.09.2001. The petitioners, parents and sister of the deceased, sought compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, initially under Section 166, but the Tribunal permitted amendment converting the petition to Section 163A, reducing income from Rs.10,000 to Rs.3,333 per month and total compensation to Rs.10,00,000. The insurer admitted cover; some respondents contested liability, while one respondent was ex parte. The Tribunal found composite negligence by the two riders (the 1st and 3rd respondents) and held the 2nd (insurer) and the 4th (owner) liable, with the insurer indemnifying the owner. The petitioners argued that the statutory conversion under Section 163A was improper, and that full Section 166 compensation (higher income) should be considered, and that all legal heirs deserved equal shares. The court relied on Supreme Court guidance that negligence proof is not required in 163A claims and confirmed the Tribunal’s finding of composite negligence. On quantum, the court fixed notional income at Rs.3,333/month, applied the Second Schedule, and awarded Rs.4,84,500 to the heirs (with deductions and funeral/losses). It directed the 2nd respondent to deposit this amount (with 6% interest) and disburse it 60:40 to appellants, while directing recovery of half from the 4th respondent; MACA 539/2009 is dismissed and MACA 1140/2010 is allowed.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 31753 of 2022), filed in the High Court of Kerala, challenges Exts. P6 to P9, which rejected the petitioners’ proposals for approval of their appointments as teachers in a Higher Secondary School on the ground that there was no approved manager after the manager’s term expired on 17.06.2020. The four petitioners—Radhika V.S., Nishakumari K.G., Cinimol Prabhakaran, and Vinitha S.—were appointed to various HSST/HST posts between 2020 and 2021, and sought certiorari and mandamus to quash the impairing orders and to direct the respondents to approve their appointments and grant service benefits within a timeframe to be fixed by the court. The petition contends that reliance on the absence of an approved manager is misplaced, citing Kerala Court precedents Padmanabhan Nambiar v. Government of Kerala (1997) 2 KLT 725 and Manager, St. Mary’s H.S. v. Beji Abraham (2002) 1 KLT 406, which recognize a de facto doctrine protecting appointees who have acted under a manager’s tenure. Ext.P10 (the court’s earlier judgment) is relied upon by the petitioners. The counsel for the petitioners and the Government Pleader appeared. The High Court, interpreting the de facto doctrine and extant precedents, set aside Exts. P6–P9 and directed respondents 4 and 5 to reconsider the approvals de hors those reasons, if otherwise in order, and to disburse benefits if approved. The court ordered compliance with certified copies of the judgment and petition.
The petitioners—Ashraf M, aged 47; E.C. Subair, aged 46; and Muhammed, aged 64—filed W.P.(C) No. 30609 of 2021 before the Kerala High Court seeking a building permit from Thamarassery Gram Panchayat. They submitted their application on 13.06.2019 and, after the first round of defects were communicated (Ext.R2(a)), re-submitted on 05.12.2019 (Ext.P5). The Panchayat did not communicate any order within 30 days of the resubmission, prompting Ext.P7 filed on 04.03.2020 signaling reliance on Rule 14(2) of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2019 to deem a permit. The petitioners commenced construction on 08.06.2020 (Ext.P8), acknowledging a deemed permit, which Ext.P9 later cancelled on 12.04.2021, asserting non-compliance with the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act and Rules. Counter affidavits argued the defects were timely communicated and the construction violated the Act and Rules, negating the deemed permit. Citing Abdul Kharim v. Pazhayakunummel Grama Panchayat and Aniyeri Satyan v. Triprangottoor Grama Panchayat, the court underscored the object of Section 236(3) of the Act to ensure prompt decision and protection of fundamental rights; it held that the failure to decide within prescribed time cannot bar entitlement where no communication occurs. The result: the petition is allowed, deeming a valid permit from 04.04.2020 under Section 235K(2) read with Rule 14(2), directing issuance of a paper permit within 10 days, while preserving the power to revoke for violations.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Cr. MC No. 8509/2023) filed in the Kerala High Court seeking quashing of proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in SC No. 623/2023, arising from Crime No. 1456/2022 of Kundara Police Station. The petitioner, Wilson J. alias Shibu, is the accused in the corresponding Sessions Court proceedings alleging offences under IPC sections 294(b), 308, 324, and 323. The defence centers on a settlement between the parties, with affidavits from the victims indicating no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging the settlement, reserves some reservations about quashing solely on that basis. The High Court, after thorough consideration of the records and settled precedents, relies on Supreme Court guidance in Laxmi Narayan and others, and its relied-upon decisions in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, to articulate the controlling principles for invoking the power under Section 482 CrPC in non-compoundable offences. The court emphasizes that quashing is permissible in disputes private in nature where there is a complete settlement, that offenses listed under serious or public-interest statutes, or heinous acts, are generally not quashed, and that antecedents and conduct of the accused may be considered. Finding the case private in nature with a settled dispute, the court allows the CrMC and quashes the proceedings against the petitioner. The order reflects a careful balancing of settlement dynamics with statutory limitations on quashing non-compoundable offences.
This MACA arises from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, in OP(MV) No. 2362/2014, relating to a road accident on 07.05.2014 in which Vijayakumar N sustained grave injuries including facial disfigurement. The appellant challenges the Tribunal’s compensation under Pain and Suffering, Loss of Amenities and Disfiguration as inadequate, and opposes its assessment of Permanent Disability. The Tribunal had fixed a notional income and applied a multiplier, while recording 10% Permanent Disability under Ext. X1 and concluding there would be no loss of earnings since the company continued paying salary during treatment. It also exonerated the Insurance Company on the ground that the offending vehicle lacked a Fitness Certificate at the time of the accident. Counsel for the appellant urged that the medical evidence, CT scans and the disability certificate reveal lasting trauma and disfigurement, and pressed Amrit Paul Singh v. Tata AIG General Insurance Co. (2018) to inform the insurer’s liability. The insurer’s counsel contended that the Tribunal’s figures were generous, noting the modest 10% disability. The High Court partly allows the appeal, enhancing Pain and Suffering to Rs 1,00,000, Loss of Amenities to Rs 50,000, and Disfiguration to Rs 1,00,000, while maintaining the 10% Disability framework. It directs the insurer to bear the enhanced amount, permits recovery from the vehicle owners, awards 8% interest, and fixes deposition within two months, excluding 160 days for delay."
This Original Petition challenges the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s order dated 9 January 2015 in TA 4858/2012, which held that the three years of physical teaching experience prescribed for the promotion from Senior Lecturer to Assistant Professor in Paediatrics should be counted after obtaining the Post Graduate (PG) qualification, applying Rule 10(ab) of Part II KS&SSR when the relevant Special/Recruitment Rules are silent. The petitioner, a lecturer who acquired PG qualifications in 2001, contended that three years’ teaching experience accrued after PG should be counted for promotion; others argued that Ext.R4(a) (G.O. 22.12.1976) governed qualifications before 2008 and Ext.P10 (G.O. 7.4.2008) thereafter, and that Rule 10(ab) should apply, counting post-PG experience. The High Court notes there were no Special Rules or Recruitment Rules for the Medical Education Service; Ext.R4(a) remained in force until 2008 and Ext.P10 superseded it in 2008, with neither expressing that the experience must be post-PG. Relying on Basheer v. Saiful Islam and Sirajudheen v. KPSC, the Division Bench held that where experience as a qualification is prescribed but the rules are silent on the timing relative to the basic qualification, Rule 10(ab) applies. The Court endorses this interpretive approach and Roy K. George’s view against arbitrariness, but sets aside the Tribunal’s directive to review all promotions. The petition is disposed of with a modification: Rule 10(ab) applies, but the consequential review/recast directions are vacated, preserving promotions already effected.
This is a High Court of Kerala Division Bench matter in SSCR No. 15 of 2022, where the Sabarimala Special Commissioner’s report is being considered following directions in a 2022 judgment (W.P.(C) No. 19465 of 2022). The case concerns the blacklisting of Sunil Kumar P.G., a long‑standing contractor for the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) at Sabarimala and Pampa, and related tender disputes during Mandala-Makaravilakku. The petition, filed as Suo Motu, seeks to quash Ext.P3 (05.06.2022) and a mandamus against coercive action, while challenging the Board’s proceedings that culminated in blacklisting. The 6th respondent contends that he was the cloaking room bidder and that accusations of intimidation and violence are a product of rival tenderers’ competition; he claims to have paid Rs. 22,12,500 (including interest) on 11.07.2022 and seeks removal from blacklist. The court recalls prior rulings, notably Suneesh K.S. and M.V. Ramasubbiar, and the 08.06.2022 decision in W.P.(C) No.18537 of 2022, to emphasize fair process, accountability, and the need for a reasoned decision by the Board. The judgment dated 19.07.2022 directed a fresh Board decision within three weeks, guided by law and with party hearing, and the present order ultimately disposes of the SSCR by setting aside the 05.09.2022 ROC order and directing a fresh, reasoned decision within two months, with a report to the Court.
On 30 December 2009, Noorudheen P.M., a 20-year-old student employed as a supervisor, was seriously injured when his motorcycle was struck by a tempo traveler driven rashly and negligently. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, awarded Rs 12,79,169 as compensation. The appellant challenged the award seeking enhancement on several heads: loss of earnings (contending that as a student he earned Rs 8,500 per month), transportation costs for multiple hospital visits, higher future treatment expenses, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, disfigurement, and marriage prospects, as well as bystander expenses and additional medical costs. He relied on decisions including Pappu Deo, Yadav v. Naresh Kumar & Ors. (AIR 2020 SC 4424), V. Mekala v M. Malathi & Anr. (2014) 11 SCC 178, and Kajal V. Jagdish Chand (2020) (1) KLT 743), along with a learned Single Judge of this Court in MACA No. 1728/2014, to justify higher compensation. The High Court carefully examined the heads of loss and the appellant’s debilitated condition years after the accident, concluding the Tribunal under-valued several elements, especially bystander expenses, transportation, and future medical costs. It enhanced the compensation to Rs 40,43,000 with 9% interest from the date of filing till realization, plus proportionate costs. The insurer was directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months, after deducting lawful fees. The decision reinforces the principle that disability and dependency, even for a young student, can warrant substantial augmentation of compensation when supported by medical evidence and judicial precedent.
This appeal arises from MACA No.540 of 2009, heard by the Kerala High Court, challenging an award under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in a fatal-accident claim. On 14.3.2003, the deceased Sri V. Raman Menon was struck and killed, leaving behind dependants—the appellants. The motor cycle involved was owned by the first respondent and insured with the third respondent insurer. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,50,050 with 7% interest and costs, after evaluating Exts A1–A12 and B1, and held the insurer liable. The appellants contended the amount was inadequate for the lost companionship and dependency, citing the deceased’s income and age (74). The respondents argued negligence lay with the deceased and that the claim amount was excessive, with the insurer merely liable for the covered risk. The High Court, applying Sarla Verma for multiplier and Pranay Sethi for conventional heads, held that only the first appellant was a dependent and that 50% of the dependency should be deducted for personal living expenses. It recalculated loss of dependency to Rs. 3,00,000, enhanced funeral expenses to Rs. 15,000, and increased loss of consortium to Rs. 40,000, while removing duplicative heads like pain and suffering and loss of love and affection. The overall enhanced award totaled Rs. 4,45,050, with 7% interest and proportionate costs, and a direction to deposit the amount before the Tribunal within 60 days.
Dr. Radhakrishna Pillai, an OCI card holder, was continuously engaged by the University of Calicut. Following a complaint, Exts.P15 and P17 show-cause notices were issued under Section 7B(2)(a) and (i) of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, proposing termination of his services. Pillai approached the High Court challenging the notices as premature and an attempt to pre-judge the matter, arguing that the proceedings reflected the University’s predetermined action and thus violated due process. The learned Single Judge held the petition premature but safeguarded Pillai’s interests by permitting 15 days to explain the notices and allowing affidavits attested by a advocate or notary, with a clear assurance that he would be heard before any adverse action. On appeal, the Senior Counsel for Pillai argued that the notices were a futile formality since the Chancellor had initiated action and the University had already decided to proceed, citing Supreme Court precedents that show-cause proceedings must not be a mere formality. The Division Bench declined to interfere with the single judge’s order, noting that Exts.P15 and P17 merely proposed action and did not foreclose the opportunity to explain or hear. Citing Oryx Fisheries and Kunisetty Satyanarayana, the court reaffirmed that ordinarily a writ petition should not lie against a mere show-cause notice. It directed the University to extend time for explanations and to proceed fairly before any adverse action, and dismissed the appeal.
This appeal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arises from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ottappalam, in OP(MV) 753/2007, concerning the death of Mani Vasangan, a coolie engaged in daily wage work. The appellants—father, wife Vijaya and five dependents including three minors—claimed compensation of Rs. 13,19,750, arguing the accident on 16 February 2007, near Urakam Health Centre on the Thrissur–Irinjalakkuda road, was caused by rash and negligent driving of a goods auto rickshaw (KL-8-AF-2960) owned by the 2nd respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent. The Tribunal partly allowed the petition, awarding Rs. 4,43,650 with 7% interest from the petition date and costs. The 1st and 2nd respondents were ex-parte; the 3rd respondent admitted valid insurance but contended contributory negligence by the deceased. The High Court, applying Ramachandrappa for notional income and Sarla Varma for multiplier (16) and Pranay Sethi for future prospects (40%), revises the calculation: notional monthly income Rs. 4,000; dependency loss Rs. 8,06,400; conventional heads increased; loss of love and affection eliminated to avoid duplication per Somwathy; pain and suffering awarded; bystander, funeral and loss of estate enhanced; total enhanced compensation Rs. 10,22,450, and further Rs. 5,78,800 with 7% interest, payable within 60 days. The appeal is thus allowed in part, with disbursement to appellants 40:20:20:20 and closure of pending interlocutory applications.
In MACA No. 865 of 2011, the Kerala High Court hears an appeal from the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Ottapalam (OP(MV) No.517/2007) arising from a July 18, 2006 collision in which Saidalavi, husband of the 1st appellant and father to the 2nd–5th appellants, died after being injured in a motorcycle-car crash. The car, owned by the 2nd respondent and insured by the 3rd respondent, struck the motorcycle, and the deceased’s dependants sought enhanced compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Tribunal awarded Rs.6,25,650 with 7% interest and costs. The insurer admitted coverage but contended the accident stemmed from the rider’s negligence; it disputed the deceased’s age, occupation and income. The appellants produced Exts. A1–A12; the respondents contested. The High Court re-evaluated the claim by fixing the notional income at Rs.5,500 per month (up from Rs.3,500), applying a multiplier of 17 (age 30), and incorporating 40% future prospects per Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi. After deducting 1/4 for personal living expenses, the court computed loss of dependency at Rs.11,78,100, augmented various conventional heads (funeral, estate, and loss of consortium) and eliminated duplicative awards for loss of love and affection (per New Insurance Assurance). The final enhanced compensation totaled Rs.14,80,750 with 7% interest, plus costs, payable to the appellants in specified ratios and deposited within two months.
This is a MACA (Motor Accidents Claims Appeal) filed by the appellant, V. Bodheswaran, challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha's award in O.P.(M.V) No.1267/2005. The accident occurred in 2005 when the appellant, riding a motorcycle, was overtaken rashly by an autorickshaw, causing injuries including cervical spine injury with quadriparesis. The Tribunal ex parte as against the first two respondents; the insurer contested on policy conditions and negligence. The appellant argued for higher disability income and compensation, noting hospitalisation for 64 days on two occasions, loss of earnings, and loss of amenities. The court evaluated proof, particularly Exts. A9 and A10, and the medical certificate showing 25% disability, though the Tribunal had fixed 15% disability. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court recalculated disability income using a 7 multiplier for age group 61–65 per Sarla Verma and Ramachandrappa for income estimation, and re-assessed various heads of compensation: loss of earnings, loss of disability income, loss of amenities, and pain and suffering. After reassessment, the total enhanced compensation amounted to Rs. 1,67,845, with Rs. 81,000 additional over the Tribunal’s award. The appeal is allowed; the insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount within two months, with release to the appellant upon deposit. The decision was pronounced by Justice A. Badharudeen on 07-12-2021.
