This is a High Court of Kerala, Division Bench proceeding under Article 227 challenging Ext.P8, a common Rent Control petition order, and related orders in R.C.P. No.20/2018 before the Rent Control Court, Payyannur. The petitioner asserts arrears and rent dispute under Section 11(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, claiming the tenant defaulted from 01.09.2017 with alleged rent hikes and receipts reflecting higher sums. After trial, Exts.P4 and P5 sought recall of PW1 to prove Ext.P1, an agreement dated 01.12.2014 asserting a rent of Rs.20,000/month with a 20% biennial increase. The Rent Control Court dismissed these applications, holding that Order XVIII, Rule 17 CPC could not be invoked and that Ext.P1 was inadmissible. The High Court, noting the power under S.23(2) of the Act to summon material witnesses and the desirability of just decision, holds that Ext.P1 could be a rent deed or a document of similar character and may be used for collateral purposes under Section 49 of the Registration Act. It relies on authorities including Sai Service Station Ltd., Satish Chand Mukhan, Rai Chand Jain, Aniyan T.V., and Maria Margarida to justify allowing recall and admission of Ext.P1 for determining possession and tenancy. The petition is allowed; Ext.P8 is set aside, Exts.P4 and P5 are allowed, and the Rent Control Court is directed to proceed with the trial in accordance with law.
Leelamma Eapen, a 66-year-old widow and senior citizen, petitions this court challenging an order of Ext. P1 issued by the Maintenance Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act. She argues that her son and daughter-in-law obstruct her right to access her own earnings and to reside in the house that was her life interest under her husband’s Will (Ext. P2). The Tribunal had directed the 4th and 5th respondents not to obstruct her from taking usufructs, to create a peaceful living atmosphere, and not to cause her harm, but the petition alleges ongoing harassment. The petitioner sought enforcement of Ext. P1 and protection of her life and property rights, claiming that the Tribunal has wide powers to secure maintenance from earnings and ensure a dignified life, including residence, under the Act and Rules. The respondents contested, arguing Ext. P1 exceeded the Tribunal's jurisdiction and that maintenance issues are the sole remit of the Tribunal. The High Court held that the Senior Citizens Act empowers the Tribunal to ensure maintenance from earnings to enable a dignified life and to direct non-obstruction to earnings and peaceful residence; enforcement is to be effected by the District Magistrate under Rule 19 and Section 22. The court directed enforcement within three months and encouraged amicable settlement through mediation, allowing the petition to the extent of enforcement.
This writ petition concerns two retirees who sought payment with interest on delayed pensionary benefits from the Kerala University of Fisheries and Ocean Studies (KUFOS). The petitioners, who retired in 2012, argued that though pensionary benefits were sanctioned, the amounts were not disbursed in time; past orders (Ext. P1) directed expeditious disbursement with interest at 6.5% per annum if delayed. Their earlier petitions (including W.P. 9672/2013) resulted in Ext. P1 directing timely payment and interest, while further interim orders (Exts. P2–P4) and subsequent writs sought to enforce these directions. Despite these directions, the pensionary benefits were disbursed only on 24-08-2015, exceeding the time permitted in Ext. P4 by more than four months. The petitioners contend the delay attracts interest per Ext. P1 and subsequent orders. The respondent university explains financial constraints and that funds were ultimately released after a High Level Committee decision, asserting there was no culpable delay. The court, noting the delay in disbursement despite express directions, holds the petitioners are entitled to interest. It orders payment of interest at 6.5% per annum for the period 21-04-2015 to 24-08-2015, with a six-week deadline for payment and a fallback of 9% per annum thereafter until full payment, disposing of the writ petition accordingly.
This is a criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.MC No. 5358 of 2022) heard by a single judge of the Kerala High Court, arising from Crime No. 436/2019 of Badiadka Police Station, Kasaragod, now pending as SC 142/2022 before the Assistant Sessions Court, Kasaragod. Accused Nos. 1–15 (names listed) are alleged to have led an unlawful assembly and attacked respondents 2 and 3 with stones and sticks on 20 December 2019 at around 19:10 hours, in offences punishable under IPC Sections 143, 147, 148, 324 and 308 read with Section 149. The petition seeks to quash all further proceedings under CrPC Section 482 on the ground that the dispute is private and has been settled, supported by affidavits AIV and AV sworn by the injured parties, with SHO verification confirming no subsisting grievance. The State and the injured parties’ counsel confirmed the settlement. The Court, emphasizing private nature of the dispute and lack of public interest in continuing proceedings, relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Another (2012) to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quash the proceedings against the petitioners, thereby terminating the case SC 142/2022 and the final report. The order directs quashing of all further proceedings in relation to the petitioners.
A single-judge Kerala High Court revisional inquiry under Cr.P.C. sections 397/401 challenges a conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Naroth Jagadeesh was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Thalassery, for dishonour of a cheque; the Sessions Court confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the Court and maintained the rest. The High Court, citing State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri and subsequent Supreme Court authorities, held that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and not an appellate power, and it should not re-appreciate evidence already evaluated by the trial and appellate courts unless there is a glaring miscarriage of justice or non-consideration of material. The court discusses the burden and standard of proof under the NI Act, referencing Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, Kalamani Tex, and Kishan Rao to explain presumptions under sections 139 and 118, including the rebuttable nature of the presumption under S.139 and the effect of a signed cheque. It notes that the trial and appellate courts correctly treated the evidence and presumptions in favour of the complainant. Ultimately, the High Court dismisses the revision petition but grants two months to pay the amount and directs surrender on 01.02.2023, with execution of the sentence deferred till 31.01.2023.
V.H. Kuttymoosa, a 59-year-old claimant, sustained injuries in a road traffic collision on 17 December 2009 when a car driven by the first respondent knocked him down near BOT junction, Kundannoor-Island road. He was hospitalized for 14 days and later required implant removal in 2012. He claimed Rs 3.5 lakh as compensation in OP(MV) 2524/2009; the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, awarded Rs 1,74,500. The insurer admitted the accident and policy; no oral evidence was adduced; Exts. A1–A17 were marked. The appellant contends that the tribunal erred in notional income assessment, arguing Rs 6,000 per month, guided by Ramchandrappa v. Royal Sundaram (AIR 2011 SC 2951), which would yield higher compensation. The tribunal had fixed Rs 3,000 notional income and awarded various heads. The court notes the appellant’s age, occupation, and injury, and determines that notional income of Rs 6,000 per month is appropriate, given the seriousness of the case and prior jurisprudence; however, since the claim itself was Rs 6,000, it does not go beyond that. The Tribunal’s other heads—loss of earnings, transport, extra nourishment, medical expenses, bystander costs, pain and suffering, and loss of amenities—are re-examined, leading to an enhanced aggregate of Rs 76,020. The appeal is allowed; the insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount with interest within two months, in accordance with Circular No. 3 of 2019, etc., and without costs.
TR.P(C) No. 513 of 2021; TR.P(Crl.) No. 70 of 2021 This is a common High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam, order disposing of two transfer petitions filed in matrimonial proceedings between Prabha Padmanabhan and Nitin Krishnankutty Nair. The wife, in Tr.P(C) No.513/2021, sought transfer of OP No.1227/2021 from the Family Court, Ernakulam, to the Family Court, Thrissur, under Section 24 CPC, arguing matrimonial cruelty, penury, and the difficulty of transporting two minor children (ages 15 and 11) for proceedings and the need to avoid undue hardship. The husband, in Tr.P(Crl.) No.70/2021, sought transfer of MC No.355/2021 from Thrissur to Ernakulam, contending harassment, desertion, his back pain, and alleging that the wife’s move would facilitate harassment and delay. The Court heard both sides and relied on Supreme Court precedents holding that the transfer of matrimonial disputes is guided by the convenience of the wife and children, rather than strict territoriality, and that consolidation of proceedings can be efficient. It emphasizes the “convenience of the woman and children” doctrine and the need for joint trial when appropriate. Ultimately, the judge allows the wife’s transfer petition and dismisses the husband’s petition, with directions to transmit records and consider consolidation, thereby promoting both protection and judicial economy.
This writ appeal challenges a single-judge order in W.P.(C) No.21796/2019 arising from a National Highways Authority of India land-acquisition matter. The respondent-1 claimed enhanced compensation for lands acquired for widening NH 47/544. An Arbitrator–District Collector had rejected the enhancement due to a belated application, holding it time-barred. The writ court, however, allowed the petition, condoning the delay on the ground that the writ petitioner belonged to a disadvantaged background and was not legally trained, and directed the Arbitrator to decide Ext.P3 on merits after hearing all concerned, thereby remitting the matter for fresh consideration. The appellant contends (i) the writ petition was not maintainable and should have been challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act; (ii) non-joinder of NHAI as a party to the writ petition; (iii) condonation of delay defeats the statutory limitation and undermines settled law on limitation, citing various decisions. The High Court, in setting aside the impugned judgment, reiterates the primacy of statutory remedies (Section 34) over writ jurisdiction where an award exists, and emphasizes that ignorance of law cannot justify delay. It surveys constitutional and doctrinal standards on discretion, reasonableness, and judicial review, ultimately allowing the appeal and setting aside the writ court’s order.
This writ petition concerns whether the District Collector should award interest under Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act when he redetermines compensation under Section 28A for land acquired for the Perinthalmanna-Manathmangalam-Kakkooth bye-pass-II road in Malappuram district. The original owner died; the petitioners are her legal heirs, who deposited the awarded compensation before the Sub Court at Manjeri and later filed a Section 28A application on 22.11.2013 after not filing under Section 18. The 2nd respondent passed Ext.P3 on 1.12.2016 determining a new compensation of Rs. 13,82,636.04, but did not award statutory interest. Petitioners rely on Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari (1995) to argue that interest under Section 34 must be paid on the excess amount determined under Section 28A, and cite Kallianikutty Amma v. Special Tahsildar (LA) (2003) as supporting precedent. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pushpavathi (2018) held that disputes regarding non-award of interest under Section 28 or 34 cannot be referred under Section 18; remedy lies in Article 226, and not as an alternative statutory remedy. The Kerala High Court agrees with these authorities and holds the petitioners are entitled to interest on the enhanced amount and directs the 2nd respondent to calculate and pay it under Section 34 on the redetermined amount within three months, from certified copy of the judgment. The petition is allowed.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 582 OF 2022 This is a criminal revision petition under sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by the sole accused, T P Shine, challenging his conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as recorded by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, confirmed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ernakulam, and upheld on further appeal. The prosecution alleged that the accused issued two cheques—Exts. P1 and P2—for Rs. 2,00,000 each, in discharge of a loan, which were dishonoured on presentation. The trial court examined PW1 and admitted Exts. P1–P6; under Section 313 Cr.P.C. the accused did not produce defence evidence. The defence argued that Exts. P1 and P2 were blank signed cheques given as security, and that the alleged Lok Adalat settlement under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act produced a final decree, which should negate criminal proceedings. The court relied on the evidence and presumptions under the NI Act in favour of the complainant, and discussed controlling precedents on reverse onus, presumption, and the execution of Lok Adalat awards. The High Court, after considering those authorities, held that there was no final Lok Adalat award capable of execution as a civil decree, and that the earlier findings were not perverse. The revision petition was dismissed, though the accused was given time to pay compensation and to undergo the sentence, with execution deferred to a date certain.
Vinodan S/O Sankunny Panikkar (late) filed MACA 174/2012 challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ottappalam’s award in O.P. (MV) No. 895/2007 arising from a 24.6.2007 accident in which he was the pillion rider on Reg.No.KL-49 924. The Tribunal found the first respondent negligent and the second respondent vicariously liable; the insurer (third respondent) was held to indemnify the second. An award of Rs.80,000 was deemed inadequate, prompting this appeal. The appellant contends that the Tribunal erred in not accepting Ext.A17, showing 8% permanent disability, and in not accepting a higher monthly income; pleadings claimed Rs.4,000 per month, while the Tribunal adopted Rs.3,000. Relying on Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq, the court notes the sufficiency of the notional income of Rs.4,000 and proceeds to reassess damages with reference to the generally accepted principles of compensation (Raj Kumar) classifying damages into pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads. The court rejects the Tribunal’s limited consideration of disability evidence and awards enhanced compensation by recalculating heads: four months’ loss of earnings (Rs.16,000, deducting Rs.3,000 already awarded leaves Rs.13,000), bystander expenses (Rs.850 after deducting Rs.3,400), pain and suffering (Rs.5,000), loss of amenities (Rs.5,000), and disability compensation (Rs.33,600 on the basis of a 5% whole-body impairment with multiplier 14 on age 41). Total enhanced compensation: Rs.57,450, with interest at 6.5% p.a. from the date of petition until realization (excluding 316 days delay). The insurer is directed to pay within two months, subject to the appellant providing bank details. Costs allocated as per Court’s discretion.
RCRev. Nos. 405/2017, 406/2017, 407/2017, 408/2017, 409/2017, 410/2017; Nos. 97/2018, 102/2018, 107/2018, 183/2018 This batch judgment central to the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) regime consolidates six Rent Control Revision Petitions filed by the landlady Beena Thomas Alexander challenging concurrent judgments of the Rent Control Appellate Authority at Pathanamthitta in respect of six Rent Control Petitions (R.C.P. Nos. 7/2011, 8/2011, 9/2011, 11/2011, 12/2011 and 15/2011) and related revisions by tenants, challenging the Appellate Authority’s orders. The landlady sought eviction under Section 11(3) to facilitate conversion of her three-storeyed building into a hotel, with the ground floor to be used as parking and the upper floors for lodging. The Rent Control Court had granted eviction under Section 11(3); the Rent Control Appellate Authority reversed in several appeals, apparently invoking Section 11(8). The High Court, in a common judgment dated 23 December 2022, holds that the landlady’s need was bonafide under Section 11(3) and that the RCAA erred in treating the case as under Section 11(8) in the absence of pleadings or evidence. The Court restores the RCC eviction order and dismisses the tenants’ revisions, while granting six months’ time to vacate on conditions (undertaking, arrears, and ongoing rent). The judgment also clarifies that landlord affluence is not relevant to bonafide need and that Section 20 revisional power permits re-appraisal only for legality or propriety, not full re-litigation of facts.
This appeal, heard by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, challenges the order of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Bangalore, which had set aside the Service Tax demand against South Indian Bank Ltd. for the period 1.9.2004 to 31.7.2007 on grounds including non-levy of extended limitation (Section 73) and a deemed absence of willful suppression. The department initiated investigation following an intelligence report that the bank did not fully assess service tax on provided services and did not account for charges paid to foreign entities; a show-cause notice was issued on 03.09.2008. The Adjudicating Authority raised a demand of Rs. 5,45,61,022 along with penalties under Sections 76 and 77; penalty under Section 78 was waived under Section 80. CESTAT held that the extended period could not be invoked, relying on case law including Rochem’s case and other precedents. The High Court, however, examines the interplay between Sections 73 and 80, and concludes that the Tribunal erred in holding the extended period non-applicable. It holds that extended period under Section 73(1) can be invoked in the facts, and the appeal is allowed; the Tribunal’s finding to the contrary is set aside, and the department’s demand for the relevant period can be sustained.
OP(C) 944 of 2022 before the Kerala High Court challenges the order/judgment in OS 484/2021 before the Munsiff, Kottayam. The petitioner, Oommen K. Eapen, seeks to direct the Munsiff to consider and dispose of I.A. No.1/2021 (Ext. P13) and related amendment I.A. No.4/2022 (Ext. P23) in OS 484/2021 within a defined time frame, emphasizing urgency and the risk of the suit becoming infructuous if delay persists. The second respondent has moved I.A. No.6/2022 (Ext. R2(b)) under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and the Limitation Act to reject the plaint, a position contested by the petitioner. The respondent bank relies on the Supreme Court’s Electrosteel Castings v. UV Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2022) 2 SCC 573 to argue that mere use of the word “fraud” without specific particulars cannot bypass the statutory bar under Section 34. The Court, after hearing, noted that Ext. P13 can be disposed within three months per a prior order and concluded that expeditious disposal would serve justice to both sides, avoiding infructuous litigation. Exercising Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court directs the Munsiff to consider Exts. P13 and R2(b) within one month of certified copy and to address Ext. P23 only after a decision on Exts. P13 and R2(a). An undertaking that no coercive measures shall be taken for ten days post-judgment is recorded. The petition is allowed and the order directs prompt disposition of the listed applications.
This Kerala High Court original petition challenges the Central Administrative Tribunal’s November 21, 2018 order dismissing OA No. 433/2017, which refused the petitioner’s request to transfer from the ARS cadre to another ICAR institute (CIFT). Manojkumar T.S., a Senior Scientist/Head of Krishi Vigyan Kendra, CPCRI Kasaragod, had been recruited into the Agricultural Research Service in the AS&PE discipline with a four-year mandatory tenure and a lien that permitted posting anywhere in India. After being posted as Head, KVK under Anx.A-2, his request to transfer to CIFT was rejected in Anx.A-10 on grounds that the Head, KVK post is location-specific and that he did not hold an ARS discipline, making a transfer outside ARS impermissible. The petitioner contended that ICAR’s transfer guidelines (Ext.P-5, 2018) and the ICAR personnel policy require linkage with tenurial posts and permit transfers/back transfers to ARS streams while preserving the tenurial nature of the post. The High Court held that the Anx.A-10 grounds are unsustainable, quashed Ext.P-1, and remitted the matter to the Transfer Committee for fresh decision, with directions to consider transfer back to ARS in AS&PE or to a suitable ARS post, after hearing. It also directed that the CIFT vacancy not be filled until the committee decides, and that the decision be rendered within two months of receiving a certified copy.
Meju, the appellant, sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for injuries sustained in a December 27, 2008 accident while riding a motorcycle (KL 8 AH 9227). A car (KL 54 A 1293) driven by the first respondent allegedly caused the collision; the car was owned by the second respondent and insured by the third. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal initially awarded Rs. 21,100, with 40% contributory negligence attributed to the appellant, permitting recovery of Rs. 12,600 with interest, and denying any compensation for disability. The appellant challenged both liability and quantum. The High Court held that the charge sheet (Exhibits A5/B1) constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence under Section 166, citing New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal, and found that the respondents failed to adduce evidence to dispute the charge sheet. On quantum, the Court re-determined the notional monthly income, fixing it at Rs. 6,500 (in light of Ramachandrappa), and determined loss of earnings at Rs. 13,000, with disability at 5% (per Raj Kumar) and a multiplier of 17 (per Sarla Verma). It also reassessed damages for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities, and disability loss, leading to an aggregate enhancement of compensation. The final order allows the appeal, enhances compensation by Rs. 91,300, permits recovery of Rs. 8,500 related to contributory negligence, and directs deposit by the insurer within 60 days, with costs of Rs. 7,500. The judgment totals roughly Rs. 1,00,000 with interest at 6% per annum from the petition date until deposit.
BA 5953/2022; BA 6792/2022 These bail petitions arise from Crime No. 183/2022 of New Mahe Police Station, Kannur, in which the accused are alleged to have formed a criminal conspiracy and killed Haridasan, a CPI(M) loyalist, on 21.02.2022 by beating with steel pipes and sword, as per the prosecution. The petitions BA 5953/2022 (Lijesh K., accused No.1) and BA 6792/2022 (Atmaj S. Ashok, accused No.13) seek regular bail after the trial court allegedly rejected default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC on the ground that the charge sheet was not properly presented before the court or that the accused were previously detained. The prosecution contends that the petitioners are not eligible for default bail, citing serious charges under IPC (sections 143, 147, 148, 447, 204, 120B, and 302 read with 149) and their criminal antecedents (including a section 302 case). The court evaluates the position in light of Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer (SC), Shino Paul, Saharath V. P., and Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre, and considers the defence's arguments that defects in the charge sheet and the right to default bail should be read in favor of the accused. The judge concludes that the nature of the offence, the accused's active involvement, and other criminal antecedents justify denying bail. Consequently, both bail applications are dismissed.
Joseph Baby, the tenant, has challenged the Rent Control Appellate Authority’s common order dismissing his I.A. Nos. 6 and 7 in R.C.A. No. 1 of 2022, which sought appointment of an Advocate Commissioner and permission to adduce additional evidence in O.P. (RC) No. 135 of 2022. The eviction petition under Sections 11(2)(b), 11(3) and 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 had claimed that the petition schedule shop room needed to be vacated for the third respondent to start a computer training and job centre, and that the petitioner had annexed a common veranda to the shop. The Rent Control Court had concluded eviction under Section 11(3). The petitioner contended he had fallen ill during the trial and was not able to obtain a Commissioner and evidence timely; he pointed to five vacant rooms and a hall in the same three-storied building as alternative accommodation. He sought appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to verify the current vacancies and to allow additional evidence to reflect subsequent developments, including the vacancy of the Olivia tailoring shop. The Appellate Authority rejected these applications, noting that elaborate evidence is ordinarily unnecessary and that subsequent events ordinarily have no bearing unless they render the proceedings infructuous. The High Court allowed the petitions, set aside the Appellate Authority’s order, and directed appointment of an Advocate Commissioner with follow-up action as per law, holding that subsequent events bearing on relief may be relevant in eviction matters.
MFA (Forest) No. 168 of 2006 The Kerala High Court heard MFA (Forest) No. 168 of 2006, an appeal by Mrs. Puthiyambra Pennukka challenging a Forest Tribunal Kozhikode order under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. The dispute concerns about 1.30 acres of land in Kedavoor Village, Kozhikode Taluk (amended to 1.56 acres), claimed not to be private forest and sought exemption under S.3(2) of the Vesting Act. The land forms part of a larger 3.57 acres allegedly leased from Mallikasseri Kovilakam, though no lease document was produced; the respondent-State contends the land falls under vesting. The Forest Tribunal framed three issues: limitation, declaration, and exemption. It found in favour on limitation but rejected ownership and exemption, holding that Ext. A1 Purchase Certificate under the Land Reforms Act is not binding on the Forest Tribunal and that there was no proven cultivation or possession on the appointed day; it also found PW1 ineligible to testify. The appellant invoked authorities like Parameswara Sastrigal and Mohammed Basheer, arguing that a Purchase Certificate under S.72K is conclusive proof of exemption and title under the Vesting Act. The Special Government Pleader countered that such certificate is evidence, not conclusive proof, of cultivation. The High Court remands the matter to the Tribunal for afresh consideration on the evidence already on record, with directions that pleadings or new evidence shall not be introduced, while adopting the conclusive-proof principle from Mohammed Basheer and State of Kerala v. Mohammed Basheer. The appeal is allowed with costs.
BAIL APPL. NO. 4389 OF 2024 Subash Lambat, the first accused in Crime No.1314/2023 of Thrissur West Police Station, seeks bail under Section 439 CrPC. He and a co-accused allegedly deceived a defacto complainant by claiming to deal in scrap articles from a Goa-based company and induced payment of Rs.1.25 crore between 07.03.2022 and 14.03.2022, promising supply of scrap articles. The petitioner was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 08.04.2024. The prosecution alleges offences under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 IPC, based on dishonest misappropriation with a common intention. The petitioner’s counsel contends innocence, false implication, and lack of material linking him to the alleged act; there is ongoing investigation and no final report filed within 60 days, thus entitling him to the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, arguing the offences are grave economic offenses and that the petitioner, a Maharashtra native, may flee justice; he notes the final report has not been laid. Relying on prior Supreme Court doctrine — Sanjay Dutt; Uday Mohanlal Acharya — and Indian jurisprudence including Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Hussainara Khatoon, the Court holds that where investigation cannot be completed within the statutory period and the offences are punishable with less than ten years, the accused acquires an indefeasible right to statutory bail under Section 167(2) CrPC, subject to stringent conditions. On 12.06.2024, bail is allowed, directing a bond of Rs.1,00,000 with two solvent sureties of Rs.1,00,000 each, and imposing conditions for appearance, non-inducement, prohibition on tampering with witnesses, passport surrender, and reporting details; with the Investigating Officer continuing to proceed and final report to be laid in accordance with law.
