CON.CASE(C) NO.1934 OF 2020 Contempt of Court Case (Civil) No.1934/2020 arises out of W.P.(C) No.33238/2016 and is filed by AV Sureshan, the ninth petitioner, alleging willful disobedience of Annexure A1 judgment dated 12.10.2018 and related orders. The petition targets the Employees Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) for failing to implement the directions in the 2018 judgment concerning the Employees Provident Fund pension scheme, following the 2014 amendment (G.S.R.609(E)) and the extended window to exercise options under para 11 of the pension scheme. The matter traverses the validity of the 2014 amendment, the interpretation of para 11(3) proviso and para 11(4) post-amendment, and the Supreme Court’s read-down directions, including Article 142 of the Constitution. The judgment cites RC Gupta and others v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, EPFO (2018) 14 SCC 809, and the apex Court’s Sunil Kumar B. decision (Civil Appeals Nos.8143-44 of 2022; AIR 2022 SC 5634; 2022 (7) KHC 12), under which the 2014 notification was held legal and valid and certain extensions and options were directed. The Kerala High Court acknowledges the apex Court’s decision and holds that the petitioner’s higher pension entitlement requires reconsideration by the EPFO. The contempt petition is disposed of, with the case closed, but without prejudice to EPFO’s right to reconsider entitlement in light of the 2022 Supreme Court judgment. Annexures A1–A4 are listed in the Appendix.
This Kerala High Court Civil Revision Petition challenges an appellate order that permitted withdrawal of OS No.312/2010 (Munsiff Court, Chengannur) after the first suit had been tried and a decree had been passed. The suit was for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the revision petitioners from trespassing into the plaint schedule property, with the respondent asserting ownership and possession of 7.50 cents of land and alleging that a latrine and bathroom were constructed on the northwestern part of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the portion identified as 16 sq.m in Sy.No.240/1 was not correctly described or scheduled in the plaint. The respondent appealed, and while the appeal was pending, he filed a fresh suit (OS No.157/2017) and moved to withdraw the earlier suit (OS No.312/2010) under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The appellate court, after hearing objections, allowed the withdrawal on terms, which the revision petitioners challenge as illegal, arguing that withdrawal after a decree/appeal cannot be permitted. The respondent counters that there is no embargo on withdrawal after filing an appeal and that the law has evolved, citing V. Rajendran and others. The learned Judge discusses several Supreme Court precedents, including Rathinavel Chettiar and Sneh Gupta, to explain the position, and ultimately relies on Rajendran to hold that the appellate court can permit withdrawal in such circumstances where the earlier suit suffered a formal defect. The court refuses to interfere and dismisses the revision petition.
WP(C) Nos. 24751/2022 & 24765/2022 The two writ petitions, WP(C) Nos. 24751/2022 and 24765/2022, are filed by a husband-and-wife duo who availed financial assistance from UCO Bank, secured by an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Both petitioners faced default in instalments due to circumstances beyond their control and are willing to settle the overdue amounts in instalments to regularise their loan accounts. The Bank has initiated proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and the petitioners sought invocation of the One Time Settlement (OTS) scheme, seeking continuation or extension of instalment facilities. A prior interim order directed the petitioners to submit a settlement proposal; Rs. 5 lakh was required as a condition, and the Bank later rejected the proposal on 12.04.2023. The petitioners were advised to pursue statutory remedies, and the court noted that the Bank had rejected the OTS proposal. The Hon’ble Court referred to Supreme Court guidance in South Indian Bank Ltd v. Naveen Mathew Philip (2023 LiveLaw SC 320) and to State Bank of India v. Aravindra Electronics Pvt. Ltd. (2022 KHC 7165), emphasizing restraint in interfering with SARFAESI proceedings under Article 226 except in extraordinary circumstances, and the non-extension of time under OTS per the Kerala decision. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petitions, while preserving the petitioners’ right to pursue remedies under law in accordance with the statute.
Cont.Case (C) No. 1316 of 2019 This Contempt of Court case, Cont.Case (C) No. 1316 of 2019, arises from a contempt petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, filed by petitioners (W.P.(C) No. 38713 of 2016) alleging willful disobedience of the directions contained in Annexure A1 judgment dated 12 October 2018. The petitioners claim that the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) has not disbursed higher pension in accordance with the scheme amendments and the Supreme Court’s subsequent 2022 decision in Sunil Kumar B. v. EPFO. The respondents contend that the apex Court’s 4 November 2022 judgment requires reconsideration of entitlements under the EPF scheme, and that the contempt petition should be closed with directions to the EPFO to undertake the reconsideration in accordance with law. The court references the apex judgment in Sunil Kumar B. (AIR 2022 SC 5634) and the view in RC Gupta (2018) 14 SCC 809, noting that the amended scheme’s provisions and read down interpretations guide the authorities. After hearing counsel for both sides, the High Court holds that the 2022 apex decision necessitates reconsideration of the petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension and directs EPFO to undertake the necessary exercise. The contempt petition is accordingly closed, without prejudice to the petitioners’ right to seek reconsideration under law.
The Kerala High Court, in Cr.M.C. No. 4108 of 2020, quashed the Annexure A2 final report and all further proceedings in CC 872/2018, initiated against accused Muraleedharan and Aiysah Beevi for alleged offences under Sections 294(b) and 53 read with 34 IPC. The court found that the First Information Report (FIS) and the final report did not specify the exact obscene words allegedly used, a prerequisite for constituting an offence under 294(b). Relying on Preethimon v. State of Kerala and James Jose v. State of Kerala, it held that the 294(b) charge could not be sustained without precise language. Regarding Section 353 IPC, the court noted that the FIS and final report merely alleged that chairs were pulled and arranged to obstruct the Village Officer, which does not, by itself, satisfy the ingredients of 353 IPC as interpreted by Hariprasad v. State of Kerala, which requires assault or use of criminal force against a public servant with the intended aim to deter. Consequently, the court concluded that the allegations do not establish the necessary elements of either offence, and allowed the petition, quashing the proceedings. The order emphasizes that the questions should be resolved in trial only if the materials disclose the requisite elements; here they do not.
OP(C) No.2816 of 2014 & con.cases The judgments arise from a long-drawn land dispute concerning 7.97 acres comprising Sy.Nos.126/5, 126/2C and 126/2A in Karingarapully Amsom, Kodumbu, Palakkad. In 1908 a partition deed allotted the property to Ayya Pattar; after his death, his heirs, notably P.A. Viswanathan and successors, sought partition (O.S. Nos. 17/1964 and 337/1989). The final decree in 1991 allotted 2/9 shares and 1.77 acres to the plaintiffs, delivering that portion in 2013, while other attempts to recover 6.20 acres continued. The case traversed issues of verumpattam, oral leases to Mallu, and subsequent transfers of interests by Krishnan @ Kitta, with Taluk Land Board findings ultimately holding that the disputed 7.97 acres were owned/possessed by P.V. Damodara Sharma, excluding them from the ceiling calculations. Multiple petitions (OP(C) Nos.2816/2014 and connected matters) challenged orders relating to appointment of Advocate Commissioners and mutation corrections, and addressed maintainability, evidence, and the genuineness of documentary transfers. The Kerala High Court, under Justice V.G. Arun, held that commission reports are evidence but should not be used to protract litigation, set aside certain interim orders, and remand for reasoned decisions, while dismissing other challenges. The outcome emphasizes that the identity of the plaint schedule property had been conclusively determined by prior judgments, though several interlocutory orders required re-examination.
This is a regular bail petition by Athmaj S Ashok, accused No. 8 in Crime No.183/2022 of the New Mahe Police Station, Kannur, alleging conspiracy to murder a political rival. The prosecution claims that on 8 February 2022 the deceased assaulted several accused, triggering a criminal conspiracy in which accused Nos. 1–6 formed an unlawful assembly and assaulted the deceased on 21 February 2022, killing him with swords after trespass into his property. The petitioner, arrested on 4 March 2022, contends he had no direct role in the murder and that swords allegedly recovered from him were stage-managed. The investigation has not named him in the FIR, though the final report implicates him in conspiracy. The State argues that the petitioner was active in the conspiracy, citing three swords recovered during custody, call data, RFSL sound-file evidence, and location data showing his presence with other accused. The court has previously held prima facie materials connect the petitioner to the conspiracy and that conspirators may share equal culpability. It relies on Supreme Court precedents such as Mamta Nair, Ishwarji Nagaji Mali, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar, and Ramesh Bhavan Rathod to emphasize that bail in serious offences involving murder and conspiracy requires careful consideration of role, evidence, and risk to witnesses. Given the seriousness of the offence, lack of fresh circumstances, and risk factors, the bail application is dismissed.
The petitioners, Sarath, Vishnu and Najee B. (accused Nos. 1–3) in CC No. 276 of 2020 before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-III, Attingal, approached the Kerala High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashment of criminal proceedings arising from Kilimanoor Police Station Crime No. 658/2019. The offence alleged comprises Sections 341, 294(b), 323, 324 and 326 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution claims that on 02.09.2019, at about 7:45 a.m., the petitioners, in furtherance of a common intent, restrained the 2nd respondent Ajay and attacked him with weapons, causing injuries. The petitioners contend that the parties have amicably settled their disputes (Annexure-A2) and seek termination of the proceedings, arguing that continued prosecution would hinder peace and reconciliation. The court directed the investigating officer to record the defacto complainant’s statement and verify the genuineness of the settlement, confirm there are no other impediments to quashing, and ascertain whether any petitioners have criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but noted absence of other convictions. The High Court relied on Supreme Court decisions, including Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, Parbatbhai Aahir and others, to hold that Section 482 CrPC power can be exercised to quash non-compoundable offences where the dispute is private and settled, subject to exceptions for heinous offences, special statutes, or public servants. Having weighed gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the settlement, the court held that quashing would not adversely impact society and exercise of the inherent jurisdiction is justified. Result: the petition is allowed and Annexure-A1 Final Report in Crime No. 658/2019 and all further proceedings in CC No. 276/2020 are quashed.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale and a perpetual injunction relating to an A schedule and B schedule land. The respondent, Georgekutty, claimed ownership and possession of the plaint A schedule property and alleged a sale of B schedule land as per Sale Deed No.2475/1997, with a separate agreement for sale fixing Rs 42,500 as consideration. An amount of Rs 15,000 was paid on 30.01.2005; the balance was to be paid at the time of registration, but due to restrictions on alienation under land rules, the sale deed could not be executed. The appellant, Joseph, contended that the document was forged, no sale consideration was received, and there was no valid restriction on alienation over B schedule land. He further argued that the appellant did not owe any duty to execute the sale deed. The trial court decreed specific performance and injunction in 2015; the first appellate court dismissed the appeal for delay in filing a condonation petition. The High Court, while upholding the principle on condonation of delay, relied on Thambi v. Mathew (Full Bench) and Shyam Sunder Sarma v. Pannal Jaiswal to hold that dismissal of delay condonation is a decision in the appeal but found no substantial question of law. The appeal is dismissed with no costs.
Three minor children, aged 9, 7 and 6, are at the heart of this Original Petition (Family Court) filed by their maternal grandparents seeking custody. After the death of their mother on 02.09.2021, the petitioners, who raised the children, claim custody rights and challenge a Family Court order that granted limited interaction to the petitioners while the respondent seeks legal guardianship and permanent custody in O.P.2377 of 2021. The Family Court's Ext.P12 order, dated 16.03.2023, permitted only restricted interaction on Saturdays between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m. The petitioners moved I.A.7/2023 for interim custody, and I.A.5/2022 seeking passport impounding; the court heard arguments on 10.04.2023 and the matter under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was entertained. The petitioner’s counsel urged that the welfare of the children should prevail and that, given the mother's untimely death, the grandparents deserve extended interaction and custody to ensure continuity and stability. The respondent contends that the petitioners are not fit to care for the children, citing alleged mental derangement of the first petitioner and risk to the welfare of the children. Citing Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2022 SC 3511), the court reiterates that the welfare of the child is paramount and that the best interests must guide custody decisions. The court modifies Ext.P12 to grant interim custody for specified dates during summer vacation, with custody times and return obligations, and retains authority to modify later if necessary.
Chandramathy Sankunni, the appellant in W.A. No. 2213 of 2018, challenged a Kerala High Court judgment that declined relief in a petition seeking Swatantrata Sainik Samman (SSS) pension for her late husband Kelan Sankunni. The case arises from the claim that the husband participated in the Punnapra-Vayalar struggle and was detained in connection with PE 10/1122 ME before the Special Magistrate, Alappuzha, for about seven months and later in a Sessions Court. The writ petition, previously disposed of by the High Court on 02.12.2015 and reconsidered under Ext. P11, led to a central recommendation to grant pension on the basis of a Tahsildar certificate stating nine months imprisonment; however, the Central Government, via Ext. P12 dated 13.04.2015, rejected the claim, recording that the applicant's husband had only three months of imprisonment and that two co-prisoner certificates or other primary evidence were lacking. The learned Single Judge noted differences between state and central schemes and held that the central scheme requires primary evidentiary material. On appeal, the Division Bench affirmed the decision, highlighting that the applicant failed to establish imprisonment for the minimum period and that the evidentiary requirements of the central scheme could not be met. The court relied on Gurdial Singh for context but ultimately held the appellant's evidence insufficient, upholding the rejection of pension.
Anil Jacob Mathew filed WP(C) No. 741 of 2023 challenging actions under the SARFAESI Act by The South Indian Bank. He had two primary loans: a Kissan Cash Credit Facility (KCC) and a housing loan, and also obtained business loans for running a bar hotel (subject to Ext.P4 judgment). The petitioner contends there are no defaults in the housing loan; the KCC facility is in NP A, with December 2022 outstanding about Rs. 44 lakhs, from which he has paid roughly Rs. 22 lakhs, leaving about Rs. 22.50 lakhs. The bank argues that regularisation of the housing loan cannot be effected while the KCC remains NP A, and insists that the entire KCC balance must be cleared by 31.03.2023 before regularising the housing loan. The petitioner asserts liability is admitted and seeks time to clear the amount, stating compliance with Ext.P4 and that the outstanding has been reduced. The court relies on Sundaram BNP Paribas Home Finance Ltd. v. Nisha to permit repayment of the balance in easy installments, and on Satyawati Tondon and Mardia Chemicals (supra) to contextualize the statutory remedies under SARFAESI and the admissibility of accommodation. The bench finds the petitioner not a recalcitrant defaulter and directs the bank to accept Rs.22.50 lakh in 10 equal installments, starting 31.01.2023, while continuing housing EMI. Coercive proceedings are kept in abeyance and, upon completion, the housing loan would be regularised. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
This is an Original Petition [OP(C) No. 2401 of 2021] filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the Kerala High Court, challenging an order passed by the Munsiff Court, Punalur in I.A. No. 1/2021 in O.S. No. 232/2013. The matter traces its history to a suit originally dismissed by the trial court, which the appellate court later reversed and remanded, remitting it for fresh disposal with directions to consider additional evidence and to frame further issues, including limitation and the validity of Ext. A2 (a conveyance) for re-conveyance. On remand, the plaintiff indicated no further evidence, while the defendant sought amendment to the written statement, asserting the need to elaborate the sale deed’s circumstances and to justify the stated consideration. The petitioner contends that amendment is necessary to present the real questions and that technical compliance with the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC is not mandatory, arguing the affidavit should suffice. The respondents oppose amendments after trial has commenced, relying on mandatory proviso compliance and Salim P.M. v. Vasudevan Namboothiri. The High Court, after examining the limited supervisory remit, dismissed the petition and directed the registry to transmit a copy of the judgment to the trial court for information and compliance.
Jameela P.K., the plaintiff in O.S. 87 of 2016 before the Munsiff’s Court, Parappanangadi, seeks partition of properties belonging to the late Kunhikoya, the father of the petitioner and of several respondents. The suit claims that items 1 and 2 in plaint B schedule form part of the ancestral estate and have not been equitably divided among the heirs. To challenge a sale deed (No. 2760 of 2015) of those properties to the 4th respondent, the petitioner sought amendments to the plaint (Ext. P3) to declare the sale deed null and void, contending Kunhikoya had suffered cognitive decline and was admitted to the Department of Neurological Sciences at Aster Mims, Calicut on 03.12.2015, within a month of the sale. The trial court dismissed Ext. P7, the amendment petition, on the ground that the relief sought would be barred by limitation, referring to the earlier amendment application IA 1797/2017. The petitioner then filed Ext. P5 for amendment to incorporate setting aside the sale. Counsel for the petitioner urged that limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and that the amendment is essential to determine the real dispute; the court should adopt a liberal approach to amendments, citing Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan; Sasidharan v. Sudarsanan; and South Kongan Distilleries v. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik. The respondents contended that a second amendment is not maintainable and that the relief is time-barred. The High Court ultimately allows the amendment, sets aside Ext. P7, allows IA 2/2020, and directs expeditious disposition of the suit with additional pleadings to follow.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC 5882 of 2022) before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The petitioner, Anas, is accused No.1 in Crime No.753/2015 of Nadapuram Police Station, pending as CC 625/2021 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Nadapuram. The offences alleged against the petitioner and other accused are under Sections 143, 147, 353 and 506(i) read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The prosecution case is that on 09.09.2015 at 11:30 hours, police went to the house of Ayoob to execute a warrant, but the accused and eight others assembled unlawfully, prevented entry, and threatened the police. The 2nd accused was tried and acquitted (Annexure E); the case against the petitioner was separated and refiled as CC 625/2021. The petitioner contends that after the acquittal of the 2nd accused, the substratum of the prosecution is lost and continuing proceedings serves no fruitful purpose, relying on Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police. The State opposes, arguing that the petitioner’s culpability can only be decided after trial, and the acquittal of the 2nd accused cannot nullify proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The court notes discrepancies in the Magistrate’s findings (absence of an advance search memo, lack of corroboration, discrepancies in PW2’s evidence, and reliance on police witnesses only) and concludes that the substratum has been lost. It applies the Moosa principle to exercise powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and quashes Annexure B final report and all further proceedings against the petitioner, effectively terminating the case against him.
TR.P.(C) No. 447/2021; Tr.P.(Crl.) Nos. 67/2021 & 68/2021 This is a composite transfer petition arising from matrimonial disputes between Divya L. and Naveen Srigunan and their families. The petitions seek transfer of proceedings from one Family Court to another, and include three petitions: TR.P.(C)447/2021 by the wife Divya L. seeking transfer of O.P.(G&W) No.414/2021 from Kasaragod to Kollam; Tr.P.(Crl.)67/2021 by Naveen and his parents seeking transfer of M.C.13/2021 from Kollam to Kasaragod; and Tr.P.(Crl.)68/2021 by Naveen against Divya L. seeking transfer of M.C.40/2021 from Kollam to Kasaragod. The common order notes that the parties and pleadings are consolidated for convenience. The court relies on Supreme Court precedent such as Sumitha Sing v. Kumar Sanjay and another (2001) 10 SCC 41, and other decisions including Mona Aresh Goel v. Aresh Satya Goel (2000) 9 SCC 255, Vaishali Shridhar Jagtap v. Shridhar Vishwanath Jagtap (AIR 2016 SC 3584), Santhini V. Vijaya Venkatesh (2017 4 KLT 415 (SC)), and Valsal Nisha v. Rajesh Soman Nair (2020 8 KLR 475). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the convenience of the woman and children is decisive in transfer decisions. The petitioner divisionally argues Kollam as her permanent residence with the child’s schooling and medical needs in Kollam, while the respondent contends Kasaragod residency and travel burdens. After hearing, the judge holds that the petitioner’s and child’s convenience prevails, and transfers O.P.(G&W)414/2021 to Kollam; dismisses the two criminal transfer petitions; and allows consolidation of all related proceedings in Kollam, with directions for record transmission and expedited posting, while preserving liberty for personal appearance dispensation for the respondent.
R.C.R.No.185 of 2014 and connected cases (consolidated with Nos. 186, 190, 191, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 210, 211, 216, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233 of 2014) These Rent Control Revision petitions arise from landlord Korothmkandy Khalid seeking eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, in respect of multiple rooms in the Jayasree Complex, Thalassery. The High Court examines a batch of revisions challenging orders of dismissal and confirmations by RCC and RCAA, with the core issue being whether the landlord’s reconstruction plan and his own occupation constitute bona fide needs justifying eviction. The court reiterates the wide scope of Section 20 revisional jurisdiction, allowing the High Court to review the legality, regularity or propriety of subordinate orders and, if necessary, reappraise evidence for that limited purpose. It rejects the contention that Khalid’s wealth or possession of other premises negatives bona fides, emphasizing that a landlord may own multiple properties and still have a genuine need. The court also clarifies that the definition of “building” under the Act can extend to space occupied by the building itself for the landlord’s bonafide use, aligning with precedents like Sarada, Daniel and Narayanankutty, while engaging with points from D.A.V. College and other authorities to refine interpretation. Ultimately, the petitions are allowed: eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(iv) is granted, with three months to surrender possession and conditions to pay arrears and rent up to vacatur.
This writ petition challenges Ext P1, an order dated 12/10/2021 passed by the Deputy Director under Section 33 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, appointing an administrator for the Peringavu Ksherolpadhaka Co-operative Society Ltd. No.198D, Malappuram, on the ground of lack of quorum in the managing committee. The nine-member committee had been in place since 07.03.2019; petitioners 5–7 allegedly resigned after allegations that they were coerced to sign blank papers. Petitioners contend that the resignations were obtained fraudulently and that the required procedural steps—specifically, submission to the President and adherence to Rule 38(3) of the Rules—were not properly complied with, rendering the resignation invalid. They also argue non-compliance with the proviso to Section 33(1) requiring publication on the notice board. The petition contends that the Registrar’s exercise of power under Section 33 should be made with caution, citing precedents including Deputy Registrar v. P.K. George and Varma v. Joint Registrar. The court, after examining the petition, the letters and police complaints, and the statements of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, held that there is no valid basis to declare the resignation invalid and that Ext P1 should not be interfered with. The judgment directs that elections for a new elected committee be conducted within three months, and that the administrator refrain from policy decisions until the elected committee assumes office.
WP(C) Nos.23186 of 2022 & connected cases These batch writ petitions challenge Government Order G.O.(MS.) No.121/2022 dated 07.07.2022 and the accompanying prospectus for Plus One admissions in Private Aided Higher Secondary Schools in Kerala. The Kerala High Court, in a judgment rendered by Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V, examines the policy decision to reduce management quota in PAHS to 20% and the requirement that management declare the community to which the school belongs and allocate 10% of seats to that community. The Court traces the historical allotment patterns (open merit, management quota, community quota, and SC/ST quotas) dating back to 1991–2005, notes prior judicial scrutiny of community quotas, and reiterates constitutional guarantees of equality (Articles 14 and 15) and secular school management. After considering submissions from petitioners (managers of PAHS) and respondents (State and education authorities), it holds that the 20% management quota is a valid policy decision that can stand judicial review, but the 10% community quota is arbitrary and unconstitutional. The Court directs that the 10% seats be treated as open merit seats and filled through the Centralized Allotment Process, while ensuring admissions already made are not disturbed. The petitions are disposed of with directions consistent with CAP and the new policy, clarifying the scope of government policy in PAHS admissions.
This is a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court relating to WA No. 727 of 2022, arising from WP(C) No.38133/2016. The appellant, Margaret Franco, challenges Ext.P13 G.O.(Rt) No.803/2016/TD dated 17-10-2016 issued by the Taxes Department, seeking refund of Rs.41,49,629 forfeited from her security deposit with 18% interest and the release of land auctioned as “bought in land,” arguing that the entire kist amount has already been realized by the Government and that the auction and forfeiture proceedings were unlawful. The writ petition was filed on 28-11-2016 and disposed of on 02-06-2022 by a learned Single Judge, who, noting there was no interim stay and the prolonged passage of time, closed the petition with liberty to revive if something survived. The appellant contends that there is a strong merits-based case, drawing on apex court guidance in VK Ashokan v. Asst. Excise Commissioner & Others (Ext.P9) and subsequent state actions (Exts.P10-P12), arguing that similarly placed defaulters received relief. The respondents rely on the absence of interim relief and the inertia of the writ petition. The Division Bench sets aside the impugned judgment and restores the petition for fresh consideration, directing a hearing on merits, with the matter to be listed before a suitable court for adjudication. The appeal is disposed of with these directions.
