The petitioner, P. Basheer, a former Mazdoor of Malabar Cements Ltd., challenges the 2006 job profile that makes a Diploma in Mining Engineering a prerequisite for the post of Senior Foreman (Mines) and seeks promotion to Senior Foreman with effect from 2015 and pay upgradation. Basheer has progressed through multiple roles, earning the Blaster Competency Certificate, Mines Mate Competency Certificate, and Mine Foreman Certificate of Competency, and was promoted to Mines Foreman (Grade VII) in 2008. He contends he should be promoted despite lacking a Diploma, arguing that his certificates and DGMS authorization suffice for technical responsibilities. Respondents counter that the 2006 profile created a managerial grade requiring a Diploma; direct recruitment requires Diploma, while promotions depend on vacancy, interview, and competency, with the Foreman certificate not being equivalent to a Diploma. They rely on Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1961 (Regulations 43, 37, 46) and Ext.P8 (DGMS guidance) to justify a higher qualification for Senior Foreman (Mines). The court reviews the pre- and post-2006 promotion regime, notes that the Senior Foreman role is managerial and requires higher qualification, and ultimately holds that the petitioner did not have the Diploma in Mining Engineering as of the date of consideration, dismissing the petition. The judgment cites Ashok Kumar Gupta and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar for principles on promotion rights and rule-based eligibility.
OT.Rev Nos. 23/2019; 24/2019; 25/2019; 29/2019; 30/2019; 32/2019; 33/2019 This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court arises from seven connected O.T.Revisions (VAT) filed by the State of Kerala challenging the orders of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, in TA(VAT) Nos. 162/2015, 159/2015, 160/2015, 161/2015, 158/2015, 1329/2015 and 60/2016. The central issue is whether the receipts by Sathyam Audios for the transfer of the right to use copyrighted music/ringtones constitute taxable turnover under the Kerala VAT Act, 2003 (KVAT). The Assessing Officer treated the royalties as taxable under Section 6(1)(c) and Entry 68 of the Third Schedule, arguing that the transfer of the right to use intangible property falls within taxable events even without exclusive transfer. The Appellate Tribunal had reversed, holding no tax on royalties as service-tax had been levied, and relying on Malabar Gold (Ker. HC) to emphasize exclusivity. The State challenged on grounds that (i) intangible rights fall under goods, (ii) transfer of right to use could be a deemed sale per Tata Consultancy Services and Associated Cement, and (iii) Quick Heal Technologies clarifies the essential elements for transfer of the right to use. The High Court ultimately allowed the revisions, set aside Tribunal orders, and remitted the 2005-06 matter for fresh, speaking order, while restoring other years to tax.
Anil Kumar, the judgment debtor, challenged coercive execution measures taken by the Sub Court at Attingal, where a warrant of arrest under Rule 38 of Order XXI CPC was issued against him while his immovable property was under attachment for a money decree in O.S. No. 9/2014. The Kerala High Court, in OP(C) No. 2422 of 2022, examined whether coercive steps under Rules 37–38 of Order XXI CPC may be invoked to compel the judgment debtor’s presence in court or detention in civil prison when an attachment exists or at the execution stage. The court traced the statutory sequence under Section 51 CPC: (a) delivery of property specifically decreed; (b) attachment and sale or sale without attachment; (c) arrest and detention in prison for such period as allowed by Section 58; (d) appointment of a receiver; (e) other modes. It held that arrest and detention cannot bypass the sale of attached property and must be used only after exhausting remedies under clause (b). It invoked Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin to emphasize Article 21’s protection of personal liberty and the need for strict compliance with procedure. In the instant case, the immovable property under attachment could be proceeded against; therefore, the warrant of arrest and the entire proceedings under Rule 37/38 were set aside, the bond cancelled, and the execution court directed to proceed against the attached property or other available assets. The decision clarifies that coercive steps may be initiated for arrest and detention only after exhausting clause (b).
CRL.R.P. No. 2440 of 2012 This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition by four accused challenging their conviction under the Abkari Act for illicit liquor transportation and manufacturing equipment. The trial court convicted accused Nos. 1 to 4 under sections 8(1) and 8(2) for transporting 180 litres of arrack in a Maruti Omni, with ancillary findings of manufacture at the first accused’s residence. The III Additional District & Sessions Judge (Adhoc-I), Thodupuzha, dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment and Rs 1 lakh fine per accused with default imprisonment. The High Court revisits the legality and propriety of these concurrent judgments. The prosecution’s case rests on seizure of arrack at the scene on 16.11.2007, and on a search at the first accused’s house yielding utensils for arrack production. The defence argues the arrest at 8:30 p.m. on 16.11.2007 is not established (arrest memo carrying crime number 360/2007 suggests later registration), that key witnesses were hostile, and that there are unexplained delays in forwarding the contraband and its sample to the laboratory, compromising the chain of custody. The court surveys delays, tamper-proof handling of the sample, and link-evidence requirements, citing Rafeeque, Krishnadas, Madhavan, Sasidharan, Chandran and others, and ultimately accuses the evidence as tainted for conviction. The result is acquittal of the accused and setting aside of the conviction and sentence.”
This is a regular bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by B.J. Johnson, the first accused in Crime No.74/2022 of the Excise Enforcement and Anti Narcotic Special Squad, Ernakulam, challenging the order in CRMC 2497/2022 of the I Additional District Court, Ernakulam, denying regular bail. The prosecution case is that, at about 2:30 a.m. on 14 October 2022, an Excise Circle Inspector and party recovered 2.3485 grams of LSD (115 tablets) and 77 grams of hashish oil from the petitioner’s bed room, and that the 2nd accused (his son) remains at large. Consequently, offences punishable under NDPS Act sections 22(c), 20(b)(ii)(A) and 29 were registered and are under investigation. The petitioner contends innocence and asserts that the recovery was effected from his son’s room, questions the search of other parts of the house, and points to a wife’s complaint and mass petitions by residents alleging false implication. He argues that the rigour of Section 37 of the NDPS Act should not apply due to lack of direct nexus and substantive material. The Public Prosecutor counters that the recovery was based on secret information and that the contraband is of commercial quantity, invoking Section 37 with twin conditions. After careful consideration, the court finds prima facie evidence of possession and holds that the twin conditions of Section 37(1)(b) are not satisfied, denying bail. The application is dismissed.
Koyambath Puthiya purayil Mohammed Kunhi, a Non-Resident Indian employed in Oman, challenged notices issued by the Income Tax Department for the Assessment Year 2018-19 under the IT Act. The Department issued a show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) on 19 March 2022 asserting escaped assessment on the basis of unexplained cash used to acquire immovable properties and a vehicle, and indicating that the petitioner had not filed returns. The notice allotted time to respond up to 24 March 2022, i.e., four days, which the petitioner contends falls short of the statutory seven-day minimum mandated by Section 148A(b). The petitioner claims lack of awareness of Ext.P1, resulting in an ex parte assessment order under Section 148A(d) dated 30 March 2022 and Ext.P3 notice under Section 148 dated 30 March 2022. In March 2023, an assessment order under Section 147 read with Sections 144 and 144B was passed with an addition of Rs. 4,39,00,000/-. Citing Hosdurg Beedi Workers, the petitioner argues the seven-day requirement is mandatory and non-compliance invalidates the proceedings. The respondents do not dispute the seven-day deficiency, conceding the point, and the court ultimately allows the petition. It quashes Ext.P1, Ext.P2, Ext.P3 and Ext.P4, and directs a fresh notice under Section 148A(b) with seven to thirty days for reply, after which the department may proceed as per law, considering the reply.
OP No.10611/1994 & W.P.(C) No.18814/2004 Two writ petitions, OP 10611/1994 by Varkey Chacko and W.P.(C) 18814/2004 by One Earth One Life, address decades of forest land governance in Palakkad/Mannarkk ad, Kerala, under vesting and forest protection regimes. The courts trace legislative history from the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (Madras Act 27 of 1949) to the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, and its successor Kerala Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1972, culminating in the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003. The core dispute concerns a registered lease (document No. 2034 of 1956) for 500 acres and whether private forest lands were validly vested or assigned under Act, 1971 and whether subsequent forest tribunal orders, and land restoration actions, encroach upon public forest land not covered by the schedule. The Forest Tribunal’s determinations in OA nos. 7–10 of 1977 and 70–99 of 1979, favoring lessees, are scrutinized amid allegations of fraud and misidentification of land, with PIL seeking quashing of certain notices and restoration of lands improperly restored. The court undertakes a factual identity exercise, including site visualization, to determine if the land claimed by lessees falls within adjudicated boundaries, emphasizing public trust, environmental protection, and the need to prevent delivery of forest land outside the schedule. Ultimately, OP 10611/1994 is dismissed; WP(C) 18814/2004 is disposed with protective directions to preserve forest land and ensure only adjudicated land is restored to lessees, while allowing contemporaneous verification of the subject land.
Babuk, a Conductor Grade I in KSRTC at Chittur, Palakkad, belonging to the Panan community (SC/ST), seeks relief from a transfer order Ext.P8 moving him from Chittur to Sulthan Bathery. He argues that under the KSRTC Pay Revision Agreement Annexure IV Clause 9.8, SC/ST employees are exempt from transfers for five years during service, a benefit he contends should extend to him for the entire period of his service. He had earlier been transferred; Ext.P8 would amount to another transfer within two years, and Ext.P9 Government guidelines should govern. He seeks quashing Ext.P8 and mandamus to refrain from transferring him till Ext.P7 is considered (and Ext.P3 by the 2nd respondent) and to grant 5-year exemption based on Ext.P4. The KSRTC contends that 18,000 employees exist and a general transfer order was necessary for administrative efficiency, affecting about 4,000 employees. It relies on Babu v State of Kerala and Nixy James to argue that transfers in the public interest are not ordinarily interfered with under Article 226. The court reviews the settled law that transfer is an incidence of service; mere personal inconvenience is not a ground for interference, and guidelines are non-statutory and not exhaustive. It directs the first respondent to consider Ext.P7 and decide per law within two months, keeping Ext.P4 and Ext.P3 in view.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks police protection and a direction to respondents 1–3 to consider Exhibit P2 and provide adequate protection to the life and property of the petitioner against respondents 4–7 and their associates. The petitioner asserts possession of 1.750 cents of property in Survey No. 2194, Attipra village, with larger extents prior to partial acquisition for the National Highway, leaving a triangular remainder bounded by walls. The northern yard of the plaint schedule property is alleged to be used by respondents 4–7 as an access to their property, and the petitioner claims harassment, threats, and past non-action by the police despite a prior decree (Exhibit P1) restraining such use and safeguarding her rights. Respondents 4–7 counter that the land identification was incorrect and that there is a 3.20 m open space on the northern side outside the boundary, which they currently use for access; they deny encroachment and contend that the petition seeks enforcement beyond the decree, pointing to an appeal (AS 279/2022) pending before the District Court. The court observes that the decree should be honoured unless varied by the appellate court, and that police protection will not be granted at this time since respondents deny violations. The matter is left open for decision on appeal, with directions to abide by any appellate outcome.
This writ appeal challenges the settlement between KMML management and the workers’ union which purported to dilute the statutory entitlement to overtime wages under Section 33 of the Mines Act, 1952 and Rule 60 of the Mines Rules, 1955. The appellants (KMML Titanium Complex Employees Union and Anu A., a junior technician) contend that overtime must be paid at twice the ordinary rate for hours exceeding daily or weekly limits, as prescribed, and that the settlement’s 30-days-basis calculation (from 1 January 2022) illegally contracts out these statutory rights. They rely on apex court precedents including Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh v. Jet Airways, Rita Bella v. State of Kerala, Shive Shankar Singh v. Union of India, and Godrej Sara Lee to argue that settlements can override statutory terms in some contexts, and that arbitrariness in Exhibits P3/P4 can be challenged. The respondents submit that there is no statutory prohibition on contracting out terms via settlement; a union signatory cannot be aggrieved by one term, and the remedy lies in government channels. The Kerala High Court ultimately holds that the Mines Act contains no prohibition on contracting out its terms, upholds the settlement, and directs pursuing the grievance with the government; the appeal is dismissed.
This Kerala High Court writ petition challenges an order of the Lok Ayukta directing interest at 9% on the admissible DCRG and related terminal benefits withheld due to audit/liability considerations. The petitioners, authorities in the General Education Department and its subordinate offices, contend delays in disbursal were due to administrative exigencies, audit objections, and inter-departmental processes; they argue the Lok Ayukta exceeded jurisdiction and relied on flawed evidence, wrongly holding the government liable for interest. The respondent, a retired District Educational Officer, filed a complaint with the Lok Ayukta alleging undue delay in sanctioning and releasing retirement benefits (DCRG, commuted pension, Family Benefit Scheme). The Lok Ayukta’s Exhibit-P2 order directed payment of interest at 9% per annum on the admissible amount, with recovery from responsible officers. The High Court surveys jurisprudence across multiple authorities, including Nadeera v. State of Kerala and several Supreme Court decisions, to address the entitlement to interest on belated retiral payments, the role of audit objections, and the State’s duty to timely disburse benefits. It ultimately considers whether the Lok Ayukta’s remedial orders were warranted and whether the petition merits relief. The court dismisses the writ petition, confirming the final disposition as against the petitioners.
CRL.M.C NO. 9297 OF 2023; CRL.M.C NO. 9247 OF 2023 This judgment disposes of two Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (Crl.M.C. Nos. 9297 of 2023 and 9247 of 2023) filed by accused persons seeking to quash prosecutions arising from two separate crime cases. The petitioners—primarily Muhammed FASEEM, Ameen AYOOB, Showkath ALI, Shamsudeen PANACHIKKAL, Jaffer N.A., and in the second petition Ameen AYOOB and Muhammed FASEEM V.P.—contend that the disputes have been settled with the victims having no grievance and that the court should exercise its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings, especially since the offences are non-compoundable yet private in nature. The respondents include the State of Kerala (Public Prosecutor) and private individuals Suneer Niledath and Kunimmal Sameer. Counsel for petitioners submit affidavits from victims supporting settlement; the Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about quashing solely on settlement but concedes the matter is settled. The court grounds its reasoning on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) and the line of cases including Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, as summarized in Laxmi Narayan, to hold that non-compoundable offences with private disputes may be quashed if the entire dispute is settled and the offences are not heinous or otherwise excluded by law. Relying on these principles, the court allows the two Crl.M.Cs, quashing CC 413/2021 (Edavanna P.S., Malappuram) and ST 1836/2020 (Kozhikode), and thereby terminates the prosecutions.
N.P. Kunhikkannan, a devotee and subsequently non-hereditary trustee of Sree Vellalath Siva Temple, Kadannappilly, Kannur, filed a writ petition under Article 226challenging encroachments and mismanagement of temple lands under the Malabar Devaswom Board. The temple claimed Jenmam lands over about 1,931.95 acres spread across Kadannappally and Pariyaram, with encroachments by third parties and alleged pattayam frauds evidenced in revenue records. The petitioner sought several reliefs: measurement and demarcation of temple properties; keeping in abeyance the assignment of surplus land in Rs. 256/1 and 256/1B2 until measurement; implementation of Ext.P4 recommendations; eviction of encroachers; consideration of Ext.P7 and Ext.P8 applications; and an order to prevent quarrying on temple lands. During pendency, the court permitted the petitioner to prosecute in the capacity of non-hereditary trustee and appointed/approved a special team to prepare Ext.P3 (land details and encroachment list). The petition invoked precedents emphasizing temple property protection and the guardian/parens patriae role of courts, notably A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board, Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair, and Mrinalini Padhi v. Union of India, among others. The High Court ultimately disposed of the petition with directions to the Additional District Judge, Thalassery, to conduct a proper enquiry and report within four months, and to expedite action for temple land protection under applicable law.
WP(C).No. 28173 of 2008 (D) & WP(C).No. 8263 of 2009 This judgment of a Kerala High Court bench, delivered by Justice Shaji P. Chaly on 10 June 2016, concerns a challenge by Pattancherry Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. (the petitioner) to an order (Ext. P6) of the first respondent, invoking Rule 176 of the Co-operative Societies Rules to rescind a dismissal in disciplinary proceedings. The core issue is whether, after the introduction of Chapter IX into the Co-operative Societies Act via Section 69 (with its non-obstante clause), the arbitrator’s exclusive authority under Section 69 overrides the power of the first respondent to decide disputes under Rule 176. The petitioner contends that due to Section 69(1)(c), the arbitrator alone has the jurisdiction to decide disputes arising in such matters, and therefore Ext. P6 is without legal basis. The second respondent initiated ARC No.148/2008 before the Co-operative Arbitration Court, leading the Bank to file WP(C) 8263/2009 seeking stay. The Court examines arguments, cites two Kerala authorities (thrissur Taluk Co-operative College Educational Society Ltd v Joint Registrar and Cheranallur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd v State of Kerala) as authority for the petitioner’s view, and ultimately holds that the introduction of Section 69 negates the continuing applicability of Rule 176 to matters covered by Section 69. The Court disposes the petitions by quashing Ext. P6 in 28173/2008 and directing the Arbitration Court to proceed with ARC 148/2008, with a four-month deadline, vacating any prior interim orders.
Petitioners, six accused in C.C.1069/2011 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kayamkulam, seek to quash the proceedings under section 482 CrPC. The first petitioner is the de facto complainant in S.C.No.953 of 2010 pending before the Alappuzha Sessions Court; that case involves an alleged assault and public humiliation of the de facto complainant by Salim Shah, and offences under IPC sections 447, 427, 294(b), 323 and 324 along with provisions of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (Sec. 3(1)(x)(xi)(xv)). The petition argues that the complaint in CC 1069/2011 is a counterblast to the other Sessions case and that the two incidents are not connected; it further asserts inconsistent statements by the de facto complainant, and contends that the incident in CC 1069/2011 is distinct from the scene of the incident in the other case. The State opposes quashing. The High Court notes that the incidents occurred in proximity and may be interconnected, but refuses to delve into factual determine- ments or merits, citing Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander for guidance on 482 CrPC and the caution against reappraising evidence. The court holds that if it is a counter case, it must be tried in parallel and leaves the merits to the trial court. The Crl.M.C. is dismissed.
The appeal arises from a trial where the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pala, acquitted the accused under Section 138 NI Act after finding no guilt. The complainant, Jojo Scaria, claimed the accused borrowed Rs. 30,00,000 and issued a cheque (Ext. P1) drawn on Federal Bank, which bounced for insufficient funds. A registered notice was issued but payment was not made, leading to prosecution under Section 138 NI Act and Section 142 NI Act. The trial court recorded PW1–PW7 and Exts. P1–P49 in support of the complaint; the defence produced DWs 1–3 and Exts. D1–D3. The appellate court, presided by Justice Mary Joseph, re-examines the evidence, focusing on the core issues: (i) validity of the cheque transaction and the debt/liability; (ii) the burden of proof and the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act; (iii) whether the presumption could be rebutted by the accused, relying on decisions such as Sanil James, Triyambak S. Hegde, Bir Singh, and Rajaram Naidu, among others. The court notes significant inconsistencies in PW1’s source of funds and the complainant’s financial capacity, despite the statutory notices. It concludes that the presumption under Section 139 NI Act was successfully rebutted by the accused, and the trial court’s acquittal stands. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the judgment is upheld.
The petitioner, Jilson P.T., a Senior Clerk at Ayroor Service Co-operative Bank Ltd, was suspended following disciplinary proceedings. He challenges Ext. P1, the charge memo issued by the Bank’s President on 27.06.2023, contending it violates the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules because only the Managing Committee or the disciplinary sub-committee can issue memos under Rule 198(2A). The petition cites the Minutes of 26.06.2023 showing the Managing Committee authorised the President to issue the memo, and argues that delegation to the President renders the memo void. Counsel for the petitioner relies on Mattanur Co-operative Rural Bank v. Co-operative Arbitration Court (2023) 5 KLT 312 to support the proposition that the proper authority must issue memos, not the President. The respondents contend that the minutes confer authority to the President and that delaying disciplinary action would prejudice the Bank, especially as the petitioner has been suspended since January 2023; they characterise technical objections as delaying tactics. The court, applying Mattanur and Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath, holds that a memo issued by an officer lacking the designated authority is without jurisdiction and vitiates the proceedings. The petition is allowed and Ext. P1 is quashed, with directions that proceedings continue strictly under the applicable law and rules.
This Kerala High Court writ petition (WP(C) No.19170/2014) was filed by the President of the Parent-Teacher Association and aManaging Committee Member of the Government Welfare Lower Primary School, Thevayoor South, Pathanamthitta. The petition challenged an alleged attempt by respondents to construct a water tank within the school's playground without requisite permission. The petition argued that a playground is an essential, integral part of a school, fundamental to holistic education, and that Kerala Education Rules (KER) Chapter IV requires play spaces and proper grounds but does not specify the exact extent of playground area across different school categories. The matter discusses the tension between local infrastructure development and safeguarding play space, noting the CBSE/ CISCE norms (affiliation requirements) articulate explicit playground facilities in private boards, whereas KER lacks quantified standards. The court recalls State of Kerala v. Manager, Mahatma Public School, Kottackakom (2019 KLJ 744) to emphasize that recognition under the Right to Education Act and affiliating boards entails adherence to norms prescribed by those bodies. Although the water-tank proposal was dropped, the judge highlights the need for a normative framework and directs the State to issue guidelines consistent with KER Chapter IV Rule 3(2) and Chapter IV Rule 1 within four months. The petition is disposed with precautionary directions to ensure compliance and potential enforcement actions for non-compliance.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C No.5867 of 2021) before the Kerala High Court concerns Dr. K.T. Thomas, the second accused in Crime No.198/2021 of the Punalur Police Station, who moves to quash the continuing proceedings under Sections 468 and 471 read with Section 34 IPC. The FIR alleges that the wife of the de facto complainant worked as a staff nurse at St. Thomas Hospital controlled by the petitioner, and that an experience certificate issued by him contained false details to aid the first accused’s employment in Ireland. The FIR was registered on 07.02.2021 based on the complainant’s allegation. The investigation has been impeded by the apparent non-seizure of the original experience certificate; a UN report was submitted to assist reopening. The petitioner contends the certificate was genuine and that the complaint arises from matrimonial discord and harassment of his wife and him, emphasizing his decades of service as a doctor. The Public Prosecutor argues for further details regarding the first accused’s appointment and the Irish certificate, noting the Ireland hospital’s non-response and the absence of the original certificate. The court, after reviewing annexures and the UN report, observes impediments to the investigation and notes the absence of a disclosed offence against the petitioner. Relying on Bhajan Lal’s paradigm, the court holds the proceedings constitute abuse of process and, exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, quashes all further proceedings and the UN report.
The petitioner Hedge Finance Private Limited challenges Ext.P5, the order returning CMA (Arb) 530/2022 to the proper court for representation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The dispute arises from Ext.P1 hypothecation agreement of 11.08.2020 under which Hedge Finance and the respondent agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration in Ernakulam before a sole arbitrator appointed by Hedge Finance. The respondent allegedly breached the loan agreement, prompting invocation of Clause 20 and a notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The petitioner appointed a sole arbitrator; an interim award under Section 17(1) permitted repossession of the vehicle (Ext.P2). The ensuing CMA (Arb) No.530/2022 sought to enforce this interim award under Section 17(2) (Ext.P3) and an IA for an Advocate Commissioner (Ext.P4). The court below held it had no jurisdiction, noting the respondent’s residence in Kottayam, and directed the petition’s return (Ext.P5). The petitioner contends the Act is self-contained with seat-based enforcement; post-2015 amendments render unilateral appointment by a party or interested authority impermissible, and diverse precedents (Sundaram Finance, Muthoot, HDFC Bank) support a non-appellate enforcement framework. This Court appointed Amici Curiae to examine the issue. Ultimately, the High Court set Ext.P5 aside, directing a fresh consideration in light of post-2015 jurisprudence, with notice to the respondent, potential pleadings amendment, and a one-month timeline for disposal, while ensuring enforceability of Ext.P2 if appropriate.
