## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
# **PRESENT**
## **THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.V.N. BHATTI**
## **&**
## **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI**
**TUESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF JULY, 2023 / 13TH ASHADHA, 1945**
## **OP NO. 10611 OF 1994**
## **PETITIONER:**
VARKEY CHACKO, S/O. VARKEY, VETTUKATTIL KALAPURACKAL KURAVILANGAD, NAZARATH HILL P.O., KOTTAYAM DISTRICT.
BY ADV SRI. K. MOHANAKANNAN
## **RESPONDENTS:**
- 1 CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS AND CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS, OLAVAKODE CIRCLE, PALGHAT DISTRICT.
- 2 STATE OF KERALA, NOTICE FOR WHOM MAY BE SERVED ON THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, TRIVANDRUM.
## BY ADV. SRI. NAGARAJ NARAYANAN,
SPECIAL GOVERNMENT PLEADER [FORESTS]
THIS ORIGINAL PETITION, HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION ON 04.07.2023, ALONG WITH W.P.(C) NO.18814/2004, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
2
**IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM**
## **PRESENT**
**THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.S.V.N. BHATTI**
**&**
**THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BASANT BALAJI TUESDAY, THE 4TH DAY OF JULY, 2023 / 13TH ASHADHA, 1945**
## **WP(C) NO. 18814 OF 2004**
## **PETITIONER:**
ONE EARTH ONE LIFE (REG. NO. S. 246/1988), THRISSUR, REPRESENTED BY MR. TONY THOMAS, AGED 43 YEARS, S/O. THOMAS, KIZHAKKEKARA HOUSE, IRUMBAKACHOLA, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., PALAKKAD DIST.
## BY ADV. SMT. DAISY A. PHILIPOSE
## **RESPONDENTS:**
- 1 UNION OF INDIA, REP. BY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND FOREST PARAYAVARAN BHAVAN, LODI ESTATE, NEW DELHI.
- 2 STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF FOREST AND WILDLIFE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM.
- 3 THE CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS, OLAVAKODE CIRCLE.
- 4 THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD.
- **5** ULAHANNAN, S/O. DEVASSIA, MANALOTTIL HOUSE, POTTASSERI AMSOM, MANARKKAD. (DELETED)
- 6 DEVASSI, S/O. PAILO, THALACHIRAKUZHIYIL, POTTASSERI AMSOM, MANARKKAD.
- 7 CHACKO, S/O. VARKEY, KALAPURACKAL HOUSE, NAZRETH HILL P.O., KURUVILANGAD.
- **8** JOSEPH, S/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, NAZRETH HILL P.O., KURUVILANGAD, KOTTAYAM. (DELETED)
- 9 PAPPACHAN, S/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, NAZRETH HILL P.O., KURUVILANGAD, KOTTAYAM.
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
3
- 10 GEORGE, S/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, NAZRETH HILL P.O., KURUVILANGAD, KOTTAYAM.
- 11 MATHAI, S/O. VARKEY, PAWATHINAL HOUSE, INCHIKUNNU, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 12 CHACKO, S/O. VARKEY, PAWATHINAL HOUSE, VATTAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 13 DEVASSIA, S/O. VARKEY, PAWATHINAL HOUSE, THAZHE KUNDANPOTTIL, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 14 DEVASSIA, S/O. VARKEY, PAWATHINAL HOUSE, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- **15** JOSEPH, S/O. ALEXANDER, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD. (DELETED) (RESPONDENTS 8 AND 15 ARE DELETED FROM THE PARTY ARRAY AS PER ORDER DATED 16/10/2006)
- 16 THOMAS, S/O. ALEXANDER, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, POTTASSERI, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 17 PAPPACHAN, S/O. ALEXANDER, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, POTTASSERI, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 18 THOMAS, S/O. OUSEPH, PAZHUKKATHARAYIL HOUSE, MUTHUKURRISSI P.O., THACHAMPARA, MANNARKKAD.
- 19 MANI, S/O. THOMAS, MAROTTITHADATHIL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 20 JOSE, S/O. THOMAS, MAROTTITHADATHIL HOUSE, PALLIPPADY, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 21 DEVASSIA, S/O. THOMAS, MAROTTITHADATHIL HOUSE, AKKIYAMPARA, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
- 22 MATHEW, S/O. THOMAS, MAROTTITHADATHIL HOUSE, PALLIPPADY, KANJIRAPUZHA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 23 VARKEY, S/O. JOSEPH, MAVARAYIL HOUSE, KUTTIYAMPADAM, POONCHOLA P.O., MANNARKKAD.
- 24 DEVASSIA, S/O. VARKEY, CHAKKUNGAL HOUSE, KUNDAMPOTTI, PALAKKAYAM P.O., KANJIRAPUZHA, MANNARKKAD.
- 25 **ADDL.R25:** MARYKUTTY, W/O. JOSEPH, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O, MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
- **26 ADDL.R26:** ROY, S/O JOSEPH, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O, MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT. (DELETED)
- 27 **ADDL.27:** SAJI, S/O. JOSEPH, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
- 28 **ADDL.28** : VALSAMMA, D/O. JOSEPH, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
- 29 **ADDL.R29:** LISSY, D/O. JOSEPH, PALLIVATHUKKAL HOUSE, CHEENIKKAPPARA, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
- **30 ADDL.R30** :- ELIYATTI, W/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT. (DELETED)
- 31 **ADDL.R31** . BENNY, S/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
- **32 ADDL.R32** : BOBBY, S/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT. (DELETED)
- (RESPONDENTS R5, R26, R30 AND R32 ARE DELETED FROM PARTY ARRAY AS PER ORDER DATED 18/12/2009 IN IA.16141/2009)
- 33 **ADDL.R33** : MINI, W/O. CHACKO, KUZHITHOTTIYIL HOUSE, PALAKKAYAM P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD DISTRICT.
(ADDL.R25 TO R33 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 23/11/2006 IN IA.16271/2006)
- 34 **ADDL.R34** : S. RAMANKUTTY NAIR, SHOURINKAL HOUSE, VIYYAKKURISSI P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD-678593.
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35 **ADDL.R35** : K. P. GEORGE JOSE VILLA, THEKKIL P.O., KASARAGOD-671541.
(RESPONDENTS 34 AND 35 ARE REPRESENTED BY THEIR POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER JIJI JOSEPH, AGED 47 YEARS, SON OF P. M. JOSEPH,
POLAKKATHARAPPIL HOUSE, POTTASSERY P.O., MANNARKKAD, PALAKKAD678598)
(ADDL.R34 AND R35 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 10/08/2018 IN IA.12421/2018)
- 36 **ADDL.36** : ABRAHAM MANGALI,
S/O. JOSEPH, MANGALI HOUSE, P.O, KARIMBA, PALAKKAD-678597.
- 37 **ADDL.R37** : FRANCIS MANGALI,
S/O. JOSEPH, MANGALI HOUSE, P.O, KARIMBA, PALAKKAD-678597.
38 **ADDL.R38** : MARYKUTTY VARGHESE, AGED 64 YEARS, W/O. LATE VARGHESE POKKATH, POKKATH HOUSE, P. O. IRINJALAKKUDA, KODUGALLUR ROAD, THRISSUR DISTRICT-680121.
(ADDL.R36 TO R38 ARE IMPLEADED AS PER ORDER DATED 10/08/2018 IN IA.13426/2018)
R1 BY ADV. S. MANU, DSGI R2 & R3 BY ADV. SRI. NAGARAJ NARAYANAN, SPECIAL GOVERNMENT PLEADER (FORESTS) R7, R9 TO R13 & R24 BY ADV. SRI. JOSHI N. THOMAS R19 TO R23 BY ADV. SRI. K. MOHANAKANNAN R24 TO R38 BY ADVS. SRI. K. M. SATHYANATHA MENON SRI. ARUNKUMAR P. SMT. KAVERY S. THAMPI
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 04.07.2023, ALONG WITH O.P. NO.10611/1994, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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[O.P. No. 10611/1994 & W.P.(C) No.18814/2004]
## **JUDGMENT**
Dated this the 4[th] day of July, 2023
## **S. V. N. Bhatti, CJ**
The subject matter in the two writ petitions revolves around a property located in Palghat Taluk and District. Palghat District was a part of the State of Madras before the reorganisation of States in 1956.
2. The subject matter in the Public Interest Litigation is the alleged preservation of “Forest” and to prevent the restoration of possession of the Forest by implementing the orders of the Forest Tribunal made under the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949 (for short, Madras Act 27 of 1949) and the Kerala Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1972.
3. The crux of the matter, though it needs a little narrative,
the narrative is appreciated as it is needed for disposing of both
cases.
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [11 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
4. Legislative History - Under the Madras Act 27 of 1949, owners of the forest could not sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise alienate any portion of the forest without the previous sanction of the District Collector, nor could the owners of the private forest without permission from the District Collector cut trees or do any act likely to denude the forest or diminish the utility of the forest as such.
5. Legislative History demonstrates that the need of the
hour was to preserve Forests and prevent denuding forest land.
6. The Legislative Assembly enacted the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, (for short, Act, 1971) providing for the vesting in the Government of private forests in the State of Kerala and the assignment thereof to agriculturists and agricultural labourers for cultivation. The Legislature enacted Act, 1971 to divest ownership of individuals over the forest, vest the title in Government and assign available land for agriculture operations. The need of the hour, as is discernible, is
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
8
to enhance agricultural production and make the nation selfreliant.
7. By operation of Section 3 of the Act, 1971, the ownership and possession of private forest land stood vested in the Government. Section 8 of the Act, 1971 provides for the settlement of disputes. Act, 1971 was struck down by this Court resulting in the enactment of the Kerala Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1972 (for short, Act, 1972). In **State of Kerala** v. **Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd** . [(1973) 2 SCC 713], the Apex Court reversed the view in **Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. And Others** v. **State of Kerala** [1972 KLT 628]. Resultant thereto, Act, 1971 is in operation.
8. Act, 1972 is made with the objective of preventing the indiscriminate destruction of private forests and regulating the customary and prescriptive rights therein.
9. The circle of taking legislative measures to protect
ecologically sensitive forests is completed within the enactment
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9
of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003 (for short, Act, 2003). Act, 2003 has the object of providing for the vesting in the Government of Ecologically fragile land in the State of Kerala and the management of such lands with a view to maintaining ecological
balance and conserving biodiversity. The importance of Forests noticed in 1949 has been reiterated with Act, 2003. We are not concerned with the provisions of Act, 2003 in the present litigation.
10. The subject matters of Public Interest Litigation and O.P. No. 10611 of 1994 come within the ambit of the laws read above, and the litigation has been going on for more than five decades.
11. On 13.11.1956, one Mr. Mannarghat Moopil Nair, an owner of the estate land, executed a registered agreement of lease bearing document No. 2034 of 1956 in favour of Mr. M. Ulahannan and nine others for an extent of 500 acres. The schedule of the property covered by the lease deed No. 2034 of 1956 has a bearing
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
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on the _lis_ between the parties. The schedule of the lease deed
recites as under:
## “ **Description of Property**
Unsurveyed land having an extent of 500 Acres within the Kanjirapuzha Hill Valley Area, excludes the land, Piles of logs, and Estate ways of the Tenants as per Agreements. (Emphasis added)
|Extent|Acres :<br>|500|
|---|---|---|
||**Boundaries**||
|East|:|Reserve Forest|
|North|:|Kallara|
|West|:|Palakkayam|
|South|:|Mundanad Forest|
12. The estate of Mr. Mannarkkad Moopil Nair, represented
by an Advocate Receiver, filed O.S. No.101 of 1960 before the
senior Civil Judge of Ottappalam for the relief of recovery of possession of plaint schedule property.
13. The defendants in O.S. No.101 of 1960 are the lessees of
the schedule properties covered by the lease deed dated 13.11.1956, viz., M. Ulahannan and 14 others. The learned trial Judge, on the pleadings set out in O.S. No. 101 of 1960, formulated the following issues:
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- “1. Whether the suit as brought is not maintainable?
2. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession?
3. Whether the lease alleged in the plaint is invalid for all or any of the reasons maintained in the plaint?
4. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from contending that the said lease is invalid?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any and what damages?
6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any and what profit?
7. To what reliefs are the plaintiffs entitled?
- Addl. 8. Whether the defendants are entitled to the value of improvement in case of eviction, and what is the quantum?
9. Whether defendants are deemed tenants under Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969?
14. Exhibit A1 was the registered lease deed dated
24.09.1956. On Exhibit-A1, the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge is that “I find that the lease granted by the original of Exhibit-A1 by then Sthani was an act beyond his powers, not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and therefore, void, invalid, and not binding on the estate”. In other words, the trial court held that Ext.A1 was an invalid and inoperative document. The petitioner raises the legality or validity of the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 in PIL W.P.(C) No.18814 of 2004. The conclusion arrived at in the suit is adverted to because of the said reason.
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## 15. By operation of Section 3 of Act, 1971, private forest
stood vested in Government. Section 3 reads as under:
“ **3. Private forests to vest in Government** . - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract or other document, but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), with effect on and from the appointed day, the ownership and possession of all private forests in the State of Kerala shall by virtue of this Act, stand transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, and the right, title and interest of the owner or any other person in any private forest shall stand extinguished.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of so much extent of land comprised in private forests held by an owner under his personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (1 of 1964) or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto.
**Explanation. –** For the purposes of this sub-section, “cultivation” includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species.
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of so much extent of private forests held by an owner under a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him, which together with other lands held by him to which Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, is applicable, does not exceed the extent of the ceiling are applicable to him under Section 82 of the said Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, private forests shall, for the purposes of sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), be deemed to be lands to which Chapter III of the said Act
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is applicable and for the purposes of calculating the ceiling limit applicable to an owner, private forests shall be deemed to be “other dry lands” specified in Schedule II to the said Act.”
## 16. Section 8 of Act, 1971 provides for the settlement of
## disputes between the title holders, their assignees, lesser, lessees,
etc., and reads as under:
“ **8. Settlement of disputes** . - (1) Where any dispute arises as to whether-
(a) any land is a private forest or not; or
- (b) any private forest or portion thereof has vested in the Government or not,
the person who claims that the land is not a private forest or that the private forest has not vested in the Government, may, within such period as may be prescribed, apply to the Tribunal for decision of the dispute.
(2) Any application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form as may be prescribed.
(3) If the Tribunal decides that any land is not a private forest or that a private forest or portion thereof has not vested in the Government and-
- (a) no appeal has been preferred against the decision of the Tribunal within the period specified therefor; or
- (b) such appeal having been preferred has been dismissed by the High Court,
the custodian shall, as soon as may be after the expiry of the period referred to in Clause (a) or, as the case may be, after the date of the order of the High Court dismissing the appeal, restore possession of such land or private forest or portion, as the case may be, to the
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person in possession thereof immediately before the appointed day.”
17. In the above background, the lessees in the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 filed O.A. No.7 of 1977 and eight other original applications before the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri, claiming right under Act, 1971. The petition schedule reads as under:
|Name|Extent<br>(acres)|O.A.<br>No.|Extent<br>claimed<br>[acres]|Survey<br>No.|Date of<br>Order|Date of<br>Restoration|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|Devassia<br>Chakkungal|36|7/77|20|2019/pt|12.9.78|7.3.79|
|Chacko<br>Kuzhimthottiyil|32|8/77|6.76|2019/pt|12.9.78|7.3.79|
|Chacko<br>Kuzhimthottiyil|32|9/77|8|2293/pt|12.9.78|7.3.79|
|Varkey<br>Pawvathinal|32|10/77|13|2019/pt|12.9.78|9.3.79|
|VarkeyMavarayil|50|70/79|15|2019/pt|28.1.80|1980|
|Thomas<br>Marottithadathil|95|71/79|10|2019/pt|26.3.80||
|Alexander<br>Pallivathukkal|50|84/79|7.5|2019/pt|7.5.80|13.10.80|
|Pailo<br>Talachirakuzhiyil|70|85/79|7|2019/pt|7.5.80||
|Chacko<br>Kalappurakkal|32|86/79|12|2019/pt|7.5.80||
|Thomas<br>Pazhukkatharayil|25|99/79|14|2019/pt|25.6.80||
|Total|500||113||||
18. By a common order dated 12.09.1978 in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9,
and 10 of 1977, the Forest Tribunal, Manjeri, upheld the claim of
the lessees/claimants. Similar original applications filed by other
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15
lessees got favourable orders from the Tribunal. The operative portion of the order in O.A. No.70 of 1979, dated 25.01.1980, reads as under:
“…………….. The respondent has also no case that the petitioner is not in possession of any portion of the said 35 acres of land. PW1 has stated that as on 01.01.1970, the petitioner was having his family consisting of the petitioner, his wife and 6 children. He has further stated that out of those 6 children, 4 children were minors on 01.01.1970. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to keep possession of 20 acres of land within the ceiling limits allowed under the provisions of K.L.R Act. PW1 further stated that besides petition schedule property, the petitioner is having 50 cents of paddy land and 4.75 acres of paramba. He also stated that the petitioner is also having his residential house in the said 4.75 acres of paramba. The respondents have not shown that the petitioner is having any other property apart from the properties mentioned by P.W.1. In the circumstances, it has to be held that including petition schedule property, the petitioner is in possession of only lands within the ceiling limits applicable to himself and his family under the provisions of K.L.R. Act. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to get petition schedule property exempted under Section 3[3] of Act 26 of 1971. I find that the petition schedule property has not vested in the Government under the said Act.”
19. It is the case of the lessees/claimants that in obedience
to the orders of the Forest Tribunal, the Government have put the
lessees back into possession of the survey numbers claimed by the petitioners in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 of 1977, and 70, 71, 84, 85, 86 and
99 of 1979. The lessees have moved this Court on more than one
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occasion vindicating their grievance against failure to implement the orders of the Forest Tribunal. One of such original petitions was O.P. No.8166 of 1994, filed by Mr. Jose and three others challenging Exhibits-P1 to P3 orders dated 28.01.1980, 12.09.1978 and 21.07.1982 of the Forest Tribunal. Another was O.P. No.8855 of 1994, filed by Mr. Chakkungal Varkey Devassia and seven others, substantially challenging Exhibits-P6, P7, and P8 notices issued by the State of Kerala through which the petitioners therein (lessees/claimants) were called upon to produce relevant documents before the authority for proving their entitlement over the land which has been restored to them pursuant to the order dated 12.09.1978 of the Forest Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10 of 1977.
20. On 27.10.2003, O.P. Nos. 8166 and 8855 of 1994 were disposed of. In paragraph (6) of the said judgment, it has been observed as under:
“………It appears, against the first order in O.A. No.71/1979, respondents had taken up the matter in appeal before this court in M.F.A.No.339/1980. It is also seen that the respondents had approached the Tribunal
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17
by way of review in the case of the same petitioner; however, the review was also dismissed on 23-12-1985, as can be seen from Ext.P5 judgment in O.P. No.6953/1990. There is also no dispute that the petitioners have been put in possession of the lands covered by Exts.P1 to P3 orders of the Tribunal. It is also seen that the petitioners were already before this Court, leading to Ext.P5 judgment in O.P. No.6953/1990 and the judgment in O.P. No.3402/1990. Be that as it may, there is no dispute that all the petitioners have been put in possession of the properties covered by Exts.P1 to P3 orders. Thereafter only Exts.P9 and P10 notices to prove the entitlement were issued. As already observed above, in case, the respondents have a case that what is released to the petitioners is not the property ordered in Exts.P1 to P3, it is for them to take steps to identify the property. That shall be done only with notice to the petitioners. But it is made clear that in any case only after putting the petitioners in possession of such property, they shall be dispossessed of the property already released to them.”
21. From the conclusion, it can be noticed that the claim for
possession or restoration of land covered by the orders dated 28.01.1980, 12.09.1978 and 21.07.1982 of the Forest Tribunal involved the location or identity of property as an issue.
22. Yet another O.P. No. 10611 of 1994 filed was referred to the Division Bench by order dated 17.01.2005. The lessees complaining disobedience of the directives issued by this Court in O.P. No. 10611 of 1994 have filed contempt cases. The contempt cases have been taken up to examine whether the disobedience
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18
complained by the lessees is true and valid. The contempt cases were considered by the Court having jurisdiction in these matters. At that stage of the matter, One Earth One Life/ petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.18814 of 2004. The petitioner files the
writ petition as a Public Interest Litigation praying for the following reliefs:
- (i) Issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to Exhibits-P1 to P7 and set aside the same.
- (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the 3[rd] respondent to resume and protect the lands wrongly restored as per Exhibits-P1 to P7.
- (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents 3 and 4 to prevent all non-forest operations in 56.77 hectares of land comprised in Sy. No.1957 of Agali Village in Palakkad District.
- (iv) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the 1[st] respondent to initiate proceedings as per Section 3 of the Forest Conservation Act against respondent Nos.2 to 24 for abetting to the contravention of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
- (v) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the 1[st] respondent to recover the damages caused to the environment by the felling and removal of the trees from the restored lands and initiate criminal proceedings against respondent Nos.6 to 24 for giving false evidence before the Court of law and for dishonestly making false claim in Court.”
23. The gist of the petitioner’s case is noted for deciding the
public interest canvassed in the PIL. The narrative in the PIL
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19
proceeds on the ground that the lessees rely on the registered lease deed dated 24.09.1956, in all the litigations, either between
the State and themselves or with the predecessors-in-interest of the lesser.
24. It is the case of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.18814 of 2004 that the competent Civil Court in O.S. No. 101 of 1960 held and declared that the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 executed was beyond the power of the lesser, not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and therefore, void, invalid, and not binding on the estate. Therefore, there is no legal document referring to which a claim for settlement of dispute under Section 8 of Act, 1971 could be made. The _sine qua non_ for a claim is a valid document, with the declaration by a competent Civil Court, but there is no document. The declaration by the Civil Court is suppressed. This omission in the arguments is stated as fraud.
25. The petitioner in the public interest writ petition further avers that in obedience to the directives issued by this Court, in the writ petitions filed by the lessees/claimants, forest land which
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**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
is not covered by the schedule in O.A. Nos. 7/1977, 8/1977, 9/1977, 10/1977, 70/1979, 71/1979, 84/1979, 85/1979, 86/1979, and
99/1979, under threat of contempt or out of fear for imprisonment, are sought to be delivered to the lessees. Further, the public interest writ petition refers to a few acts of alleged fraud and suppression by the lessees/claimants to ensure the preservation of valuable forest land.
26. To state specifically, the petitioner refers to the property schedule covered by each original application filed before the Forest Tribunal and contends that the lessees claim land lying 3 kilometres north of Kallar River at Kallamala Village in Survey No.1151 in Mundanad Malarvaram, whereas the land covered by the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 is situated on the southern side of the Kallar River.
27. The petitioner in PIL contends, firstly, by referring to the lease deed and the order of the Forest Tribunal, that the department cannot be compelled to give possession of the land not covered by the schedule of those properties. Respondents 5 to
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24 are either successors-in-interest of the lessees or alienees of the lessees. On receipt of the notice, the respondent filed counter affidavit and statement.
28. In all fours, the unofficial respondents contend that the PIL at the instance of One Earth One Life is not maintainable. The order of the Forest Tribunal has become final. Once the order of the Forest Tribunal becomes final, under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, 1971, the petitioners are entitled to restoration of land settled by the Tribunal.
29. The party respondents contend that the Forest Department is introducing an issue on the identity of the property after giving possession to the lessees or the successors-in-interest at one point.
30. The above narrative discloses that on the one hand, the lessees/claimants seek restoration of land which is adjudicated by the Forest Tribunal, and on the other hand, the PIL canvasses that in execution of orders of the Forest Tribunal, the actual forest not
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covered by the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 and orders of the Forest Tribunal shall not be allowed to be carried out by the officers of the Forest Department.
31. Judgment in O.P. No.8166 of 1994, has noticed that there is an issue for decision on the identity of property covered by lease deed dated 24.09.1956, orders of the Forest Tribunal dated
12.09.1978, 28.01.1980, and 21.07.1982, and the property now claimed by the lessees/claimants. With due respect to the learned Single Judge, we are unable to agree with the operative portion of the judgment in O.P. No.8166 of 1994 dated 21.10.2003.
32. On 19.02.2010, in the present litigation, this Court, after considering the area of controversy between the parties, made the following order:
“4. Counsel appearing for the public interest litigant has referred to the Village Officer’s report which substantially confirms their claim. The Village Officer’s report is also controverted by the awardees before us. We, therefore, feel that factual verification is required about the identity of both 500 acres of property covered by the lease granted by one Mannarkkad Mooppil Nair
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and also 113 acres of property covered by various awards obtained by the awardees. The main question to be considered is whether 113 acres covered by various awards are part of 500 acres of property leased out by Mannarkkad Mooppil Nair. In order to ascertain this position, we issue an interim direction to the Custodian of Forests to conduct a local verification with the assistance of all claimants in the various awards, Public interest litigant, Village Officers involved and the Taluk Surveyor or any other revenue officer who is familiar with the matter, and to file a detailed report along with the sketch showing the position of river, location of the leased properties of all 500 acres and 113 acres of land covered by various awards, within a period of two months from today.”
33. In obedience to the order dated 19.02.2010, a sketch and report have been filed by the Custodian of Vested Forests and Conservator of Forests, Eastern Circle, Palakkad. The party respondents have filed detailed objections on the method and manner of the survey, erroneous conclusion, and consideration of the identity of property covered by the schedule in the original applications, and the property now claimed by the lessees is sought to be delivered to the lessees by the Government. In all
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fours, the lessees/claimants contend that the conclusion in the report dated 07.08.2010 that the schedule property in the respective original applications is different from the property now claimed by the lessees. Be that as it may.
34. As the crux of the issue in the Public Interest Litigation is the preservation of forest land, and the effort in PIL is also to ensure that in the implementation of any of the orders in favour of the lessees, a land not covered by the schedule of the said applications is being delivered to the lessees/claimants. As the versions of the petitioner in PIL and the lessees/claimants were independent, diametrically opposite, to appreciate the ground reality, viz., whether the land which is now claimed for restoration by the lessees is forest land or brought under cultivation, on 05.06.2023, the following order was made:
“We have taken note of the introduction to the case given by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. A question of considerable importance on whether a private forest, which according to the State, stood vested in the Government by law or as
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claimed by the claimants that the subject land ceased to be forest, arises for consideration.
2. In the case on hand, the claimants rely on the adjudication of the Tribunal. Still, the writ petitioner and the State, though accepting the order of the Tribunal, would like to convince the Court that the reality is not adverted to, and fraud has been played on the Tribunal.
3. We merely refer to these contentions and direct the contesting parties to visit the subject site by 1.30 pm and give us virtual access to the site after identifying the subject matter at 1.45 pm. We would like first to appreciate the classification, nature of enjoyment and the surrounding circumstances relevant for considering the writ prayers. All contentions are left open, and we give liberty to the parties to enable the Court to have a virtual view of the subject matter of the litigation at 1.45 pm on 06.06.2023. The claimants are allowed to accompany the Officers while the virtual vision of the land is enabled to this Court.”
35. After arriving at _consensus ad idem_ on the identity of the property, the parties have implemented the order dated 5.6.2023 and enabled virtual access to this Court of the property claimed by the lessees, resisted by the Forest Department, and contested
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**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
by One Earth One Life/the petitioner in PIL. We have the advantage of a virtual visit of the property now claimed by the now lessees/claimants. The physical feature of the property claimed by the lessees/claimants is identified. We are not concluding the case in favour of one party or the other by referring to the visuals we have seen on the subject matter of the writ petitions.
36. O.P. No.10611 of 1994 was filed by one Varkey Chacko praying to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order, or direction quashing Exhibit-P4 notice dated 03.06.1994. The notice Exhibit-P4 calls upon the petitioner therein to establish through documentary evidence his entitlement over the land, either in his possession or the restoration is sought. The notice contains several averments as to why the competent authority is constrained to issue a notice calling upon the petitioner therein to establish his entitlement over the land now claimed in the writ petition.
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37. The respondents filed counter, additional counter, and several exhibits are brought on record.
38. Now that the area of controversy in the Public Interest Litigation or the relief prayed for in O.P. No.10611 of 1994 is stated, we are of the considered view that a detailed examination or re-examination of any of the facts in issue is unnecessary at a later point of time, for the controversy relates to two issues. Firstly, whether the property now claimed by the petitioners is the very same property on which relief under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, 1971 was granted to the lessees. Secondly, whether the challenge to notice in O.P. No.10611 of 1994 merits consideration or not.
39. Advocate Daisy A. Philipose appearing for the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.18814 of 2004, contends that the lease deed dated
24.09.1956 covers an extent of 500 acres, and the lease deed identifies the property with reference boundaries. The original applications filed refer to Survey No. 2019A etc., as shown in paragraph (11) _supra_ . The lessees now are not claiming to restore
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**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
possession of any of the properties covered either by the lease deed or the adjudication in the order dated 12.09.1978. In the name of implementation of the orders of the Forest Tribunal, the lessees are trying to take possession of valuable forest land, and such a course is impermissible in law. Advocate Daisy argues that the officers of the Forest Department, under the threat of contempt or to save their skin or avoid imprisonment, go to any extent and deliver forest land to the lessees.
40. Advocate Daisy further argues that the lease deed dated
24.09.1956 cannot and could not be treated as a valid document enabling any entitlement under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, 1971. The foundation for the said argument is that emphasis in Section
3 or 8, as the case may be, is on the possession of a claimant under a valid document. A valid document is a circumstance which attracts the jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal. Once the competent court has declared the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 as an invalid document, according to the learned counsel, there is no document in the eye of law referring to which the Forest
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Department could consider the claim for restoration of possession.
41. Next, it is argued that the findings recorded in O.S. No.101 of 1960, either by choice or design, should be disclosed in the petition filed before the Forest Tribunal. Such suppression amounts to fraud. Therefore, adjudication in a proceeding vitiated by fraud, she argues, must be set aside by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, mainly where forest land is involved. The respondents cannot be heard to contend that there needs to be consistency in identifying the property from any documents now available on record.
42. Advocates Mr. Joshi N. Thomas and Mr. K. M. Sathyanatha Menon contend that the PIL at the instance of One Earth One Life is a case filed at the instigation of the Forest Department. The Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable from any standpoint of view. This Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of fact under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once there is a binding order from a Forest Tribunal, the
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**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
lessees are entitled to the relief of implementing the order of the Tribunal. There is no issue on the identity of the property. Therefore, firstly it was argued that the PIL needs to be thrown out, and secondly, a direction as prayed for in O.P. No.10611 of 1994 ought to be granted by quashing Exhibit-P4 challenged in the original petition.
43. Special Government Pleader (Forests) Mr. Nagaraj Narayanan submits that as a matter of fact, the Forest Tribunal in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 of 1977 and 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, 99 of 1979 has accepted the case of the claimants under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, 1971, the schedule property under the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 or the orders of the Tribunal in the original applications is far away from the land being now claimed by the lessees. According to him, the land conveyed through the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 is in possession of third-party encroachers, and the lessees/claimants, having lost possession of a property covered by the lease deed dated 24.09.1956, cannot be heard to claim a property not covered by lease deed, or not covered by
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adjudication, in any of the proceedings initiated for implementation of the orders of Forest Tribunal, Manjeri.
44. The Government and the Custodian, in effect, support the petitioner in the PIL and contend that the Forest Department shall not be compelled to deliver possession of some other forest land in execution of the orders made by the Forest Tribunal.
45. In support of his case, Mr. Nagaraj Narayanan relied on a series of decisions on matters of trust, duty of the custodian of forest property, identification, etc., viz.,
- (a) Niyamavedi v. Union of India [2003 KHC 1338 (DB)].
- (b) Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala & another [(2006) 7 SCC 416].
- (c) Custodian, Vested Forests, Palakkad & Others v. P.V. Kunhiraman [2018 (3) KHC 768 (DB)].
- (d) M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Others [(1997) 1 SCC 388].
- (e) Association for Environment Protection v. State of Kerala and Others [(2013) 7 SCC 226].
- (f) Union of India v. Ramesh Gandhi [(2012) 1 SCC 476].
- (g) A.V. Pappiyya Sastry v. Government of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC 221].
- (h) S P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRS v. V. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1].
- (i) Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550].
- (j) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319].
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- (k) Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust [(1996) 3 SCC 310].
- (l) Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School [(2003) 8 SCC 311].
46. If required, we will consider the principle or ratio enunciated in these citations in the ultimate analysis and examine the applicability to the cases on hand.
47. The petitions on hand remind us of Shakespeare’s Novel ‘Much Ado About Nothing’. The said position can be appreciated if the court analyses the events occasioned chronologically and records a contemporaneous finding on each happening.
48. As noted, lessees claim entitlement through registered document No. 2034 of 1956. Independent of the said document, the lessees assert to have acquired a claim under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, 1971. The schedule to the lease deed No. 2034 of 1956, the translation of which is placed on record, we prefer to advert to the schedule, both in the Vernacular and also the English translation, as under:
## “ **SCHEDULE**
District : Palakkad
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|Sub District|:|Mannarkkad|
|---|---|---|
|Taluk|:|Valluvanad|
|Amsom|:|Pottasseri|
|Desom|:|Pottasseri|
|Sl. Number|:|1|
## **Description of Property**
Unsurveyed land having an extent of 500 Acres within the Kanjirapuzha Hill Valley Area excludes the land, Piles of logs, and Estate ways of the tenants as per Agreements.
Extent Acres : 500
|East<br>North<br>West<br>South|**Boundaries**<br>:<br>Reserve Forest<br>:<br>Kallara<br>:<br>Palakkayam<br>:<br>Mundanad Forest”|
|---|---|
## Vernacular version
**==> picture [438 x 280] intentionally omitted <==**
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49. The above evidences that the subject matter of the lease is identified with contemporaneous boundaries.
50. The next stage of the matter is the estate of Moopil Nair, represented by the Advocate Receiver, filed O.S. No.101 of 1960 for recovery of possession, damages, and profits for use and occupation or unauthorised occupation and other reliefs against the lessees/claimants. The plaintiffs in O.S. No.101 of 1960 to secure possession of the plaint schedule property have joined issue with the lessees on the validity of registered lease deed No.2034/1956. We have excerpted the issues the trial court had framed, and the finding recorded by the competent Civil Court is that the executant of the lease deed dated 24.09.1956 had gone beyond his powers, not executed for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate, and **therefore** , **void, invalid, and not binding on the estate** . An attempt with considerable seriousness has been made by the learned counsel appearing for the lessees that the answer or finding of the Civil Court in O.S. No.101 of 1960, at best, is between the parties to the suit and that a mere finding
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is not susceptible to the scope of an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, in a collateral proceeding, more particularly in Public Interest Litigation, this Court ought to avoid examining the finding recorded on registered deed No.2034 of 1956. The said objection or argument needs our examination.
51. The petitioner in PIL has prayed for setting aside Exhibits-P1 to P7 orders of the Forest Tribunal in O.A. Nos.7, 8, 9 10 of 1977, and 70, 71, 84, 85, 86 and 99 of 1979 on the ground of alleged fraud, etc. Advocates Joshi and Sathyanatha Menon argue that the orders of the Forest Tribunal having become final, it is not legally tenable for this Court to covert the PIL into a statutory appeal and examine whether fraud has been played in securing an order under Section 8 of Act, 1971 from the Forest Tribunal.
52. The discussion in the preceding paragraph takes us to precisely note what is jurisprudential adjudication by a writ court in PIL; what constitutes fraud; whether this Court needs to necessarily decide on the orders of the Forest Tribunal in
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Exhibits-P1 to P7, and lastly, whether adjudication of issues could be limited to the simple PIL jurisdiction of this Court.
53. The introduction and acceptance of public interest litigation as a jurisprudential concept is a matter of extensive debate in India and, even more than that, outside India. This concept brings into focus the rights of the plurality (as against individual's right) especially when the plurality is, for one or the other reason, not in a position to seek redressal of its grievances. This inadequacy may not always emerge from financial constraints. It may sometimes arise out of a lack of awareness. At other times merely from the overwhelming might of executive authority. The jurisprudential thought in this country, after the emergence of public interest litigation, is seeking to strike a balance between individual rights and the rights of the plurality. {See **Natural Resources Allocation, In re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012** [(2012) 10 SCC 1].
54. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Vol.4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined as, "A matter of public or general interest does
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not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected”.
55. In **Janata Dal** v. **H.S. Chowdhary** [(1992) 4 SCC 305], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the scope of Public Interest Litigation, and, in paragraph 53, after considering what is public interest, held as under:
"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of Law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression 'PIL' means a legal action initiated in a Court of Law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
56. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be
used with great care and circumspection, and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public
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interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and / or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. {See **Kushum Lata** v. **Union of India and Others** [(2006) 6 SCC 180]}
57. The next question is the locus of the petitioner to agitate
for preserving and protecting ‘Forest’ in the alleged implementation of orders of the Forest Tribunal. We refer to the leading precedent on the Doctrine of Public Trust in all natural resources. In **M.C. Mehta** v. **Kamal Nath and Others** [(1997) 1 SCC 388], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:
“ **23** . The notion that the public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristic is finding its way into the law of the land. The need to protect the environment and ecology has been summed up by David B. Hunter (University of Michigan) in an article titled an ecological perspective on property: A call for judicial protection of the public's interest in environmentally critical resources
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published in Harvard Environmental Law Review Vol. 12, 1988 page 311 in the following words:
“Another major ecological tenet is that the world is finite. The earth can support only so many people and only so much human activity before limits are reached. This lesson was driven home by the oil crisis of the 1970's as well as the pesticide scare of the 1960's. The current deterioration of the ozone layer is another vivid example of the complex, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic effects posed by our disregard of the environmental limits to economic growth. The absolute finiteness of the environment, when coupled with human dependency on the environment, leads to the unquestionable result that human activities will at some point be constrained.
"[H]uman activity finds in the natural world its external limits. In short, the environment imposes constraints on our freedom; these constraints are not the product of value choices but of the scientific imperative of the environment's limitations. Reliance on improving technology can delay temporarily, but not forever, the inevitable constraints. "There is a limit to the capacity of the environment to service ... growth, both in providing raw materials and in assimilating by product wastes due to consumption. The largesse of technology can only postpone or disguise the inevitable.”
Professor Barbara Ward has, written of this ecological imperative in particularly vivid language:
“We can forget moral imperatives. But today the morals of respect and care and modesty come to us in a form we cannot evade. We cannot cheat on DNA. We cannot get round photosynthesis. We cannot say I am not going to give a damn about phytoplankton. All these tiny mechanisms provide the preconditions of our planetary life. To say we do not care is to say in the most literal sense that "we choose death.”
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There is a commonly recognized link between laws and social values, but to ecologists a balance between laws and values is not alone sufficient to ensure a stable relationship between humans and their environment. Laws and values must also contend with the constraints imposed by the outside environment. Unfortunately, current legal doctrine rarely accounts for such constraints, and thus environmental stability is threatened.
Historically, we have changed the environment to fit our conceptions of property. We have fenced, ploughed and paved. The environment has proven malleable and to a large extent still is. But there is a limit to this malleability, and certain types of ecologically important resources - for example, wetlands and riparian forests can no longer be destroyed without enormous long-term effects on environmental and therefore social stability. To ecologists, the need for preserving sensitive resources does not reflect value choices but rather is the necessary result of objective observations of the laws of nature.
In sum, ecologists view the environmental sciences as providing us with certain laws of nature. These laws, just like our own laws, restrict our freedom of conduct and choice. Unlike our laws, the laws of nature cannot be changed by legislative flat; they are imposed on us by the natural world. An understanding of the laws of nature must therefore inform all of our social institutions.”
**24** . The ancient Roman Empire developed a legal theory known as the "Doctrine of the Public Trust". It was founded on the idea that certain common properties such as rivers, seashore, forests and the air were held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. Our contemporary concern about "the environment" bear a very close conceptual relationship to this legal doctrine. Under the Roman Law these resources were
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either owned by no one (Res Nullious) or by everyone in common (Res Communious). Under the English common law, however, the Sovereign could own these resources but the ownership was limited in nature, the Crown could not grant these properties to private owners if the effect was to interfere with the public interests in navigation of fishing. Resources that were suitable for these uses were deemed to be held in trust by the Crown for the benefit of the public, Joseph L. Sax, Professor of Law, University of Michigan proponent of the Modern Public Trust Doctrine in an erudite article "Public Trust Doctrine in natural resource law; effective judicial intervention". Michigan Law Review Vol. 68 Part I page 473 has given the historical background of the Public Trust Doctrine as under:
“The source of modern public trust law is found in a concept that received much attention in Roman and English law - the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore. That history has been given considerable attention in the legal literature, need not be repeated in detail here. But two points should be emphasized. First, certain interests, such as navigation and fishing, were sought to be preserved for the benefit of the public, accordingly, property used for those purposes was distinguished from general public property which the sovereign could routinely grant to private owners. Second, while it was understood that in certain common properties - such as the seashore, highways, and running water - "perpetual use was dedicated to the public," it has never been clear whether the public had an enforceable right to prevent infringement of those interests. Although the state apparently did protect public uses, no evidence is available that public rights could be legally asserted against a recalcitrant government.”
**25** . The Public Trust Doctrine primarily rests on the principle that certain resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the
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people as a whole that it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The said resources being a gift of nature. They should be made freely available to everyone irrespective of the status in life. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit then use for private ownership or commercial purposes. According to Professor Sax the Public Trust Doctrine imposes the following restrictions on governmental authority:
“Three types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the public trust: first, the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types of uses.”
**33** . It is no doubt correct that the public trust doctrine under the English Common Law extended only to certain traditional uses such as navigation, commerce and fishing. But the American Courts in recent cases have expanded the concept of the public trust doctrine. The observations of the Supreme Court of California in Mono Lake case clearly show the judicial concern in protecting all ecologically important lands, for example fresh water, wetlands or riparian forests. The observations of the Court in Mono Lake case to the effect that the protection of ecological values is among the purposes of public trust, may give rise to an argument that the ecology and the environment protection is a relevant factor to determine which lands, waters or airs are protected by the public trust doctrine. The Courts in United States are finally beginning to adopt this reasoning and are expanding the public trust to encompass new types of lands and waters. In Phillips Petroleum co. v. Mississippi ###1988 108 SCC 791, the United States Supreme Court upheld Mississippi's extension of public trust doctrine to lands underlying non
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navigable tidal areas. The majority judgment adopted ecological concepts to determine which land can be considered tide lands. Phillips Petroleum case assumes importance because the Supreme Court expanded the public trust doctrine to identify the tide lands not on commercial considerations but on ecological concepts. We see no reason why the public trust doctrine should not be expanded to include all eco systems operating in our natural resources.
**34** . Our legal system based on English Common Law - includes the public trust doctrine as part of its jurisprudence. The State is the trustee of all natural resources which are by nature meant for public use and enjoyment. Public at large is beneficiary of the seashore, running waters, air, forests and ecologically fragile lands. The State as a trustee is under a legal duty to protect the natural resources. These resources meant for public use cannot be converted into private ownership.
**39** . We, therefore, order and direct as under:
1. The public trust doctrine, as discussed by us in this judgment is a part of the law of the land.
2. The prior approval granted by the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forest by the letter dated November 24, 1993 and the lease deed dated April 11, 1994 in favour of the Motel are quashed. The lease granted to the Motel by the said lease deed in respect of 27 bighas and 12 biswas of area, is cancelled and set aside. The Himachal Pradesh Government shall take over the area and restore it to its original natural conditions.
3. The Motel shall pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the environment and ecology of the area. The pollution caused by various constitutions made by the Motel in the riverbed and the banks on the river Beas has to be removed and reversed. We direct NEERI through its Director to inspect the area if necessary and give an assessment of the cost which
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is likely to be incurred for reversing the damage caused by the Motel to the environment and ecology of the area. NEERI may take into consideration the report by the Board in this respect.
4. The Motel through its management shall show cause why pollution fine in addition be not imposed on the Motel.
5. The Motel shall construct a boundary wall at a distance of not more than 4 meters from the cluster of rooms (main building of the Motel) towards the river basin. The boundary wall shall be on the area of the Motel which is covered by the lease dated September 29, 1981. The Motel shall not encroach / cover / utilise any part of the river basin. The boundary wall shall separate the Motel building from the river basin. The riverbank and the river basin shall be left open for the public use.
6. The Motel shall not discharge untreated effluent into the river. We direct the Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board to inspect the pollution control devices/treatment plants set up by the Motel. If the effluent/waste discharged by the Motel is not conforming to the prescribed standards, action in accordance with law be taken against the motel.
7. The Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board shall not permit the discharge of untreated effluent into river Beas. The Board shall inspect all the hotels/institutions/factories in Kullu Manali area and in case any of them are discharging untreated effluent/waste into the river, the Board shall take action in accordance with law.
8. The Motel shall show cause on December 18, 1996, why Pollution fines and damages be not imposed as directed by us. NEERI shall send its report by December 17, 1996. To be listed on December 18, 1996.”
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58. This Court, in this present Public Interest Litigation, will not be examining whether the judgment in O.S. No.101 of 1960 is
a judgment _in rem_ or _personam_ and what is the standing of the petitioner in the Public Interest Litigation to rely on the findings recorded by the competent Civil Court. The fact of the matter, which is not disputed by the counsel appearing for the lessees/claimants, is that document No.2034 of 1956 has been held to be void. The effect of the declaration of a document as void by a competent Civil Court is well established. Therefore, the argument of learned counsel for lessees/claimants that the finding recorded in O.S. No.101 of 1960 will have to be completely excluded from consideration is untenable.
59. The next stage in the matter is with effect from 10[th] May, 1971, the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971, has come into operation. The subject land on the showing of the lessees/claimants has been treated as coming within the fold and ambit of the Vesting Act, 1971, by operation of Section 3. The subject matter covered by Act, 1971 by operation of law stood
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vested in the Government. The regrant if one may so describe, is available under Section 8 of the Act, 1971. The lessees or the claimants moved the Forest Tribunal to settle a dispute under Section 8 of the Act. The jurisdiction, nature of relief, and subject matter of relief are clearly being the _dominus litis_ of the lessees/claimants, they have described in the manner in which they thought correct and the property for which they want relief from the Tribunal. As an example, one of the schedules given in the original applications filed before the Forest Tribunal is reproduced hereunder:
|D<br>I<br>S<br>T<br>R<br>I<br>C<br>T|R<br>E<br>V<br>.<br>D<br>I<br>V<br>.|T<br>A<br>L<br>U<br>K|V<br>I<br>L<br>L<br>A<br>G<br>E|<br>N<br>O<br>.|Name|Extent|Extent||Boundaries|Boundaries||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|||||||Hec.|Are|East|South|West|North|
|P<br>A<br>L<br>A<br>K<br>K<br>A<br>D|<br>M<br>A<br>N<br>N<br>A<br>R<br>K<br>K<br>A<br>D|M<br>A<br>N<br>N<br>A<br>R<br>K<br>K<br>A<br>D|A<br>G<br>A<br>L<br>I||**6 Acre 76**<br>**Cent, included**<br>**in**<br>**Kanhirapuzha**<br>**(Malavaram)**<br>**Survey**<br>**2019/Part.**|<br>2|70|Reserve<br>Property of<br>Chakingal<br>Devasya|Property of<br>Joseph<br>Thomas,<br>Puzhakathara<br>Malavaram)|<br>Property of<br>Chandy<br>Varkey,<br>Pawathinal<br>(vellachal)|Property of<br>Chandi<br>Varkey,<br>Pawathinal<br>(vellachal)|
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
60. What is important from the above excerpt is that the lessees/claimants have chosen to identify the subject matter on which the lessees/claimants desire settlement of a dispute by corelating the claimed property with the survey number. If the property is sought to be identified with the help of a survey number, it is axiomatic that the dominant subject matter of the litigation is the survey number by referring to which the parties have joined the issue. Therefore, notwithstanding other arguments against the order of the Forest Tribunal, the subject matter for which a claim was made, and the dispute was settled by the Tribunal is categorically and explicitly identified by the lessees/claimants.
61. Fraud vitiates everything, and suppressing a material v. **State of** fact indisputably constitutes fraud. {see **Hamza Haji Kerala** [(2006) 7 SCC 416], **Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd.** v. **Anil Kanwariya** [(2021) 10 SCC 136], and **K. Jayaram** v. **BDA** [(2022) 12 SCC 815]}
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48
62. If the relief is to be moulded on whether the fraud, as alleged, has been successfully carried out by the lessees/ claimants, we are of the view that notwithstanding the adjudication by Forest Tribunal and such adjudication attaining finality, will this Court, in the public interest, to protect the forest, rights of citizens in the forest, etc., can certainly go into that question and record a finding. Such a course of consideration is avoidable for the view we propose to take.
63. The claimants/lessees seeking execution of the orders of the Forest Tribunal have been invoking the jurisdiction of this Court by way of writ petitions. The very order on which the lessees/claimants rely, i.e., the judgment in O.P. Nos. 8166 and 8855 of 1994, dated 27.10.2003, in unequivocal terms, identify that there is, in fact, an issue on the identification of property covered by the schedule in the original applications filed before the Forest Tribunal and the property now claimed by the lessees/claimants. In this background, an exercise was directed to be carried out by this Court.
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49
64. The claimants/lessees now claim a particular piece of property forming part of the schedule concerning the original applications. This Court, taking note of the larger public interest of ensuring that even if an order of the Tribunal has become final, the finality is to be attached only to the property covered by the
subject matter of that litigation, directed survey, identification, and filing a report. The State constituted a committee consisting of the following officers:
- (a) The Custodian of Vested Forests and Conservator of Forests, Palakkad.
- (b) The Tahsildar, Mannarkkad.
- (c) The Assistant Director, Mini Forest Survey, Kozhikode.
- (d) The Village Officer, Palakkayam, Mannarkkad.
- (e) The Village Officer, Kallamala, Mannarkkad.
- (f) The Taluk Surveyor, Taluk Office, Mannarkkad.
## 65. The officers filed the plan with a report dated 07.08.2010,
which was taken on record.
66. To the above report, lessees/claimants have filed objections dated 01.11.2010 for the 24[th] respondent and respondent Nos.19 and 21 to 23. The purpose of the report by the
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50
department is to, _prima facie,_ demonstrate before this Court that Survey No.2019A is the property for which there has been an adjudication under Section 8 of the Act, 1971. The said land is far away and different from the land covered by the lease deed No.2034 of 1956 and the orders of the Forest Tribunal. The report identifies the Village legend map with reference to survey numbers. When the area is surveyed and identified with survey numbers, the identification must be with reference to the survey numbers.
67. The purport of the objections filed by the lessees/ claimants is that the report in its entirety and the sketch are required to be rejected. The objection begs the question that the petitioner in the Public Interest Litigation is requesting this Court to consider and ensure that in execution of an order made by the Forest Tribunal, forest or forest land is not delivered to the claimants. _Prima facie,_ it appears that by filing a claim petition with a survey number, the lessees/claimants have chosen to identify that property, _inter alia_ , with the survey number. When
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
the entire field sketch containing the legend map of the area is placed before the Court in sequence with all the survey numbers, it is unavailable for lessees/claimants to turn around and argue that the property now claimed by the lessees/claimants is easily identifiable with boundaries and if done so, the green marked portion is the property which should be handed over to the claimants/lessees. Said argument, which appears to be persuasive, needs to be more attainable for two reasons. This Court is concerned only with the protection and preservation of forest and also ensuring that in execution of any of the orders made by the Forest Tribunal, a property which is not covered by the adjudication is not made over to the lessees/claimants. To this extent, it cannot be said that the public interest canvassed by the petitioner is without merit. The virtual tour of the property claimed by the lessees/claimants vide order dated 05.06.2023 discloses the nature of the property claimed by the lessees/claimants. We place on record the recorded video
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**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
clippings as part of the record together with the report submitted by the Committee dated 19.07.2010 together with the area map.
68. As has been held in **Niyamavedi** v. **Union of India** [AIR
2004 Ker. 81], under the threat of contempt, if a land to which a claimant does not have entitlement is made over, that is not a reason to continue to keep the land so delivered or restore the said land again to the said claimant without determining the entitlement.
69. The sequence from 1956, adjudication by the trial court, relief of the Forest Tribunal, and now the claim for the property earmarked as green portion indeed demonstrate inconsistency in the claim of lessees/claimants. Merely because at a given point of time, under the threat of contempt of court orders, possession of the forest land was given under an error of fact or mistaken impression on the identity, the said act is not a reason to restore the very same land once again to the lessees/claimants, even if it is a Forest and not covered by the schedule of the lease deed dated
24.09.1956 or the orders of the Forest Tribunal. It shall always be
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
the responsibility of the Forest Department firstly to protect the forest. Secondly, unless and until the identity is contemporaneously established with the schedule shown in the registered lease deed No.2034 of 1956 and the original applications filed before the Tribunal, the claim of the lessees/claimants is not processed in law. The argument advanced on fraud, the applicability of Section 3 of Act, 1971, etc., need not be considered for the simple reason that the petitioner in PIL has demonstrated before the Court that what has been stated in paragraph (10) of the petition is correct, and the respondents are directed not to handover Forest land as the property other than the subject matter of adjudication in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10 of 1977, and 70, 71, 84, 85, 86, 99 of 1979.
70. Special Government Pleader (Forests) Mr. Nagaraj Narayanan argues that firstly the property covered by the schedule in O.S. No.101 of 1960 is in possession of a third party. Secondly, with the enactment of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Act, 2003, if the land
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
satisfies the definition of ecologically fragile, still it has to be decided by the competent Court. As this issue has arisen postadjudication, we are not expressing our view on the claim of any party under Act, 2003 or the defence available to the Government on this behalf. If the circumstances ultimately arise, it is for the competent Court or Tribunal to decide the issue.
71. O.P. No.10611 of 1994 is filed questioning the show cause notice (Exhibit-P4) issued by the Custodian of Vested Forests and Conservator of Forests, Palakkad, respondent No.1 therein. The show cause notice refers to a few intrinsic anomalies in the property claimed by the lessees/claimants and the property covered by adjudication in O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of 1977, as well as 70, 71, 84, 85, 86 and 99 of 1979. The subject matter of the present original petition is a show cause notice. Certainly, from the material now brought on record in the PIL, it is sufficiently clear that the Custodian is justified in issuing a show cause notice for finding out the entitlement of the lessees/claimants to land, in terms and pursuance of the order of the Forest Tribunal.
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
**==> picture [17 x 10] intentionally omitted <==**
72. The burden and responsibility are on the lessees/ claimants to establish a fact and then press the claim. It is not for this Court to adjudicate upon a finding of fact and accept the case of one party or the other. The discussion in the Public Interest Litigation sufficiently deals with the controversies on the identity of the property. When there are several disputed questions right from the day of the lease deed, validity, schedule, enforceability, either quashing Exhibit-P4 notice or issuing a direction to the Forest Department to deliver possession of schedule property covered by the subject original applications, do not fall within the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we are persuaded not to entertain the prayers in O.P. No. 10611 of 1994.
73. The fact that objections are made by the lessees/ claimants to the report dated 07.08.2010 shows that there is a dispute even from the claimants' perspective concerning the land they are claiming and what land is available on the ground. The
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
56
adjudication in the original applications cannot be treated as conclusively establishing the property now claimed.
74. The view above is taken keeping in perspective the rights that have accrued to the lessees/claimants pursuant to the adjudication of O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of 1977, as well as 70, 71, 84, 85, 86 and 99 of 1979. Merely because there is an adjudication, it does not mean that it can be put to execution against a property of the choice of the claimants.
75. For the above reason and discussion, Public Interest Litigation viz., W.P.(C) No. 18814 of 2004 stands ordered by declaring that respondents are directed to ensure that the forest land in Kanjirapuzha Hill Area, Mannarghat Taluk, Agali Village is protected. It is further ordered that the claimants are given liberty to contemporaneously establish the land covered by the registered lease deed No.2034 of 1956, adjudicated by the Forest Tribunal, and whether in execution of the orders of the Forest Tribunal, no other property from Custodian is taken. Finally, we order that the Forest Department shall ensure that in the
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
57
execution of any of these orders, no forest land in lieu of the land covered by the O.A. Nos. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of 1977, as well as 70, 71,
84, 85, 86 and 99 of 1979 is restored to the claimants/lessees.
W.P.(C) No.18814/2004 is ordered as indicated above, and
O.P. No.10611/1994 is dismissed.
Sd/S. V. N. Bhatti Chief Justice
Sd/Basant Balaji Judge
Krj/6.7.23
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58
## **APPENDIX OF OP NO.10611/1994**
## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS** : -
- P1 COPY OF ORDER IN O.A.NO.86/79 DATED 7-5-1988 OF THE FOREST TRIBUNAL, MANJERI.
- P2 COPY OF ORDER IN I.A NO.182/85 IN O.A.55/88 OF THE FOREST TRIBUNAL, MANJERI DT.10-111986.
- P3 COPY OF JUDGMENT DT.7-6-89 IN M.F.A NO 898 OF 1988 OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KERALA.
- P4 COPY OF NOTICE NO A1-4517/94 DATED 3-6-94 ISSUED BY THE FIRST RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER.
- P6 COPY OF THE OBJECTION FILED BY THE PETITIONER AGAINST EXT.P4 BEFORE THE CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS.
- P7 COPY OF THE LEASE DEED NO.2034 OF 1956 DATED 24.09.1956.
- P8 COPY OF THE HANDWRITTEN COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 1899/1958.
## **RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS** : -
R1(A): COPY OF THE REGISTERED DOCUMENT NO.1899/1958 DATED 11.11.1958 OF S.R.O, MANNARKKAD.
R1(B): COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.S. NO.281/1961 IN THE COURT OF THE MUSIFF OF OTTAPALAM DATED 12/63.
R1(C): COPY OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENT FILED BY THE DEFENDANTS IN COURT IN O.S. NO.101/19601 OF THE SUB COURT, OTTAPPALAM.
R1(D): COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.S. 101/66 OF SUB COURT, OTTAPPALAM.
R1(E): COPY OF DOCUMENT NO.2377 DATED 17.08.1966 OF SRO, MANNARKKAD.
R1(F): COPY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE VILLAGE OFFICER, PALAKKAYAM.
R1(G): COPY OF LOCATION SKETCH SHOWING THE AREA INVOLVED IN LEASE DEED NO.2034/56.
R1(H): COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 30.06.1998 OF THE FOREST TRIBUNAL.
## **ANNEXURES TO INSPECTION REPORT DATED 07-08-2010.**
ANNEXURE-1: COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 19.03.2020 OF THE CONSERVATOR OF FOREST TO TAHSILDAR, MANNARKKAD, OTHER OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE PARTIES. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
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ANNEXURE-2: - COPY OF THE MINUTES DATED 06.05.2010 OF TAKING EVIDENCE BY THE CUSTODIAN OF VESTED FORESTS AT THE PALAKKAYAM FOREST STATION AND PROCEEDINGS OF LOCAL INSPECTION. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-3: - COPY OF THE NOTICE DATED 19.07.2010 OF THE CONSERVATOR OF FOREST TO TAHSILDAR, MANNARKKAD, OTHER OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE PARTIES. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-4: - COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF LOCAL INSPECTION OF THE FIELD HELD ON 19.07.2010 BY THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKAD IN THE PRESENCE OF PRIVATE PARTIES. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION).
ANNEXURE-5: - COPY OF THE MINUTES OF THE MEETING DATED 19.07.2010 HELD AT THE OFFICE OF THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-6: - COPY OF THE SKETCH.
ANNEXURE-7: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2034/1956. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-8: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 1899/1958. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-9: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2377/1966. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-10: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 421/1971 (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-11: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2427/1990. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-12: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 967/1968. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-13: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2462/1966. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ANNEXURE-14: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 599/1981. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-15: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO.273/2006 (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-16: - COPY OF THE DOCUMENT VIA ORDER DATED 29.08.1975 IN OA NO.1046/1972 OFLAND TRIBUNAL, AGALI.
ANNEXURE-17: - COPY OF DEPOSITION DATED 03.03.1980 OF 1ST WITNESS IN O.A. NO.90/1979 BEFORE THE FOREST TRIBUNAL, MANJERI (ENGLISH TRANSLATION).
ANNEXURE-18: - COPY OF DOCUMENT NO.2004/1996. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-19: - COPY OF DOCUMENT VIA ORDER DATED 18.07.1975 IN O.A. NO.1057/1972 OF LAND TRIBUNAL, AGALI.
ANNEXURE-20: - COPY OF CERTIFICATE DATED 02.08.2010 OF THE VILLAGE OFFICER, KALLAMALA (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
OP. No.10611/1994 & WPC.18814/2004
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ANNEXURE-21: - PHOTOGRAPH OF A PORTION OF CULTIVATED LAND WITH ROAD AND CULVERTS IN SY. NO.2119 OF PALAKKAYAM VILLAGE AND THE AREA WHERE KUNDAMPOTTI THODU STREAM JOINS WITH KALLAR RIVER.
ANNEXURE-22: - PHOTOGRAPH OF ANOTHER CULTIVATED PORTION OF 500 ACRES OF LEASED LAND IN THE AREA IN SY. NO.2122 OF PALAKKAYAM VILLAGE.
ANNEXURE-23: - PHOTOGRAPH OF ANOTHER CULTIVATED PORTION OF 500 ACRES OF LEASED LAND IN THE AREA IN SY. NO.2121 OF PALAKKAYAM VILLAGE.
ANNEXURE-24: - PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING BOTH SIDES OF PALAKKAYAM - SHIRUVANI ROAD WHERE MUTHIKULLAM RESERVE FOREST STARTS WHICH AREA IS CLAIMED BY THE OA AWARDEES/ REPRESENTATIVES AND WRONGLY RESTORED AND TAKEN BACK BY THE FOREST DEPARTMENT.
ANNEXURE-25: - PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING THE SPOT WHERE THE AWARDEES / REPRESENTATIVES CLAIMED THAT THE NAME OF THE AREA IN THEIR VERSION IS KALLARA.
ANNEXURE-26: - PHOTOGRAPH SHOWING ONE PORTION OF THE LAND WHICH IS CLAIMED BY THE AWARDEES / REPRESENTATIVES AS THEIR LEASED LAND.
ANNEXURE-27: - STATEMENT GIVEN BY T.K. KURIAN, S/O. VARKEY KURIAN LIVING IN THE LEASED LAND BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD DURING FIELD VERIFICATION ON 18.07.2010 ADMITTING THAT THEIR LAND IS DERIVED FROM THE LEASED LAND OF 500 ACRES. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-28: - SIMILAR STATEMENT DATED 18.07.2010 GIVEN BY N.S. MATHAI, S/O. SKARIA BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-29: - SIMILAR STATEMENT DATED 18.07.2010 GIVEN BY K.T. JOHN S/O. THOMAS BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-30: - SIMILAR STATEMENT DATED 18.07.2010 GIVEN BY KOYIKKAL KURIAN THOMAS, S/O. THOMAS BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-31: - SIMILAR STATEMENT DATED 18.07.2010 GIVEN BY V.C. THOMAS, S/O. CHACKO BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
ANNEXURE-32: - SIMILAR STATEMENT DATED 18.07.2010 GIVEN BY K.M. SEBASTIAN, S/O. K.D. MANI BEFORE THE DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, MANNARKKAD. (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
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## **APPENDIX OF WP(C) 18814/2004**
## **PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS** : -
P1: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NOS.7, 8, 9 AND 10 OF 1977 DATED 12.09.1978.
P2: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO.70 OF 1979 DATED 28.01.1980.
P3: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO. 71 OF 1979 DATED 26.03.1980.
P4: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO. 84 OF 1979 DATED 26.03.1980.
P5: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO. 85 OF 1979 DATED 07.05.1980.
P6: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO. 86 OF 1979 DATED 07.05.1980.
P7: - COPY OF THE ORDER IN O.A. NO. 99 OF 1979 DATED 25.06.1980.
P8: - COPY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY VILLAGE OFFICER, PALLAKKAYAM, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
P9: - COPY OF THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER ON 26.03.1994, ALONG WITH ITS TRANSLATION.
## **RESPONDENT EXHIBITS/ANNEXURES** : -
EXT.R9(A): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.S. NO.101/66 OF SUBORDINATE JUDGES COURT, OTTAPPALAM DATED 20.11.1973.
EXT. R9(B): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.P.NO.8855/1994 DATED 27.10.1973.
EXT. R19(A): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.S. NO.101/66 OF THE SUBORDINATE JUDGES COURT, OTTAPPALAM.
EXT. R19(B): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.P. NO.8166/94 DT. 27.10.03 OF THIS HON'BLE COURT.
EXT. R34(A): COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER DATED 12.09.1978 IN O.A.NO.7/1977 OF FOREST TRIBUNAL, MANJERI OBTAINED BY SRI. CHAKKINGAL DEVASSIA.
EXT. R34(B): COPY OF THE COMMON JUDGMENT DATED 27.10.2003 IN OP NO.8166/1994.
ANNEXURE-R4(A): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT IN O.S. NO.101/1960 OF THE SUBORDINATE JUDGE, OTTAPPALAM.
ANNEXURE-R4(B): - COPY OF THE ORDER FT. 30.06.1998 IN O.A.54/85 OF THE FOREST TRIBUNAL, MANJERI.
ANNEXURE-R4(C): - COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 16.12.1963 IN O.S. NO.281/1961 OF THE MUNSIFF'S COURT, OTTAPPALAM.
ANNEXURE-R4(D): - COPY OF JUDGMENT DATED 18.08.2006 IN C.A. NO.3535/2006 OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT.
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ANNEXURE-24(A): - TRUE COPY OF THE DOCUMENT NO. 2740 OF 1926 DATED 04.10.1926.
ANNEXURE 1: - NOTICE DATED 19.03.2010.
ANNEXURE 2: - COPY OF MINUTES DATED 6.4.2010.
ANNEXURE 3: - COPY OF NOTICE DATED 2.7.2010.
ANNEXURE 4: - COPY OF FIELD INSPECTION REPORT DATED 19.07.2010.
ANNEXURE 5: - COPY OF MINUTES DATED 19.07.2010.
ANNEXURE 6: - COPY OF SKETCH
ANNEXURES 7 TO 19: - COPY OF DOCUMENTS (ANNEXURE-17 DELETED)
ANNEXURE 20: - COPY OF THE LETTER NO.84/10 DATED 2.8.2010 OF KALLAMALA VILLAGE OFFICER.
ANNEXURES 21 TO 26: - COPY OF PHOTOGRAPHS.
ANNEXURES 27 TO 32: - COPY OF STATEMENT OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN THE LEASED LAND.
//TRUE COPY//
P.A. TO C.J.