Padmakumari challenged the order in IA 27/2022 in OP(Election) 1/2021 before the Ernakulam Principal Munsiff’s Court, via an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petition concerns the Kochi Municipal Corporation election in Division 29 (Willington Island North), alleging that one vote—allegedly illegitimate and cast by the Presiding Officer—had improperly decided the outcome and that the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 and related rules had not been followed. The Election Petition invoked sections 178(2)(d)(iii) and 178(d)(iv) as grounds to void the election, contending improper reception of a vote and non-compliance with statutory provisions. The petitioner sought to have the records called for, frame proper issues with reference to pleadings, and, ultimately, obtain a declaration voiding the poll or, if the missing vote were accounted for, declare the petitioner as returned. The trial court initially framed seven issues and, at the petitioner’s request, was urged to add further issues; the court later rejected that request. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Makhan Lal Bangal to insist on meticulous issue-framing, but the court noted the issues already framed (ii)–(v) cover the material proposition and no additional issues were necessary. The High Court concluded the parameters of the Election Petition were met, found no merit in the challenge, and dismissed the petition with costs.
This writ petition challenges the denial of appointment to the post of Accountant-cum-Data Entry Operator notified by Annamanada Grama Panchayat under MNREGS. After ranking No.1 in Ext. P2, the petitioner faced opposition in the Panchayat committee meeting held on 11.09.2020, where nine members, including the Vice President, opposed appointment on the ground that she did not reside within Annamanada Grama Panchayat. The petitioner contends a mala fide motive behind the dissent, allegedly to favour Anumol Babu, the sole applicant resident in the Panchayat who had the least marks. Pending the petition, the Panchayat decided not to fill the post due to non-availability of pending works, and later issued Ext. P6 (17.02.2022) not to fill the post. The petitioner seeks quashing Ext. P3 (dissent) as arbitrary and unconstitutional and to enforce appointment in line with her rank. The respondent Panchayat claims there is no legal right to appointment; Ext. P6 reflects a temporary hiatus rather than a denial on merits, and there is no resident-preference provision in MNREGS. The Court holds that discrimination based on residence in public employment contravenes Article 16, citing Kailash Chand Sharma, and sets aside Ext. P3. It directs a merits-based consideration of Ext. P6’s validity under MNREGS and related orders after affording hearing, with a two-month deadline for a decision.
This original petition (OP(C) 655/2021) arises in the context of OS 1/2019 in the Munsiff’s Court, Devikulam, concerning a partition and separate possession claim in a set of properties (Schedules A–G) based on a family settlement executed among siblings and their late husband Meenayya. The petitioners Muniyamma, Indira, and Geetha—titular defendants in the suit—alleged that the family settlement, carried out in 2013, and the subsequent passport-like licence arrangements over the Matha Lodge were forged and that the respondents (Sasi and Yesudas) had no right to exclusive possession of Schedule B/C property. The second petitioner sought to challenge the closure of the Matha Lodge by the Vattavada Grama Panchayat and to obtain possession of the lodge’s keys via an interim order. In the interim, the Munsiff directed keys be handed to the petitioners, which order the respondents challenged, prompting the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction. The court notes that the petitioners are title holders and that the respondents’ possession and the license arrangement were contested; it highlights that Premji Ratansey Shah limits relief to trespassers, and ultimately sets aside the impugned order for a fresh, reasoned determination by the trial court on I.A. No. 2 of 2020, directing a hearing and a reasoned order within two months of this judgment.
The writ appeal challenges a two-vernacular newspaper notice dated 19.3.2020 purporting to remove 4,464 members from the ADAT Farmers Service Co‑operative Bank Ltd. The appellants contend the removals were effected without individual notices or adequate opportunity as required under Section 104 of the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act, 1969 and Rule 16(3) of the Rules. The Society’s contention is that interim Administrators enrolled members (some with voting rights) and that such enrollment, though later ratified by an elected Committee, was void ab initio. The Single Judge relied on Ext.R2(g) (a Division Bench precedent) and Abdu Rahiman to hold that the statutory requirement is satisfied by an opportunity to represent rather than by individualized notices, and stayed by Supreme Court in related matters only to certain petitioners. The appellants emphasize that a full membership (A class) cannot be conferred by an administrator and that General Body authority cannot ratify an unlawful act. The Division Bench ultimately held that the Administrator’s actions could not validate the initial enrollment of A‑class members; it reaffirmed that notices must adhere to statutory mandates and that the General Body cannot validate jurisdictionally void acts. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
WP(C) Nos.8727/2022, 8840/2022, 8844/2022 This set of three connected writ petitions challenges Ext.P2 communications issued by the first respondent, directing the petitioners to produce a land development certificate before a building permit can be considered, on land that has already been developed and subdivided into plots. The petitioners contend that requiring a separate development certificate is unnecessary for small extents carved out of larger tracts, and that such a precondition unduly delays legitimate construction. The court frames the dispute within a line of binding authority, noting that in WA No. 1288/2019 this Court held that where purchasers acquire small extents from larger lands, the Local Self Government Authority should not insist on a separate development permit. The Division Bench later confirmed the earlier ruling in Nafeesa v. Chavakkad Municipality (2018 (3) KLT 1). Applying these precedents, the learned Judge observes that the legal policy favors avoiding an extra layer of permit for such purchasers, provided other regulations are observed. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed, Ext.P2 is set aside, and the respondents are directed to consider the applicants’ building-permit applications without requiring a development permit. The order directs that necessary actions be completed within six weeks from receipt of the judgment. The decision reflects a pragmatic approach to development in areas already developed and subdivided, ensuring timely housing and infrastructure while preserving essential compliance and oversight.
This High Court of Kerala, in Crl.A. No. 580 of 2012, hears an appeal by the former Inspector of Police, S. Ajith Kumar, challenging a 2012 conviction under sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The prosecution alleged that the accused, while in service at Sreekandapuram Police Station (2003), demanded illegal gratification from PW1, a trader, in the form of monthly “masapady” and accepted Rs. 7,000 in two instalments, with a further Rs. 3,000 allegedly to be paid on a later date. The trap was laid by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau, with various witnesses (PW1–PW8) and documentary exhibits (Exts. P1–P16; MO1–MO3). The trial court convicted the accused; on appeal, the appellant contends lack of legal evidence of demand and acceptance, unreliability of the sole complainant PW1, and substantial non-compliance with Vigilance Manual guidelines (e.g., non-signing of mahazars by PW2/PW6, delayed chemical examination, missing best evidence such as the mundu, bark, and table scrapings). The State counters that the evidence suffices to prove demand and acceptance, and that manual non-compliance does not vitiate the trap. The Court ultimately finds that the prosecution failed to prove demand beyond reasonable doubt and the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt; the appeal is allowed and the conviction reversed, acquitting the appellant and setting him at liberty.
MAT.APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2018 Jasna M., the appellant, challenges a Family Court order in OP 374/2015 and MC 199/2015 that recorded a compromise decree, later alleged to be fraudulently filed. The Matrimonial Appeal before the Kerala High Court (MAT.APPEAL NO. 581 OF 2018) addresses whether a petition to recall such a compromise decree is maintainable and whether a separate suit or appeal to challenge the decree is permissible. The High Court surveys a lineage of authorities, notably Janakiammal R. v. S.K. Kumarasamy (2021 KHC 6296), Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) Through LR. Sadhna Rai v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566, R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy (2014) 15 SCC 471, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (2020) 6 SCC 629, and Banwari Lal, to illuminate the permissible route to contest a consent decree. A consent decree functions as a contract supervised by the court and is generally insulated from independent challenges due to bar under Section 96(3) CPC and Rule 3A of Order 23. However, the court acknowledges that allegations of fraud may necessitate an enquiry by the same court that recorded the compromise. In virtue of these authorities, the High Court sets aside the impugned judgment, holds the recall petition maintainable, and directs the Family Court, Malappuram, to conduct a merits-based inquiry with both sides given an opportunity, fixing appearance on 24.03.2022. The overall aim is to balance finality with legitimate challenges to a compromised decree.
R.P.No.209 of 2021 in R.C.Rev.No.297 of 2016 The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, reviews the order dated 02.02.2021 in R.C.Rev.No.297 of 2016, passed in a Rent Control revision. The review petitioner-landlady contends that the Order remanding the case to the Rent Control Court to allow amendment of pleadings or fresh evidence was based on a critical omission: it did not consider Ext.A1, a gift deed, and it also suppressed judgments in O.S.165 of 2007 and A.S.No.160 of 2010, which upheld the genuineness of the gift deed. The petitioner argues that the relief sought was decided earlier by competent Civil Courts and that the remand order accorded by the High Court was therefore based on wrong premises and should be recalled. The respondents argue that remand was permissible to reassess the bona fide need and the validity of Ext.A1, and that the onus lay on the petitioner to bring to notice the other judgments. The court invokes Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and others to delineate the criteria for review, including discovery of new matter, mistake, or any other sufficient reason, and notes that the broader principle was explained through Chhajju Ram v. Neki and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev Mar Poulose Athanasius. The court ultimately holds that the remand was on erroneous premises, that the judgments pre-existed and were not properly presented, and thus allows the review petition, recalls the 02.02.2021 order, and dismisses R.C.Rev.No.297/2016.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case instituted by the petitioner, T. Moideen, the 12th accused in Crime No. 189/1992 of Changaramkulam Police Station, Malappuram district, arising from a 1992 incident in which 16 accused allegedly restrained and assaulted at least CW1 and CW2, with offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 324, 447, 427 and 307 read with 149. The Sessions trial at Manjeri resulted in acquittals of several co-accused in SC No.158/1994; Moideen’s case was split and placed in the Long Pending Register as LP 14/1997 before the ASJ, Thirur. Moideen surrendered, and the case was refiled as S.C. 467/2022 before the ASJ Tirur. The CRL.M.C. seeks to quash all further proceedings on the ground that the underlying dispute is settled, supported by affidavits (Annexures D and E) from respondents 3 and 4 stating they have no grievances. The State and respondents’ counsel acknowledge the settlement. The Court notes the case is essentially private in nature, that CWs 1 and 2 were not examined in the earlier trial, and that the substratum is weakened. Relying on Gian Singh and InMoosa, the Court holds that Section 482 CrPC can be invoked, and, despite a 307 IPC offence, quashes the proceedings: SC 461/2022 (corrected from SC 467/2022).
RSA Nos. 67 of 2019 and 607 of 2012 This is a common judgment arising from Regular Second Appeals Nos. 607 of 2012 and 67 of 2019, involving Kamalamma (2nd plaintiff/appellant) challenging decrees in two earlier suits (O.S. Nos. 307/1990 and 696/1990) between Lakshmikutty Amma and Krishnan Nair/Appukkuttan Pillai, with Kollam Municipal Corporation impleaded. The suits concerned declaration of title, fixation of boundary, and possession over plaint A and B schedules, with disputes over an encroached portion and measurement of old survey 6184. After remand following a 2005 common judgment (A.S. Nos. 72/1999 and 36/2000), the trial court relied on Ext.C5(b) plan and related reports to grant relief to Lakshmikutty Amma and deny Kamalamma. Kamalamma challenged the assessment, arguing anomalies in Ext.C5(b) and related documents, failure to locate a 1.5-cent way, and misalignment with Ext.A1 partition deed. The High Court reaffirms the absence of a substantial question of law, cites leading precedents on the nature of substantial questions and the procedure for second appeals, and ultimately holds that the appeals are meritless and deserve dismissal without admission, with interlocutory applications also dismissed. The decision emphasizes strict adherence to Section 100 CPC and Order XLII Rule 2 CPC requirements for admitting second appeals and the need for precise framing of substantial questions of law.
Shanmughan, the appellant, was convicted by the Additional Sessions Court, Palakkad, for offences under Sections 8(2), 55(b) and 55(g) of the Abkari Act after being found in possession of 5 litres of illicit arrack. The Kerala High Court re-examines the prosecution’s proof of the chain of custody for the contraband sample that formed the basis of the chemical analysis. The court notes that Ext. P5, a forwarding note for sending the sample to the laboratory, lacks the name of the Excise Officer and the date when the sample was forwarded; the space for these details is left blank, and the signing Magistrate’s initials have no date. This triggers concerns about tamper-proof transmission from the court to the Chemical Examiner. Citing Kumaran v. State of Kerala and Sasidharan v. State of Kerala, the court emphasizes that the prosecution must prove a tamper-proof chain of custody from seizure to lab analysis. It observes that the samples were handled by a property clerk and an Excise Guard, neither of whom were examined, and Ext. P7 shows the chemical analysis, but without proving the chain of custody. Consequently, the court concludes the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and allows the appeal, setting aside the conviction and acquitting the accused. Additionally, the court notes the ratio in Sasidharan and Sathi has been affirmed by Ravi, and that presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act does not apply where official acts are not shown to have been performed.
CRL.M.C. No. 1430 of 2016 Dr. Sobhana, a gynecologist at Government District Hospital, Thrissur, faced criminal proceedings in Crime No. 271 of 2011 for alleged medical negligence following a delivery that ended in death. The FIR under Section 174 Cr.P.C. was later amended to include an offence under Section 304A IPC. In CrL.M.C. No. 1430 of 2016, she sought to quash the Final Report (Annexure-A6), arguing that the investigation violated the principles laid down in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Martin F. D'Souza v. Mohd. Ishfaq, and that there was no prima facie evidence supported by credible expert opinion. The court heard the petitioner’s counsel and the Public Prosecutor; notice to the victim was issued but with no appearance. The judgment recalls Jacob Mathew’s rule that a doctor who follows an accepted medical practice cannot be condemned for negligence merely because a superior option existed, and that a private complaint requires credible evidence and an independent medical opinion. It also notes that Martin D'Souza requires referral to a competent doctor or committee before issuing notices, and that Suvarna v. Renil Philip (Full Bench, 2014) mandates expert opinion be sought and given due weight before continuing investigation. The records show the case was referred to a District Level Expert Committee, which, despite differing opinions, led to a State Level Apex Committee that found no proven materials establishing negligence against the petitioner. Accordingly, the court held that the prosecution cannot proceed and quashed the Final Report and all further proceedings. The CrL.M.C. is allowed.
A long-pending criminal Misc Case (CRL.M.C. No. 4446 of 2013) before the Kerala High Court concerns Crime No. 44/1987 of Pulinkunnu Police Station, Alappuzha, in which Joseph Mathew, accused No.2, was an accountant of the Vadakke Angadi Service Co‑operative Bank. The first accused, the bank’s secretary, was tried under sections 409 and 477A read with section 34 IPC for alleged misappropriation between 1982 and 1985. Cognizance was taken as CC No.131/1987 and later renumbered; the trial court acquitted the first accused in 1993, while petitioner remained absconding and the case was placed in the long-pending LP No.19/1995. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the substratum of the prosecution has been effaced by the coaccused’s acquittal, and that the essential element of entrustment and the appointment as cashier were not proved; reliance was placed on Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police and Abbas v. State of Kerala. The Public Prosecutor argued that the petitioner’s non-appearance and the continuance of substratum justified continued proceedings. The High Court examined the evidence in CC 245/89 and concluded that entrustment and appointment were not proved, thereby eroding the substratum of the case and justifying quashing, particularly after a long pendency. Consequently, the court quashed all further proceedings in CC 398/1993 against the petitioner.
The Kerala High Court deals with a writ petition filed by Kerala State Service Pensioners Co-Operative Society Ltd. challenging Ext P4, an order passed by the third respondent that dismissed the society’s statutory appeal for non-prosecution under the Income Tax Act. The petitioner, a cooperative society of retired employees, had filed an annual return for the assessment year 2015-16 showing a modest income but later faced a high assessment after the authorities contended non-disclosure of credit facilities to members. The appeal before the 2nd Respondent culminated in Ext P4, which rejected the appeal for default, without addressing the merits. The petitioner contends that Ext P4 is contrary to the law laid down by courts, particularly the Supreme Court and this Court’s Division Bench in Uzhuva Service Co-operative Bank v. Income Tax Officer, that appeals should not be dismissed for non-prosecution and must be considered on merits. The respondents defend Ext P4 as a valid exercise of procedural safeguards and point to an alternate remedy by filing a second appeal. The court ultimately holds that Ext P4 violates established principles and quashes it, directing the third respondent to re-consider the Ext P3 appeal on merits after giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard, with email notice and deferral of Ext P5 proceedings until merits are decided.
This revision petition challenges the Family Court, Kollam order in MC 158/2011 directing the revision petitioner to pay maintenance to his wife, Sajeena, and to his two minor sons, at Rs. 3,000 per month per person from 30.06.2011. The respondents claim desertion since 02.12.2007 and lack of any sustainable income, while the revision petitioner contends he lacks substantial means and was misled by the first respondent, who allegedly misappropriated his earnings. The Family Court considered the parties’ pleadings and evidence: the wife as PW1 with Exts P1–P2(b) and the petitioner with CPWs 1–2 and Ext D1. The Court held that the respondents are unable to maintain themselves and that the revision petitioner earns enough to support the dependants, directing Rs.3,000 per month for each. The petitioner argued he is only a hotel supplier earning about Rs.100 per day, while the wife has other incomes. The High Court cites established authorities on maintenance, including Rajnesh v. Neha and Anr., Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal, and Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, to emphasize maintenance as a social justice measure and the duty of a husband to support dependants, even as courts may estimate quantum. The revision petition is dismissed; interim deposits, if any, may be adjusted against arrears.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from OS No. 243/2014 before the Munsiff Court, Nadapuram, where the plaintiff (respondent) obtained a decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants (appellants) from trespassing on the plaint schedule property, based on a gift deed (No. 18/1970) and subsequent amendments limiting the relief to 5.14 acres. The plaint originally described 7 acres 42 cents, but after amendments and commissions the extent was narrowed, with plots identified as A, B, C (and E) in Ext. C4 plan. The defendants challenged the description, amendment, and the decree’s scope, arguing that the plan and schedule wrongly included E plot and that possession and boundaries were misdescribed. The trial court granted the injunction over the entire property, and the appellate court affirmed. The High Court, on admission, framed three questions of law: (i) whether a decree for 7 acres 42 cents could stand when the plaintiff claimed only 5.14 acres; (ii) whether possession was proved as of the suit date without examining the Advocate Commissioner and Surveyor; (iii) whether the decree should cover 5.14 acres where the plan and plaint did not perfectly align. The court ultimately held that Ext.C4 identifies 5.14 acres (A–C) and that E plot must be excluded; it modified the decree to confine the injunction to A, B, and C plots, directing amendments to pleadings and ensuring Ext.C4 forms part of the appellate decree.
RP 601/2023 in O.P.(FC) No.15/2023 This is a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court delivering judgment on a review petition under Section 114 and Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC, challenging the High Court’s 08 March 2023 order in O.P.(FC) No.15/2023 (and related matters). The petitioner, Ayesha C.M., contends that the interim custody directive granting the respondent 15 days of custody for the child was issued without considering crucial facts: for the past two years, except for one incident, the child has not been in the respondent’s custody; there were alleged instances of cruelty toward the child; and the respondent is claimed to suffer from hepatitis-B. The respondent opposes the review, arguing there was no error in the judgment and adduces Annexure R1(A) photographs showing moments of the child with the father. The Family Court had previously regulated interaction and interim custody and issued an injunction; this Court later modified the interim custody arrangement in light of changed circumstances, directing daily interaction via WhatsApp/video calls (7:00–7:30 pm) and interim custody for 15 days during the child’s school vacation in Qatar (July–August). The Court cites Supreme Court precedents on the narrow scope of review (Meera Bhanja, Parsion Devi, Lily Thomas, Anantha Reddy, S. Madhusudhan Reddy) and on custody variation (Rosy Jacob). It holds there is no sufficient ground to review but clarifies that interim custody may be varied upon changed circumstances, while preserving the mother’s right to contact the child.”
The Kerala High Court, exercising its inherent power under section 482 CrPC, considers a criminal miscellaneous case filed by the sole accused, Shuroorrahman V.K., seeking quashment of an FIR and proceedings in Crime No. 190/2023 of Chandera Police Station, Kasaragod, for offences under sections 341, 323 and 506 IPC. The petitioner asserts an amicable settlement between the parties and submits affidavits (Annexures A2 and A3) to substantiate the claim, arguing that termination of the prosecution would enable both sides to move forward peacefully. At admission, the court directed the investigating officer to record the de facto complainant’s statement and verify the genuineness of the settlement and any impediments in terminating the case, including whether the petitioner has any criminal antecedents. The learned Public Prosecutor conveyed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement, but acknowledged the absence of other transgressions against the petitioner. The court, after reviewing the records and relevant law, relies on the principle laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and related decisions (Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and others) that quashing non-compoundable offences may be permissible where the private dispute has been settled and the offence is not heinous or societally injurious, subject to caveats for offences under special statutes or serious crimes. The judge ultimately held that keeping the proceedings would be futile where prospects of conviction are bleak and ends of justice demand peace, and thus allowed the petition, quashing the FIR and all further proceedings (Annexure A1).
Sitco Associates, the petitioner, challenged Ext.P16 termination and Ext.P17 forfeiture of its contract for a Sabarimala Master Plan project awarded by the High Power Committee for Implementation of the Master Plan, Travancore Devaswom Board. The project involved a straight walkway along Chandranandan Road, 800 meters. Sitco emerged as the lowest bidder, quoting 7.86% below the sanctioned estimate. The selection notice (Ext.P1) required a performance guarantee of Rs. 17,19,000 and a micro-level PERT chart; the petitioner executed Ext.P2 agreement with the HPC (Ext.P3) and was to complete the work by 30.09.2018. The writ petition sought quashing of Ext.P16 (termination) and Ext.P17 (forfeiture), and a mandamus to conclude the contract closure and return of EMD and security. The 2nd respondent argued maintainability, noting Article 6.1 of Ext.P2 provides for dispute resolution by competent courts, thus Article 226 should not be used for disputes arising from contractual obligations. The petitioner argued writ jurisdiction could be invoked for contracts involving public authorities. The court surveyed authorities on maintainability in contract disputes, including Jain Plastics, Ganga Enterprises, ABL International, Gunwant Kaur, and Joshi Technologies, distinguishing pure private contracts from those with public-law elements. Ultimately, the court held the petition non-maintainable under Article 226 for contract disputes and dismissed it, with no costs.
CRL.REV.PET NO.815 OF 2013 This is a criminal revision petition (CRL.R.EV.PET No. 815 of 2013) by the accused challenging the concurrent judgments arising from a conviction under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The prosecution alleged that on 17.08.1999, a food inspector purchased 600 grams of banana chips from the accused’s establishment in Pathanapuram. A Form III report (Ext P13) indicated adulteration due to transparency and the presence of water-soluble synthetic colour tartazine, leading to convictions under Section 16(1)(A)(1) read with Section 2(ia)(j) & 7(1) and under Section 16(1) proviso (1) read with Section 2(ix)(K) & 7(1) of the Act, with sentences totaling one year imprisonment and fines, to run concurrently. The Appellate Court (Crl.A. 91/2007) upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to six months. The revision petition relied on Supreme Court authority in Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Inspector and Rasheed v. Food Inspector, arguing that analysis must be conducted in a laboratory defined under Section 23(1-A)(ee) and that prosecution could fail where analysis was not so conducted. The State contended that Pepsico’s ratio should be reconsidered given Section 8’s public analyst appointments. The Kerala High Court ultimately held that because the sample was not analysed in a laboratory notified under Section 23(1-A)(ee), the prosecution must fail; the revision petition is allowed and the accused acquitted, with bail bonds cancelled.