This Kerala High Court original petition concerns execution of a joint and several decree in a personal injury/compensation case arising from an accident at the Live Stock Health, Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition in 1992. The trial court awarded compensation against multiple defendants (the operator, licensee, and exhibition’s convenor) who allegedly negligently caused the death of the respondent’s son. The first appellate court confirmed the decree but reduced the amount. In EP 28/2017 in OS 36/1995, respondents proceeded to execute solely against the petitioner Balussery Grama Panchayath, despite joint and several liability. The petitioner challenged Ext.P3 (attachment order) on grounds of maintainability and argued that the decree holder was not entitled to execute against only one of several jointly liable defendants; they would be liable for only 1/4th. The respondents argued there is no CPC prohibition against executing against any or all defendants where liability is joint and several. The High Court reiterates the longstanding law on joint tortfeasors: where two or more breaches cause a single indivisible injury, each tortfeasor is jointly and severally liable; the decree holder may sue or execute against any or all. It cites leading authorities (Winfield, Palghat, T.O. Anthony, etc.). The Court holds Ext.P3 to be proper and dismisses the petition, refusing supervisory intervention under Article 227.
RCRev. Nos. 354 of 2018; 356 of 2018; 357 of 2018; 358 of 2018 These four Rent Control revision petitions under Section 5(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 challenge fair rent determinations for four rooms in a commercial complex in Kozhikode occupied by a common tenant. The Rent Control Court fixed fair rents of Rs. 1,150; Rs. 2,000; Rs. 2,500; and Rs. 750, with a 10% annual increment, applying the criteria laid down by this Court in Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria. On appeal, the Appellate Authority affirmed those orders. The landlords then approached the Kerala High Court through four revision petitions. Their contentions relied on Exts. C1–C4, claiming higher rents in similar premises; however, the commissioner’s reports were based on hearsay information and failed to establish identical features, areas, and amenities. The respondents contended that the hearsay nature of Exts. C1–C4 undermined their probative value. The High Court, noting that the Appellate Authority dealt with the submissions in detail, held that no material exists to disturb the concurrent findings, and that evidence such as Exts. C1–C4 cannot replace the requirement of proof of identity of features. It reiterated that it cannot reappraise evidence unless perverse or grossly erroneous, citing Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh. Ultimately, the petitions were dismissed, upholding the Rent Control Court’s fair rent fixation and the concurrent appellate orders.
The petitioner Benny filed O.P.1368 of 2017 before the Family Court, Thrissur, seeking dissolution of marriage under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. The marriage with Riya was solemnised on 24.08.2008. In Ext. P1 he alleges cruelty and desertion; Ext. P2 is the respondent’s objection. During trial, the petitioner moved I.A.5 of 2022 seeking a direction for the respondent to be examined by a Medical Board—physician, clinical psychologist, psychiatrist and neurologist—for a mental/psychological evaluation. The Family Court dismissed I.A.5, holding that the plea was not bona fide and that there was no pleading requiring such an examination; it noted that the entire evidence had been recorded and the relief under Section 10 did not hinge on the respondent’s mental state. Earlier, in O.P.(FC) No.147 of 2021, this Court had observed that, if prima facie warranted, the Family Court could refer the respondent to a Medical Board after considering medical records, but the present pleadings failed to show proximate nexus between mental illness and the claimed relief. Citing Jai Singh and Sobhana Nair, the High Court affirmed the supervisory, non-appellate nature of Article 227 jurisdiction and held there was no interference with Ext. P9. Consequently, the Original Petition is dismissed.
This is a criminal revision petition filed by Abdul Gafoor under sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. challenging the concurrent conviction for an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant alleged that the accused and his wife borrowed Rs. 25 lakh and issued a cheque in repayment, which bounced, leading to a prosecution under NI Act. A settlement later occurred for Rs. 5 lakh, and the accused issued a fresh cheque dated 25.11.2015, which also bounced. The trial court convicted the accused in 2018 and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 5,50,000, with Rs. 5,40,000 as compensation to the complainant and the balance to the government; in default, further imprisonment. The Sessions Court affirmed the conviction in 2022. In revising, the High Court underscored the limited scope of revisional power, reiterating that it cannot re-appreciate evidence as an appellate court and citing State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri and other precedents to emphasize supervisory, not appellate, function. The court discussed the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act and the burden on the accused to rebut it by preponderance of probabilities, citing Rangappa, Bir Singh, Kalamani Tex, and other decisions. Ultimately, the court held the conviction valid but modified the sentence and directed payment with a brief custodial term and conditions for deferment of execution.
The petitioner, K. Surendran, President of the State Unit of the Bharatiya Janata Party, challenged a plan by the ruling Left Democratic Front in Kerala to stage a protest in front of Raj Bhavan on 15 November 2022, involving government servants and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) beneficiaries. He contends such participation would impede the functioning of the government and violate established norms restricting government servant involvement in strikes. The petitioner relies on Balagopalan G. v. State of Kerala and Chandara Choodan Nair S. v. State of Kerala to argue that government servants have no right to participate in strikes and that the welfare state must protect public interests without slowing governance. He sought a mandamus directing the Chief Secretary to consider Exhibit P1 (letter dated 14.11.2022) and declared that government servant participation in the protest is illegal. The respondents counter with the position that procedural safeguards and service rules govern such conduct, and that the petition raises PIL issues requiring careful evaluation of public interest, while invoking PIL principles. The court, citing Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. Rajan and other PIL authorities, lays out the PIL framework, but finds no material to support the petition’s assertions beyond directing the Chief Secretary to consider Exhibit P1 expeditiously due to the imminent march. The petition is disposed of with this direction, balancing public order with constitutional governance.
RCREV. Nos. 179 of 2021; 183 of 2021; 2 of 2022; 6 of 2022 These four Rent Control Revision petitions arise from eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging orders directing deposit of admitted arrears of rent under Section 12 and the fixation of fair rent under Section 5(1). In R.C.R.No.179/2021, R.C.R.No.183/2021, R.C.R.No.2/2022 and R.C.R.No.6/2022, the landlords moved the rents court for deposit of arrears, while the tenants had appealed against the fair rent orders before the Rent Control Appellate Authority under Section 18(1)(b). The Rent Control Court had dismissed the deposit applications on the ground that arrears were not admitted, since appeals were pending. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals and directed deposit of arrears at the rate fixed by the Court with effect from 01.01.2014, keeping the appeals alive. The revision petitions challenge these rulings under Section 20. The High Court, applying established principles that mere filing of an appeal does not automatically stay proceedings and that admitted arrears (including fair rent) must be deposited, upholds the Appellate Authority’s order and dismisses the revisions. The judgment discusses statutory contrasts between Section 12, 5(1) and 18, and cites Williams Daniel, Madan Kumar Singh and Inderchand Jain to justify the approach, while also noting the stay mechanics under CPC Order XLI Rule 5(1).
The petitioner, Mary Elias, a quarry operator at Kottappady Village, seeks to quash Clause 3 of Ext.P1, the Environmental Clearance (EC) issued for his quarry project, which conditions the clearance on Wildlife Clearance from the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL). He argues that the quarry is 9 km from the Thattekkad Bird Sanctuary, and the buffer/esZ rules should not automatically bar the project given the apex Court’s directions that ESZ restrictions pertain to the area proposed and can be narrower if warranted. The petitioner relies on the Supreme Court decision in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, asserting that ESZ restrictions should not be broader than necessary, and that the ESZ should be interpreted flexibly based on the proposed area. The Special Government Pleader counters that NBWL clearance is mandatory for developmental activities within 10 km of a protected area when final notification is pending, and that the Division/State authorities must consider wider ESZ only through proper channels. The court reviews the apex Court directives and Goa Foundation guidance, noting the ESZ framework and the need to balance development with environmental protection. Ultimately, in light of Godavarman Thirumulpad, the petition is disposed of with Clause 3 of Ext.P1 quashed, directing compliance with ESZ norms and related guidelines while leaving room for further orders in related matters.
This writ petition challenges the pension entitlements of Dr. Nakulan K.V. in relation to his pre-joining service with Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) and its reckoning for pension by the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit. The petitioner asserts that his prior KVS service, rendered before joining the university on 22.12.1998, should be counted towards pension under Rule 11 of Part III of the Kerala Service Rules (KSR). He contends that amendments introduced via Ext.P15 (GO (P) No. 53/2018/FIN) limit the benefit to Central Government service only, thereby excluding KVS and creating hostile discrimination. As an alternative, he argues that KVS is not a Central Autonomous Body or a Central Public Sector Undertaking, and thus should be treated as a State entity, which would entitle him to pension benefits. The respondents advocate that KVS is a Central Autonomous Body or PSU, and Ext.P15 governs pension eligibility for employees of such bodies; Exts.P9 and P11 implemented in pursuance of Ext.P15 are relied upon. The court, however, concentrates on the true nature of KVS, noting the need for governmental determination and avoiding a premature adjudication on Ext.P15 or KSR. It grants a limited relief, directing the petitioner to submit a representation to the Government within one month. If the Government finds in his favor, pension shall be revised and implemented without delay, with a four-month deadline for completion of the process."
This writ petition challenges Ext.P14, an order terminating the service of the petitioner, who had been appointed as Librarian Grade III at St. Peter's Vocational and Higher Secondary School, Kolenchery, from 16.08.2001. The petitioner contends that despite the absence of a sanctioned Librarian post in the Rules, he was selected by a committee and his appointment should be approved by the Director in terms of the Division Bench decisions, notably Shaji v. Ramachandran (2003 (2) KLT 814). The petition traces prior steps: Ext.P4 and Ext.P7 reflect directions to consider approvals for such posts; Ext.P10/Ext.P11 show provisional appointment and salary in 2008 on the understanding that Librarian posts would be treated similarly to Teachers and Lab Attenders, subject to sanction. The Supreme Court, in Ext.P12, dismissed the SLP but noted that financial involvement could be considered by the Director of Education. The respondents contend that the Manager lacked authority to appoint without a sanctioned post and that regularisation would impose financial liability on the Government. After analyzing the case law and policy aspects, the Court held Ext.P14 to be set aside and directed the 2nd respondent to pass appropriate orders expeditiously, considering the observations and the special circumstances, including the petitioner’s impending retirement and ongoing salary payments.
OT Rev Nos. 84/2018; 75/2018; 78/2018; 77/2018; 79/2018; 80/2018; 82/2018; 81/2018; 86/2018; 91/2018; 92/2018; 94/2018 (batch with connected cases) These O.T. Revisions are a consolidated judgment of the Kerala High Court addressing interpretation and scope of reassessment under Section 25 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, in a batch challenging a common order of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal dated 5 March 2018 (TA(VAT) No. 564 of 2014 and connected cross‑objections). The Full Bench (S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji, JJ.) held that reassessment is comprehensively covered by Section 25 and may be initiated for escaped or under‑assessed turnover, erroneous deductions, misrepresentation, or fraud, even where a dealer has opted for a compounded tax rate under Section 8. The Court clarified that the compounded rate is an alternative mode of tax and does not immunize a dealer from reassessment; Section 21’s deemed self‑assessment provisions and the interplay with Sections 6, 8, 22, and 24 are relevant. The judgment overrules the proposition laid down in A M Muhammed Ali and indicates that the line of decisions relied upon by the Revenue—though including Cholayil Pvt. Ltd.—should be understood in light of the KVAT Act’s textual scheme, with Joy Alukkas Traders (I) Pvt. Ltd. cited as persuasive but not binding. The result is: the O.T. revisions are allowed, the Tribunal’s common order is set aside, and the matters are remitted to the Tribunal for fresh disposal on merits, within four months.
Joseph Martin @ Joy, the defendant in the partition suit O.S. 34/2016 before the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam, challenges Ext.P8 (I.A. No. 1/2022) which allowed the plaintiffs to amend the plaint. The suit, for a decree of partition filed on 08.02.2016, was resisted by the defendant who contends that sale deed No. 3880/2006 was executed by his father in his favour. The trial court dismissed the suit (Ext.P4), and on appeal the High Court, by Ext.P5 judgment, remanded the matter, noting that the dispute could not be resolved with the available evidence and directing the parties to amend their pleadings if necessary, with the defendant permitted to submit any additional written statement. Pursuant to Ext.P5, the respondents filed I.A. No. 1/2022 for leave to amend (Ext.P6), which the trial court permitted, despite Ext.P7 counter affidavit by the petitioner. The impugned Ext.P8 order allows the amendment, but the petitioner argues that such amendment is barred by limitation and violates Section 2(j) of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, asserting knowledge of the instrument since 2006 and that no extension was granted. He contends the amendment would prejudice his right of defense and alter the suit’s basic character. The High Court, noting the absence of consideration of the limitation issue in Ext.P8 and relying on jurisprudence including Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sanjeev Builders and Abraham v. Mathai, interventions the order. It sets aside Ext.P8 and directs the trial court to re‑decide the amendment after addressing counter affidavits and relevant law, expeditiously ensuring due process for both sides.
This writ petition by K.R. Shaji challenges Ext.P4 (18-12-2010) withdrawing permission to use the Government Higher Secondary School, Varavoor, for a Padana Sibiram (study camp) for school children, and Ext.P5. The petitioner sought to quash the withdrawal and obtain mandamus to permit the study camp as per Ext.P1, arguing the activity is educational in nature and falls within the school's educative purpose. The matter tracks a sequence: initial permission granted (16-11-2010) by the headmistress, followed by payment of charges (Ext.P2), and publication of a notice (Ext.P3). Ext.P4 cancelled the permission on the basis of higher authority instruction; Ext.P5 is a circular of the DPI. The petitioner relies on the contention that the purpose of the camp is educational, and cites Hariharan v. State of Kerala (1995 (1) KLT 453) and Khalid Mundapally v. Executive Engineer (2010 (2) KLT 86) to argue that permission to use school premises for educational purposes should not be unduly restricted, and that the power to grant permission historically rested with the District Educational Officer under Rule 15 of Chapter IV KER. The respondents contend that only the District Educational Officer can grant such permission under Rule 15, and that the headmistress acted contrary to Kerala Education Rules; a writ cannot perpetuate illegality. The court initially granted an interim stay of Ext.P4 pending consideration and observed the need for deeper analysis, ultimately closing the petition after noting the interim order was vacated in subsequent proceedings.
BAIL APPL. NO. 9271 OF 2022; 9273 OF 2022; 9314 OF 2022 These are three anticipatory bail petitions filed by Subair Thundiyil in relation to three Crime Nos. 650/2019, 649/2019 and 645/2019 registered at Elathoor Police Station, alleging offences under Sections 420, 465, 468, 471 and 472 IPC for forging documents to obtain loans from KDC Bank, Kozhikode, during 2014. The petition contends that the accused was falsely implicated, had no role in the alleged fraud, and first learned of the case via an SHO notice. The prosecution argues that forged documents were used to facilitate substantial loans by accused persons and that the offences date back to 2014–2015, with a bank complaint filed in 2019; the involvement of multiple accused (Nos. 4–6) and the allegedly forged documentation is highlighted. The learned Public Prosecutor relies on the delay in prosecution as a factor and cites the absence of prior criminal antecedents for the petitioner. The court notes the procedural history, the absence of other criminal antecedents, and the bank’s complaint filing timeline, and after considering the materials and a precedent (BA 7780/2022) grants anticipatory bail to the petitioner on certain conditions. The order emphasizes the petitioner’s cooperation, periodic appearances, and restrictions on witness interaction, with the police empowered to proceed with investigation and recoveries, referencing Sushila Aggarwal to justify bail-related police powers.
Shajeev George, the appellant, challenges a Kerala High Court writ petition dismissal in a writ appeal after his father, Mr. P.I. George, went missing in 2007. He sought a death certificate for his father under the civil death concept and argued that Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the 2017 Directorate circular on births and deaths registration, require the Registrar of Births and Deaths to issue a death certificate without a formal civil-death declaration. The single Judge examined Sections 107 and 108, and followed precedents from Devaki Amma Kamalamma v. Grace Appa Amma; Bhargavi Amma v. Bhaskara Pillai; LIC of India v. Anuradha; and Joseph Peter v. Elizabeth Manuel, to hold that the Registrar lacks power to declare civil death or issue a death certificate based on civil-death notions. The appellant contends the civil court’s Exhibit P2 judgment in a partition suit recognized lack of knowledge of whereabouts and thus should compel death-declaration rights. The division bench agrees that the Registrar cannot adjudicate civil death; the Evidence Act applies to courts, and writ remedies are not for declaring civil death. The appeal is dismissed, leaving the registrar’s action intact and the certificate unavailable pending civil-court determination.
OT.Rev Nos. 84/2018, 75/2018, 78/2018, 77/2018, 79/2018, 80/2018, 82/2018, 81/2018, 86/2018, 91/2018, 92/2018, 94/2018 This is a batch of OT Revisions (Nos. 84/2018 and connected matters) heard by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court on 29 July 2022. The petitions challenge a common order of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal (dated 5 March 2018) in T.A.(VAT) Nos. 564–569/2014 and Cross Objections (Nos. 2/2016 and others). The core issue is the scope of reassessment under Section 25 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, particularly whether the decision to accept a compounded rate of tax under Section 8 can immunize a dealer from reassessment for conduct such as misrepresentation or suppression of information. The Tribunal had followed Cholayil Pvt. Ltd. and there was divergence with cases like C.C.Sebastian v State of Kerala and State of Kerala v Muhammed Ali A.M. The Full Bench held that reassessment is permissible under Section 25 in a range of circumstances where turnover has escaped assessment, been under-assessed, or taxed at a lower rate, and that the compounded tax mechanism does not bar legitimate reassessment. It overruled the proposition in A.M Muhammed Ali and affirmed that the power to reassess is independent of the compounding scheme. The Court remitted the matters to the Tribunal to decide on merits within four months, directing expeditious disposal.
Wayand District Drivers Co-operative Society Ltd., a registered co‑operative society formed for upliftment of its auto‑rickshaw driver members, challenges two orders passed under the Abkari Act: an order of confiscation under Section 67B and the corresponding appellate order (Exts. P2 and P4). The vehicle KL-12 J‑2458, entrusted to a member, was seized at Pozhuthana Junction on 24-7-2015 following a police complaint that six litres of Indian Made Foreign Liquor were illicitly transported. The Petitioner argues that no offence under the Abkari Act was committed by the society, that the driver was unaware of the liquor’s presence, and that the petitioner was not named as an accused in the criminal proceeding; moreover, the contraband amount is small and could be treated as a compoundable offence under Section 53. The petition also notes that the interim custody order was granted but the petitioner was not heard before Ext. P4 was issued, and that the acquittal of the driver in the criminal case cannot automatically render confiscation illegal, as the two processes are distinct. The Government Pleader relies on Shaiju v. Assistant Excise Commissioner to justify confiscation notwithstanding the acquittal, and cites Nazeer M.P. to emphasize the need for knowledge or involvement by the owner. The Kerala High Court ultimately quashes Exts. P2 and P4, holding the petitioner’s due‑process rights were violated and that the petitioner had no proven involvement in the offence, allowing the writ petition.
This Kerala High Court judgment under CRL.MC No.7103 of 2018 concerns two accused (Davis and Joseph) challenging the final report in Crime No.615/2017 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Irinjalakuda, and the consequent C.C. No.2339/2017. The de facto complainant alleged that the petitioners induced him to sign blank papers to obtain credit facilities, which were later misused to initiate criminal proceedings for property grabbing. The petitioners contend that the underlying transactions were civil in nature and point to civil suits filed by them (O.S.4569/2014 for specific performance and O.S.61/2015 for return of advance payments on a registered sale agreement). Annexures A3–A6 show the civil suits were pending and include pleadings and written statements acknowledging the existence of registered documents, contradicting the narrative of blank signatures. The FIR was registered in 2017, about three years after the alleged events, and the petition argues that the criminal process constitutes an abuse of the court’s process since civil remedies are available and suit litigation demonstrates a civil dispute. The State argues these are questions of fact to be determined at trial. The court holds the dispute is predominantly civil, cites Govind Prasad Kejriwal v. State of Bihar as authority, and, under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quashes the entire prosecution by allowing the Crl.M.C.
This writ petition before the Kerala High Court concerns the certification process of a Malayalam feature film titled “Puzha Muthal Puzha Vare,” based on the Malabar Rebellion of 1921. The petitioner, a prominent film director, screenwriter and lyricist, submitted an application to the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) for certification. The CBFC’s Examining Committee denied certification, prompting the Board to refer the matter to a Revising Committee. The Revising Committee initially recommended certification with several modifications, but the Chairman of the CBFC referred the film to a second Revising Committee. The second Revising Committee, with a different composition and lacking historical expertise, advised certification for adults only, subject to 12 modifications, alleging that certain portrayals could offend minority communities. The petitioner contends these proceedings violated Rule 24(2) and related provisions of the Cinematograph Act, infringing Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution by arbitrarily altering the film’s artistic integrity. The respondents defend the process, arguing ample opportunity and adherence to statutory powers, emphasizing that the final decision rested with the CBFC and that the film could be released with conditions. The court invokes constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression and the guiding precedent in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India to assert that censoring standards must permit artistic and social value and avoid arbitrary overreach. The High Court ultimately holds that the Chairman’s referral to a second Revising Committee was illegal and sets aside Exts.P3 and P4, allowing the writ petition.
This Kerala High Court revision concerns tenant Sreelatha Sunilkumar challenging an eviction order for default on rent, under sections 11(2)(a)–(2)(b) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965, and whether she can invoke section 11(2)(c) to vacate that eviction order during appeal or revision. The Rent Control Court directed eviction for non-payment after a registered notice; the tenant deposited Rs.87,400 on 21.11.2018 and Rs.22,800 on 25.11.2019; the appellate authority and revisional court affirmed. The core issue was what "rent payable" means under 11(2)(b) when considering relief under 11(2)(c): whether it is only the arrears claimed in the notice or the entire arrears up to date. The court held eviction can be ordered only if the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the fixed date, and the proviso to 11(2)(b) makes the notice mandatory; the rent payable thereafter is not necessarily the entire admitted arrears but the amount due under the notice with 6% interest and postal charges. A tenant can move under 11(2)(c) even without a formal application, and the court may vacate the eviction order if the arrears, with interest and costs, have been deposited, after crediting deposits already made. The court relied on Sulochana v. Kalyani to uphold the deposit-for-default principle and distinguished Delhi Act jurisprudence (Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd. and Civil Appeal No. 5996 of 2021) as inapposite. The revision petition is allowed, the impugned orders are set aside, and the landlord may withdraw the deposited amounts after adjusting the default rent, interest and postal charges.
This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by the sole accused, Shihab K U, challenging his conviction for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, recorded in C.C. No. 533/2016 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Angamaly, and subsequently modified by the Additional Sessions Judge-II, North Paravur. The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to imprisonment till rising of the court and to pay a fine of Rs. 12,58,000, with Rs. 12,57,000 to be given as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. The appellate court confirmed the conviction and modified the sentence to imprisonment till rising of the court. The revision petition argues that the complainant failed to prove the loan transaction and the execution of Ext. P1 cheque by cogent evidence; the accused admitted the transaction during 313 Cr.P.C. questioning and claimed he had other dealings with the complainant, with cheques given as security, but no evidence established this defense. It contends that the evidence was inadequately probed and that the courts below improperly relied on the complainant’s version. The High Court, applying established revisional principles, declined to re‑appreciate evidence, relied on presumption under Sections 118/139 NI Act, and dismissed the petition, while granting a four‑month window to pay the fine and deferring execution until 28.01.2023.