This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. filed by the sole accused, Joby Paul, challenging the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) and the concurrent appellate verdict. The case arises from a cheque for Rs. 50,000 dated 10-02-2012 that allegedly bounced for want of funds. The trial court convicted the accused and imposed a one-month simple imprisonment along with a Rs. 50,000 fine, directed as compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C.; default on payment of fine would incur an additional 15 days imprisonment. The Additional Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha, in Criminal Appeal No. 239/2020, confirmed the conviction but modified the substantive sentence to a period till rising of the court. The revision contends misnarration of transaction in the complaint, and urges that the cheque was given as collateral for a loan and that the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under NI Act by leading DW1’s evidence; it also challenges the notice issued under Section 138(b) for being addressed to the wrong place and asserts mis-use of a signed blank cheque. The High Court, after examining the evidence and applying established revisional guidelines, upheld the concurrent findings and dismissed the revision petition, though it granted two weeks to undergo the sentence and pay compensation, deferring execution until 27.12.2022.
This is a review petition (R.P. No.174 of 2023) filed by the Cochin Devaswom Board and the Cheranalloor Sree Karthyayani Bhagavathi Temple challenging the Kerala High Court’s 18 January 2023 judgment in W.P.(C) No.29526 of 2022. The writ petition, filed by a devotee of Cheranalloor temple, sought mandamus to remove the Temple Advisory Committee’s President, Secretary and Treasurer and to convene a General Body meeting to elect a new 19-member panel, and to direct audit of accounts from 2010 onward including Dwajaprathishta, Kalasam, renovation and sale of temple assets, with alleged misappropriation by the office bearers and others. An interim order dated 07.10.2022 restrained development decisions pending audit. The court relied on Sunil Kumar C. v. Travancore Devaswom Board (2022) to interpret the term of Temple Advisory Committees under Section 31A of the 1950 Act as two years, extendable only in limited circumstances. In the present order, the court disposes of the petition by directing the Devaswom Board to constitute a temporary committee to conduct the 2023 festival under the 2021 procedure, within two days, and to hand over festival funds for audit, excluding respondents 2–4 from the committee, while keeping other directions in force and noting the possibility of DBA relief for any issues.
This is a writ petition (WP(C) No. 3734 of 2023) filed in the Kerala High Court by Regini Murali and 17 co-petitioners challenging termination notices issued by the 6th respondent, Sree Gokulam Public School, to several teachers and staff. The petition seeks quashing of the termination notices (Exhibits P8 and related notices) and reinstatement of petitioners into service from 31.03.2021 with back wages, as well as mandamus directing action against the authorities for non-compliance with directions and for alleged violations of the CBSE Affiliation Byelaws, 2018. The petition relies on prior communications, show-cause notices, and union correspondence (Exhibits P2–P7, P8 series, P10–P12, etc.) to contend violations of due process and the CBSE byelaws. The respondents include the State of Kerala, the District Collector, CBSE, the Director and Deputy Director of Education, and the school management. During hearing, CBSE’s counsel invoked Division Bench decisions (Sommy Kunjappan and ILR 2022 Ker 996) to argue lack of maintainability, while petitioners countered that there are bye-law violations. The court ultimately notes force in the respondents’ submissions and closes the writ petition, holding the prayers not entertainable and leaving contentions open, effectively disposing of the case without grant of relief. The decision underscores the tension between school-level termination actions and CBSE-byelaw compliance, with maintainability being decisive.
W.P.(C) No. 22230 of 2021 This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India concerns the tender for the coconut counter at the eastern nada of the Guruvayur Temple, for the period 01.11.2019 to 31.10.2020. S.R. Rajan, the petitioner, was the second-highest bidder and deposited Rs. 92,82,000 (comprising Rs. 14,04,000 GST and Rs. 78,000 cess) after executing Ext. P1 with the Guruvayur Devaswom Administrator. The Covid-19 lockdown forced the temporary closure of the temple premises, and the coconut counter could not be operated. The petitioner sought a mandamus to refund the proportionate tender amount for the period of non-operation. He relies on Ext. P3 (a communication from the GDMC’s Chief Finance and Accounts Officer dated 06.07.2020) alleging GST refunds in certain circumstances and on Ext. P2 (13.04.2020) requesting a three-month extension of the tender. Ext. P8 (24.11.2020) reportedly reflected a decision to refund part of the tender amount, later superseded by Ext. R2(b) on 17.12.2021. Respondents contend Ext. R2(b) was issued without notice and that the matter requires reconsideration under the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978, with the 4th respondent’s involvement under Section 10. The court ultimately sets aside Ext. R2(b) and directs a fresh, reasoned order after hearing, with approval by the 4th respondent, within two months, to determine refund and GST liability.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CrL.MC 3970/2023) filed under Section 482 CrPC before the Kerala High Court by accused Nos. 1 and 2 in CC No.2125/2020, challenging an order/judgment of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class-III, Attingal. The offence alleged are under Sections 457 and 435 r/w Section 34 IPC, for trespass and arson on 15.11.2019 at 1.45 a.m. the de facto complainant’s car porch was trespassed and KL-16-C-2423 was set on fire. The petition asserts amicable settlement between the petitioners and the 2nd respondent (Soorajlal) and that the entire disputes have been resolved, seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. The court directed investigation to verify the settlement and to check for any prior criminal antecedents or impediments to quashing. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations but noted no other crimes against the petitioners and that the respondent has stated no lasting grievances. After considering the gravity of the offences, the private nature of the dispute, antecedents, and the purported settlement, the judge held that quashing would not adversely affect society and would serve the ends of justice. The petition was allowed; Final Report (Crime No.1331/2019) and proceedings in CC 2125/2020 were quashed. Annexures include a certified copy of the Final Report and the second respondent’s affidavit.
CRL.M.C. No. 5412 of 2022 Subair A, the first accused in Crime No. 811/2021 of Adhur Police Station, Kasaragod, challenged a common order in Crl.M.P. Nos. 1903/2022 and 1918/2022 extending his custody beyond 180 days under the NDPS Act. The Kerala High Court, in a Criminal Misc. Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C., scrutinized whether the custody extension was legally permissible and whether the Public Prosecutor independently applied mind to the Investigating Officer’s report. The court notes that contraband was detected in November 2021 and the accused remained in custody; however Annexure A2 to the petition failed to show what investigation had progressed in the initial 180 days or why further time was needed. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and others was cited to emphasize that the Public Prosecutor is not merely a conduit but must assess progress and justify the extension, and not leave it to the court or police alone. The court found that the Designated Court relied on pleadings rather than a proper report, thereby denying the accused his statutory entitlement to bail. Consequently, the court allowed the Crl.M.C., set aside the impugned order, and granted bail on conditions including a Rs. 2,00,000 bond, two sureties, passport handling, cooperation with investigations, non-interference with witnesses, and non-commission of offences while on bail. The decision underscores the balance between expeditious investigation and personal liberty.
WP(C) Nos.21618 of 2021 & 23237 of 2021 The two writ petitions in W.P.(C) Nos.21618 of 2021 and 23237 of 2021 arise from promotion disputes in SNM Higher Secondary School, Purakkad. W.P.(C) No.21618 is filed by Smt. Sreerekha R., challenging Ext.P6, an appointment order promoting Smt. Ushas S. as Headmistress, and seeking a declaration that she is entitled to promotion from 01.06.2021, arguing that she fulfils continuous service and test qualifications under Rule 44A(1) and its third proviso to Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER). She relies on government orders and a 2015 GO to argue test-qualified teachers deserve priority for Headmaster posts; she also seeks implementation of Ext.P8 (DEO order). W.P.(C) No.23237/2021, by Chandrika K.C., Ashadutt A.N., and Ravilal T.R., seeks provisional benefits under the third proviso to Rule 44A(1) for the Headmaster post arising on 01.06.2021, claiming delays due to COVID-19 and testing issues. The court noted the Manager’s reliance on Pavandoor v. Sadanandan C.M. and related decisions, but found factual issues, and that the Manager has invoked statutory remedies (revision). It disposed of the petitions with directions: remit the revision petition to the Director of General Education for consideration within two months with hearing, and dismissed the 23237 petition. The judgment underscores evolving interpretations of Rule 44A(1) and the need for due process.
On 11 October 2022, the Kerala High Court, presided over by Dr. Kauser Edappagath, heard CRL.MC No. 5496 of 2022, challenging an anticipatory bail order granted by the Additional Sessions Court, Ernakulam in Crime No. 387/2022 of Chengamanad Police Station. The de facto complainant (petitioner) alleges that accused Nos. 1–4 fraudulently induced her to part with Rs. 1,17,75,000 between 2017 and 2021 by falsely promising ritualistic dispensation of evils and negative energy, under Sections 406 and 420 read with 34 IPC. The bail petition, Crl.M.C. 1530/2022, was allowed by the court below, and the petitioner seeks a Section 482 Cr.P.C. intervention. The court scrutinizes whether the bail order is perverse, considers whether relevant factors were ignored or extraneous material considered, and references a line of authorities (Prasanth Singh Rajput, Dinesh M. N., Narendra K. Amin, Neeru Yadav, and X v. State of Kerala). The court ultimately reiterates that bail is discretionary and should be grounded on relevant considerations, but finds no perverse or improper exercise of discretion in the impugned order. It dismisses the Crl.M.C., directing the investigation to proceed untrammelled by the bail observations. The matter touches on the interplay of Cr.P.C. provisions and the broad principles for interference in bail, with references to Neeru Yadav and X for perverse bail standards.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC is filed by Sudhil @ Rajesh, the 18th accused in Crime No.102/1995 of Ramankari Police Station, Alappuzha, which is now pending as S.C.No.564/2022 before the Assistant Sessions Court, Alappuzha. The alleged incident occurred on 12-10-1995 near Kidangara junction, where a crowd pelted stones at a police party, followed by lathi-charge and firing, resulting in a death. All other accused were acquitted by the trial court; the petitioner could not appear earlier, and his case remains pending. The petitioner contends that continuing the prosecution against him would amount to abuse of process since the substratum of the prosecution case has been shattered by the acquittal of co-accused. The Public Prosecutor argues that the petitioner must face trial before the lower court and that the court should not exercise its power under Section 482 to quash. The High Court cites Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police, Abbas T.K. v. State of Kerala, and Ashraf Kancheriyil v. State of Kerala, noting that when the substratum is crushed by acquittal of co-accused, it is legitimate to consider quashing the proceedings. After reviewing the evidence and noting issues like non-identification and lack of parade, the court concludes that the substratum is shattered and quashes the continuation of the prosecution. The Crl.M.C. is allowed, and further SC No.564/2022 proceedings against the petitioner are quashed.
DBP No.33 of 2023 before the Kerala High Court is a suo motu proceeding initiated on Ombudsman’s Report No.11 of 2023 in Complaint No.114 of 2022, concerning the construction of the compound wall of Sreechaleenarayanapuram Temple at Thanneermukkom and protective measures against street dogs. The petition, filed by devotee S. Rajasekharan Nair, seeks judicial monitoring of encroachments on the Devaswom land and directions for timely action. The respondents include the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDVB) and its officers, including the Devaswom Commissioner and the Special Tahsildar (Land Conservancy Unit), with the suit later adding the TDVB as 8th respondent suo motu. The court reviews the statutory framework governing Devaswoms — notably the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (Sections 15A and 31) — and cites fiduciary duties of trustees and the protection of temple properties from encroachment, drawing upon established authority. It records that eight encroachments have been identified on Devaswom lands, and that Form C notices under the Land Conservancy Act were issued. The order disposes of the petition by directing prompt finalisation of the encroachment proceedings with due notice (three months), while mandating protective steps against dogs and an action-taken report from the Devaswom Commissioner within four months. It emphasizes the trustees’ duties and the need to safeguard temple property in accordance with precedent.
WP(C) Nos. 19656/2019, 20175/2019, 20201/2019, 20209/2019, 20214/2019, 20280/2019, 20373/2019, 20383/2019, 20387/2019, 20432/2019, 20435/2019, 20452/2019, 20462/2019, 20497/2019, 20528/2019 and 19452/2019 The batch of writ petitions concerns the applicability of the Right to Information Act, 2005 to Cochin International Airport Limited (CIAL), a public limited company operating Kochi International Airport. The Court analyzes whether CIAL falls within the definition of "public authority" under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, considering “body owned, controlled or substantially financed” or a non-government organization substantially financed by public funds. The petitions arise from the State Information Commission's orders directing disclosure of information and the government’s involvement in CIAL, including shareholding (32.42% by the Government of Kerala), board composition with the Chief Minister as Chairman, Ministers as directors, and an IAS officer as Managing Director, as well as guarantees and loans from public bodies aiding the project. The judgment traverses leading authorities such as Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd., Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union, and D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society to articulate what constitutes “control” and “substantial financing,” holding that the Government’s deep and pervasive involvement makes CIAL a public authority under 2(h)(d)(i)/(ii). It also engages the public-interest framework from Central Public Information Officer v Subhash Chandra Agarwal to discuss disclosure. The court sustains the State Information Commission’s 20-06-2019 order for the batch petitions, while in WP(C) No. 19452/2019 it partly allows by declaring CIAL a public authority and remanding for information compliance; the overall disposition is parsimonious and jurisdictional, with a single-judge bench delivering judgment on 2 December 2022.
This High Court of Kerala case arises from an Administrative Tribunal order dismissing OA/OP in which the petitioner, Rasak P.M., challenged his non-inclusion in the rank list for the post of Driver-Grade II (LDV) in Idukki district. The core issue is whether the Driving Badge requirement, a stipulation under the PSC recruitment rules and related notifications, could be relaxed or struck down. The notification for the post, issued in 2014, required a driving licence with a three-year badge and proficiency in driving. The petitioner’s badge had expired in December 2013 and was renewed only in May 2014, creating a break in the continuous three-year badge requirement as of the application date. While the petitioner argued, relying on Mukund Dewangan, that the badge requirement could be deemed unnecessary for driving light motor vehicles and urged striking down the Special Rules, the Division Bench did not accept this, emphasizing the indefeasible legal effect of recruitment rules. It relied on Maheen v. State of Kerala to hold that the prescribed qualification must exist on the last date fixed for receipt of applications and continue throughout the selection process. The court concluded there was no infirmity in PSC’s action, rejected the challenge to the Special Rules, and dismissed the petition. The decision underscores adherence to the recruitment rules and the continuity of qualifications across the selection process.”
Jehangir Gopal, the petitioner, challenged Ext.P4, the order in I.A. No.2/2023 in O.S. No.47/2017 of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, which rejected recall of PW1 for further cross-examination. The suit is a money decree filed by the respondent plaintiff; the petitioner resisted via Ext.P2 written statement. PW1 was examined on 10.01.2023 and cross‑examined; the trial was adjourned to 16.01.2023 for the petitioner’s cross-examination. On 11.01.2023, the petitioner moved Ext.P3 to recall PW1 for clarifications. The respondent did not file a written objection but produced Mathew Lawrence v. Rockey C. Neroth (ILR 2020 Ker. 939) in court. The trial court, by Ext.P4, rejected Ext.P3, holding that the affidavit lacked specific grounds, the cross‑examination already touched on all aspects, and recall is exceptional and not warranted by mere probing or insufficient preparation. The petitioner relied on Mathew Lawrence to contend that the inherent power under Section 151 CPC can be invoked sparingly to permit recall. The respondent countered with Ram Rati v. Mange Ram, Velusamy KK, and Bagai Construction, arguing that when the Code prohibits an act, inherent powers cannot be exercised. The High Court reviewed the law on Section 151, Order 18 Rule 17, and the ends of justice, reiterating circumspection in invoking inherent powers and confirming that the impugned order was legally sound. It dismissed the original petition, upholding the trial court’s Ext.P4 order.
This writ petition, filed by the Special Tahsildar Land Acquisition (General), Malappuram, challenges a demand for interest under sub-section (1A) of Section 201 of the Income Tax Act arising from delayed remittance of tax deducted at source on compensation paid for land acquired for establishing the Government Medical College at Manjeri. Facts show that tax was deducted in January 2014 and remitted to the Income Tax Department only on 30 June 2014; Ext. P1 confirms the officer in charge was on election duty from January to May 2014. The petitioner contends that the liability to deduct tax arises only when the Act requires deduction, and the lands subject to compensation were agricultural lands excluded from the definition of capital asset under Section 2(14) of the Act; therefore there was no deduction liability, and refunds of TDS to landowners (Exts. P5–P8) corroborate this. The respondents contend that levy under Section 201(1A) is statutory and triggers on delay in payment of deducted sums, regardless of later refunds; they argue that the delay cannot be excused by refunds, and that whether the land was agricultural and outside capital assets remains a matter for inquiry. The court ultimately concludes that liability to deduct arises only if required by the Act, and here it was not; thus the levy of interest was unwarranted. Exts. P2 and P3 are quashed; the petition is allowed, with no costs.
WA Nos.957 & 1071 of 2022 This is a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court (Ernakulam) arising from WA Nos. 957 and 1071 of 2022, challenging the selection for the post of Assistant Professor in the School of Gandhian Thought and Development Studies at Mahatma Gandhi University. The University notified three vacancies, two reserved for Other Backward Classes and one for General Category. The petitioner Nisha Vellapan Nair and the second respondent Rekha Raj participated for the General Category seat. The University’s merit scheme awarded 80% on external criteria and 20% on interview, with six marks for PhD and two marks for awards from academic bodies; NET was an eligibility criterion, with exemption for PhD holders. Nisha contended that she should have received six marks for her PhD and that Rekha Raj’s marks for PhD and publications were improperly granted, including publications not in UGC-approved journals and a translated international article not qualifying under the scheme. The University argued that PhD, if basic qualification, yields no extra marks and that Post Doctoral Fellowships are not to be treated as awards; it also contended the selections must be left to expert committees. The Single Judge directed the Selection Committee to grant marks for PhD and consider NET marks for Rekha Raj. The Division Bench disagreed with the remand approach, held that PhD should be treated in line with the UGC framework, and set aside the Single Judge’s order. It/quashed Rekha Raj’s selection and directed appointment of Nisha Vellapan Nair forthwith, noting errors in awarding marks for research publications and the need to maintain a level playing field under Article 14/16 of the Constitution.
W.P.(C) Nos. 14778 of 2018; connected cases This is a consolidated challenge by private hospitals, hospital associations, and nurses’/medical practitioner bodies against Government of Kerala’s 23.04.2018 notification revising minimum wages for employees in private hospitals. The petitioners contend that the revision was arbitrary, irrational, and violative of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, as it bypassed statutory procedure and relied on a completed draft proposal without adequately hearing objections. The court notes that Section 3(3) of the Act permits either appointment of enquiry committees or publication of a proposal for public response, with a minimum two-month window for objections, and that the 23.04.2018 notification purports to retroactively fix wages without a transparent, law-based process. The judgment traces the lineage of the matter to the Supreme Court’s Trained Nurses Association of India v. Union of India (2016) and to the long-standing Workmen v. Reptakos Brett framework, which require adherence to statutory procedures and fair wage standards, including the use of advisory boards and a reasoned, consultative process. The petitioners highlight disparities between hospital wage scales and those under Shops and Establishments Acts, and point to malafides/arbitrariness in the final notification. The court, after hearing, sets aside the impugned notification and directs the Government to reconsider the wage revision with due process within three months, affording hearing to all affected parties and issuing a fresh, detailed order/notification.
This writ petition by S. Haja Najeemudeen, a retired CMFRI employee, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) to conduct a detailed inquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment of 124 Skilled Support Staff (SSS) at CMFRI, under ICAR, without requisite sanction from the Department of Expenditure. The petitioner contends that the audit report (Exhibit P5) details irregularities, favoritism and possible malpractices in the direct recruitment initiated at the instance of the 5th respondent and his colleagues, resulting in undue benefits and public money misuse. He asserts the 6th respondent (CVC) failed to investigate despite his representation (Exhibit P6) and other communications; RTI disclosures (Exhibits P11–P13) show that the matter was closed for want of merit after ICAR/DA-ICAR advised closure. The petition argues this inaction contravenes the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, and seeks judicial intervention to uncover the truth and uphold the rule of law. The High Court weighs the timeliness of the petition under the doctrine of delay and laches, approving the need for timely challenge to state action. Ultimately, the petition is dismissed for lack of reasonable time, and the relief sought is refused.
WP(C) Nos.23186 of 2022 & connected cases These writ petitions challenge Government Order G.O.(M.S.) No.121/2022 dated 7.7.2022 and the related prospectus for Plus One admissions for 2022-23 in private aided higher secondary schools. The core questions are whether the Government can reduce the management quota for Plus One admissions to 20% and whether a 10% community quota (to be reserved for students from the community to which the school’s management belongs) can be mandated. The court traces the historical evolution of management quota and community quota under prior GO schemes (1991, 2003–2005) and notes earlier Court directives, including Division Bench decisions, that rejected community quotas. The judge ultimately holds that GO.MS.No.121/2022 to fix 20% management quota is a valid policy decision that does not warrant interference, while the provision requiring managements to declare the community they belong to and allocate 10% seats to that community is unconstitutional and arbitrary under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The 10% community seats are quashed and must be treated as open merit seats to be filled through the Centralized Allotment Process (CAP) on merit. The petitions are disposed of with these directions, and admissions already made on the basis of declarations remain undisturbed.
The Kerala High Court hears Crl.A 809 of 2016 against the conviction and life sentence of Edathatta Narayanan, the uncle of a 14-year-old girl found dead at her home. The prosecution had charged him under sections 302 (murder) and 449 (house trespass) IPC, while the 376 IPC offence (rape) was also invoked in the backdrop of the investigation. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for murder and to a fixed term for the other offence; a fine was imposed with defaults. The appellants challenge the entire chain of circumstantial evidence, arguing there was no cogent basis for linking the accused to the death beyond reasonable doubt. Key defence points include the death of a crucial witness, reliance on hearsay statements, gaps in the chain of evidence, and the contested interpretation of forensic results. The prosecution relied on an autopsy that suggested homicide as a possibility, eyewitness testimonies of the accused’s proximity to the victim’s residence, scene photographs, and forensic materials such as rope and fingerprints. The court notes the material contradictions and the absence of certain independent confirmatory links, parsing the evidence to assess whether guilt beyond reasonable doubt is established. After examining the totality of the evidence and the evidentiary inconsistencies, the court acquits the accused and orders release if not required elsewhere.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges Awards Exs. P23 and P24 passed by the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) under the National Highways Act (NH Act) for land acquired for the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The petitioners contend that the Awards are vulnerable to challenge and should be open to the Statutory Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act. The respondents oppose this, contending that once CALA issues awards, they become functus officio; the appropriate remedy for challenging such awards lies exclusively with arbitration under Section 3G(5), relying on the decision in Usman Arif v. The Project Director, NHAI. The High Court, while noting the rival submissions, proposes a pragmatic resolution: the petitioners may file an application before the Statutory Arbitrator under Section 3G(5) within two weeks of receipt of the judgment, and the Arbitrator shall hear and decide after giving both sides an opportunity. If the arbitration proceedings are not completed within eight months, the petitioners may approach this Court to fix a time frame. The court further directs that, if the petitioners raise objections about the building’s valuation, the District Collector will determine whether re-valuation is required after hearing the parties. Until these preliminary issues are resolved, demolition of the building is deferred. The decision references the need for orderly statutory remedy and timely resolution of disputes, balancing due process with highway project requirements.