This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal (CRL.A No. 205 of 2014) arising from a conviction under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act, 1077, by the Additional Sessions Court, Neyyattinkara, in SC No.1744 of 2007. The appellant, Vijayan, was found in possession of five litres of arrack in a jerry can on 22 January 2005 and was convicted on the basis of the testimony of PW1 (Preventive Officer) and PW2 (Excise Guard), with Exts. P1–P8 and MO1 presented in evidence. Two independent witnesses (PWs 3 and 4) signed Ext. P1 but denied signatures in court, leaving the case primarily dependent on the credibility of PW1 and PW2. The prosecution showed that samples prepared at the time of seizure reached the chemical examination laboratory and tested positive for Ethyl Alcohol, supporting the inference of arrack. The defense argued contradictions between PW1 and PW2, absence of independent corroboration, lack of a seal on Ext. P1 Mahazar, and non-compliance with Section 53A of the Abkari Act, which they contended invalidated the conviction. The State argued that credibility of PW1 and PW2 sufficed regardless of hostile witnesses and that Section 53A non-compliance was not raised earlier. The High Court ultimately found merit in the appellant’s contentions, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellant, allowing the appeal.
This intra court appeal challenges Ext. P14 show cause notice issued on 28 February 2022 under Section 32 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, directing potential supersession of the Managing Committee of the Santalinga Nagar Ksheerolpadaka Co-operative Society Limited. The writ petition (W.P. No. 7498 of 2022) had sought quashing of Ext. P14 and further reliefs, including a declaration that no grounds existed to initiate action under Section 32 and an injunction against proceeding thereunder. The learned Single Judge, on 10 March 2022, dismissed the petition while directing that the show cause be given due consideration and that the authorities could proceed after hearing, finding Ext. P14 essentially a show cause notice requiring an opportunity to be heard. The appellant contends that the alleged irregularities were predominantly attributable to a former secretary who was suspended, and that subsequent proceedings and reports, including an interim Section 65 enquiry (Ext. P11) and an audit (Ext. P5), render Ext. P14 unsustainable; further, there is concern that the affected committee members would not receive a fair and effective hearing. The respondents maintain that Ext. P14 draws on multiple reports and that a show cause notice at this stage is proper, with final action to be taken after hearing and upon evaluation of all material, including final Section 65 findings and audit. The Division Bench ultimately refuses to interfere with the learned Judge’s approach at this stage, but directs that the Section 65 final enquiry report and relevant audit findings be considered in finalizing action, ensuring copy and hearing rights to the appellant. The appeal is disposed with these directions.
On 11.08.2015, Faisal @ Biju, a motor mechanic, suffered grievous injuries when the KL 45-L 5265 pickup van, owned by Charlie and driven by Starlin Therattil, collided with his motorcycle on the Thrissur–Kodungallur road. The accident left him with a comminuted fracture of both bones of the right leg and required extensive treatment. He claimed Rs 25,00,000 as compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakuda (OP(MV) 1272/2015). The Tribunal awarded Rs 4,91,000, which the appellant challenged as inadequate. The appellant argued that Ext. A10, a salary certificate, showed a monthly income of Rs 24,000; the insurer opposed the document, and the appellant did not prove the certificate or occupation/testimony. The respondents sought to apply the notional income principle; relying on Ramachandrappa (AIR 2011 SC 2951), the court accepted Rs 10,000 per month as the notional income at the date of the accident. The court found Ext. A7 and other medical records to justify rest for a year, and noted Ext. A9 disability certificate was opposed and thus not accepted without proof. On reassessment, the court enhanced compensation under several heads: loss of earnings, extra nourishment, attendant expenses, pain and suffering, permanent disability, and loss of amenities. The total enhanced amount amounted to Rs 1,88,100. The 3rd respondent was directed to deposit the enhanced compensation with interest at 9% within two months; the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1410 OF 2011 Prakashan P. challenges a conviction under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for issuing a cheque in discharge of a financial liability. The Trial Court had found him guilty and sentenced him to three months’ simple imprisonment and Rs. 17,000 as compensation with an additional three months’ imprisonment in default. The Appellate Court confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the Court, with the same compensation and default sentence. In revision before the Kerala High Court, the court reaffirms the concurrent conviction and examines the legality of the presumption framework under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act and the reverse-onus principle. It notes the statutory presumptions—Section 118(a) (consideration) and Section 139 (presumption in favour of a debt) — and discusses that the onus shifts to the accused to rebut; the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, with proportionality guiding the reverse-onus. Citing Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, Kalamani Tex v. Balasubramanian, and Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel, the court holds that the accused failed to discharge the reverse onus. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed and the conviction and sentence are upheld, with directions for payment of compensation and appearance in February 2024; execution is deferred till February 2024.
This MACA arises from an appeal by the insurer Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. against an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha, in OP(MV) No.84/2017, arising out of the death of Akhil Krishnan, a first-year mechanical engineering student, on 21.09.2016 when riding a motorcycle on the Alappuzha–Kalavoor National Highway. The Omni van (KL-07/CA-TEMP-3121) driven by the first respondent collided with the motorcycle; the deceased succumbed to his injuries. Dependants of the deceased claimed Rs. 48.71 lakh (capped at Rs. 45 lakh) as compensation; the van’s owner was the first respondent and the insurer the second respondent. The Tribunal allowed the petition in part, directing the insurer to pay Rs. 30,43,000 with interest and costs. The insurer challenged on two grounds: (i) notional monthly income fixed at Rs. 18,000 was too high, and (ii) the quantum under other heads was excessive. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s reasoning, relying on precedents including Fathimath Zuhara, Basanti Devi, Sarla Varma, Pranay Sethi, Magna General Insurance, and Kiran Singh, noting the accident occurred in 2016 and emphasizing tribunals’ discretion in compensation. The court dismissed the appeal at the threshold, thereby affirming the Tribunal’s award and the insurer’s liability to indemnify.
Manoj V., a 50-year-old HSA (Malayalam) at Mayyanad Higher Secondary School, filed WP(C) No. 26140 of 2022 challenging several government/school orders relating to the approval of his service spells (Exhibits P1–P4 establish his initial appointment; Exhibits P5–P7, P13, P20 relate to subsequent refusals). He contends that the revision petition filed by the Manager (Exhibit P14) and the government’s order (Exhibit P21) denying his rights were passed without due process, including a hearing, and seeks quashment of Exhibits P13, P20 and P21 and directions to reconsider P14 and P22 in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution and Kerala Education Rules. The petitioner relies on Sudheer v. M.V. Susheela and Others to argue that government orders in revision petitions must conform to constitutional provisions and established procedure. The learned Judge found that Ext. P21 was casually issued and not in proper conformity with law, and thus quashed it. The Court directed the 1st respondent to reconsider Exhs. P14 and P22, furnish hearing (physical or virtual), and pass fresh orders within four months, with liberty to produce copies of the writ petition along with the judgment for further action. The judgment emphasizes due process and adherence to statutory rules in executive revisions.
BAIL APPL. NO. 2183 OF 2023 This is a bail application under Section 439 CrPC filed by accused nos. 1 to 4 and 7 in Crime No. 546/2022 of Walayar Police Station. It follows an earlier petition (BA 645/2023) where bail for the 6th accused was not pressed; the 6th accused had already been granted regular bail. The prosecution alleges that at about 5:00 am on 06.12.2022, under direction of the 8th accused, the 9th accused caused a lorry to block the victim’s Ritz car and restrained him to facilitate robbery; the car window glass was broken with an iron rod, injuring the complainant, who was dragged from the vehicle; Basheer accompanying him was also attacked. The accused allegedly robbed Rs. 10,07,000 and mobile phones. Accused 6 allegedly sheltered the conspirators and provided a SIM to the first accused to hatch the conspiracy. The prosecution invokes offences under IPC sections 341, 364, 394, 395, 120B and 212, among others. The prosecution also highlights criminal antecedents of petitioners 1–4 and 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that they have been in custody since 08.01.2023; money seized; investigation has progressed; co-accused were granted bail; and there has been substantive improvement in the investigation. The court, while acknowledging gravity, enlarges the petitioners on bail with stringent conditions, including bond of Rs.50,000 with two solvent sureties, non-interference with witnesses, cooperation with investigation, and regular appearances before the IO on Mondays for two months. The court records a caution that any violation will cancel bail. The petition stands allowed and the petitioners are enlarged on bail under the specified conditions.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, filed by Sadanandan, a devotee and former president of the Temple Advisory Committee of Iringole Bhagavathy Temple (administered by the Travancore Devaswom Board), challenges the Board’s refusal to commence the copper plating of the Chuttambalam roof. The petitioner traces a sequence of Administrative actions: in 2004 the Board accorded sanction subject to a Rs. 3,00,000 contribution; subsequent reminders in 2004–2005 and 2007; the Temple Advisory Committee deposited Rs. 3,00,000 in 2007 while he was president; despite this, the Board did not tender the work. The matter was repeatedly directed by courts, with Ombudsman reports suggesting a need for broader temple maintenance work and fencing to secure temple properties. The High Court reviewed the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, noting Sections 15A (duties of the Board), 31 (management of Devaswoms) and 31A (formation of Temple Advisory Committees), and cited a 2021 Division Bench decision on Section 31A making the committee’s formation statutory. Ultimately, the Court directed the Board to decide, expeditiously and within two months, whether to prioritise copper plating or fencing, and to utilize the Rs.3,00,000 remitted by devotees accordingly, with any fencing subject to forest permissions and approvals. The judgment contemplates potential cost-saving alternatives to copper roofing and emphasizes budgetary considerations and broader temple welfare.”
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case filed under Section 482 CrPC before the Kerala High Court (Ernakulam) by five petitioners seeking quashing of Crime No. 437/2023 of East Kallada Police Station, Kollam, along with all further proceedings. The petition arises after the petitioners were charged with offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 294(b), 323, 324 and 308 read with 149, allegedly arising from a 2 April 2023 incident of unlawful assembly and assault. The petition emphasizes that the parties have amicably settled their disputes, supported by affidavits (Annexures 2 and 3) from respondents 3 and 4, and that continuing prosecution would thwart the peace and future harmony between them. The court initially directed investigation to verify settlement genuineness, the absence of antecedents, and any impediment to quashing. The Public Prosecutor raised reservations about quashing solely on settlement, but conceded no other complaints against petitioners and that respondents harbored no enduring grievances. Relying on established Supreme Court principles (cited herein) the court held that quashing could be appropriate where the case has predominantly civil character, the dispute is settled, and the gravity of the offences is not against public interest. After weighing the circumstances, the court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and proceedings.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 594 OF 2008 This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition by K. M. James challenging a conviction under Section 8(1) of the Abkari Act and the accompanying sentence as affirmed by the first appellate court. The incident occurred on 23 June 2003, when the accused was found in possession of two litres of illicit arrack on a public road in TK Colony, Nilambur. He was arrested and the contraband seized; a chemical analysis followed, with the report received in 2004, but the investigation and final report were not completed until 2006, about three years after the occurrence. The trial court convicted the petitioner under Abkari Act 8(1) and sentenced him to two years’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, with a default sentence. The appellate court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to one year’s imprisonment with the same fine and default terms. In this revision petition, the High Court scrutinizes the legality and propriety of the conviction in light of unexplained delay in investigation and filing the final report, contrary to Section 50 of the Abkari Act, and the credibility of independent witnesses who turned hostile. The court notes the age of the petitioner (68) and the long lapse since the incident, and ultimately sets aside the conviction and sentence, acquitting the accused and ordering release. The court cites precedents on procedural delay and its impact on prosecution credibility in reaching its conclusions.
BAIL APPL. NO. 4317 OF 2024 This High Court bail application concerns three accused (Sandeep K.B., Jini M.P., and Rajitha) in Crime No.144/2024 of Aloor Police Station, Thrissur, registered for offences under sections 406, 409, 420 and 506 read with 34 IPC. The de facto complainant allegedly pawned 136 grams of gold with the first accused who, without her knowledge, opened a bank account in her name and re-pledged the ornaments, resulting in a short return of 106 grams valued at around Rs. 6,30,000. The second accused (the bank’s former manager) and the third (present manager) are said to have procured withdrawal forms from the complainant but returned only 30 grams. The fourth accused allegedly telephoned and threatened the complainant. The petitioners sought pre-arrest bail under section 438 CrPC. Counsel for petitioners argued the transaction is civil, the first petitioner is willing to return all ornaments upon repayment of the loan, and petitioners 2 and 3 had no involvement; the third accused merely performed his bank duties, and the fourth accused acted only to complain. The Public Prosecutor opposed bail, citing incriminating materials and the need for custodial interrogation. The Court dismissed the first petitioner’s bail, while allowing petitioners 2 and 3 bail with conditions, after noting that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted in exceptional circumstances.
The writ petitioner, Baby M.P., was provisionally appointed as a Shift Operator in the Kerala Water Authority on 10.09.1985 under Rule 9(a)(1) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Rules (KSSR). Ext.P1 (1984) notified vacancies to fill up the post on a provisional basis, inviting applications from two streams: those sponsored by the employment exchange and direct applicants; Ext.P2 (1985) appointed three persons, including the petitioner and two employment-exchange sponsored candidates. The two sponsored employees were regularized with effect from 19.09.1990; the petitioner was not, and his representations for regularization were rejected, with Ext.P4–P5 clarifying that he could be regularized only from 30.06.2004. The petitioner challenged Ext.P9 (2013) and Ext.P10 (2014) orders stopping adhoc allowances and recovery of payments. The government and Kerala Water Authority argued that Jacob v. Kerala Water Authority (1990 KHC 449) dealt with regularization of employees recruited through the employment exchange and did not extend to those recruited directly, nor did it apply to the petitioner. The petitioner contended that Rule 9(a)(1) makes provisional appointments and that there is no basis to deny regularization merely because he was not sponsored by the employment exchange, and that Binu v. State of Kerala (2002(3) KLT 133) should not lead to discrimination. The court ultimately held that the petitioner is a provisional employee under Rule 9(a)(1) categorized as Category II in Jacob v. Water Authority and is entitled to regularization; Exts.P4, P5, P7 and P9 were quashed, with directions to regularize within one month.
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges Ext.P2, a 2023 order of the Malabar Devaswom Board Commissioner, transferring Balaji K. as Executive Officer of the petitioner temple and directing that 50% of his salary be borne by the two Devaswoms. The petitioner had earlier challenges to an order directing 100% salary (Ext.P1 from 2017) and sought a declaration that the appointment of the 4th respondent to the petitioner Devaswom was illegal and that the 50% salary arrangement violate the court’s earlier directions. The petition also sought to place on record audited annual accounts (Exts.P4–P9) and to obtain relief via Article 226. Respondents contend that the petition is not maintainable given the statutory remedy under Section 99 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, including provisions under Sections 45 and 71 and the right to revise Ext.P2. The court discusses discretionary writ jurisdiction and the availability of efficacious statutory remedies, citing multiple Supreme Court authorities. Ultimately, the court dismisses the petition on maintainability grounds, with liberty to challenge Ext.P2 through Section 99 revision, and directs actions to ensure statutory compliance if accounts are not maintained.
The Kerala High Court heard a criminal writ petition challenging an externment order issued under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAA(P)A) against Muhammed Althaf. The Authorized Officer externed him from Thrissur Revenue District for one year based on a Sponsoring Authority report stating that the petitioner engaged in anti-social activities and was a "known rowdy." The Sponsoring Authority relied on three prior cases, including a murder charge in the third incident, with the petitioner currently on bail. The last prejudicial act is dated 06.11.2023; the petitioner was arrested on 07.11.2023 and released on bail on 20.02.2024 with strict conditions. Despite these events, externment proceedings were initiated only on 04.05.2024, show cause issued on 18.05.2024, and the externment order dated 29.05.2024, served 15.06.2024 and executed 30.06.2024. The petitioner contends the order violates legal mandates and contains fatal procedural defects. The court notes an inordinate delay of six months and 21 days from the last prejudicial activity to the externment, plus a delay of 74 days from the SHO’s Ext.P4 recommendation to the externment order, with unexplained gaps in the sequence of actions. Relying on Shamnad Amiyan v. State of Kerala (2023 KHC 271), the court holds that the live-link between last activity and externment has been snapped, rendering Ext.P1 void. Consequently, the petition is allowed and Ext.P1 is set aside.
OT.Rev Nos.29/2022 to 44/2022 This omnibus decision of the Kerala High Court (Division Bench) issues in OT.Rev Nos. 29/2022 through 44/2022, challenging orders of the State Tax Appellate Tribunal on exemptions under the CST Act and related KVAT provisions. The revision petitions by the State of Kerala arise from orders that denied exemptions claimed under the first CST notification for inter-State sale of natural rubber and rubber products and the subsequent implementation of a second notification that restricted exemptions to sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the CST Act 1956, while introducing an option to pay tax under a third notification. The Tribunal had remanded matters to the assessing authority to dispose of claims in light of the interplay between the three notifications. The State contends that allowing the dealer to enjoy the exemption under the first notification while the second notification limits the exemption results in a double benefit and is unlawful; the respondents/dealer argues that the second notification correctly narrows the exemption and that the dealer retains the option to either claim exemption or pay tax, as permitted by the scheme. The High Court, relying on Hi-Tek Traders, holds that the second notification supersedes the first to the extent necessary, upholds the remand, and dismisses the revisions, with no costs. The judgment is delivered by Justices S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji on 12 October 2022.
The High Court of Kerala, in a combined order by Justice Amit Rawal, adjudicated three writ petitions filed by persons working in Group-D posts in the Travancore Devaswom Board who suffer benchmark disabilities. The petitioners challenged the Board’s non-reservation of vacancies for persons with disabilities (PWD) under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 as amended in 2016, particularly the 3% reservation and the identification of posts eligible for such reservation under Section 32, and the related promotion/direct recruitment dynamics. The court revisited earlier directions issued by this court, including judgment WP(C) 7802 of 2016 and related precedents, which held that the percentage reservation must be computed on the total cadre vacancies and that posts to be filled by direct recruitment and by promotion should not be treated differently for reservation purposes. It noted government notifications and orders (Exts. P6, P9) and a series of developments around backlog, backlog identification, and 60% direct recruitment versus 40% promotion quotas. Ultimately, the court held that the 22.1.2022 order restricting benefits to PWD required reconsideration, set aside that order, and directed the Board to revisit backlog, identify posts eligible for 3% PWD reservation under Section 32, and ensure reservation irrespective of recruitment mode. The court also allowed rank-list publication under interim terms, and directed promotion/appointment actions per law, with a three-month timetable for reconsideration, while permitting the 60% direct recruitment framework to proceed under the 18.6.2022 notification.
The appellant-plaintiff filed O.S. No. 69 of 1993 before the Principal Sub Court, North Paravoor, seeking fixation of boundary and eviction from the plaint schedule building. On 18 September 2006, the suit was dismissed for default as the plaintiff was absent with no representation. The plaintiff then moved I.A. No. 3303 of 2006 under Order IX, Rule 9 CPC seeking restoration of the suit, claiming that his mother was bedridden and he could not attend court. The trial court dismissed the restoration application on 16 November 2006, stating there was no sufficient cause and that no evidence supported the claim. The appellant challenged this order in FAO 158 of 2007. The High Court, after hearing both sides, held that the restoration application was within the limitation period and that the trial court erred by summarily rejecting it without proper consideration, noting the provisions of Order IX and the liberal approach to “sufficient cause” as explained in G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada (2000) 3 SCC 54. Citing M. Shivananda v. M. Susheela and Peeves Enterprises v. Muhammed Ashraf, the court reiterated that sufficient cause is elastic and that substantial justice may justify restoration. It also emphasized that merits should guide adjudication rather than default alone, as echoed in Robin Thapa v. Rohit Dora. Consequently, the appeal is allowed: the impugned order is set aside, the suit is restored to the file, and the trial court is directed to dispose of O.S. 69 of 1993 expeditiously within four months, with a date fixed for appearance on 14.03.2022.
Rahiyanath, the accused, seeks CrL.M.C. 6145 of 2021 against an order allowing amendment of the complaint in ST 20/2019 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Payyannur, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The challenged amendment concerns the cause title and the complainant’s address, with the aim of aligning notices with the complainant’s corrected particulars. The trial court held that the amendment related to curing a simple infirmity and would not prejudice the accused; consequently, it allowed the amendment. The petitioner contends that altering the complainant’s address would effectively change the identity of the complainant and prejudice the accused, pointing to a potential prejudice in trial and service of process. The complainant (second respondent) did not appear despite service. The court traces jurisprudence, citing U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Modi Distillery and Others (1987) 3 SCC 684, which held that easily curable infirmities could be remedied by amendment; it cites S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram (2015) 9 SCC 609 as a related authority. It also discusses Madhavi v. Thupran (1987) (1) KLT 488, Linda John Abraham v. Business India Group Co. (2011) (4) KLT 787, and Kuttan v. Varanamalyam Kuries (P) Ltd. (2020) (1) KHC 551 to delineate the evolving doctrine. The High Court ultimately upholds the trial court’s discretion, holding that absence of express statutory provision does not bar a formal amendment in appropriate cases, provided no prejudice is caused, and dismisses the Crl.M.C.
This is a Criminal Revision Petition filed by Brajith Joseph, accused No.2, challenging an order dated 07.07.2023 of the Court of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thalassery, which rejected his discharge application and proceeded to frame charges in C.C. No.1/2018. The accused is charged under Sections 7, 8 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120-B IPC, alleging a criminal conspiracy with the then Commercial Tax Officer at Sulthan Bathery Division to demand and collect illegal gratification from the defacto complainant, M/s Asian Agencies. The prosecution contends that a trap was laid by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau; the defacto complainant’s FIS states that Rs.10,000 was collected and handed to accused No.1, with persistent demands for Rs.90,000 more to evade a potential Rs.3 lakh fine. The decoy notes and a positive phenolphthalein test reportedly corroborate the version. The trial court had already framed charges, and the petitioner argued that the materials do not prima facie establish the offences. The High Court cites established doctrine on discharge and framing of charges, drawing from decisions in Onkar Nath Mishra, Som Nath Thapa, Mohanlal Soni, Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others, among others, to hold that the material on record makes out a prima facie case. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed and the charges stand.
This is a first appeal from an order in a suit for partition and injunction (O.S. No. 733 of 2008) filed before the II Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam. The appellant (1st defendant) challenged two interlocutory orders dated 07.06.2017: I.A. No. 2027 of 2015 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay and I.A. No. 2028 of 2015 seeking to set aside the ex parte preliminary and final decrees in the suit. The court below dismissed both applications on grounds that there was an unexplained delay of 2176 days and that almost all parties had already received their shares. The High Court, after mediation-directed proceedings and review, found the cryptic handling of the delay improper and proceeded to scrutinize the law on condonation of delay (notably under Section 5) and the liberal-approach jurisprudence. It cited Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee, G.P. Srivastava, Peeves Enterprises, Robin Thapa, and Rafeek v. K. Kamarudeen to emphasise that “sufficient cause” is elastic but must be tempered by reasonableness and justice. The appellate court ultimately allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded for a reasoned reconsideration with liberty to adduce evidence; parties were directed to appear on 07.03.2022 for further proceedings.