The writ petition concerns nine head-load workers employed at the Urban Wholesale Market, Maradu, who submitted Exts. P1–P9 seeking registration under Rule 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules. The petitioners seek (i) dispensing with translated copies for admission, (ii) a mandamus directing the first respondent to consider Exts. P1–P9 after hearing within a time frame, (iii) a directive restraining respondents 2–4 from deputing head-load workers in the market to work for respondents 6–8, and (iv) permission for petitioners to perform head-load work under their employers pending final orders, along with other proper directions. The court notes the limited prayer is to consider Exts. P1–P9; it references the judgment in WA No. 1942/2022 and Kerala Head Load Workers Welfare Board v. Hishad M.B. and Others (ILR 2022 (3) Kerala 688), to the effect that an attached worker need not be immediately registered and may work under the employer while registration proceeds, with registration to follow under Rule 26A. Consequently, the court disposes the petition with directions: (a) the first respondent shall expeditiously consider Exts. P1–P9 within six weeks after hearing, and (b) till final orders, respondents 2–4 may permit petitioners to head-load work under respondents 6–8. The decision is issued by a single judge, P.V. Kunhikrishnan.
This Motor Accident Claims Appeal arises from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, pertaining to injuries suffered by Chandran in a motor accident on 10 November 2005 while travelling in autorickshaw KL-11/M5615. The Tribunal held the driver negligent and the insurer liable to indemnify, and awarded Rs. 1,03,940 in total compensation. The appellant contends that the income of the claimant as a mason was understated (claimed Rs. 4,500 per month while Tribunal applied Rs. 2,500) and that other heads of compensation were inadequately assessed. Relying on Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., the court is urged to fix the notional monthly income at Rs. 4,500. The appellant also relies on established jurisprudence for calculating pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, including future earnings, medical expenses, loss of earning during treatment, pain and suffering, and loss of amenities, and cites Raj Kumar, Sarla Verma, and Pranay Sethi to justify the approach. The court ultimately revises several heads of compensation, including loss of earning, bystander expenses, nourishment, disability, pain and suffering, and loss of amenities, resulting in a total enhanced compensation of Rs. 1,06,350 with 6% interest from the petition date, payable within two months by the insurer.
Rosamma Kurian and Siany Shaji filed W.P.(C) No.37490 of 2022 in the Kerala High Court seeking police protection to enable construction of a passage from a PWD road to their property and to restrain interference by the Major Archiepiscopal Marth Mariyam Archdeacon Pilgrim Church at Kuravilangad. They contend ownership of the suit property (10 cents) after a partition, and that a public road along the eastern boundary—Ilaykad–Kuravilangad–Pallithazham–Madayakunnu Road—has footpaths on both sides, obstructing access. They had paid Rs.57,469 to obtain PWD permission to create a passage (Ext. P1) and, per Ext. P3, were allowed to alter up to 4.5 metres; workers were hired for the work. The petition asserts that the church restricted construction and demanded compensation (Ext. P4) despite the road being part of a public right of way; PWD permission was re-granted on 10.11.2022 (Ext. P7) for 30 days, but threats continued. The petition relies on precedents such as Sambandam, Pavithran VKM, and Inox Leisure to justify police protection, and contends civil remedies should not be precluded by police action. The respondents contend the footpaths belong to the church, supported by tax receipts and possession certificates (Ext. R16). The court held that ownership of the footpath is in dispute and must be resolved in civil court; police protection was not warranted, and the petition was dismissed.
The Kerala High Court, Ernakulam, presided over by single Judge Raja Vijayaraghavan V., dealt with a criminal miscellaneous petition (Crl.M.C No. 2499 of 2023) filed by accused Nos.1 to 3 seeking quashing of Crime No.37/2023 of Medical College Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram. The accused were charged under IPC sections 294(b), 323, 506 r/w 34 and Arms Act Section 27. The petition argued that the parties had resolved their disputes amicably and sought termination of proceedings, supported by an affidavit of the 2nd respondent; the petition relied on precedents including Stephen v. State of Kerala and Jinu v. State of Kerala to argue that settlements can justify quashing in appropriate cases where the offence is private in nature. The Public Prosecutor opposed quashing, citing State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan and stressing the seriousness and societal impact of the offences, including substantial criminal antecedents of the petitioners. The court reviewed Section 482 CrPC and the principles laid down by various Supreme Court decisions, noting that quashing is generally reserved for private, non-compoundable offences with civil character or settled private disputes, while heinous offences and those under special statutes or public interest crimes (like arms offences) typically cannot be quashed merely on settlement. The court concluded that the present case involves offences with societal impact and the petition was dismissed, allowing the prosecution to continue."
This writ appeal challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) 2494 of 2021, concerning appointment of a Headmaster at St. Sebastian's High School, Punnakkal, Kozhikode. The appellants are the Manager and the Corporate Manager along with K.J. Jose (Headmaster-in-Charge), who had secured appointment as Headmaster on 5.6.2018, and Xavier T.J., the HSA who filed the writ petition challenging the appointment on grounds that the 7th respondent was not in service as an HSA on the vacancy date of 1.6.2018. The single Judge held that the Manager’s discretion to appoint, especially in a minority institution, required striking off a paragraph in Form 27 asserting there was no eligible qualified teacher, and relied on earlier Kerala decisions (notably Manager, Mar Sleeba U.P.School v. State of Kerala) to hold that a protected teacher not in service on vacancy could not be considered for Headmaster, even with discretionary rights. It was further held that the writ petitioner was entitled to notional promotion as Headmaster from 1.6.2018 up to 31.05.2020 for pension purposes, while the 7th respondent would be Headmaster from 1.6.2020 to 31.05.2023 with pension benefits. On appeal, the Division Bench partly allows the appeal: while upholding the core principle that a non-teaching on vacancy cannot be appointed, it allows the discretion to appoint and clarifies Form 27; the writ petition relief is disposed accordingly, with pensionary and salary implications recomputed. The decision reconciles minority rights with statutory mandates under the Kerala Education Act and Rules.
WP(C) No. 25747/2017 & 26395/2017 Two writ petitions by doctors of Government Medical College, Ernakulam challenge police registration of criminal cases for alleged medical negligence and challenge the State‑level apex body’s report of negligence. The petitioners rely on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (AIR 2005 SC 3180) and circulars/govt instructions to press that criminal action against medical professionals should not proceed without credible, independent medical opinions and proper hearing. The investigation into the death of Shamna Thesneem, a second‑year medical student, began after a complaint about alleged negligence and passed through an Expert Panel, which largely found no negligence, and then to the State Level Apex Body, which concluded negligence. The petitioners contend that the Apex Body’s reference and its findings were not in accordance with Circular No. 73304/SSB3/2007/Home (16.06.2008) and violated natural justice since petitioners were not afforded a hearing. The court scrutinizes the procedure, notes the lack of hearing and misapplication of the circular, and holds that the Apex Body’s report cannot be sustained. It directs reconstitution of the Apex Body with a prescribed composition, allows for additional expert opinions if needed, requires a hearing, and sets a six‑month window for completing the investigation if pursued, with a three‑month period for the new Apex Body’s report.
This batch of writ petitions, filed in the Kerala High Court, challenges the upper age limit of 20 years prescribed for admission to the Integrated Five-year LLB Course in Kerala under the Legal Education Rules, 2008 (Clause 28(a)). The petitioners contend that the notification dated 28.07.2016, which prescribed an upper age limit after provisional admission and rank-list publication, was arbitrary, irrational and illegal, especially since the prospectus stated that there was no upper age limit. They rely on the terms of the notification, prospectus, and subsequent amendments (GO (Ms) No. 213/2016/H.Edn and other communications) to argue that age restrictions were not present in the original advertisement and that the rank list had already been prepared without the limit. The respondents, including Union of India, Bar Council of India, Bar Councils of Kerala, the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations and others, maintain that Clause 28 of the Legal Education Rules, 2008, was valid and that its withdrawal or alteration was necessitated by judicial considerations and ensuing directives from the Bar Council of India and higher courts. The court, noting substantial controversy about Clause 28’s validity and the backdrop of several High Court judgements (Punjab and Haryana, Allahabad, Madras) and apex court action, stayed the 2016 notification for the time being and allowed participation in the selection process. Ultimately, the court made the interim order absolute, disposed of the petitions, and held that petitioners who completed the course were entitled to receive certificates upon successful completion.
Udayan, the appellant, challenged MACA 3186/2009 arising from a 8 March 2006 accident in which he was a pillion rider on a motorcycle. The Tribunal awarded Rs.60,100 with interest and costs, but the High Court re-assessed several head elements. Citing Ramachandrappa, the court fixed the notional income at Rs.5,000 per month (instead of the Tribunal’s Rs.2,000) and enhanced the loss of earnings to Rs.15,000. The court accepted Ext A6’s 10% disability after applying the principles in Rajkumar Ajayakumar, overruling the Tribunal’s finding of no disability. With a multiplier of 14, the court recalculated compensation for loss due to disability, and re-evaluated other heads such as transport, bystander expenses, medical expenses, pain and suffering, loss of amenities and disfiguration, treating the Tribunal’s awards as largely reasonable. The court ultimately held that the appellant was entitled to enhanced compensation, directing calculation to reflect a total enhanced sum of Rs.1,53,100 (after corrections), with interest on the enhanced amount at 6% per annum and costs of Rs.3,000. The insurer was ordered to deposit the enhanced compensation within two months from receipt of a certified copy, after which the Tribunal would disburse it. All interlocutory applications were closed.
MACA Nos.125 & 271 of 2018 These two Motor Accident Claims Appeals arise from OP(MV) No.1570/2010 before the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Mavelikkara, challenging the quantum and the posture of the disability assessment. The claimant BhagyaDev sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident on 09.01.2010 causing 64% disability per Ext.X1, with a claim for Rs.11,50,000. The tribunal accepted liability of the insurer but reduced the disability to 20%, adopting reasons that Ext.X1 certificate did not specify the scale. The insurer argued the disability assessment by the Medical Board should stand; the claimant contended that the IDEAS scale and the 64% disability, along with future prospects, could not be discarded. The High Court, after considering the record and case law (Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar; Mekala v. Malathi M.; K. Janardhanan Nair), concluded that a competent medical board's disability percentage should be generally accepted; in this case the board's 64% disability could be sustained. The Court also adopted a monthly income of Rs.10,000, recognising the claimant's qualification as a Fire and Safety Diploma holder and the potential for future earnings, with 40% future prospects. The Court calculated additional compensation of Rs.17,34,360 on top of the tribunal's award and directed payment at 7.5% interest, holding that 12% penal interest would be unjustified. Both MACAs are disposed of accordingly.
This is an original petition under Article 227 challenging Ext.P3 of the Munsiff’s Court, Chengannur, in IA No.1/2023 of an unnumbered suit filed by the petitioner (the plaintiff) seeking decrees of permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction. The central dispute arises from Ext.P3, an order returning the plaint for presentation after complying with the requirements of Section 80(1) CPC, on the ground that IA No.1/2023 sought leave under Section 80(2) to dispense with notice. The trial court purportedly heard the petitioner but did not hear several respondents (respondents 7 and 9–14) and concluded there was no urgent relief, leading to Ext.P3. The petitioner contends that Ext.P3 is erroneous, improper and illegal because the court failed to hear all affected parties and erred in applying Section 80(2) in isolation, effectively regularizing non-compliance with Section 80(1). The court relies on a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Government of Kerala v Sudhir Kumar Sharma (2013) to emphasize that a Section 80(2) application cannot regularize non-compliance with Section 80(1) and that both sides must be heard before granting leave. On these grounds, the High Court holds Ext.P3 to be erroneous and interferes under Article 227, directing the Munsiff’s Court to reconsider the IA in light of the law and dispose within a month, thereby restoring the petition’s path to adjudication on merits.
The petitioner, K.I. Joseph, is a quarry operator who holds a Letter of Intent for mining 0.9910 hectare of land in Thrissur district and challenges Environmental Clearance Condition 3(4), which requires Wildlife Clearance from the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (SCNBWL) because the site lies within the broader ESZ framework around Peechi-Vazhani Wildlife Sanctuary. The MoEF&CC issued an Office Memorandum (Ext.P3) dated 08.08.2019 and a related draft notification Ext.P4 to regulate developments within 10 km of National Parks/Wildlife Sanctuaries, mandating wildlife clearance in certain ESZ situations. The petitioner contends the site is 6.64 km from Peechi-Vazhani Sanctuary and outside the proposed ESZ, with the ESZ boundary on the northern side only 4.5 km away, so SCNBWL clearance should not be obligatory for mining beyond 1 km from the sanctuary boundary. The respondents argue that, within 10 km of a Park/Sanctuary, ESZ-related restrictions apply and SCNBWL clearance is mandatory for projects within the ESZ or governed by the EIA regime, citing guidelines and apex court directions including T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad and Goa Foundation cases. The Kerala High Court, applying those directives, ultimately quashes Ext.P2’s Condition 3(4) and directs that mining lease be considered without insisting on SCNBWL clearance, relying on Ext.P8 and related precedents. The decision clarifies the interpretation of ESZ and proximity rules in this context.
WP(C) Nos.28461/2018 & con.cases This batch of writ petitions challenges KSRTC’s action of terminating provisional empanelled employees and seeks regularisation under earlier bipartite settlements and Government orders. The core dispute traces back to a 2008 bipartite settlement and Government orders in 2011, 2013, and later clarifications, which set criteria for regularisation (ten years of service and, subsequently, 120 days of duty per year). Petitioners allege that many employees were regularised or awaiting regularisation under those orders, and KSRTC’s 2018 termination orders were issued without due hearing or justification, undermining vested rights from earlier judgments. The respondents argue that the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 4435–4438/2017 authorised employers to impose conditions for regularisation, and that the 2013 Government Order incorporating 120 days of duty is binding; hence termination orders are lawful and retrospective effect is controlled by the 2017 judgment. The Judge reviews Suresh Kumar v. State of Kerala (2013) and the subsequent Supreme Court order, clarifying that Supreme Court directives bind all, and telescopes earlier judicial results. The court ultimately allows the petitions in part, sets aside the KSRTC terminations, directs a hearing to ascertain whether petitioners satisfied ten years of service and 120 days of duty as of 21.12.2011, and provides timelines for a fresh regularisation process and attendant pension/benefits, with possible termination if criteria are not met.
Muhammed Shammas P.P., a differently-abled individual with 60% locomotor disability, sought admission to MBBS under the PwD quota for KEAM-2022/NEET-UG 2022. He argues that his disability qualifies for PwD quota under National Medical Commission norms and that he achieved high marks (97% in +2, All-India rank 307202 in NEET-UG 2022 with PwD rank 381) and thus should be eligible for MBBS. He contends that the provisional list’ which marked him not eligible/not suitable is grounded on misapplication of guidelines, particularly since Appendix H-1 (Annexure H-1) of the prospectus allows 40–80% disability for PwD candidates provided both hands are intact and functional. He asserts congenital limb deficiency should not bar admission, emphasizing that skill and adaptation reduce disability impact. The single-judge judgment rejected his petition, upholding the prospectus and MCI/NMC norms as applicable to KEAM-2022, and concluding that the appellant’s hand-function deficiency rendered him not suitable for MBBS. The Division Bench, citing Albin Joseph, declined to interfere with the Medical Board’s disability assessment, reaffirming that a writ court should not reappraise expert medical findings. The appeal is dismissed, with no relief granted to the petitioner, and the State Medical Board’s opinion upheld.
The Kerala High Court, through Justice Raja Vijayaraghavan V, heard CRL.MC No.3928 of 2023 challenging a magistrate’s May 4, 2023 order cancelling bail granted to the petitioner in Crime No.277/2022 (Vallikunnam PSI) under IPC 307, and later involving NDPS-21(b)(ii)(B). While on bail, the petitioner allegedly committed Crime No.441/2022 under the NDPS Act, prompting a cancellation application by the investigating officer. The State contends that bail can be revoked where the accused abuses liberty, citing P. v. Madhya Pradesh (and Another) and Edwin Thomas v. State of Kerala, and that the bail order must be cancelled in light of new, adverse facts; it stresses the petitioner’s initial commercial quantity narcotic offense and subsequent possession of ganja/hashish oil. The petitioner’s counsel counters that mere registration of a subsequent crime cannot automatically cancel bail; reliance is placed on Godson v. State of Kerala and Renjith v. State of Kerala to emphasize that cancellation requires substantial, linked misuses and relevant supervening circumstances. The court discusses the difference between setting aside an unjustified order and canceling bail, citing Gurcharan Singh and Puran, and analyzes the grounds for cancellation under Dolat Ram, CBI v Subramani Gopalakrishnan and others, including misuses, investigation interference, tampering with evidence, witness intimidation, evasion of proceedings, and supervening circumstances. The petition is dismissed; the magistrate’s bail cancellation is sustained, though surrender for potential fresh bail remains possible under NDPS norms.
This is a rent-control revision petition filed under Section 22 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging an eviction order passed by the Rent Control Court (RCP 218/2014) and confirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority (RCA 8/2020). The landlord sought eviction on the grounds of bonafide need to start a construction materials shop in a petition-schedule building that also housed a school-like setup conducted as a tuition centre. The tenant resisted, asserting that the landlord’s demand for higher rent and the alleged bonafide need were not genuine, and that the building was used for education in a manner falling under Section 11(11) of the Act, which affords a protective shield. The case traversed multiple stages: initial eviction under Section 11(3) was upheld by the Rent Controller, RCA affirmed, and the High Court (in a previous remand) directed the Rent Control Court to consider Section 11(11) and related documents. Upon remand, the Rent Control Court again found eviction justified under Section 11(3). The appellate authority held that Section 11(11) does not apply because the building was used for a tuition centre rather than a Government-recognized educational institution, and that Ext.B1 extant letter cannot negate a legitimate bonafide need. The High Court ultimately upheld the eviction order and dismissed the revision, granting the tenant six months to vacate with conditions and payment of damages in the interim.
MACA No.1987/2012 arises from OP(MV) No.683/2008 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kottayam, seeking compensation for injuries suffered in a motor vehicle collision on 13.02.2008. The appellant, a retired Assistant Executive Engineer of the Kerala State Electricity Board, claimed a monthly income of Rs.10,000 from electrical contract works and claimed substantial physical disability, resulting in loss of earning capacity. The tribunal held the insurer liable, rejecting exoneration on the ground that cancellation notice was served after the accident, and awarded Rs.3,54,025 with interest at 7.5% per annum from the date of petition. On appeal, the appellant contends the award is inadequate, particularly under the heads of disability and loss of earnings; he challenges the tribunal’s adoption of a low monthly income (reported as Rs.3,000–Rs.3,500) despite Ext.A15 showing Rs.10,000 and argues the Ext.A11 disability certificate (50%) was not issued for MACT and should support a higher loss of earning capacity. Citing Ramachandrappa and Syed Sadiq, he urges fixation of a higher monthly income (around Rs.6,500) and an appropriate multiplier considering his age. The learned judge reassesses, fixing Rs.8,000 monthly income, applying a multiplier of 9, and revising disability to 30%, leading to an enhanced overall compensation. The court allows the MACA and modifies the award by granting an additional Rs.2,83,160 to be deposited with interest and costs within three months.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 370 OF 2022 This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition filed under section 397 Cr.P.C. challenging an order of the Special Court for the Trial of Offences Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) in SC 474/2021, which dismissed Annexure 1 seeking alteration/addition of a charge to include Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act, 1989. The petitioner is the father of a five-year-old victim and alleges that the second respondent (Arjun) trespassed into the victim’s house, committed rape, and murdered her, with the victim’s caste identity forming the basis for adding the SC/ST (POA) offence. The case centers on whether the court can alter or add a charge under Section 216 Cr.P.C. based on materials produced by the de facto complainant and on records suggesting the accused’s caste, despite the investigation indicating otherwise. A crucial issue is whether the offender knew the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe, a knowledge element essential for Section 3(2)(v). The court canvassed competing Supreme Court precedents (Kartikalakshmi; Anant Prakash Sinha; Jagjeet Singh), noted evolving jurisprudence permitting alteration of charges in certain circumstances, but ultimately held that there is no basis to invoke Section 3(2)(v) given the lack of knowledge allegation. Consequently, the petition was dismissed."
This writ petition challenges an order of the Admission Supervisory Committee (ASC) directing revenue recovery against Kerala Medical College and Hospital to compensate students affected by the college’s status following the grant of an Essentiality Certificate. The petitioners seek to implement Ext. P5 through revenue recovery against the college; Exts. P4 and P8 had already been issued by the ASC. The learned standing counsel for ASC cites Najma v. Union of India to support the position that revenue recovery actions should be pursued and that the college should be compelled to pay the amount within a specified time-frame. The Government Pleader endorses that a judgment to this effect has been delivered by this Court in earlier matters, and that revenue recovery has already been initiated. The Court recognizes that when the Government grants an Essentiality Certificate, its duties extend beyond mere initiation of recovery; it must ensure that the recovery is completed and the amounts are paid to the students within time, consistent with the Division Bench’s directions in Najma. With respondents 1 and 2 not appearing, the Court finds no counter-argument and allows the petition, directing the State and District Collector to initiate and complete revenue recovery against the college within six months; failing which, the amounts covered by Exts. P4 and P8 shall be paid to the petitioners and the recovery continued from the College as per Najma.
Mat.Appeal Nos.577, 582, 610, 611 of 2022 These four matrimonial appeals arise from family court proceedings in Thiruvananthapuram concerning guardianship and custody of a minor, dissolution of marriage by mutual consent, maintenance and counter-claims, and restitution of conjugal rights. The appeals, heard together before a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court on 20 December 2022, challenged judgments dated 31 March 2022 of the Family Court (O.Ps/G&W Nos.336/2017; 462/2017; 1689/2018; 1534/2016). The appellant-husband Arun Subramoniam sought custody of his minor daughter Krishna Arun, and in other matters sought dissolution of marriage and maintenance, while the respondent Kalaivani contested custody, pressed maintenance and counter-claims relating to property. The court referred the matters to mediation, and on 16 December 2022 a memorandum of settlement was recorded. The judgment discusses the discretionary nature of waiving the six-month cooling period under Section 13B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act (citing Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur), and ultimately disposes of all four appeals in terms of the settlement. The settlement contemplates mutual divorce under Section 13B, lifting of attachments, and specified custody arrangements, with directions to implement and communicate the order to relevant authorities. The outcome underscores the appellate court’s preference for mediated settlements in family law disputes.
Petitioner M/S United Ply and Boards, a proprietorship engaged in plywood manufacture since 2008 at Varapetty, Kothamangalam, sought writ relief challenging threats by the Swathanthra Headload Workers Union to entrust loading/unloading to its members. The factory operates in a non-scheme area, and the petitioner contended that it is not obliged to register employees under the Kerala Headload Workers Act and Rules, nor to engage workers from the Headload Workers Union, though it had filed an application for registration under Rule 26A(I). On 28 March 2023, Ext. P14, a letter from the 4th respondent Union, demanded that loading/unloading be performed by union members and warned against peaceful operation, prompting the petitioner to file a representation to the Sub-Inspector of Police (Ext. P15) with receipt (Ext. P16) but no action was taken. The petitioner relied on Jilmon John v. District Police Chief and Others (2018(5) KHC 506) and SAFA System & Solutions v. Station House Officer, Palarivattom and Others (2018(3) KHC 311) as authorities. The State contended no law-and-order issue existed. The court observed the area is non-scheme, Ext. P14 is only a letter, and there is no incident; there is an available alternate remedy under Section 9, CPC. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed for lack of a demonstrable legal right and because of the availability of an alternate remedy.