This petition challenges the Lok Adalat award Ext.P3, dated 14.12.2019, passed in MC.7/2019 under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and the related execution proceedings (EP 17/2021). The petitioner, Divakaran, is contesting the compromise reached during DV proceedings wherein his wife agreed to transfer 64.74 acres to her son-in-law and he would transfer 36.42 acres to his son, conditioned on the son's settlement of bank liabilities and debt on a car, and on the son and Jyothi vacating the residence. The Lok Adalat’s award effectively implements a family-arrangement with transfers of land and occupancy arrangements. The petition argues Ext.P3 is unsustainable in law for violating the guidelines laid down by this Court in Rajagopala Rao G.K and another v. State Police Chief (2016) 3 KHC 917, and for failing to conform to Section 51 of the Indian Contract Act, as reciprocal promises are absent. It is argued that DV proceedings contemplate relief under Sec. 18-22 and that enforcement by execution in EP 17/2021 is inappropriate. The court, however, finds that Ext.P3 followed guidelines and that the terms are independent and self-working, not reciprocal. It notes no fraud or coercion, and declines interference under Article 227. The petition is dismissed; EP 17/2021 is not maintainable, and earlier EPs were withdrawn.
Santharam Roy T.S., a member of the Thirunakkara Kshetra Bhaktha Mandali, filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the 7 November 2021 election to the Temple Advisory Committee (TAC) of Thirunakkara Sree Mahadeva Temple. The petition argued that the two-year term of the existing TAC had expired in January 2021, and that Ext.P1 Rules framed by the Travancore Devaswom Board govern the selection of TAC members. It contended the 07.11.2021 election was illegal and arbitrary for not giving proper notice to members of the Mandali, violating Clause (5) of Ext.P1 and the right to participate in the election process. The court traced the statutory framework: Section 31A of the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 authorizing Temple Advisory Committees; Section 122 empowering the Board to frame rules (Ext.P1); Ext.P1’s provisions including Clause (11) fixing a two-year term; Clause (5) on notices; Clause (3) and 3.1 on membership; and the Board’s 2011 approvals. It cited Chandu K. v. Travancore Devaswom Board to acknowledge the statutory basis of TACs. It ultimately held that the election notice, publication on the temple notice board and gopurams, and supplementary press releases satisfied Ext.P1 requirements; the petition was dismissed for lack of demonstrated violation of due process or notice, thus upholding the validity of the 2021 TAC election.
This is a Criminal Misc. Case (CrL.M.C. 6454/2022) filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash an order of attachment issued on 07.10.2014 in S.T. No.4620/2009 (refiled as CC 1017/2017) before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur. The petitioners, a private limited company and its managing director, faced attachment of their property under Sections 82/83 Cr.P.C. in a cheque- bounced matter under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant later withdrew the complaint; the accused surrendered, and the case was settled. The lower court had dismissed the lift-of-attachment plea, citing a pre-existing Court decision (Babu M.C. v. State of Kerala) that two years from attachment was a hard bar. The Kerala High Court, relying on Vimlaben Abhijitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel (A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 2675) and Abdul Khader v. State of Kerala, held that the two-year period under Section 85(3) Cr.P.C. is directory, not mandatory, and that once the purpose of attachment is served (presence secured, settlement achieved), the attachment can be lifted. The court ordered lifting of attachment on payment of Rs. 2,000 as costs and directed delivery of the property after remittance to the government authorities.
This Original Petition challenges a common order in I.A. Nos. 648/2019 and 649/2019 in O.S. No.57/2016 of the Principal Munsiff Court, Kozhikode, and the corresponding CMA Nos. 23/2020 and 24/2020 of the Principal District Court, Kozhikode. The petitioner, Muhammed Ali Ottappokkil, plaintiff in the suit seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent from trespassing on the plaint schedule property, could not attend the 2018 trial as he was employed in Saudi Arabia. He moved to remove the case from the trial list and later filed I.A.s 648/2019 and 649/2019 to restore the suit and condone a delay of 140 days; both applications were dismissed by the learned Trial Court in Exhibit P6, and the appellate CMA No. 23/2020 dismissed as well, noting that the delay was not sufficiently explained. The petitioner challenged these orders under Article 227 of the Constitution, arguing that sufficient cause exists and that liberal construction is required to do justice in the circumstances. Citing G.P. Srivastava and Robin Thapa, the High Court finds merit in the argument that sufficient cause should be liberally construed and that justice should be done on merits. Consequently, the court sets aside Exhibits P6 and P13–P16, on condition of a Rs. 10,000 cost deposit within two weeks, restores O.S. No.57/2016, and directs expeditious disposal by 31.03.2023, with consequences for non-compliance.
Krishnankutty, the petitioner, sought quashing of Ext.P7 and a mandamus to the 2nd respondent, Kuttichira Gramam Panchayath, to issue a building number and Occupancy Certificate (OC) for a small industrial building constructed on land originally assigned under the Kerala Land Assignment Rules. After obtaining a valid building permit (Exh. P4) and completing construction, the petitioner faced a denial of building numbering on the ground that the land was assigned for agricultural purposes under land assignment rules, rendering commercial use impermissible. The petitioner relied on Mahin and Another v. Keezhmad Grama Panchayath (2020) to argue for numbering, while the respondents cited GO MS 61/2021 (22.02.2021) and Circular (1.10.2021) directing officers to issue possession certificates mentioning land-use and assigned purpose, along with Haridas R v. State of Kerala and others (2016) and Raphy John v. Land Revenue Commissioner (2022) to support restrictions on land use. The court found that the petitioner’s land parcel is part of a patta and that a valid permit had already been issued for construction; it held the 2nd respondent’s refusal to number the building as arbitrary. Ext.P7 was set aside, and the 2nd respondent was directed to assign a building number and issue an OC if the construction complied with the permit, within one month of copy of the judgment.
This writ appeal challenges the judgment of a learned Single Judge which held that the movement/transfer of capital goods from the petitioner’s unit in the Cochin Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) to a 100% Export Oriented Unit at Udaipur, Rajasthan, exempted from Central Sales Tax (CST) under EXIM policy/SEZ provisions. Imported capital goods were stored in a bonded warehouse under a bond agreement and later transferred inter-unit after obtaining permission from the Development Commissioner, CSEZ, under the EXIM policy. The goods were detained at Walayar by Sales Tax authorities as an alleged inter-State sale; the State contends CST is payable. The petition framed issues around whether such inter-unit transfer constitutes an inter-State sale and whether SEZ status exempts CST, or whether the overriding SEZ provisions negate CST liability. The court traced the EXIM policy and Customs Act provisions, including the interpretation that SEZs are deemed foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations, with Sections 51 and 53 of the SEZ Act and related provisions. A key dispute was whether lease-like arrangements or mere financial considerations governed the transfer, and whether the documents (Bills of Entry, Invoices) square with CST’s definition of cross-border movement. The WA ultimately set aside the Single Judge’s view, holding that CST exemptions claimed were unsustainable and allowing the appeal, with no costs.
W.P.(C) No. 36733 of 2023 Ramadas G., a registered B-class contractor, challenged Ext.P1, a notice dated 01.11.2023 inviting short quotations for five urgent works by the Travancore Devaswom Board (TD Board). He alleged his sealed quotation was snatched away just before submission by the 4th respondent, undermining his chance to compete, and that officials of the 1st respondent Board encouraged unfair practices. He sought a mandamus to (i) restrain respondents 1–3 from proceeding under Ext.P1, (ii) consider Ext.P5 (04.11.2023) and (iii) re-tender to give him a fair opportunity. The counter affidavit states the works are urgent and that several contractors obtained quotation forms; on 03.11.2023 a disturbance occurred and the 4th respondent allegedly snatched the documents, which were later recovered by police; the 4th respondent is not the successful bidder for any item. The petition implicates systemic malpractice; the 3rd respondent’s counter explains tendering as per directives dated 30.10.2023. The High Court relied on the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, Sections 15A, 24 and 31, and other authorities to emphasize fiduciary duties and guardian-like jurisdiction over temple properties. The Court disposed of the petition by directing a Vigilance Wing enquiry, a State Audit Department scrutiny, and audit of expenditures, with potential backlisting for proven impropriety, while ordering further action within three months.
Cus.Appeal Nos.23/2022, 18/2022, 19/2022, 20/2022, 21/2022, 22/2022, 24/2022, 25/2022 This batch judgment/order from the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam deals with Customs Appeals (Cus.Appeal Nos. 23/2022 and connected Con.cases 18/2022, 19/2022, 20/2022, 21/2022, 22/2022, 24/2022, 25/2022) arising from CESTAT Bangalore orders. The Revenue (Commissioner of Customs, Willingdon Island, Kochi) challenges CESTAT’s findings related to confiscation, export drawback, and assessment value of goods, arguing that the approval and valuation aspects are integral to the determination of duty on imported/exported goods. A preliminary objection was raised on maintainability under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, contending that if the CESTAT order involves questions relating to the rate of duty or the value of goods for assessment, the appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Section 130E(b). The court notes that the CESTAT orders effectively adjudicated valuation for assessment, including the value of goods for assessment and the related consequences (confiscation/drawback), hence the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction under 130E(b). Relying on decisions from Madras High Court (Ashu Exports) and Bombay High Court (Knowledge Infrastructure), as well as Navin Chemicals Mfg. and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs (1993) 4 SCC 320, the court treats valuation as central to assessment. The bench also discusses Section 129A and its provisos about Appellate Tribunal jurisdiction over drawback. The court concludes that the appeals, being primarily valuation-related, ought to be taken up by the Supreme Court, and indicates that the matter is to be addressed by higher courts rather than resolved here on merits.
Petitioner K P Chandrangadan, an environmental activist, filed a Public Interest Litigation in the Kerala High Court seeking immediate protection of the Pazhayangadi-Kuppam and Valapattanam-Kuppam rivers in Kannur district from illegal reclamation and mangrove destruction. He alleges that CRZ-1A and CRZ-1B areas are being encroached by heavy filling with red earth, construction on river banks, and installation of pilings and floating structures, all without the requisite clearance under the Coastal Regulation Zone norms and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The petitioner asserts that state authorities have misused funds for development schemes branded as mangrove cruise projects, while the Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC-CRZ) refused approval. He points to Exts P1–P4 to show CRZ status and the EAC’s deferral. The petition prays for a writ of mandamus to stop such activities, remove debris and pilings, restore the river to its original state, prohibit floating hotels, and take action against those responsible for mangrove destruction, while seeking waiver of translations. On 15 December 2022 the court passed an interim order directing cessation of activities until clearance. The present judgment reiterates that no construction may proceed in CRZ areas without clearance and that authorities must obtain competent approvals; the court refused to order removal of partially completed works but made the interim relief absolute and disposed of the petition, underscoring environmental protection under CRZ norms and the Environment Act.
Geetha Thankappan, a pre-primary school teacher at Government Junior Basic School, Vennikulam, was appointed in June 2012 by the school's Parent Teachers' Association. She received salary until 2013, but at reopening she was informed that she had been terminated. She challenged her dismissal in WP(C) No. 15346 of 2020, which led to Ext.P17 directing the Government to consider her representation. The Government then issued Ext.P19, terminating her for three reasons: alleged misconduct with children, lack of qualification for 2012 appointment, and having served less than a year. She contends that Ext.P19 is unsupported by corroborating materials and lacks any prior enquiry; it relies on post hoc assertions. Counsel for the petitioner submits that Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner established that administrative orders must be justified by their own contents, not by later pleadings, and Ext.P19 fails this test. The 7th respondent argues that the petition is not maintainable as the post was filled by the PTA’s replacement and the petitioner was not eligible. The Government Pleader defends Ext.P19 as irrefutable since she worked only eight months and was found to be misbehaving. The Court, after considering submissions and precedents, finds Ext.P19 defective for not specifying the basis of misconduct, lack of enquiry, and failure to reference relevant orders and circulars. It sets aside Ext.P19 and orders the Government to reconsider the matter after hearing all parties within three months, keeping the status quo until the process concludes; no final relief on eligibility is expressed.
RCREV. Nos. 330 of 2016 and 347 of 2016 These are Rent Control Revision Nos. 330 and 347 of 2016 from the Kerala High Court, heard by a Division Bench. The petitions challenge a common judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority, which modified the Rent Control Court’s order under Section 5(1) for fixation of fair rent in respect of a 250 sq ft shop room in Kozhikode. The property was let in 1982 at Rs. 500 monthly, later revised to Rs. 600 in 2012; the landlord seeks a fair rent of Rs. 3,000 per month, arguing the premises’ central location and market dynamics justify higher rent. The Rent Control Court fixed Rs. 2,000, and the Appellate Authority raised it to Rs. 2,500. The tenant argues there is no material to justify Rs. 2,000 or Rs. 2,500, and the landlord failed to prove rents in comparable premises; the Advocate Commissioner’s report is treated as hearsay. The court relies on Edger Ferus v. Abraham Ittycheria (2004) for factors in determining fair rent, including inflation, purchasing power, locality, demand, amenities, and construction costs. It notes 30 years with no revision is significant and, upon analysis, holds there is no basis to interfere with the authorities below, sustaining the Appellate Authority’s Rs. 2,500 fixation. The revision petitions are dismissed.
This High Court of Kerala judgment concerns MACA No.452 of 2012, a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal filed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) in OP(MV)684/2005. The appellants, who are the owner and legal representatives of the rider of a motorcycle (KL-7/8012), challenge the MACT finding that liability to pay compensation should be borne by them and not by the KSRTC bus driver. The MACT had exonerated the KSRTC driver and fastened liability on the motorcycle’s owner and rider, resulting in a compensation to the first respondent (the claimant). The appellants contend that Exts. A1–A10 and Exts. B1–B2 (insurance policy certificates) establish the existence of a valid policy on the date of the accident (16.09.2004/17.09.2004) and that the additional loading premium of Rs. 48 should be construed as indemnifying the pillion rider, or at least indicate coverage. They rely on cited Supreme Court authorities (including Tilak Singh) to argue for insurer liability. The respondents dispute coverage on the date of accident and emphasize that the policy was not properly established or read in the MACT records. On 13.12.2019, the court dismissed the appeal, upholding the MACT’s findings and liability allocations against the appellants, and confirming the award in favor of the claimant.
BA Nos. 4158 & 4161 of 2024 This is a common order in two connected bail applications (BA Nos. 4158 and 4161 of 2024) arising from Crime No. 268/2024 of Enath Police Station, Pathanamthitta. The petitioners (accused 1–3 and 5 in 4161; accused 1 in 4158) are challenging their detention under Section 439 CrPC after being arrested on 22.04.2024 for offences under IPC Sections 143, 144, 147, 294(b), 323, 324, 506(ii) and 307 read with 149. The prosecution alleges that, on 22.04.2024, in pursuance of a prior grudge against Vishnu, the accused formed an unlawful assembly, abused Vishnu, assaulted him, and the first accused stabbed Vishnu, with injuries to the de facto complainant, forming the quantum of offences listed. The petitioners contend innocence, submit that Section 307 is not attracted, note that the 4th accused has already been granted bail, argue that they have spent 35 days in custody, and emphasize that investigation is complete with recoveries effected. The State counters that investigation is ongoing and bail could enable tampering with evidence. The learned Judge evaluates the material, cites the presumption of innocence, and the right to life under Article 21, and notes the absence of antecedents and the fact that the 4th accused has been enlarged on bail. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court allows both bail applications with stringent conditions, including bonds, sureties, regular appearance, no tampering, and possible modification or cancellation of conditions by the court.
O.P.(C) No.3331/2019 challenges Ext.P6 of EP No.21/2018 in OS No.166/1994, a dispute before the Sub Court, Cherthala. The petitioners are EZHUPUNNA PANCHAYAT PATTIKAJAATHI SERVICE SAHAKARANA SANGHOM LTD. NO.A 815, represented by its Secretary Kunjumon, and its Secretary, Kunjumon, aged 46, in his personal capacity. The respondents include K.R. Devadas and others who filed a plaint seeking partition and possession; the first petitioner in Ext.P1 is shown as being represented by its President, not its Secretary. A decree was passed and Ext.P2 execution petition was filed; Ext.P4 sought to implead the Secretary; Ext.P3 was for staying delivery and Ext.P5 under Section 47 CPC to declare the decree a nullity. Ext.P6 is the order under challenge. The petition contends that Ext.P6 is erroneous and that the decree, being improperly described as to representation, can be declared null under Section 47. The court examines Section 47 of the CPC, which requires that questions relating to execution be determined by the executing court, not by a separate suit, and that the scope of Section 47 is narrow. It cites Dhurandar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University; S. Bhaskaran v. Sebastian; Rameshwar Das Gupta v. State of U.P.; and Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan to emphasize the limits of appellate and review powers in execution. The Kerala High Court concludes that the execution court cannot travel beyond the decree’s scope and that the misdescription of representation does not render the decree void ab initio. The petition is dismissed; Ext.P6 stands and there is no interference under Article 227.
M.F.A(Forest) No.140 of 2005 This appeal under the Kerala High Court concerns the exemption of scheduled forest land under the Vesting Act, sought by the State against the Forest Tribunal’s order. The Kokkaranikunnu-Malavaram property, claimed to be a private forest spanning 88.38 acres, was found by the Tribunal not to be barred by limitation and to fall within the scope of the Vesting Act’s private forest regime, with the land described as rocky and containing cultivable portions. The applicant contends that the land was purchased under deed No.1611/1982 from a vendor who held it as kanamdar, that cultivation of crops such as sweet potato and pulses occurred, and that parts of the land are rocky; they argue the exemption under S.3(2)/(3) should apply for personal cultivation or intended cultivation, and that the land does not fall under the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949. The respondents maintain that the land is part of vested forest, note quarrying activities on the western boundary, and assert that the MPPF Act does not apply to 88.38 acres; there is insufficient evidence of cultivation or intention. The High Court reverses the Tribunal, holding that cultivation was not proven and that the exemption cannot be granted under S.3(2)/(3); the land remains a private forest within vesting. The appeal is allowed, with costs to the parties.
The petitioner, Dr. K. Mohandas, was the accused in C.C. No. 521/2009 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kozhikode, arising from Crime No. 105/2004 of Kozhikode Town Police Station. The death of Smt. Bindu after a Mini-lap surgery, allegedly during post-operative care, led to a criminal prosecution under Section 304A IPC. Annexure A1 states the final report; the petitioner contends initial sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was not obtained and that the materials do not disclose the offence. The Magistrate discharged in 2014 on this ground; the State preferred Crl.R.P. No. 23/2016, which remanded for proper disposal and rejected the rationale that Section 239 Cr.P.C. applies to summons cases. Thereafter, proceeding under Section 258 Cr.P.C. for stay and under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. for further investigation were pursued. The petition seeks to quash proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., arguing (i) lack of sanction, (ii) belated cognizance beyond Section 468 Cr.P.C. limits, and (iii) non-compliance with Jacob Mathew guidelines for prosecuting medical professionals. The High Court analyzes whether cognizance was properly taken, whether delay can be condoned under Section 473 Cr.P.C., and whether an inquiry into negligence requires gross negligence. It ultimately quashes the earlier cognizance due to lack of sanction but directs fresh cognizance once sanction obtained (28.09.2019) and allows further investigation under Annexure A6, preserving justice for victims and ensuring fair proceedings for the accused.
The High Court of Kerala (Single Judge: Johnson John, J.) hears MACA 521/2019 challenging an MACT award directing pay-and-recovery by the insurer from the owner and driver of a light motor vehicle auto rickshaw after payment of the amount to the claimant. The injury petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arose from an accident on 27.02.2011 involving KL-51/A-1990 autorickshaw. The MACT held the driver negligent and, since the driver held a LMV licence, allowed pay-and-recovery against the owner and driver, with the insurer as the statutory defaulter. The appellant-owner argues that a LMV licence suffices to operate an auto rickshaw, referencing Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and Sjaji v. Pradeesh, which hold there is no need for a separate endorsement for the transport vehicle class. The insurer counters with the Kerala High Court’s own 2018 M.A.C.A 2055 decision, and the Supreme Court’s Bajaj Alliance decision on licensing issues, as well as moot points about retrospective vs prospective operation. The Court analyzes MV Act provisions (Sections 166, 10(2)(d), 10(2)(e), 3(1), 2(21)), Kerala MV Rules, 1989, and the 1994 Amendment, ultimately holding that LMV licence holders may operate transport vehicles below 7500 kg, and that the Bajaj Alliance principle need not be given a retroactive effect. The appeal is allowed and the pay-and-recovery direction is quashed to the extent it seeks recovery from the owner/driver.
The Kerala High Court, in MACA No. 1803 of 2012, entertained an appeal by Purushothaman M.S. against an award of Rs. 66,300 made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta, in OP(MV) No. 135/2007, arising from a motor vehicle collision on 11 December 2006. The claimant sustained serious injuries while riding a motorcycle and sought enhanced compensation. The Tribunal awarded compensation across heads including Rs. 30,600 for permanent disability, Rs. 9,000 for loss of earnings, and Rs. 10,000 for pain and suffering, with 7.5% interest. The appellant challenged the disability assessment, arguing the Medical Board’s 5% whole-body disability under the McBride Scale should be replaced by 23% per the NIOH Scale, particularly as a loading worker. He also urged the Tribunal’s income assessment of Rs. 3,000 per month be raised to Rs. 5,500, citing Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. The Tribunal had relied on the McBride Scale and fixed income at Rs. 3,000. The High Court did not disturb the Tribunal’s approach to disability but recalculated the economic loss using the higher income (Rs. 5,500) and a 17-year multiplier, yielding a total enhanced sum of Rs. 92,600 against Rs. 49,600, an increment of Rs. 43,000. The appeal was allowed with enhanced compensation, 7.5% interest, and set-off for any paid amounts, with directions to transfer via NEFT/RTGS after furnishing bank details.
This MACA arises from an award by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, in O.P.(MV) No.2261/2007, concerning a fatal bus accident on 07.07.2007 in which T. P. Joseph, a Postal Department employee, died following injuries sustained when a KSRTC bus, driven by its employee, allegedly in a rash and negligent manner, struck an electric post. The appellants, being dependents of the deceased (wife, children and mother as guardian for the minor), claimed compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, alleging liability of the bus owner (KSRTC) and vicarious liability for the driver. The Tribunal partly allowed the petition, awarding Rs.11,51,872 with interest and costs. The appellants challenged the quantum, contending that the income of the deceased, his age, and the future prospects warranted greater compensation under the established law (Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi), including 30% future prospects and 1/4 deduction for personal living expenses. The Tribunal had fixed the monthly income at Rs.9,867 and used a multiplier of 13. The High Court recalculated losses of dependency at Rs.15,00,770, allowed enhanced conventional heads (funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate, and others), and disallowed duplicative claims for love and affection. It also applied the 10% escalation rule on conventional heads from recent Supreme Court judgments and awarded a total of Rs.17,65,770, with interest and costs, directing deposit before the Tribunal within 60 days and a specific disbursement ratio among the dependents. The appeal was allowed to the extent of enhanced compensation and directed disbursement.
The batch of writ petitions before the High Court of Kerala arises from the payment of FL-11 licence fees for Abkari Year 2017-2018 and FL-3 fees under revised policy for 3- and 4-star hotels. Petitioners, namely Parays Holiday Hotels Pvt. Ltd.; Broad Bean Hotel; Chola Huts; Rojan Chacko; Hotel Cloud 9; N. Satheeshkumar; and Manju Rajeev, had remitted substantial sums towards renewal of FL-11 licences (vending of beer/wine) for premises situated along highways, but could neither renew nor operate the licences during 2017-2018 owing to a nationwide embargo triggered by a Supreme Court decision in Tamil Nadu v. Balu and later clarified in Arrive Safe Society of Chandigarh v. UT Chandigarh. Kerala’s policy change vide G.O. 43/2017/TD allowed FL-3 licences for certain hotels, and the petitioners availed this benefit, remitting around Rs. 28.8 lakh; licences were issued, yet FL-11 licences were not renewed or operable. Petitioners argued that since the non-utilisation was due to factors beyond their control and/or court directions for only a part of the financial year, they were entitled to a refund or at least a set-off against future licence fees. Respondents contended there is no statutory provision for refunds and amounts were credited to the exchequer. The Court examined precedents such as Chitra v. State of Kerala and Yesar Regency, underscoring the principle that refunds may be due when a license cannot be used due to extraneous reasons, and directed consideration of refund/adjustment within three months. The judgment hinges on equitable remedies, not mere technicalities, and emphasizes the State’s duty to act justly toward citizens in similar circumstances.