These writ appeals challenge a Kerala High Court single-judge order (dated 29 September 2021) that allowed two writ petitions filed by CISF personnel stationed at Cochin Port Trust and directed the government to grant Transport Allowance (TA) notwithstanding the existence of government transport facilities. The petitioners contended that they commute from residence to the unit armory and from there to vantage points with armed transport, often returning after duty hours via the unit armory, and that the current policy requiring TA only where no campus or government transport exists led to discriminatory treatment. They relied on Ext. P1 (03.10.1997) which restricted TA to employees with campus housing within 1 km or on-campus work-residence proximity, and Ext. P2 (29.08.2008) issued after the 6th Central Pay Commission relaxing that distance rule, arguing TA should be available irrespective of distance if government transport was not provided for the entire journey. The petitioners highlighted that several CISF units in Kerala ( eleven cited) grant TA even where government transport is available for portions of the journey, signaling hostile discrimination against Cochin Port Trust personnel. The respondents contended that TA is not payable where government transport is provided and relied on case law and policy, including Delhi High Court precedents. The High Court bench ultimately held the matter requires fresh re-evaluation by executive authorities rather than judicial resolution of merits, directing a reconsideration by the Ministry of Home Affairs and permitting representations within three months, while setting aside the impugned judgment and disposing of the appeals.
This writ appeal arises from a Kerala High Court decision under the Sand Act challenging a 2011 confiscation order against a goods vehicle (KL-5Y-2900) for allegedly transporting river sand. The vehicle was seized in January 2010 by a revenue squad. An initial confiscation order under Rule 27 of the Kerala Sand Rules, 2002 and Section 23A of the Sand Act was issued with liberty to release on deposit of Rs. 6.5 lakh. The High Court subsequently quashed the order in a writ petition (W.P.(C) No.16239 of 2011) on grounds that the sand was ordinary sand, not river sand, and that Ext.P10’s river-sand finding was not conclusively proved; Ext.P17 indicated no sampling at Kottayam during a specific period. The Revenue authorities then issued Ext.P13, again directing confiscation with the same deposit condition. The State contended that the writ petition should be dismissed in limine due to efficacious remedies under Sections 23B and 23C of the Sand Act, and that reliance on the Assistant Geologist’s cross-examination was misplaced since Section 23A does not provide for witness examination. The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the writ appeal, upholding the confiscation order and restricting the applicability of Sand Act remedies to the river-sand context, thereby sustaining the authorities’ action.
WP(C) Nos. 23 of 2023; 92 of 2023; 113 of 2023; 189 of 2023; 785 of 2023 (connected cases) This batch of writ petitions challenges seizure of tipper lorries and excavators allegedly used in illegal mining under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015. The petitioners contend that the seized vehicles were idle and not loaded with minerals; the JCBs were not excavating minerals, and the seizures were thus unwarranted. They rely on the court's own earlier decision in W.P.(C) No.40240 of 2022, which held that vehicles seized at a quarry without being loaded cannot be treated as offences and should be released. The Respondents counter that Section 21(4) of the MMD Act authorizes seizure of any vehicle or equipment used to raise or transport minerals without lawful authority and that Rules 25-26 of the Kerala Rules require Mineral Transit Passes; they also cite Government Order GO(Ms) No.51/2017/ID (2017) on compounding of offences. The judgment examines these provisions, concludes that mere presence of vehicles at a quarry does not establish an offence, and that the compounding regime cannot justify seizure absent evidence of illicit mining. The court ultimately allows the petitions and directs immediate release of the vehicles, clarifying the scope of seizure in such cases.
WP(C) Nos. 29890/2018 & 41327/2018 Two writ petitions by retired Union Bank of India employees—M.K. Ravindran and C. Gokulraj—allege that their pensions are not being updated in accordance with pay-band increases. They contend that the Union Bank of India (Employees) Pension Regulations, 1995, particularly Regulation 35(1) as amended on 18 May 2002, mandate that basic pension and any applicable additional pension shall be updated as per the formula in Appendix I, with Regulation 56 allowing reference for guidance to Central Civil Service Rules or similar pension patterns when doubts arise. The petitions trace the pension scheme back to a 1993 Memorandum of Settlement between banks and employee unions, intended to mimic Central Government/RBI patterns. They argue that the pension fund has grown substantially (over Rs. 11,000 crores by 31.03.2017) while only a small portion of the fund is used for ongoing pension payments (about 23.91%), leaving a large surplus that should be harnessed to provide timely updation. They rely on judicial pronouncements such as D.S. Nakara, Sudhir Chandra Sarkar, and State of Jharkhand v. Srivastava to contend that pension is a vested right and, in constitutional terms, akin to property under Article 300A. They further contend that the refusal to upd ate contravenes the principle that pension is not a gratuitous bounty. The respondents argue that Regulation 35(1) already prescribes updating strictly per Appendix I, and that reliance on RBI or CCS patterns is not mandated; Singla’s decision is cited but distinguished. The court finally disposes of the petitions with a direction to petitioners to submit representations and for the bank to consider them within two months, preserving the petitioner’s rights while avoiding a premature directive to recalculate pensions.
W.P.(C) Nos. 82/2021, 155/2021, 509/2021, 496/2021, 497/2021, 489/2021, 285/2021 & 318/2021 This is a Kerala High Court judgment delivering on WP(C) Nos. 82/2021 and connected petitions, all challenging a common Labour Court order dated 19.11.2020 that quashed a domestic enquiry conducted against several Trivandrum Club employees. The petitioner is the Trivandrum Club, a society registered under the Travancore Cochin Literary and Scientific Charitable Societies Act, 1955, represented by its Honorary Secretary. The Labour Court held that the enquiry officer’s proceedings were defective, failing to address each charge separately and temporarily consolidating charges, which it found to be prejudicial to the workers and arbitrary. The High Court judge, Raja Vijayaraghavan V, observed that the Chelamattom Sree Krishna Swami Devaswom Trust v. State of Kerala (2022 (4) KLT 90) had lamented entertaining writ petitions challenging preliminary Labour Court orders and urged relegation to the Labour Court for culmination with the final award, while noting St. Thomas Missions Hospital v. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT 415) as a cited authority. Ultimately, the High Court declined to interfere with the Labour Court’s order, disposed of the writ petitions, and reserved the petitioner’s right to challenge the preliminary order along with the final order.
Shameer, the petitioner and owner of 3.33 ares in Narukara Village within the limits of Manjeri Municipality, seeks a building permit for a residential structure. The municipality declined the permit under Ext.P3 dated 27.02.2016 on the ground that the land falls within a Development/Town Planning Scheme (DTP Scheme) and is required for road widening. The petitioner contends the Ext.P3 order is arbitrary and illegal since the scheme is unworkable, and relies on the apex court’s decision in Raju S. Jethmalani v. State of Maharashtra and others to argue that developmental schemes cannot override rightful ownership. Following that judgment, the State introduced the Kerala Town and Country Planning Act, 2016 to address issues including land within master plans and schemes. The petitioner urges Section 67 of the 2016 Act, which provides a purchase notice mechanism when land designated for compulsory acquisition is not being acquired within two years, and allows the owner to seek purchase by the Municipality/Department. The court acknowledges the Act and leaves open the petitioner’s liberty to initiate proceedings under Section 67, while noting that building permits must be processed according to law, particularly after the 2019 Rules replacing the 1999 Rules. The court disposes of the writ petition with directions that the municipality must consider permits in light of Section 67 and the applicable Rules, dehors the scheme if required.
WP(C) Nos. 82/2021, 155/2021, 509/2021, 496/2021, 497/2021, 489/2021, 285/2021 & 318/2021 The judgment deals with a batch of writ petitions by the Trivandrum Club challenging a common preliminary order dated 19.11.2020 of the Labour Court, Kollam, quashing or setting aside domestic enquiry proceedings against eight workers. The Labour Court had found the proceedings defective because the enquiry officer, appointed for multiple workers, framed charges for convenience, failed to address each charge as a separate issue, and reduced the number of charges while not properly answering the framed issues. The Labour Court’s overall conclusion was that the enquiry was arbitrary and defective, and it directed the petitioner to prove the charges afresh. The Club argued that a single, common preliminary award on eight separate disputes was prejudicial and that the order was perverse and unsupported by evidence. It relied on established precedents, notably Chelamattom Sree Krishna Swami Devaswom Trust v. State of Kerala, to urge relegation to the Labour Court with liberty to challenge the preliminary order along with the final award. The respondent workers contended that the Labour Court’s approach was justified given the nature of the proceedings. In a detailed assessment, the learned Judge found no perversity in the Labour Court’s award and disposed of the writ petitions, while preserving the petitioners’ right to challenge the preliminary order along with the final order, as observed in Chelamattom supra.
This is a regular bail application (B.A. No.117/2023) under Section 439 Cr.P.C. in Crime No.825/2022, Alappuzha South Police Station, involving Ashik, the second accused, and another co-accused, who were allegedly found in possession of MDMA (137.69 grams) along with cash, ATM cards and a mobile phone. The prosecution charges the accused under NDPS Act, sections 22(c) and 29 (possession of contraband in a case involving a commercial quantity) and the matter involves the rider under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The bail plea was argued before Justice A. Badharudeen and finally heard on 10.02.2023, with the judgment delivered on 17.02.2023, denying regular bail. The defence raised an improbability in the prosecution case, pointing to Annexures IV and V (notably a tracking ID showing delivery at 3:49 p.m. on 24.09.2022 while the arrest was recorded at 14:50 hours the same day) and contending that such timing discrepancies undermine the prosecution’s version and thus negate the applicability of the Section 37 rider. The Public Prosecutor countered that the authenticity of Annexures IV–V is a matter for evidence and dismissed the improbability argument, maintaining that the NDPS rider should apply given the commercial quantity. The court analyzed Section 37, the twin conditions for bail (reasonable grounds to believe not guilty and non‑likely to commit offences on bail), and, applying precedents on “reasonable grounds” (not merely prima facie) and the conjoined requirements of Section 37, dismissed the bail petition, holding no reasonable grounds for innocence were established. The order culminates in dismissal of the petition and denial of bail.
This Original Petition (OP RC No. 1 of 2019) arises out of eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The landlord, K.S. Dominic, sought eviction of the tenant in O.S. 153 of 2010 before the Munsiff Court, Aluva. The defendant-tenant disputed maintainability on the ground that the tenanted premises lay in a jurisdiction where the Act applied, prompting withdrawal of the suit and a subsequent Rent Control Petition (RCP No. 33 of 2010) before the Rent Control Court, North Paravur. A misdescription of the property’s location occurred, with the building stated to lie in Karumalloor Panchayat though the relevant jurisdiction was Aluva West Village. The Rent Control Court concluded the property fell within its territorial jurisdiction, a finding affirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The tenant later pursued execution petitions (EP 259 of 2011) and subsequent applications challenging the decree as a nullity (EAs in 2014) and a review (IA 153 of 2018), all of which were dismissed. The central issue is whether objections to territorial jurisdiction can be raised for the first time in execution proceedings. Relying on CPC Section 21 and the Supreme Court dictum in Sneh Lata Goel, the Court held that such objections cannot be entertained in execution and dismissed the petition. The decision upholds Exts. P8, P13, and P15 and dismisses OP RC No. 1 of 2019.
Cont.Case (C) No. 21 of 2023 Cont.Case (C) No. 21 of 2023 arises from a contempt application filed by Muhammed Rafeeq, the husband of the first respondent, against the first respondent and her parents for wilful disobedience of custody orders issued by this Court in O.P.(FC) No. 566 of 2022. The 2022 judgment directed that the petitioner may interact with the child on Saturdays at the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Mannarkkad, and subsequent orders—dated 08.11.2022 (IA 1/2022) and 20.12.2022 (RP 1095/2022)— modified interim custody, permitting the petitioner to take the child to his home on Saturdays between 10:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m., with the second Saturday replaced by the second Friday and the child to be produced for visits accordingly. The petitioner alleged that the respondents wilfully failed to produce the child on 05.11.2022, 17.12.2022, 24.12.2022, and 31.12.2022. The respondents argued that they did not wilfully disobey, claiming they believed the petitioner was allowed to meet the child at the court premises and that they had no authority from counsel to permit the child's removal. After hearing, the Court held that the alleged disobedience was not wilful, citing S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman and other precedents on wilfulness. The Contempt Case is closed; any enforcement of custody orders may be sought in the Family Court, Palakkad. This ruling clarifies that mere noncompliance or a mistaken belief about the terms does not amount to wilful disobedience.
This is an appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act challenging Annexure-A6 order of the Special Judge, Pathanamthitta denying anticipatory bail to accused Nos.5 and 6 in Crime No.1250 of 2021. The prosecution alleges that the accused, not belonging to Scheduled Castes or Tribes, formed an unlawful assembly armed with wooden lathes and granite pieces, trespassed into the defacto complainant’s courtyard in Pathanamthitta, and, in furtherance of their common object, assaulted the complainant (a member of the Hindu Kurava community, a Scheduled Caste) and his wife, causing serious injuries including a fractured arm, tooth dislocations, and other injuries. The charges include offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 447, 294(b), 324 and 326 read with Section 149, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that anticipatory bail is barred by Sections 18 and 18A of the SC/ST Act, while the appellants contend for bail on innocence and the possibility of surrender. The High Court, applying the Supreme Court’s pronouncements (notably Prathvi Raj Chauhan) and the settled law that prima facie materials triggering arrest bar anticipatory bail under Sec.18/18A, holds that there is a prima facie case and the bar applies. It sustains the Special Judge’s dismissal of anticipatory bail. The appeal is therefore dismissed and the appellants directed to surrender and proceed under law.
BAIL APPL. NO. 115 OF 2023 This High Court of Kerala bail application under section 438 Cr.P.C. concerns Pradeepan K. S and Saji S. S, petitioners/accused in Crime No. 2554/2021 registered at Thiruvalla Police Station. The accused are alleged to have, along with two others, coerced and threatened the defacto complainant to obtain a title deed and money, with a total alleged unlawful gain of Rs. 8 lakhs and a transfer of Rs. 3 lakhs to the accused’s bank accounts; a mobile phone was taken from the complainant as well. The petitioners approached the court seeking bail while the investigation continued. The prosecution argued that custodial interrogation might be necessary for recovery of articles and to advance the inquiry. The petitioners’ counsel emphasized the seriousness of the allegations but highlighted the longstanding interim order not to arrest the petitioners and their cooperation with the investigation. The court recalled the well-settled principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, citing Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement to underscore fair trial. After weighing the facts, the court granted bail with conditions: the petitioners must appear for interrogation within ten days, and if arrest is proposed thereafter, they shall be released on bail on bonds of Rs. 50,000 with two solvent sureties each; they must appear before the IO on Mondays until the final report is filed, not leave India without permission, refrain from committing similar offences, and may have bail cancelled for breach of conditions.
B.A. Nos. 4241-4254 of 2025 This is a common order of the Kerala High Court by Justice P.V. Kunhikrishnan disposing of Bail Applications Nos. 4241 to 4254 of 2025 filed by the petitioner NIMI.I, the 5th accused in a constellation of cases across Thalassery, Payyannur, Mattannur, Pinarayi, Mayyil, Chakkarakkal and other police stations. The petitioner, in custody since 12.03.2025, is accused in multiple offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 and the Indian Penal Code (IPC), including offences under sections 406, 420, 468, 471, 465 and 34 IPC, and in some cases under sections 318, 338, 61 and 3(5) of the BNS, connected to promises of railway jobs through alleged scams. The learned Judge heard the petitioner and the Public Prosecutor and noted the seriousness of the allegations, including the purported large sums paid to obtain back-door railway appointments. However, guided by the long-standing principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, as enunciated in decisions such as Chidambaram, Jalaluddin Khan, Manish Sisodia and Anzar Azeez, the Court directed bail in the present petitions. The order prescribes: release on bond of Rs 50,000 with two solvent sureties; the petitioner shall cooperate with the investigation, appear as required, not leave India, and refrain from committing similar offences. The Court also clarifies that the observations are for deciding this bail application, and non-compliance can lead to cancellation of bail. The petitions are disposed of by common order with the bail granted under supervision of the jurisdictional court.
This is a Criminal Misc. Case (CRL.M.C. No.149 of 2023) before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, brought by the petitioner-accused Greik Xavier in relation to FIR No.865/2011 registered at Angamaly Police Station. The offence charged is under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC. The parties, who were married in 2011 and later separated, settled most disputes through mediation and a subsequent family court settlement culminating in a divorce decree dated 19.08.2014 (OP No.283/2014). The settlement included maintenance and other financial arrangements, and other litigations were closed. Respondent No.4 initially filed a complaint which led to registration of the FIR; the CD file was forwarded to Mundgod, Karnataka, since the occurrence is within Karnataka’s territorial limits. Notably, no final report has been submitted in the case as of the date of the petition. The court invokes Article 21 of the Constitution, emphasizing the right to a speedy and fair trial, citing Maneka Gandhi, Hussainara Khatoon, and Abdul Rehman Antulay, among others, to frame a balancing approach. It observes a twelve-year delay with no progress, and, given the settlement and the lack of prosecutorial interest, holds that continuation would amount to abuse of process. Consequently, the petition is allowed and all further proceedings are quashed.
This MACA arises from a motor vehicle accident compensation dispute under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The appellant challenged a MACT award of Rs 6,51,172, alleging miscalculation and urging enhancement based on higher notional income, 40% future prospects, and a higher disability rating. The accident occurred on 08.06.2003 when the appellant, riding scooter KL 04 C 9584, was struck by a car driven rashly. The Tribunal held negligence by the driver and awarded compensation with the insurer directed to pay. The appellant contends the income should be Rs 7,000 per month (supported by Exts A10, A14-A17) rather than Rs 6,000, and that disability should be recognized at 21.6% rather than 21%. The insurer argues the Tribunal’s income figure is reasonable. On appeal, the High Court re-evaluates notional income, disability, and heads of damage. It fixes Rs 7,000 as notional monthly income, applies 40% future prospects under Pranay Sethi and the Sarla Verma multiplier (16), increases pain and suffering to Rs 75,000 and loss of amenities to Rs 40,000, and results in a total of Rs 8,77,677. The appeal is allowed in part, directing deposit of the enhanced amount with interest and costs, to be disbursed to the appellant.
This is an OP(C) No.2387/2022 filed before the Kerala High Court at Ernakulam by K.M. Laji challenging the Munsiff Court, Varkala’s order dated 16 November 2022 in I.A.6/2022 in OP(ELE) No.9/2021 (Election Petition). The core dispute concerns the admissibility of Exts A2 to A11(a) marks placed through the first respondent’s chief affidavit. The petitioner alleges that Ext P4 (the impugned order) is illegal because the trial court did not apply the four‑stage test for reliance on documents, namely marking, admissibility, proof, and evaluation, as laid down in PRS Hospital (M/s.) Thiruvananthapuram and Another v. P. Anil Kumar (2021 KHC 1). Mere marking does not render contents proved, and contents must be proved by the person who wrote them or is aware of them before a court can rely on them. The petition sought to set aside Ext P4 and allow Ext P3 so that Exts A2–A11(a) are subjected to the proper four-stage scrutiny. The High Court held that the lower court failed to apply the PRS Hospital standard, set aside Ext P4, allowed Ext P3, and directed the trial court to consider admissibility, proof and evaluation of Exts A2–A11(a) before deciding on their evidentiary acceptance. The court also reminded the parties of a six‑month disposal timeline per a prior direction (OP(C) No.1225/2021).
This is an Original Petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the Family Court, Kollam’s order in E.A.101/2021 in E.P. No.2/2020 in O.S. No.230/2003. The Family Court’s 6 December 2021 order, in the execution proceedings arising from a long-drawn matrimonial suit, dealt with whether to dismiss the EP as not maintainable. The underlying suit (O.S.230/2003) was decreed on 15 March 2011 partly in favour of the plaintiffs, directing the return of 68.937 sovereigns of gold ornaments or their equivalent value, and monetary amounts against the defendants, with the appellate decree of 26 August 2019 modifying interest and apportioning liability among the defendants. The petitioners contend that the respondents’ claim in the EP seeks more than the decree allowed (Rs.3,60,000) and thus exceeds the decree’s scope; they rely on precedents stating that the Execution Court cannot go beyond the decree, except that trial courts may grant alternative relief. The court, however, clarifies that the term “present value” refers to value at the time of payment, and that execution can target the value as of the filing of the EP, merging of the appellate decree, and the need for clear quantification in decrees to avoid disputes. The Original Petition is dismissed, with the respondents held entitled to the value of the gold ornaments as of the EP filing date.
This High Court of Kerala, in a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No.72 of 2023), considers quashing Annexure-A3 complaint in CC 2717/2016 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-XII, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner, Jeevan Telecasting Corporation Ltd., represented by its authorized signatories, contends that the liability underpinning the dishonored cheque issued to the complainant has largely been discharged, evidenced by a payment of Rs. 30,00,000 via RTGS on 30.12.2015 against a cheque for Rs. 5,89,890 dated 21.11.2014. It is argued that the substratum of the complainant’s case has thus disappeared, rendering continued prosecution an abuse of process and warranting quashing, under Section 482 CrPC. The respondents, particularly the complainant and the State, counter that bank remittances do not conclusively prove discharge of liability towards the cheque and that, despite payments, the matter requires evidence at trial to establish whether the liability was discharged in full or in part. The court surveys established law on when process can be quashed, citing Nagawwa and a line of decisions culminating in the principles that (i) allegations must prima facie constitute an offence; (ii) the allegations must not be absurd; (iii) the process should not be capriciously issued; and (iv) defects such as lack of sanction can be fatal. The judge applies these tests and ultimately rejects the quashing, holding the petition meritless and dismissing the Crl.M.C., while emphasizing cautious use of quashing powers and leaving the trial to determine factual disputes about discharge of liability.
W.P.(C) No. 31039 of 2019; W.P.(C) No. 8715 of 2021 This common judgment disposes of two writ petitions concerning the Cochin Devaswom Board’s Ext.P1 circular dated 31 August 2019 amending by-laws for granting/renewing lease and licence in shop rooms owned by the Board, and the related question of annual rent revision. The petitioners, occupying shop rooms in Shiva Sakthi Building and Kailasom Shopping Complex in Thrissur, challenge the circular on grounds of arbitrariness and lack of market-based fixation, seeking quashing and a mandamus to refrain from yearly rent revision. The respondents counter that the circular stems from audit notes highlighting under-valuation of rents and rampant subletting; it was issued after due consideration and has since been implemented in several complexes. The court surveys constitutional remedies under Article 226 and reviews authorities cited in trust law, temple guardianship, and fiduciary duty to protect deities and their properties. It emphasizes that Devaswom Boards act as trustees and guardians, not mere landlords, and must ensure income at or above market rates. Relying on precedents like M.V. Ramasubbiar, A.A. Gopalakrishnan, and Travancore Devaswom Board cases, the court holds that the challenged circular cannot be sustained in its present form and directs refixation of rent at market value after hearing. It mandates prompt Board action with two-week and two-month timelines and clarifies that sub-tenants or violators are exempt from these directions.
The central issue concerns whether the Principal of an affiliated private college in Kerala can be appointed otherwise than under the UGC Regulations for maintaining standards in higher education. The appellant, Aleyamma Kuruvila, a senior teacher at St. Thomas College, Ranny, was promoted to Principal with effect from 01.04.2020. The University did not approve the appointment, stating that the post of Principal must be filled in accordance with the UGC Regulations on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2018, which provides for direct recruitment and not promotion. The Manager of the College argued in Ext.P5 that Section 59(2) of the Mahatma Gandhi University Act enables appointment by promotion as well, and that Regulations do not prohibit promotion; as a minority college, it contended Article 30(1) protects its prerogative to appoint a principal of its choice. The University maintained that the Regulations bind all affiliated colleges under the UGC Act, that promotion is not permitted, and that the college, being aided, is bound by these standards. The learned Single Judge upheld the University’s view, but the Division Bench ultimately held that the UGC Regulations are controlling and Section 59(2) is inoperative in the face of central standards. The writ appeal is dismissed, reinforcing that affiliated colleges must adhere to UGC regulations for Principal appointments; Article 30(1) arguments were not accepted as overriding mandatory standards.
