This intra-court writ appeal questions whether the CGST/SGST Act permits a proper officer to issue a composite show-cause notice aggregating multiple assessment years under Section 74. The petitioner, M/S Tharayil Medicals, received Ext.P1 show-cause dated 5.8.2024 for five years (2017-18 to 2021-22), proposing to initiate proceedings under Section 74(10) with alleged misapplication of HSNs and incorrect tax rates, resulting in a proposed tax liability of Rs. 21,13,080 (CGST 10,56,540; SGST 10,56,540). Relying on Karnataka’s Bangalore Golf Club decision and Lakshmi Mobile Accessories, the petitioner contended that consolidated notices are impermissible and each year requires independent proceedings; the learned Single Judge directed year-specific replies. The Division Bench examined rival authorities, including decisions from Karnataka, Madras, Bombay, and Kerala. It held that separate show-cause notices must be issued for each assessment year since each year has distinct facts and limitation timelines under Section 74(10). Consolidation would impair the assessee’s ability to present year-specific defenses and could bypass Section 73. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed in part: Ext.P1 as to 2018-2019 to 2021-2022 is set aside; Ext.P1 as to 2017-2018 is sustained, with directions to proceed after a reply within three weeks and adjudication within one month, and to issue separate notices for other years if applicable.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA) before the Kerala High Court arising from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, in O.P.(M.V.) No.149/2007. The petitioners, legal heirs of Kuriachan who died in a road accident on 26.11.2006, challenged the quantum of compensation awarded and the Tribunal’s finding of negligence against the driver. The Tribunal held that negligence was established and awarded Rs.5,25,000 as total compensation. The appellants contested the amount, arguing the assessment did not reflect the deceased’s actual income and the law on compensation should follow Supreme Court guidance. Key issues included notional income of the deceased (fixed by the Tribunal at Rs.3,500 per month, while the petition claimed Rs.5,000), future prospects, and the appropriate multiplier. The High Court relied on Ramachandrappa for notional income (Rs.5,500 in 2006), added 25% for future prospects, applied a 14 multiplier per Sarla Verma, and accounted for deductions for living expenses. It recalculated loss of dependency to Rs.8,66,250, and adjusted several heads (loss of estate, funeral, loss of consortium, love and affection, pain and suffering). The Court concluded with a total award of Rs.11,73,050 and allowed the appeal in part, directing deposit and disbursement under specified terms.
BAIL APPL. NO.4896 OF 2025 This is a bail application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) filed by five petitioners accused in Crime No. 320/2025 of the Vadanappally Police Station, Thrissur Rural. The petitioners face offences under sections 85, 115(2), 118(1), 351 and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Snahita (BNS), 2023, which are matrimonial in nature. The prosecution asserts that the accused mentally and physically harassed the de facto complainant, and there are other matrimonial disputes pending between the parties. The High Court heard the matter and concluded that, given the facts and circumstances, the petitioners may be released on bail subject to stringent conditions. Relying on established bail jurisprudence, the court reiterates that bail is the rule and jail the exception, citing Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement, Anzar Azeez v. State of Kerala, Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh, and Manish Sisodia v. CBI, among others, to justify careful judicial oversight of pre-arrest and post-arrest conduct. The order notes that arrest should not be routine and that the court may impose conditions to safeguard the investigation and the rights of witnesses and victims. The petition is allowed with conditions: appearance before IO within two weeks, Rs.50,000 bond with two solvent sureties, cooperation with investigation, non-leave of India without permission, no commission of similar offences, and other protective measures. The decision is rendered by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court (P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.).
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA 214/2014) arising from an O.P. (MV) No.1840/2007 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, concerning injuries suffered by the petitioner on 12.05.2007 in a bus accident involving a Government-registered bus. The Tribunal for Motor Accidents Claims at Perumbavoor awarded Rs. 2,28,395 as compensation after finding negligence by the driver and accepting the insured status, with the insurer directed to pay. The appellant, who died during the pendency of the appeal, is represented by his legal heirs as additional appellants. The major ground of challenge is the computation of compensation, particularly notional income used for loss of earnings. Relying on Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram, the appellants seek a higher notional income (Rs.6,000/month in 2007 for a coolie) and enhanced heads of damages. The court also considers whether future prospects should be included (finding no prospects given the age of 60) and applies multiplier rules per Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi. The judgment enhances several heads: pain and suffering, loss of amenities, extra nourishment, and disability, and corrects the period and rate of interest, ultimately directing a total of Rs.3,32,495 with interest and costs. The appeal is allowed in part, and monetary relief is recalibrated accordingly.
CRL.M.C. Nos.4170 & 4222/2021 Two Criminal Miscellaneous Cases (Crl.M.C. Nos. 4170/2021 and 4222/2021) were heard together under Section 482 CrPC before the Kerala High Court, challenging proceedings in two connected cases before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class—Kollam. Crime No. 105/2021 (Eravipuram PS) involves the petitioner in Crl.M.C. No. 4222/2021 and relates to penetrative sexual assault and related acts alleged against the accused in a clinical setting, carrying offences under IPC sections 342, 354B, 354 and 376(2)(b). Crime No. 96/2021 (Eravipuram PS) involves the petitioners in Crl.M.C. No. 4170/2021 and encompasses offences under IPC sections 294(b), 323, 324 and 448 read with 34. The defacto complainant in Crime No. 105/2021 is the wife of one petitioner in 4170/2021, while the accused in 96/2021 includes the husband of the defacto complainant in 105/2021, linking the two prosecutions. The petitions argue for quashing on the basis of a mutual settlement between the parties, supported by affidavits, contending the matter should be put to rest. The Public Prosecutor opposes it, emphasizing the gravity of the alleged rape and that not all offences are compoundable. Citing Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Court notes that settlements may justify quashing in certain civil-flavour offences, but it holds that rape is grievous and cannot be quashed merely on settlement. Ultimately, the Court declines to quash and dismisses both petitions as the offences are serious and the settlements do not justify termination of proceedings.
This is a supervisory challenge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by Lekshmi, wife of ShafeeK, against a common order of the Family Court, Chavara dated 16.03.2021 in I.A Nos. 2059/2019 and 2066/2019 in OP No. 380/2019. The Family Court had previously granted an ex parte decree of divorce under Section 27(1)(b) of the Special Marriage Act read with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act on 29.07.2019. Thereafter the husband moved to set aside the ex parte decree and to condone the delay by filing I.A Nos. 2059/2019 and 2066/2019, which were allowed in Ext. P5 by common order on payment of Rs. 10,000 as costs. The petitioner contends Ext. P5 was erroneous and seeks to challenge it through IA Nos. 2 and 3 of 2021 (review petitions) and, in parallel, invokes Article 227 seeking supervisory relief. The respondent argues that the Rs. 10,000 paid (as per Ext. P6) satisfies the order and notes withdrawal of the amount by the petitioner; the pleadings indicate she has not yet obtained fresh instructions. The High Court relies on established Article 227 jurisprudence (Shalini Shyam Shetty; Jai Singh; K.V.S. Ram; Sobhana Nair) to hold that supervisory interference is limited and not an appellate function. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed, but with a direction that the Family Court consider IA Nos. 2 and 3 of 2021 within a month under the limited review framework.
The petitioner, Saleeja Beevi S, challenges the non-approval of her appointment as regular Part‑Time Lower Grade Urdu Teacher in the Maranad Native Upper Primary School, an aided institution managed by the 6th respondent. Appointed from 15.07.2006 against an anticipated post during a period when a government ban on appointments in additional division vacancies existed, her appointment was finally regularized with effect from 01.06.2011 under the competency package for deployed/protected teachers. The government had imposed a ban via G.O.(P)317/2005/G.Edn (17.08.2005) and later lifted it through G.O.(P)10/10/G.Edn (12.01.2010) subject to conditions, including a bond requirement from managers. The petitioner asserts that such cases have consistently been directed to deem the bond executed and to appoint from the protected list in proportion to the number of appointments approved during the ban, a position supported by this Court’s decisions in past judgments. Reliance is placed on the 2011 teacher’s package and judgments directing deeming of bonds where not executed. The Government submits that appointments in such vacancies must be apportioned 1:1 and that managers should have executed a bond, with some challenges pending in apex court. The Court ultimately disposes the petition with directions to consider Ext. P7 in light of Suma Devi’s doctrine, keeping all orders subject to final apex court orders.
CRL.M.C. No. 6332 of 2022 This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 CrPC before the Kerala High Court challenging Annexure-A1 complaint which led to registration of S.T. No. 1970/2020 in the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Changanacherry. The petitioner is the accused in the trial. The respondents are the State of Kerala and the original complainant, Mani Antony. The central issue is how to compute the limitation period for filing a complaint under section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for an offence under section 138 NI Act. The petitioner’s counsel argued that the legal notice was served on 22.04.2020 and the complaint was filed on 08.06.2020, allegedly after the statutory period, absent any condonation petition, rendering cognizance illegal and the complaint liable to be quashed. Reference is made to Econ Antri Ltd. v. Rom Industries Ltd. and Others and Saketh India Ltd. v. India Securities Ltd. The respondents contended the complaint was within time, arguing the period should be counted from 09.05.2020 after excluding the date of cause and effect of notice. The court follows the Econ Antri principle, holding that the 15-day payment period under 138(c) starts after the notice is received and that the one-month period under 142(1)(b) excludes the date on which the cause of action arises, counting from the next day. Applying this, the complaint was timely filed (08.06.2020), cognizance valid, and the petition to quash rejected. The Crl.M.C. is dismissed, and proceedings proceed in the trial court.
Petitioner Harrisons Malayalam Limited challenges an order of the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act directing payment of gratuity to Lalitha Shetty after 34 years of service (1973–2007). The gratuity was initially assessed at Rs.32,330 for 41 years; the authority’s 07.04.2011 order directed payment of gratuity with 10% simple interest, a decision upheld on 18.12.2012 by the Appellate Authority. The petitioner contends that gratuity was withheld for the estate premises not being vacant; respondent no.1 remained in possession of land and a line room; the petition asserts this does not justify withholding gratuity under the Act and seeks a remedy without coercive eviction. The petitioner relies on a Division Bench decision (W.A. No.2894/09) and connected cases, which held that the ‘holding-over’ principle cannot oust the management from its premises. This Court, however, disagrees with that dictum and notes it cannot be treated as a judgment in rem against Supreme Court authority. Citing Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu (SC) and other Supreme Court rulings on ‘settled possession,’ the judge reinforces that evictions must be carried out only through due process and, if needed, police assistance after gratuity is paid. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed, with the Tribunal’s directive preserved. The court directs that, on payment of gratuity, notices to vacate may be issued within one week; failure will permit lawful dispossession with police help.
28461/2018 (and connected cases) This batch of writ petitions before the Kerala High Court concerns KSRTC employees who were provisionally empanelled as drivers, conductors and mechanics and were regularised in terms of a bipartite agreement and subsequent Government orders. The petitions challenge KSRTC’s 2018 termination of several such regularised employees on the ground that the Government Orders imposing additional conditions for regularisation—specifically, ten years of service and 120 days of duty per year as on 21 December 2011 (with modifications via Government orders)—were not applicable to them or, if applicable, could not be applied retroactively. The Court recounts a long line of precedents, including Suresh Kumar v. State of Kerala (2013) and various Division Bench and Supreme Court rulings culminating in Civil Appeals No. 4435–4438/2017 (Supreme Court) which held that conditions for regularisation could be laid down prospectively and that such conditions may be imposed to regularise employees. The learned Judge ultimately disposes of the petitions by setting aside the impugned termination orders and directing KSRTC to grant hearing to petitioners to prove ten years of service and 120 days of duty up to 21.12.2011, with regularisation to follow if proven, and pension rights for those affected. The decision binds all petitioners, including those with earlier favourable judgments, through the Supreme Court’s authoritative ruling.
This is a Rent Control Revision filed under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 by Assad, the tenant, challenging orders of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, Ettumanoor, and the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kottayam. The Rent Control Court had held that the landlord was entitled to arrears of rent at Rs 5,000 per month for January 2012 to December 2012 and Rs 6,000 per month thereafter, directing eviction for arrears after due notices; the tenant deposited portions of arrears in 2012 and contended the rates and the appellate reasoning were erroneous. The Appellate Authority confirmed the eviction order in March 2021. The revision petition, argued before a Division Bench of Anil K. Narendran and C.S. Sudha on 11 July 2022, contends that the Rent Control Court’s rates and the subsequent reasoning are perverse and illegal and that the revisional court should reappraise the evidence. The landlord submits that the rent was mutually enhanced to Rs 5,000 from Jan 2012 to Dec 2012 and Rs 6,000 thereafter, which is supported by PW1 and not challenged in cross-examination; the default accrued and arrears were rightly adjudged. The High Court, after reviewing the law on revisional jurisdiction (Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Sivasubramaniam, Ubaiba, Hindustan Petroleum, Thankamony Amma), dismisses the revision, upholding the eviction order and refusing interference. The decision underscores that revisional jurisdiction is wide but not an appeal and cannot reweigh evidence; concurrent findings based on evidence do not warrant interference.
C.E.Appeal Nos. 1/2021, 2/2021, 3/2021, 4/2021, 5/2021 This batch of Central Tax & Central Excise appeals concerns the common order of the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Tribunal (South Zonal Bench, Bangalore) that allowed CENVAT credit for service tax paid on insurance services provided to banks by the Deposit Insurance & Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC) for deposits coverage. The Revenue (the Principal Commissioner of Central Tax & Central Excise, Kochi) contends that the DICGC insurance service is not an input service and questions the validity of allowing credit after amendments to the CENVAT framework; it argues that deposits/receipts fall within the negative list under Section 66D(n) and that the statutory evolution post-2011 (1 April 2011 onward) narrowed the scope of input services by excluding activities “relating to business.” The respondent bank, M/s South Indian Bank, supports the Tribunal’s finding, emphasizing that DICGC insurance is both mandatory and linked to the bank’s output service, and that the larger bench in South Indian Bank v. Commissioner, Calicut has held creditable. The Kerala High Court, in a joint judgment by S.V. Bhatti, J. and Basant Balaji, J., examines divergent tribunal opinions (Delhi, Mumbai, Calicut) and, applying the larger bench’s reasoning, upholds the Tribunal’s decision. It cites PNB Metlife and Shriram Life Insurance to illustrate nexus between insurance-related services and banking output services, and clarifies Rule 6(3B)’s 50% reversal. Consequently, the Revenue’s appeals are dismissed and the banks’ entitlement to credit affirmed across the batch.
W.P.(C) No. 17301/2020 (batch Nos. 17578/2020; 17837/2020; 18106/2020; 18356/2020; 18653/2020; 19080/2020; 22888/2020; 22995/2020; 23115/2020; 24264/2020; 24396/2020; 650/2021) This batch judgment, delivered by a three-judge bench of the Kerala High Court led by Chief Justice S. Manikumar, addresses whether a person who purchased a bit of paddy land after the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (Act 2008) can apply for reclamation under Section 5(3) read with Section 9 for constructing a residential building. The core issue is the meaning of “owner” in these provisions and whether post-enactment purchasers are entitled to such relief. Historical jurisprudence is reviewed: Thankachan v. District Collector (2017) held that the exemption is intended for the cultivator living on his own paddy land; Yousuf Chalil v. State of Kerala (2019) held that post-enactment purchasers could seek reclamation; Sudheesh R. v. State of Kerala (2020) and its line were discussed; Murali K. v. State of Kerala (2020) followed Yousuf Chalil. The Court ultimately upholds the Thankachan/Sudheesh R approach, holding that “owner” must be the owner as of 12.08.2008 for entitlement to relief under Sections 5(3) and 9, and that post-enactment purchasers are not entitled to such benefit. The judgment clarifies the restrictive approach and emphasizes the Act’s primary objective to conserve paddy lands, while partly allowing one petitioner (18356/2020) to have her LLMC order reconsidered in light of the new interpretation. The batch petitions are disposed accordingly: most are dismissed, while WP(C) 18356/2020 is allowed and remitted for reconsideration.
This WA 1828/2018 arises from a challenge to a Kerala High Court judgment in WP(C) 17066/2011, which granted Swatantrata Sainik Samman (SSS) Pension to K.K. Devaki, the widow of Thazhe Othayoth Krishnan, a recognized freedom fighter. The writ petition sought pension with arrears from the date of application (20 July 1998) under the SSS scheme, with the state/central authorities directed to sanction and pay from that date. The appellants, Union of India and the Deputy Secretary to Government of India (Freedom Fighter’s Division), contend that backdating to 1998 is unsustainable because verification and recommendation by the State Government were only completed in 2004, and that the pension can be granted only after proper verification, especially since the jail certificate itself could not be independently verified due to destroyed records. The single judge had relied on Bharathi Krishnan v. Union of India and Other, arguing that where primary evidence (jail certificate) exists, pension can be from the date of application; otherwise, from the date of order. The Division Bench ultimately agrees that the appellants’ challenge fails: the authorities had already granted pension from 2004 on the basis of the jail certificate and State verification, and there is no jurisdictional or legal error justifying interference. The appeal is dismissed, effectively upholding the lower court’s approach and the consequential pension entitlement from the date of application as ultimately recognized by the authorities."
The petitioner, M/S ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt Ltd, an infrastructure provider, seeks a Building Permit to construct a telecom tower at Re-Survey No. 191/10-2 in Thekkumbhagom village, Aluva taluk, Ernakulam. The petitioner submitted Building Permit application (Ext. P1). Local residents objected (Exts. P2–P3). The Grama Panchayat Committee passed Ext. P9, directing that a Building Permit should be granted only if the tower is to be erected in an uninhabited area, reflecting a population-centric restriction. The Government stayed Ext. P9’s decision (Ext. P10), and the matter was referred to the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions. The petitioner contends that the issue is covered by this Court’s decision in Antony K.P. v. Chellanam Grama Panchayat (2009 (3) KLT 334) and seeks a direction to the Secretary to process the permit in accordance with law. Respondents 4–6 (the Panchayat and its officials) defend the Panchayat’s decision, arguing it reflects larger public interest and that the Secretary should defer to the stay order and potential Tribunal proceedings. The court emphasizes independent exercise of statutory power and the Panchayat as appellate authority for building permit decisions, ultimately directing the Secretary to process the application in accordance with law and decide within one month, taking into account the stay and pending Tribunal reference.
W.P.(C) No. 17301/2020 & batch (and connected cases); 650/2021 This batch of writ petitions, heard by a three-judge bench of the Kerala High Court, questions whether a person who purchased a bit of paddy land after the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 came into force on 12 August 2008 is eligible to apply for reclamation under Section 5(3) read with Section 9 for constructing a residential building. The Court recalls the Act’s object of conserving paddy lands and wetlands and preventing their reclamation or conversion, subject to a limited statutory framework. Key provisions discussed include Sections 3(1) and 3(2) (prohibition on conversion/reclamation with carve-outs for intermediary crops), Section 5 (Local Level Monitoring Committee’s power to recommend reclamation to the District Level Authorized Committee, within prescribed area limits), and Section 9 (District Level Authorized Committee’s role, eligibility criteria, and prerequisites for any reclamation, including the condition that a Local Level Monitoring Committee’s recommendation is essential). The central interpretive issue is the meaning of “owner” in these provisions: whether it refers to the person who owned the land on 12.08.2008 or includes subsequent purchasers. The Court aligns with the earlier single-judge decisions (Thankachan, Sudheesh R) that post‑statute purchasers are not entitled to reclaim under the Act, distinguishing the Division Bench’s Yousuf Chalil decision. However, in one petition (Jinimol P, 18356/2020) it reinstates a remedy by directing reconsideration of the LLMC order. The petitions are largely dismissed, with Jinimol P’s case remanded for reconsideration consistent with the law laid down in this judgment. The judgment emphasizes purposive interpretation and the Act’s protective aim for paddy lands.
WA Nos.1690 & 1325 of 2022 This is a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court deciding two writ appeals (WA Nos. 1690 and 1325 of 2022) arising from a writ petition challenging Exts. P7 and P10, and seeking renewal of a Foreign Liquor FL-3 license for 2022-23. The petitioner-hotel obtained FL-3 license for 2019-20; due to the pandemic there were lockdowns and embargoes on bar hotels, leading to a period of non-operation. The proviso to Rule 13, as amended by G.O.(P).No.2/21/TD with SRO 22/21 (effective 08.01.2021), dis-entitled renewal for bar hotels remaining defunct for 6 months, later increased to 10 months. The writ petitioner paid the full license fee for 2020-21 (only two months of operation) and sought remission for the period it could not operate, relying on Chitra v. State of Kerala (2015) 3 KLT 956 (SC). The State contended remission is unavailable since Ext.P7 is in order and the proviso to Rule 13 applies, while the petitioner contended that pandemic-induced embargo and extraneous circumstances should be treated as in remission cases. The Court held that Chitra is distinguishable here, as the licensee’s defunct period resulted from voluntary non-application rather than extraneous interference. It dismissed WA1690, but in WA1325 set aside Ext. P10 to the extent it denied renewal for 2022-23, directing renewal upon payment of the balance fees within a week, dehors the proviso, with a three-day renewal after payment. The matter was disposed with costs against the parties.
This Kerala High Court Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (C.M.A. No. 228 of 2002) arises from O.S.210/1990 before the Additional Sub Court, Kollam. The appellants—S.M.A. Karim Foundation (plaintiff) and its principal Muthavalli K.A. Kabeer (substituted as A. Sainul Abdeen)—challenged an order (I.A.1180/2001) which reversed a previous order directing the plaint to be returned for presentation before the Wakf Tribunal, Kollam. The suit sought declaration of half the plaint schedule property in the plaintiff’s favour and partition; I.A.996/2001 had directed the plaint’s transfer to the Wakf Tribunal under the Wakf Act, with Section 85 cited as the bar to civil court jurisdiction. The 1st respondent contended that because the Wakf exists and the suit concerns a Wakf-related dispute, the Wakf Tribunal should adjudicate; arguing that since the suit was pending when the Wakf Act, 1995 came into force, civil court jurisdiction persisted. The court relied on Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari (2022) to emphasize Wakf Tribunal jurisdiction, and ultimately allowed the appeal, setting aside the 2002 order and restoring the 2001 order directing plaint return to the Wakf Tribunal. The result is that the plaint must be presented before the Wakf Tribunal (Kollam/Kozhikode).
CON.CASE(C) NO. 418 OF 2020 This Contempt of Court case is filed by eleven petitioners who were petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 40435/2016. They allege willful disobedience of the directions contained in Annexure A1 judgment dated 12.10.2018 in W.P.(C) No. 40435/2016 and connected matters, relating to Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) pension benefits. The Supreme Court’s judgment dated 04.11.2022 in Civil Appeals Nos. 8143-8144 of 2022 and connected matters (Sunil Kumar B.) upheld the legality of the G.S.R. 609(E) notification and read down certain scheme provisions; it directed steps to be taken regarding pension, option rights, and the extension of time to exercise options. Following the Apex Court’s decision, the present court notes that the entitlement to higher pension requires reconsideration by EPFO under law. The respondents submit that the EPFO should undertake such reconsideration in accordance with the 2022 judgment. Consequently, the contempt petition is closed, without prejudice to EPFO’s right to reconsider entitlement for higher pension consistent with the Supreme Court’s directions. The judgment underscores alignment with Article 142 and the 2014 amendment framework while safeguarding the petitioners’ and fund’s rights.
The appeal concerns Nusrathul Islam Juma-ath Committee, registered with the Kerala Wakf Board and under the Societies Registration Act, challenging the management by a predecessor committee headed by the 1st defendant and seeking declaration that specific A-schedule properties are Wakf properties and recovery of possession. The plaintiff contends that the 1st defendant fraudulently framed a by-law in 1961, registered under the Societies Registration Act, and, after subsequent by-laws, used that instrument to exercise control over the committee. The plaint asserts that A-schedule properties were acquired with plaintiff funds and for the benefit of the plaintiff; the 1st defendant allegedly alienated these properties without prior sanction of the Wakf Board, which was required for Wakf properties under the Wakf Acts in force (Sections 36(A) and 55). The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the A-schedule properties did not acquire Wakf status and that sanction was not required. On appeal, the High Court held that Wakf properties require prior sanction for alienation, but maintained civil court jurisdiction since the Wakf Tribunal did not exist at the relevant time. The court relied on Magnum Developers v. Lal Shah Baba Dargah Trust to uphold civil jurisdiction and distinguished Rashid Wali Beg v. Farid Pindari, noting the facts of timing. The appeal is ultimately dismissed, upholding the trial court’s decision.
