Rajesh Kumar, the petitioner, was the Kuthaka holder for selling pooja items at Chettikulangara Devi Temple for the 2021-22 period. He bid Rs 26,84,500 and remitted the first instalment (half) at the time of bid, followed by Rs 3,00,000 as the second instalment; however, he defaulted on the balance of Rs 10,42,000. He had previously approached this Court in W.P.(C)No.21234 of 2021 seeking mandamus to exempt him from payment during COVID-induced temple closures and to re-schedule instalments; Ext.P1 judgment (11.10.2021) directed consideration of Ext.P4 by the Board and the court later required payment of Rs 5,00,000 within three weeks as a condition for further consideration. The petitioner then challenged a decision denying remission for the year 2020-21 after deducting the EMD. The Travancore Devaswom Board relied on the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 (Sections 15A, 24, 31) and on financial constraints due to the pandemic, arguing for orderly collection and maintenance of Devaswoms. The judgment surveys a line of authorities on fiduciary duties, contractual frustration, and pandemic-related hardships (Harikumar G., Suresan Nair T.S., Abu K.S., Suneesh K.S., Thanath, etc.). It ultimately dismisses the petition, directing recovery of the balance due with 18% interest and initiation of revenue recovery measures, with consideration of blacklisting as may be warranted.
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by accused Nos. 1 and 2 challenging proceedings in C.C. No. 2430 of 2014 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate II Kollam, arising from FIR No. 1515 of 2014 at Kottiyam Police Station. The petition seeks to quash offences under sections 294(b), 323, and 324 r/w 34 IPC. The prosecution contends the dispute arose from a party function and that the accused manhandled the de facto complainant. The petitioners assert that the dispute has been settled and they do not wish to pursue the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor is cautious about relying solely on settlement to quash non-compoundable offences, but concedes the matter is settled. The court has examined the records and cites Supreme Court teachings in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, Gian Singh, and Narinder Singh, which lay down that Section 482 powers can quash non-compoundable offences when the dispute is private, civil in character, and the parties have settled. It cautions that such power is not to be exercised for heinous offences or offences under special statutes. The High Court’s analysis concludes that the present dispute is private and the settlement is acceptable. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and all further proceedings in CC 2430/2014 against the petitioners are quashed.
This writ petition (WP(C) No.2654 of 2020) before the Kerala High Court seeks pension contributions under the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) Pension Scheme, 1995 to be computed on the actual salary drawn by the petitioners rather than the maximum pensionable salary fixed under para 11(3). The petitioners, all retired KSBC employees, contend that pension benefits must be calculated based on actual earnings, and pray for a mandamus directing the 2nd and 9th respondents (EPFO) to collect contributions accordingly from the date of joining the pension scheme, and to resolve disputes so that pension is granted on the basis of actual salary. The respondents’ counsel submits that the issue has been settled by the Supreme Court in EPF Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B and Others (2022), and that relief should be exercised in light of that decision. The court notes the Supreme Court dictum and disposes the petition by directing competent respondents to re-consider the petitioners’ claims in the light of that decision within three months from receipt of a copy of this judgment. The order is a targeted remedy to ensure pension calculations align with actual salary, grounded in the EPF Act, the Pension Scheme, and the cited Supreme Court authority. The judgment is delivered by a Single Judge, Justice Murali Purushothaman.
Criminal Appeal No.123 of 2021 Abdul Rasheed, the sole appellant, challenges his conviction under Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, by the Palakkad Sessions Court. The prosecution case is based on a 15 February 2020 seizure of 21 kilograms of ganja at Palakkad Junction, when Excise Inspector PW1 intercepted the accused with two bags containing packets of ganja. The trial court framed the charge under NDPS and, after examining PW1–PW5, convicted the accused, imposing ten years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,00,000 with a default term of one year. The High Court’s analysis focuses on Section 52A of the Act, which prescribes a magistrate’s involvement in inventory, photographs, and sampling of seized narcotics as primary evidence. The appellant’s challenge rests on alleged non-compliance with these procedural requirements: the inventory (Ext.P9) and the application (Ext.P10) were not properly produced or certified; Ext.P16 photographs lacked magistrate certification; List II entries and Ext.P19 samples show discrepancies and timing issues; there was an unexplained delay in laboratory analysis; and the chain of custody of the sample was not established. The court recognizes that Section 52A is mandatory but emphasizes a holistic, cumulative evaluation of evidence. Ultimately, it acquits the appellant, setting aside the conviction and sentence and ordering his release, while acknowledging possible adverse inferences for non-compliance but deeming the remaining evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
This Kerala High Court OP (CAT) arises from Ext.P12, the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) order dated 07.11.2022 in MA 484/2020 in OA 923/2014, challenging fixation of the petitioner’s pay on his promotion from Kerala Police Service to the Indian Police Service (IPS). The petitioner, a retired IPS officer, contends that his pay fixation was fixed lower than his state-service scale, contrary to the principle laid down in Union of India v. T.M. Somarajan & Ors. (2010) 1 SCC 129, and the amended IPS (Pay) Rules 2007 as well as subsequent notifications. The CAT, in Ext.P1/M.A.3, accepted the Somarajan principle and directed fixations incorporating amendments to the IPS/IFS (Pay) Rules, 2007, with arrears. However, Ext.P12 (the CAT’s final order) upheld compliance with Ext.P1, a position challenged by the petitioner. The State Government, Accountant General, and Government pleaders argued that, as a result of a 2004 pay revision and subsequent DA mergers, deductions and different pay matrices apply, potentially placing the applicant at a higher Level-13 or beyond the JAG ceiling. The Kerala High Court finds the CAT order cannot stand and remits the matter to the CAT for fresh consideration in light of the Somarajan doctrine and 2007/2010 amendments, emphasizing that pay should not be reduced on induction to IPS and that arrears may be due. The petition is allowed with observations and directions.
This is an original petition under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act challenging Ext.P9 order in CMP No.4129/2022 in MC No.32/2020 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kochi, concerning interim maintenance for three children. The petitioner, Anju Antony, alleges that though the 1st respondent claimed lack of means, he runs a dental clinic with employees and significant EMI obligations, and that the appellate court’s maintenance direction (Rs. 30,000 per month) was justified by the family’s needs and the respondent’s means; the revision petition and the High Court’s directions had not resulted in timely payment. The appellate and revisional streams had upheld and confirmed maintenance against the respondent, and Ext.P9 was utilized to strike the defence for non-payment. The petitioner contends that the Magistrate’s order is casual and contrary to the findings of the First Appellate Court and this Court showing the respondent’s means to pay interim maintenance. The respondents contest Ext.P9, arguing the maintenance is excessive and that the defence should not be struck off, invoking Neethu v. Trijo Joseph and Rajenesh v. Neha to emphasize that striking a defence is warranted only for willful non-payment. The Kerala High Court ultimately holds that Ext.P9 cannot stand as framed and remands with a conditional direction, emphasizing that willful default is the controlling criterion for striking a defence and directing payment of arrears within a month or face striking of the defence; proceedings are deferred accordingly.
Omana Thomas filed F.A.O. No.75 of 2021 challenging an ex parte decree passed on 06.12.2019 in O.S. No.24 of 2017 before the Sub Court, Punalur. She sought to set aside the decree under Order IX, Rule 13 CPC (I.A. No.1/2020) and to condone a 303-day delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (I.A. No.2/2020). The respondents opposed the applications, arguing absence on 04.12.2019 and 06.12.2019, lack of medical evidence, and previous delays. The Sub Court dismissed both applications. The appellant produced Exts. A1–A4, including medical certificates and testimony indicating a road traffic accident on 25.06.2013 that caused serious injuries, loss of vision in the right eye, reconstructive surgery, diabetes complications, and restricted ambulation. The High Court, noting that the appellant sustained substantial physical disabilities affecting court attendance, treated Exts. A1–A4 and the oral evidence as credible. Relying on B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee and Rafeek v. K.Kamarudeen, the court held that the concept of “sufficient cause” under Section 5 is elastic and must serve substantial justice, not defeat it. The appeal was allowed with costs (Rs. 7,500) and O.S. 24/2017 restored; the Sub Court was directed to dispose of the suit within three months after furnishing a certified copy, with appearance mandated on 28.03.2022.
This Rent Control Revision arises from eviction proceedings under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, concerning the petition schedule room in which the tenant runs a hotel. The Rent Control Court held that the need projected by the fifth respondent (landlord’s son) for starting an interior designing firm was bona fide, and that the tenant was not protected by the second proviso since there was no proven livelihood dependence on the business. The court also rejected eviction under Section 11(4)(ii) for lack of evidence that the wastewater tank installation diminished the room’s value. On appeal, the Rent Control Appellate Authority set aside the first proviso finding, holding that the room behind the petition schedule room is not exclusively in PW1’s possession and affirmed eviction under Section 11(3) while upholding the second proviso non-applicability. The landlords challenged in revision under Section 20, arguing that the appellate order correctly applied the provisos and that the second proviso’s condition regarding livelihood was not proven. The High Court, after examining established authorities on bona fide needs and revisional limits, declined to interfere with the Appellate Authority’s order, but granted six months’ time to surrender vacant possession with conditions and arrears payment obligations.
Sarath G. Nair, proprietor of Surya Travels (an MSME), challenged the denial of benefits under the Emergency Credit Line Guarantee Scheme (ECLGS) 3.0. Between 15.11.2018 and 07.02.2020, ICICI Bank advanced 11 loans to the petitioner to purchase stage carriage vehicles. Covid-19 prompted relief measures, including ECLGS operated via the National Credit Guarantee Trustee Company Ltd. (NCGTC) to provide 100% guarantee coverage to lenders. ECLGS has four components; the petitioner contends eligibility for 3.0 because his MSME sector (travel/hospitality) falls within the scheme and his account showed past due status up to 60 days as of 29.02.2020. He argues that the term ‘property’ in the scheme should be read broadly to include movable security (vehicles) and that Ext. P5 guidelines and FAQ do not restrict LAP to immovable property; the bank’s Ext. P7 refusal relies on FAQ No. 141 asserting LAP as a condition for ECLGS 3.0. The respondents maintain that ECLGS 3.0 is LAP-based; the petitioner’s loans were vehicle loans secured by movable property, not LAP. The petition contends maintainability against a private bank under Article 226, relying on MSME objectives. The court ultimately held that the bank’s decision is consistent with the scheme and that maintainability cannot override the bank’s eligibility checks; the petition was dismissed.”
Petitioners 1–7 are permanent headload workers employed in the establishment of the 8th petitioner, Liya Traders, in a Kerala Headload Workers Act, 1978 scheme area. They sought registration as headload workers under the Kerala Headload Workers Act, 1978 and the Kerala Headload Workers Rules, 1981. Their applications before the Registering Authority were rejected on the ground that granting registration would prejudicially affect the livelihoods of existing headload workers registered under the Kerala Headload Workers Welfare Board scheme, and because the employer allegedly did not maintain the required documents. The petitioners challenged these orders under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Appellate Authority likewise declined to grant registration, citing the Board’s contention that the usual pool of registered workers could supply labour, and that registration would undermine the livelihoods of existing workers. The High Court held that registration is not restricted to those who were already headload workers; the right to engage in headload work is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6). Citing Rajeev v. District Labour Officer (2010) (4) KLT 783) and Manzoor v. District Labour Officer (2021) (5) KLT 554), as well as Prasanna Kumar v. District Labour Officer, the court clarified that the Registering Officer’s inquiry focuses on willingness to employ the applicant as a headload worker, not prior status. The court read down the law where necessary and held that the Board’s objections were perverse. Ext.P1 and Ext.P3 were set aside, and petitioners 1–7 were found entitled to registration as headload workers attached to Liya Traders, with identity cards issued under Section 26A of the Kerala Headload Workers Rules, 1981 within one month of receipt of the judgment.
This High Court of Kerala, sitting in a criminal misc. case under Section 482 CrPC, exercises its inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings against twelve petitioners (Sajeer, Asees, Anas, Musthaffa P.T.K., Shaheel, Noufal, Jamsheer, C. I. Fysal, Raffi, Muhammad Raffi, Noushid, Abdul Salam) in CC No. 233/2002 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nadapuram, arising from Crime No. 450/2011 of Kuttiyadi Police Station. The case, charged under multiple IPC provisions (sections 143, 147, 148, 506, 341, 427, 153A read with 149), has seen co-accused acquitted at trial. Petitioners contend that continuing the prosecution would be an abuse of process, as the substratum of the case has been shattered by those acquittals, and no useful purpose would be served. The Public Prosecutor opposes quashing, arguing that the exercise of Section 482 is discretionary and the trial should proceed. The court canvasses jurisprudence from Moosa v. Sub-Inspector of Police, Abbas T.K. v. State of Kerala, and Ashraf Kancheriyil v. State of Kerala to emphasize that when substratum is destroyed, quashing can be warranted. It also notes evidentiary gaps: lack of precise identification, absence of a Test Identification Parade, unexplained delay in filing the First Information Statement, and insufficient proof of damage to the vehicle. Weighing these, the court concludes that continuation would amount to abuse of process and allows the Crl.M.C, quashing proceedings against the petitioners.
The three petitioners—Manju Sankar, Athira K. S, and Sheena K. S—were appointed as High School Assistants after undergoing a process of regular appointment approved by the District Education Officer, and they continued to officiate without a break. The core issue was the interpretation of the word “vacancy” in Rule 7A(3) of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER). An audit objection led the Deputy Director of Education to issue Ext. P4, directing recovery of salaries paid during the period of service, arguing that the appointment did not cover one academic year. The petitioners contended that government orders (GOs) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sneha Cheriyan v. State of Kerala require reading ‘vacancy’ along with the ‘academic year,’ so appointments to established vacancies, even if spanning less than a year, should be paid in regular pay scales where appropriate and not subject to recovery. The court examined the 2015 GO clarifications and Sneha Cheriyan’s directions, noting that (i) relief rights depend on continuous service in an academic year, (ii) managers can appoint in vacancies due to death/retirement/promotion etc. if established vacancies exist, (iii) approvals can be granted for vacancies extending beyond March 31 due to additional divisions, (iv) appointments on daily wages can occur for vacancies less than a year and regular pay may be available for longer vacancies, and (v) appointments from re-opening dates can be regularized. The petition was allowed; the impugned order was set aside.
OT.Rev.No.65 of 2013 & OT.Rev.No.12 of 2019 These are two connected Revision Petitions (OT.Rev No. 65 of 2013 and OT.Rev No. 12 of 2019) filed in the Kerala High Court challenging the KVAT Appellate Tribunal’s orders in TA(VAT) Nos. 1562/2011 and 1563/2011 relating to the assessment years 2008-09 and 2010-11. The petitions reframed four questions of law: (1) whether sales from the petitioner’s bonded warehouse to Cochin Shipyard Ltd. qualify for exemption under Sl. No. 57 of Schedule I of the KVAT Act, 2003; (2) whether such sales are export sales under the CST Act (or deemed exports under Sec. 5(3)); (3) whether the petitioner is amenable to the KVAT Act; and (4) whether Circular No. C3.31297/07/CT (15.09.2007) applies. On hearing, the court noted a recent Supreme Court ruling (Nirmal Kumar Parsan v CCT) that import duty exemptions do not automatically confer VAT exemptions, and relied on Lalitha Muralidharan (KLT) and the Government of Kerala’s own case (Waves Electronics) to decide these issues. The Court held all four questions against the assessee and in favour of the revenue, holding the bonded warehouse sales do not qualify for KVAT exemption, the sale to Cochin Shipyard Ltd. is not an export sale under CST, the assessee is amenable to KVAT, and the circular has no application to the facts. The revision petitions are disposed accordingly.
WA 1481/2015 (and connected WA Nos. 1480/2015, 1515/2015, 1538/2015; CO 136/2015, CO 180/2015) This batch of writ appeals and cross-objections arises from a dispute over retirement age for employees of the Kerala State Beverages (M&M) Corporation. The Beverages Corporation sought to challenge a prior judgment regarding retirement at 58, a proposal that originated from a Board resolution dated 27.05.2005 and a Government response culminating in a 2011 order. The Government initially rejected the expansion of retirement age, and the matter culminated in a 2007 common judgment (Kavirajan’s decision) granting declaratory relief that employees could continue beyond 55 up to 58, with related pension benefits. The Supreme Court later stayed that relief, leaving the matter in flux until this round of litigation. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, emphasizes the principle that where a judgment is declaratory or in rem extending benefits to all similarly situated employees, those not directly approaching the court should not be penalized (K.I. Shephard, Arvind Kumar Srivastava, Shobha Ram Raturi). The court ultimately holds that the retired employees are entitled to the relief granted in the earlier judgment, extending the benefit to all similarly situated employees, while upholding a 50% back-wages compensation cap as affirmed in the cross-objections. The writ appeals and cross-objections are dismissed, with the reliefs in rem-like in nature being extended.
The petitioner, Nagesh Kumar B.R., a B.VSc. (AV) student of the third respondent college affiliated to the first respondent University, faced suspension following alleged unbecoming conduct with a co-girl student. The Internal Complaints Committee, under the POSH Act, 2013, conducted an enquiry and submitted a report (Exts. P6–P7) recommending action against him, leading to suspension dated 21.01.2023 (Ext. P6). The petitioner challenged Exts. P6 and P7, contending that POSH proceedings were not applicable to his case and that the UGC Regulations, 2015 do not authorize suspension pending enquiry; he argued that continuing suspension would cause substantial hardship as he is the sole breadwinner with family commitments. The respondents submitted record of an order dated 03.04.2023 withdrawing POSH proceedings on the belief that the matter ought to be dealt with under UGC Regulations, and initiating fresh proceedings under those Regulations. They maintained that suspension serves a disciplinary purpose and facilitates a fair enquiry, not as a punishment. The Court observed that the enquiry under UGC Regulations shall be completed expeditiously and that the Principal of the College, acting to maintain discipline, has inherent authority to suspend, citing the Division Bench decision in P.M. Unni Raja & Ors. v. Principal, Medical College, Thiruvananthapuram & Ors. (AIR 1983 Ker 200) to support the legitimacy of suspension as a non-punitive measure. The writ petition is disposed of with directions to consider whether suspension should continue and to pass appropriate orders accordingly, while ensuring expeditious completion of the UGC-regulation enquiry and noting withdrawal of POSH proceedings.
This is a Kerala High Court bail application under section 438 Cr.P.C. filed by eight petitioners/accused in Crime No. 441 of 2022 of Kakkur Police Station, Kozhikode, alleging offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 308 and 392 read with section 149. The prosecution version states that on 25.12.2022, around 7:45 pm, the petitioners and other accused, who were staff and proprietor of a boat service, assaulted the de facto complainant and family when they refused to pay extra charges, and during the scuffle a gold chain was snatched; a counter case (Crime No. 439/2022) was also mentioned. The petitioners’ counsel argued that there exists a case and counter case and that custodial interrogation may not be necessary; they are ready to abide by stringent conditions. The Public Prosecutor opposed bail but suggested imposing stringent conditions if bail is granted. The Court ultimately allowed the bail application with stringent conditions, emphasizing that who was aggressor would be decided during trial and that custodial interrogation is not essential at this stage. It cited the principle that bail is the rule and jail the exception, and directed appearance before the IO on specified days, bond and sureties, travel restrictions, non-commitment of similar offences, and continued cooperation until the final report. The order also cites Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement in support of the bail principle.
ARUN PUSHPANGADAN v. THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, SUB-DIVISION, CHENGANNUR; THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, KURATHIKAD POLICE STATION; THE PASSPORT OFFICER, REGIONAL PASSPORT OFFICE, KOCHI concerns the legality of registering a crime under Section 102 Cr.P.C. and its impact on issuing a Police Clearance Certificate (PCC). The petitioner, an Indian passport holder, sought renewal of his passport and PCC to join his wife in New Zealand. A 2021 police report alleged possession of a hard drive with prohibited materials, resulting in Crime No. 374/2021 registered under Section 102 Cr.P.C. The petitioner contends that Section 102 Cr.P.C. is not an offense and cannot support criminal proceedings; he cites Akhil C. v. State of Kerala (2021 (4) KLT 12) to argue illegality of such registration. He also argues that cognizance had not been taken, and thus no pending criminal case exists, citing Muhammed v. Union of India & Others (2018 (4) KHC 945). The 3rd respondent issued notices (Exts. P6 and P8) seeking disposal orders from the court, while the petitioner submitted explanations (Ext. P7). The Government Pleader stated that the hard drive was sent to FSL, and a final report is awaited; status reports (Exts. P9, P9(a)) show no pending case. The court held that Akhil C. bars the registration under Sec. 102 and that cognizance has not been taken; Exts. P6 and P8 are quashed and PCC must be reconsidered within two weeks.
Abdul Salah Thottungal, the landlord, challenged the Rent Control Court's Exts. P11 and P12 in O.P.(RC) No. 63 of 2021, arising from eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The Rent Control Court had directed the tenant to pay admitted arrears from February 2019 and to continue to pay rent during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, with non-compliance triggering eviction under Section 12(3). The respondent, Seagulls' Catch Restaurant Private Limited, paid a portion of arrears (Rs. 5 lakhs) but owed more than Rs. 40 lakhs. After extending time for payment and allowing I.A. Nos. 8 and 9 of 2020, the court passed Exts. P11 and P12, permitting the respondent to contest and to condone delay. The petitioner contended that once admitted arrears were not paid within the fixed period, the Rent Control Court had no option but eviction, and that Exts. P11 and P12 were thus erroneous. The High Court analyzed Section 12(1)-(4), emphasizing that the object is to deny defaulting tenants the right to contest until arrears are paid, and that reasonable opportunity must follow the last date fixed for deposit, following a Shaji M. v. SNDP Sakhayogam Full Bench precedent. Consequently, Exts. P11 and P12 were set aside, with directions to decide first the Section 12 petition and then proceed with the eviction petition according to law, untrammeled by this judgment.
This Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC No. 2387 of 2015) before the Kerala High Court challenges cognizance taken by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ambalappuzha, in CP No.3/2015, arising from the death of Akhilesh (21), who died after allegedly being injured while in police custody. Akhilesh was apprehended after a rash and negligent drive on a public road on 16.03.2013; he died on 25.03.2013 due to head injuries following his jump from a police jeep. Initial FIRs—Annexure-A (police) and Annexure-B (private FIR) —formed the basis for investigation by the Crime Branch CID, which concluded that death resulted from complications of the head injury sustained during the incident and that the case against the accused was abated for Akhilesh in Annexure-D. A private complaint (Annexure-E) led to summons (Annexure-F) issued by the JFMC, Ambalappuzha, and cognizance was taken. The petitioners argue that cognizance was based on Annexure-E without considering the police final report (Annexure-C) and rely on Parameswaran Nair v. Surendran and Another (2009 (1) KHC 801) and Virupakshappa D.T. v. C. Subash (2015 KHC 4330) to contend that magistrates must evaluate the final report and that sanction for police excess may be required. The High Court agrees that Annexure-C must be considered and ultimately quashes Annexure-F summons, directing the magistrate to reconsider the matter in light of the cited precedents.
The petitioner, Prithin P. Issac, is a tenant occupying a building belonging to Shine P. Jacob and Raichal P. Jacob at Punalur, Kollam district. He approached the Kerala High Court in WP(C) No. 33123 of 2022 challenging steps by The South Indian Bank to take physical possession of the premises under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 on account of defaults by the owners. The bank contends that the tenancy was created after the mortgage and that Section 15 is not applicable to the mortgaged property; it relies on Supreme Court precedents Bajarang Shyamsunder Agarwal v. Central Bank of India and Hemraj Ratnakar Salian v. HDFC Bank Ltd. to support its position. The petitioner argues that a tenancy in a commercial building warrants the secured creditor taking over management and allowing continued occupancy, as envisioned by Section 15 of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner also cites Mathew Varghese v. M. Amritha Kumar to underscore the duties of a secured creditor, including prudent preservation of assets and avoidance of arbitrary disposal. The Court heard both sides and, without venturing into the merits, directed that any possession by an Advocate Commissioner must be preceded by a two‑weeks’ notice and that the petitioner may approach the DRT by filing a securitisation application under Section 17 if such notice is issued. The writ petition is closed with the petitioner continuing to pay rent to respondents 4 and 5 pending further action.
