Justin T Baby, a claimant in MACT proceedings, faced a motor vehicle accident on 11 February 2012 as a pillion rider. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kalpetta, held the driver negligent and awarded Rs 4,99,100 as compensation, directing the insurer to pay. The appellant challenged the quantum, arguing that the tribunal erred in fixing the claimant’s income at Rs 5,000 per month despite evidence of higher earning capacity; he relied on jurisprudence for higher notional income and future prospects. The petitioner contends he was 18 at the time of the accident and suffered 30% permanent disability (C1 certificate). He asserts that notional income for 2012 should be Rs 8,500 and that 40% future prospects must be added, with a multiplier of 18 as per Sarla Verma. The insurer supported the Tribunal’s fixation of income as reasonable. The court accepts the 30% disability and uses precedents—Ramachandrappa for notional income, Pranay Sethi for future prospects, and Sarla Verma for multiplier—to recompute compensation. The revised heads include: loss of earning Rs 68,000; medical expenses Rs 1,46,000; bystander expense Rs 1,050; transport Rs 1,500; enhanced pain and suffering Rs 1,00,000; loss of disability Rs 7,71,120; loss of amenities Rs 60,000; total Rs 11,58,170. The appeal is allowed in part; the insurer is directed to deposit Rs 11,58,170 with interest at 8% from the petition date within two months, after which the Tribunal shall disburse the amount to the claimant.
Sanil Kumar.M, the first accused in Crime No.139/2025 of Cherupuzha Police Station, Kannur, moved Bail Application No.4984 of 2025 before the Kerala High Court challenging an order denying bail under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). The investigation arises from charges under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) including sections 329(3), 118(1) read with 3(5), with Section 118(2) later added. The prosecution asserts that on 18.02.2025, at about 9 a.m., the accused trespassed into the defacto complainant’s courtyard and assaulted him with a wooden stick and other weapons, causing grievous hurt. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition under Section 482 BNSS, which the court did not entertain; he subsequently surrendered before the Investigating Officer on 29.03.2025. The learned Judge notes the established principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception and, applying judgments such as Chidambaram P v. Directorate of Enforcement, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, and Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, proceeds to examine grant of bail with stringent conditions. The court ultimately allows bail with conditions: Rs.50,000 bond with two sureties, appearance before IO as required, no international travel without permission, no commission of similar offences, and observations limited to this bail order. The Anzar Azeez v. State of Kerala principle is also invoked to justify the approach. The bail application is therefore allowed with specified conditions.
BAIL APPL. NO.5079 OF 2025 Ajay Ashok Ingole, a 19-year-old petitioner, seeks bail under Section 483 BNSS in Crime No. 556/2025 registered for offences under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Sections 332(b), 64(2)(f), 64(2)(m)) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO) (Sections 4 r/w 7, 3(a), 6 r/w 5(l), 5(n), 5(j)(ii)). The alleged incident involves sexual intercourse with a 16-year-old girl at a rented residence, resulting in pregnancy. A defacto complaint led to the registration of the case. The petitioner asserts love and mutual consent; the victim and her mother have filed affidavits stating no grievance and a plan to marry after the victim attains majority. The petitioner has been in custody since 28.03.2025. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, noting the statements of the victim and mother and ongoing investigation. The Court recognizes that while the offences are serious, settlement alone cannot dictate bail; however, considering detention period and petitioner’s age, bail with stringent conditions is warranted. Relying on authorities that bail is the rule and jail the exception, the Court allows bail with conditions and applies the Anzar Azeez principle, clarifying that the observations are for bail purposes only. The order underscores the presumption of innocence and the right to fair trial. The case is decided on 11 April 2025 by a Single Judge.
WP(C).No.15235 OF 2020(D) The petitioner, Saji K.G., was appointed as Higher Secondary School Teacher (HSST) in Zoology in Leo XIII Aided Higher Secondary School, Alleppey, against the leave vacancy of the 5th respondent, Anitha C.V., who had availed leave to join her spouse abroad. The appointment was time-bound, with Exts. P5–P6 showing approvals for periods extending up to 2020 or until the 5th respondent joined, and the petitioner continued in service for about 13 years. The 5th respondent had availed leave without allowance, extended by approvals, and in 2020 an order (Ext. R5(c)) permitted her to rejoin. The petitioner contends that Rule 56(4) of Chapter XIV A KER would cause cessation of the 5th respondent after five years of continuous absence, and thus the vacancy should be filled in the petitioner’s favor; he also argues that the 6th respondent’s promotion created a vacancy to be filled by him, and that Government Order Ext. P24 (2006) mandating principals to engage in teaching is ultra vires. The 5th respondent relies on decisions including Devaky, Elsy P. Oomman, Sreedevi Amma, and Supreme Court/Maya Mathew-style authorities, asserting the leave extension was valid. The court cites Deepa S. and Mini Varghese, and ultimately holds it bound by Ext. R5(g) (Mini Varghese), ruling the petitioner cannot challenge the leave beyond five years; the petition is dismissed.
This is a Rent Control Revision petition (RCR 164 of 2020) in the Kerala High Court arising from eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The tenants-respondents challenged an eviction order under Section 11(3) of the Act, along with rejection of eviction under Sections 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(v), which followed a Rent Control Court proceeding (R.C.P. No. 11 of 2011) and subsequent appellate proceedings. The landlady sought eviction claiming bona fide need for her son to start a provision store in the petition schedule shop, and the matter traversed multiple remands and remand outcomes. After remand, PW2 (the landlady’s son) was examined, Ext. P6 was argued to prove his temporary employment at Nirmala College, and the Landlord’s need was analysed in light of statutory provisions and established precedents. The Revisional Court addressed the scope of Section 20, highlighting that it cannot serve as a second appellate forum and that re‑appreciation of evidence is generally impermissible, except to correct perverse findings. It cited multiple Supreme Court decisions on bona fide need, the burden of proof, admissibility of documents, and the limits of revisional scrutiny. Ultimately, the Court held that the concurrent findings supporting bona fide need remained intact and dismissed the revision petition, ordering costs to be borne by the parties.
Rony Zacharia, aged 32, accused in Crime No.39/2025 of the Ernakulam Excise Range Office, moves a bail application under BNSS, 2023 before the Kerala High Court. The case concerns NDPS offences under sections 22(b), 20(b)(ii)A and 25, based on seizure of 2.6546 grams of MDMA and 40 grams of ganja on 12.03.2025. The Public Prosecutor opposed bail but reported no antecedents. The court notes the seriousness of the allegations but observes the seized contraband constitutes an intermediate quantity, where Section 37 NDPS would not attract, and the petitioner has already been in custody since the date of arrest. Relying on well-established bail jurisprudence—“bail is the rule and jail is the exception”—the court considers keeping the petitioner on bail with stringent conditions appropriate to the case. Citing Supreme Court dicta in Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement, Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, and Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, the court emphasizes that once a case for bail is made out, refusal would be contrary to law, subject to statutory conditions. The order also references Anzar Azeez v. State of Kerala to support this approach. The bail is granted on conditions, with the jurisdictional court authorized to cancel if violated, and the petitioner is directed to comply with all terms to preserve fair trial rights.
WP(C).No.22429 of 2017 & WA.No.1879 of 2014 The Kerala High Court confronts whether machinery in a sawmill falls within seizure under Section 52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, as part of confiscation proceedings for forest offences. The writ petitioner in W.P(C) 22429/2017 and the appellant in WA 1879/2014 challenge the view that tools used to saw timber can be seized merely because they facilitate a prohibited act, arguing that the offence under Section 27(1)(e)(iii) concerns trees felled inside reserves and should not sweep machinery into confiscation. The Court traces conflicting precedents, notably Moosa v. Authorised Officer (2014) 2 KHC 731, which held that ‘tools’ include machinery used for converting timber and that seizure can extend to sawmills; and Surma Valley Saw Mill (P) Ltd. v. State of Assam (AIR 1998 Gau. 35), which took a contrary view. The bench adopts a purposive, contextual interpretation, emphasizing the object of forest preservation and balancing strict penal construction with the legislature’s aims. Relying on Balram Kumawat, Kalyani, Govind Impex, Achal Industries and other authorities, the court holds that the term ‘tool’ extends to machinery used in sawmills, including equipment located outside the forest, where illegal timber is processed. The judgment directs seizure with inventory, issues show-cause notices, and allows confiscation proceedings under the existing framework, upheld against the petition and the appeal, with a six-month time-frame for finalization.
This appeal arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Palakkad, where the appellants (Nandini, guardian of Surya, and Surya) challenged the quantum of compensation awarded under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the death of Ramesh, husband of the first appellant and father of the minor. On 21-07-2004, while riding a motorcycle, the deceased was struck by another two-wheeler driven rashly by the 2nd respondent. He sustained grievous injuries and died on 22-07-2004 at the age of 38. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 4,00,500 as compensation, fixing the deceased’s income at Rs. 3,000 per month, after disbelieving PW2’s testimony and Ext. A9. The 3rd respondent insurer admitted coverage but contested liability terms. The High Court re-evaluated the evidence, holding the deceased was a skilled labourer (Site In Charge) and not a casual employee; it fixed a notional income of Rs. 6,000 per month, adopted a multiplier of 15, and applied future prospects at 40%, along with 1/3 deduction for personal living expenses in line with Sarla Varma and Pranay Sethi. Relying on Nagappa, Rajesh, and other precedents, the court enhanced compensation to Rs. 11,20,000, with a further enhancement for conventional heads (funeral, loss of estate, loss of consortium). The insurer is directed to deposit the enhanced amount within 60 days, with 60:40 distribution between appellants and insurer after court-fee deductions. The appeal is allowed.
Dr. Sonia K. Das challenged the appointment of private respondents as Category C Lecturers in Administrative Law at the School of Legal Studies of Cochin University following a rank list published on 30.12.2008. The petitioner contended that the selection committee, constituted under a Government Order dated 21.12.1999 and the Cochin University of Science and Technology Act, 1986, did not adhere to fixed interview guidelines and that the expert panel included individuals not specialized in Administrative Law. RTI disclosures (Exts. P6–P7) allegedly showed the lack of standardized guidelines for awarding marks, questionable qualifications credited to respondents, and the composition of the selection committee (Exts. P1, P4, P7) being inconsistent with statutory requirements. The respondents argued that the selection was conducted strictly under Section 31(2)(b) of the CUSAT Act, 1986, and that the petitioner, having participated in the process, cannot challenge the selection. They relied on the Government Order’s Clause 6.1 mandating merit-based direct recruitment via a duly constituted committee and on UGC Regulations, 2000/2010, and various Supreme Court rulings to defend the process. The court, after examining the statutes, RTI materials, and precedents, held no illegality in the selection process and dismissed the petition, noting the petitioner’s participation and lack of malafides. The judgment cites Full Bench decisions and well-established law supporting deference to the established selection framework.
Prakash Joseph, the first accused, moves Kerala High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash Annexure-L final report and all proceedings in Vigilance Case No. 13/16/PKD and the connected C.C. No. 04/2021 before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance), Thrissur. The final report accuses him along with co-accused of offences under Section 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and Sections 409, 420 and 120B IPC, arising from alleged conspiracy with the ARK Wood & Metal Pvt. Ltd. and Malabar Cements Limited (MCL). The contract between MCL and ARK for fly-ash supply contained a clause designating Tuticorin as the forum for disputes and a bank guarantee safeguard. Allegations include that the petitioner, as Legal Officer of MCL, conspired to file a suit at Palakkad (wrong jurisdiction) to delay enforcement of the bank guarantee, misled management, and advised amicable out-of-court settlement and even action before the Banking Ombudsman, thereby allegedly facilitating pecuniary gains to ARK and losses to MCL. The court reviews whether the allegations prima facie satisfy the ingredients of the charged offences. It holds that there is no act of entrustment or misappropriation to sustain 13(1)(c) or 409/420 IPC charges, and that 13(1)(d) may require trial. It quashes the Annexure-L portions relating to 13(1)(c), 409, 420, but allows proceedings under 13(1)(d) and 120B to continue, and grants liberty to seek discharge under 239 Cr.P.C. The order is partial and directs no prejudice to co-accused.
WP(C).No.14787 OF 2020(W) The petitioner, S.S. Sajith, asserts possession of a 7.38 ares (18¼ cents) property covered by Ext. P1 and challenges unauthorized parking of autorickshaws on the Kuriapilly South–Machamthuruthu PWD Road in front of his premises. He seeks a writ of mandamus under Article 226 to compel the 1st to 5th respondents to stop the unauthorized parking and to shift the stands away, and also requests police protection against alleged intimidation by members of the 6th respondent Autorickshaw Drivers Union, including the 7th respondent. The matter has been pending before the Traffic Regulatory Committee (TRC) and the court has previously directed impleading of the 8th respondent as the TRC chair. The court cites Noushad M. and Others v. State of Kerala and others (2019 (2) KHC 562), which held that permanent autorickshaw stands on highway frontage infringe private rights and must be regulated by constituting a TRC with the district police chief and RTA, allowing temporary parking in consultation. It also cites Kottamom (Kottiyar Mangalam) Sri Darmasastha Temple Advisory Committee v. State of Kerala and others (2019 (5) KHC SN 27) to note that MV Regulations, 2017 permit parking only under specified conditions. Ultimately, the court disposes the petition by directing no parking that blocks entry and directing the TRC to decide, under MV Regulations, within two months.
The appellant, M.K. Jose, seeks a declaration that the 2013 termination order of the contract for the Kannavam–Idumba–Trikadipoyil road project was illegal and void, and he claims entitlement to Rs.4,50,68,048 with a permanent injunction against enforcing any risk‑and‑cost clause. During the suit’s pendency, the 3rd defendant issued Ext. A1 (30.03.2021) to blacklist the plaintiff. The plaintiff moved I.A.7/2021 under Order XXXIX, Rules 1–3 and Section 151 CPC for a temporary injunction restraining the authorities from blacklisting. The Sub Court Hosdurg dismissed the application on 08.04.2021, holding that the blacklisting is a separate Vigilance and Anti‑Corruption Bureau proceeding with no direct connection to the relief sought in the suit and that no prima facie case or irreparable injury was established. On appeal, the Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, examined whether it should interfere with the trial court’s order. Relying on statutory principles and precedents, including State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose and the broader jurisprudence on writs in contractual disputes, the court held there was no justification to intervene, noting the blacklisting proceedings could be challenged through Article 226 at an appropriate stage. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs, reaffirming the separation between contract disputes and vigilance actions and the limits of interim relief in such contexts.
This Regular Second Appeal arises out of a partition dispute involving 12 cents of land with a dwelling-house at Alathur in Palakkad. The preliminary partition decree divided the property into four equal shares among the co-owners. After the death of the first defendant, Meenakshi Amma, Ammini Amma filed a final decree application claiming rights on the basis of a gift deed executed in her favour. The Commissioner partitioned the property into plots A (which includes the dwelling-house) B, C and D, and allotted plot A to the respondent. The final decree was accordingly passed. The appellants challenged the allotment and sought a final decree allotting the dwelling-house to themselves, invoking Section 4 of the Partition Act and Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. The first appellate court dismissed the I.A. for allotment of the dwelling-house during pendency of partition. The Kerala High Court examines whether Section 4 can be invoked by co-owners pending partition and at execution, and whether the Joint Family Abolition Act alters the status of tenancy. Relying on Ghantesher Ghosh and Gautam Paul, and citing Vijayalakshmi C. v. Ammini Amma, the court discusses the interplay between Sections 44 and 4. The court ultimately confirms the lower decrees, but allows the appellants to seek Section 4 relief before the executing court, preserving their rights. The appeal is dismissed with no costs.
Petitioner K.B. Balachandran, a retired police officer, filed WP(C) No.15796 of 2020 seeking mandamus to direct authorities to act on complaints against the 5th respondent (also a retired police officer) for alleged asset disproportionate to known income. He also sought a direction to the 4th respondent to retrieve and finalise proceedings against the 5th respondent within a time frame. Ext.P1, a complaint by Sivakumar against the 5th respondent, and Ext.P2, a complaint to the Union Home Minister, were relied upon, but the court noted Ext.P1 was not a party to the petition and Ext.P2 did not involve the Union of India as a party, limiting relief. The grievance is inaction by police despite cognizable-offence information. The court examined the remedy under CrPC sections 190 read with 200, noting that a complainant can approach the magistrate for cognizance rather than seek a writ directing an investigation, citing authorities such as All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees’ Union v. Union of India, Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India, Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, and M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki. It also discusses Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P, distinguishing that a writ cannot substitute CrPC remedies for inaction. Jude Joseph v. DGP (2021 (3) KHC 441) and Michael Varghese v. Pinarayi Vijayan (2020) are cited to emphasise CrPC procedures over writs. The petition was ultimately dismissed with liberty to pursue CrPC remedies if any.
Goldwin Medicare Limited, a Mumbai-based company manufacturing medical consumables, challenged the Kerala Medical Services Corporation Ltd’s 2020 blacklisting after it failed to supply items under a tender for disposable surgical caps and masks. The Corporation invited tenders for 22 products; the petitioner’s bid for 17 items, including the disputed three, was accepted and a Letter of Intent (LOI) was issued on 26 February 2020. The petitioner claimed it could not procure raw materials (sourced from China) due to the Covid-19 outbreak, informed the Corporation, and requested a deferral; the LOI was subsequently issued. The Corporation later issued purchase orders for the products; however, the petitioner did not supply, and the Corporation cancelled the orders. Show-cause notices directed the petitioner to explain why it should not be blacklisted for 24 months under clause 6.26.22. The Government later reduced the sanction to 12 months on appeal. The petitioner argued that the pandemic and related restrictions rendered performance impossible, and relied on Force Majeure provisions and government memoranda as support. The respondents contended that the non-supply was a deliberate default, not protected by force majeure, and that the tender allowed blacklisting for default. The High Court examined force majeure (clause 6.36) and the doctrine of frustration under Section 56, concluding no impossibility excused performance and dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
This is a Public Writ Petition (Civil) under Article 226 filed by V.T. Mohanan challenging inaction by the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (VACB) regarding a complaint alleging corrupt practices in the admission process to Dr. Somervell Memorial Medical College, Karakonam. The petitioner asserts that despite a Government order for vigilance enquiries, no inquiry has culminated in an FIR, and two years have elapsed without a decision. He relies on the Lalita Kumari framework to press for prompt action when cognizable offences are disclosed and seeks a mandamus directing VACB to complete verification of his complaint (Ext.P6) and register an FIR. The State and VACB contend that preliminary enquiry mechanisms must ascertain whether a cognizable offence exists before acting, and that a rigid seven-day deadline is not universally applicable. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, VACB, Southern Range, filed a statement: the initial complaint was received in 2019, a tentative enquiry report has been prepared, and it awaits higher approval. Citing Lalita Kumari (supra) the court notes the seven-day ceiling but acknowledges the Supreme Court’s later ruling in Dr. Saleem Ur Rehman (2021) that such a hard deadline is not universal. The Court directs the VACB Director to obtain the enquiry report from the Dy.S.P. and decide within one month, with communication to the petitioner within fourteen days, and disposes of the petition with these directions.
WP(C).Nos.17796/2020; WP(C).Nos.24186/2020 Two writ petitions concerning the same school, Netaji Higher Secondary School, Pramadom, were heard together because of the similar factual backdrop: Dileep R., the senior-most Higher Secondary School teacher, served as Principal-in-Charge while K. Jayakumar, the Headmaster of the School’s High School division, claimed the post of Principal. The Government rejected Jayakumar’s bid for a by-transfer appointment, citing lack of workload in the Higher Secondary section, yet issued Ext.P5(a)/Ext.P6 directing him to be the Principal-in-Charge despite finding him ineligible for permanent appointment. Dileep contends Ext.P6 is improper as it was issued without hearing him and because Jayakumar should not be placed ahead of an unresolved claim by the Senior teacher; he seeks to continue as Principal-in-Charge. Jayakumar argues that the court’s decision in Jayaraj v. State of Kerala (2016) 2 KLT 200 mandates relief if he is found entitled, and that Ext.P6 violates prior declarations. The Court holds that Jayaraj’s ratio applies and that Ext.P5(a)/Ext.P6 must be set aside, directing the Manager to appoint Jayakumar as Principal within two weeks and to forward the proposal to the Regional Deputy Director of Higher Secondary Education for approval, who must decide within two months. The judgment notes that status-quo observations in a related Division Bench WA are not binding ad rem. The petitions are disposed in terms of these directions.
This writ petition concerns four teachers (H.S.A./U.P.S.A.) at the D.V.V.H.S.S., Thavaloor, an aided school, who faced salary withholdings from January 2011 following an audit by the Director of Public Instruction (DPI) highlighting irregularities in the verification of student strength. Their appointments, approved by the relevant Educational authorities, have continued for years, but Exts. P9 and P14 directed salary withholding and later alleged recovery of excess pay in light of the DPI audit report. The petition challenges these notices on the ground that the petitioners, as teachers, cannot be held responsible for bogus admissions or irregularities in admission records, especially in the absence of specific evidence tying them to such irregularities. The petition cites Kishore V.G. v. State of Kerala and Others (2019 KHC 740) to assert that no provision in the Kerala Education Act or Rules ascribes to teachers a role in admissions; Usuvathunnisa v. Asst. Educational Officer, and Vasudevan Namboodiri v. State of Kerala are invoked to contend that audit objections do not invalidate staff fixation orders or appointment approvals, and do not justify salary recovery in the absence of proceedings under Rule 8A. The High Court ultimately finds in favor of the petitioners, quashes Exts. P9 and P14 to the extent they affect the petitioners, and directs salary payment from January 2011 onward pending the petition’s outcome, with no costs.
Mini Rajendran, owner of Sree Sakthi Chakra Manufacturers, filed this Article 226 petition challenging two forfeit notices Ext.P2 (15.02.2014) and Ext.P4 (28.03.2015) issued by the Executive Officer, Sabarimala, to the Manager of Sree Sakthi Chakra Manufacturers in relation to a Gold Plated Copper Lockets contract with Travancore Devaswom Board for five-year warranty. The petitioner seeks quashing of the forfeiture and mandamus to consider Ext.P6–P8 representations and to return Rs. 3,10,700 with interest. The Board contends the lockets were substandard and that forfeiture was justified; it also argues limitation and that the dispute is contractual, not amenable to writ. The petitioner asserts that the lockets were tested and accepted; Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 amount to unwarranted forfeiture. The matter touches on a long line of cases establishing that writs are not the proper vehicle for contract disputes where questions of fact require evidence and an adequate civil remedy exists. The court cites State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals; National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kalathil; and M.K. Jose, to emphasize that ordinarily, disputes over contracts should be adjudicated in a civil forum, and writs should be refused where facts are disputed. The petition is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable, with no opinion on merits and no costs.
WA No.410/15 & Conn. Cases This is a consolidated judgment of a batch of writ appeals challenging liability of tax deduction at source (TDS) from salaries paid to nuns and priests employed by government/aided educational institutions. The Court examines whether salary payments to members of religious congregations can be exempted from TDS under CBDT circulars issued in 1944 and 1977, and whether the doctrine of diversion of income by overriding title or canon law can shield such income from taxation. After outlining the background—vows of poverty and civil death under canon law, payment of salaries to religious personnel, and decades-long practice of non-deduction—the Court analyzes statutory provisions. It reiterates that income tax is charged on the total income under the IT Act, and section 192(1) makes it mandatory for the payer to deduct tax at source on salaries, with no statutory exemption for religious vocations. The Court finds that circulars cannot override the statute, referencing Kerala Financial Corporation, Molly Joseph, Sitaldas Tirathdas, Tuticorin Alkali, and Joshi Technologies among others to support that circulars do not create exemptions from tax or TDS. It also rejects the civil death/diversion theory, holding canon law cannot supersede statutory provisions. The judgment holds that the Madras High Court decision on non-deduction is to be applied prospectively. The batch culminates in dismissal of all appeals with no costs, while acknowledging the necessity to retain the CBDT’s clarifications for future administration and the constitutional framework (Articles 25 and 265).
