Simon K.J. and Others v. Mangamma @ Brejith Andrews and Ginu Andrews

## **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM** ## **PRESENT** **THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN** **&** **THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M.R.ANITHA TUESDAY, THE 7[TH] DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2021 / 16TH BHADRA, 1943** **RCREV. NO. 164 OF 2020** **RCA 11/2019 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT & RENT CONTROL APPELLATE AUTHORITY, NORTH PARAVUR, ERNAKULAM** ## **REVISION PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS** 1 SIMON K.J. AGED 69 YEARS S/O JOSEPH, KUNNANT HOUSE, CHIRAKKAKAM P.O.VARAPPUZHA-683 517, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT 2 FRIENDS ARTS CLUB, REGD NO E.R.30/73, CHIRAKKAKAM VILLAGE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESENT SECRETARY, K.J. SIMON 3 FRIENDS ARTS CLUB, REGD NO E R 30/73, CHIRAKKAKAM VILLAGE, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESENT TREASURER, K SASIDHARAN. 4 FRIENDS ARTS CLUB, REGD NO E.R 30/73, CHIRAKKAKAM, VARAPPUZHA P.O.REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESENT PRESIDENT, K.B. SARAF, AGED 70 YEARS, S/O BAVA, KUNNANATTU VEETTIL, CHARIYAMTHURUTHU KARA, KADAMAKKUDY VILLAGE, KANAYANNUR TALUK BY ADV DEEPAK JOY.K. ## **RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/PETITIONERS** 1 MANGAMMA @ BREJITH ANDREWS AGED 64 YEARS W/O LATE ANDREWS, KUNNAT HOUSE, VARAPPUZHA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, NOW RESIDING AT VETTIKUZHA HOUSE, CHELAD P.O.KOTHAMANGALAM, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 692. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 2 2 GINU ANDREWS, AGED 31 YEARS S/O LATE ANDREWS, KUNNAT HOUSE, VARAPPUZHA, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, NOW RESIDING AT VETTIKUZHA HOUSE, CHELAD P.O.KOTHAMANGALAM, ERNAKULAM DISTRICT, PIN-686 692. BY ADV SRI.ALEXANDER JOSEPH THIS RENT CONTROL REVISION HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 2.8.2021,THE COURT ON 7.9.2021 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 3 ## **ORDER** M.R.Anitha, J. This Rent Control Revision petition has been directed against the judgment in R.C.A.No.11 of 2019 on the file of Additional District Judge and Rent Control Appellate Authority, North Paravur, dated 17.12.2019, which arises out of the order dated 6.6.2019 in R.C.P.No.11 of 2011 of the Rent Control Court, North Paravur. 2. This is the second round of litigation before this Court in connection with the aforesaid R.C.P. Revision petitioners are the respondents-tenant in the R.C.P.11 of 2011 filed by the 1[st] respondent herein-landlord, along with his son, the 2[nd] respondent herein, seeking eviction of the petition schedule shop room under Sections 11(3), 11(4)(ii) and 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (in short 'the Act'), on the ground that the tenant ceased to occupy the petition schedule shop room for more than six months continuously and that they are using the said shop room in such a manner so as to destroy and reduce its value and utility materially and permanently. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 4 Second petitioner is unemployed and wants to start a provision store in the petition schedule room. The petitioners have no other vacant room in the locality. A lawyer notice was issued to the respondent on 26.6.2011 demanding vacant possession, to which a reply was sent raising untenable contentions. Thereafter the R.C.P was filed. 3. The tenants filed objection admitting the tenancy arrangement. Contention regarding non-joinder of necessary parties was raised since Friends Arts Club and its office bearers were not made parties. [Subsequently they were impleaded as additional respondent Nos. 2 to 4 in the R.C.P. The present President of the club was impleaded as additional respondent NO.5 in R.C.A, as per order in I.A.1031 of 2019]. The tenants contended that the 2[nd] petitioner is highly qualified and employed and is doing share market and real estate business. Hence there is no b _ona fides_ in the need urged by the landlady. They are residing at Kothamangalam, about 75 kilometres away from the petition schedule room, and have landed properties there. Hence they have no need to conduct a provision store. The allegation of R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 5 non use of the room continuously for more than six months and use of the building so as to reduce its value and utility materially and permanently are also stoutly denied. 4. During trial PW1 was examined and Exts.A1 to A5 were marked on the side of the landlady. RW1 was examined on the side of the tenant. Thereafter, on hearing both sides, the Rent Control Court allowed the Rent Control Petition in part, under Section 11(3) of the Act and refused the prayer for eviction under Sections 11(4)(ii) and 11(4(v). Against which, R.C.A.No. 7 of 2013 was filed before the Additional District Court and Rent Control Appellate Authority, North Paravur and as per the judgment dated 20.11.2015 the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction passed under Section 11(3) of the Act, by the Rent Control Court. 5. Aggrieved by the same, tenant filed R.C.R.No.11 of 2016 before this Court and as per the order dated 16.3.2017 this Court set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and the case was remanded to the Rent Control Court for the limited purpose of deciding the question as to whether the son of landlady was R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 6 permanently employed or not at the time of filing of the petition or thereafter. It was also made clear that the scope of remand is confined to the _bona fide_ need urged under Section 11(3) of the Act and finding in favour of the landlady under both provisos to Section 11(3) and the rejection of the eviction sought under Section 11(4)(ii) are confirmed. 6. After the remand, the Rent Control Court as per the order dated 31.7.2017, again ordered eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. Against which R.C.A.No.19 of 2017 was filed by the tenant and as per the judgment dated 17.12.2019 the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority allowed the Appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Control Court and the case was remanded for fresh disposal for the reason that the order was passed by the Rent Control Court without hearing the tenant and also that, though there are five respondents in the R.C.P. they were not shown as parties in the order, etc. 7. After the remand, additional respondent 2 to 4 were impleaded in R.C.P.No.11 of 2011 the son of landlady was examined as PW2 and Ext.A6 was marked subject to proof. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 7 Thereafter, on hearing both sides, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. Against which RCA 11 of 2019 was filed and as per the judgment dated 17.12.2019 the Rent Control Appellate Authority confirmed the order of eviction passed under Section 11(3) of the Act. Aggrieved by the said judgment, tenant is before this Court in this Revision Petition filed under Section 20 of the Act. 8. On 04.11.2020 this Court admitted the matter on file and granted interim stay of eviction for a period of 4 weeks. The said interim order, which was extended from time to time is still in force. Lower court records were called for and both sides were heard. 9. The limited purpose for which the remand was made by the order of this Court dated 16.03.2017 in R.C.R.No.11 of 2016 is only to determine the issue of bona fide need urged by the landlady. The findings in favour of the landlady under both provisos to Section 11(3) and rejection of claim under Section 11(4)(ii) of the Act has been confirmed. Hence, after the remand additional evidence was adduced by examining PW2 and R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 8 producing Ext.P6 (marked subject to proof) to prove that the employment of PW2 at Nirmala College was only temporary. So the only point which arises for consideration is whether the concurrent findings of the Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority on the _bona fide_ need for own occupation to PW2 call for any interference in this revision. 10. The powers of the Revisional Court Under Section.20 of the Act is well settled. In **Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and Ors. [(1993) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1993** **SC 1616 : 1993 KHC 874]** a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court dealt with the revisional powers of the High Court and its scope and it has been held that even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act will not enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. It is also held that even by the presence of the word 'propriety' it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Though it was laid down that revisional court can come to a different conclusion, it was emphasized that it is not on a re-appreciation of evidence. In that case, the procedure of High Court in re-appreciating the entire R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 9 evidence both oral and documentary in the light of the commissioners report was deprecated and it was held that the High Court had traveled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction and it was also held that the presence of the word 'propriety' cannot be said to mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence and accordingly the order passed by the High Court in revision was set aside. 11. In **Ubaiba v. Damodaran [(1999) 5 SCC 645 : 2000 (1) KLT 24 SC : 2000 KHC 6]** , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had occasion to consider the powers of revision of the High Court under Section 20 of the Act and it has been reaffirmed that no power has been vested with the Court in revision to reappreciate evidence and come to its own conclusion and ultimately it was held that the revisional order of the High Court is wholly unsustainable and accordingly it was set aside and the order of the Appellate Authority was affirmed. 12. Again, in **Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh [(2014) 9 SCC 78 : 2014 (4) KLT 182 (SC) : 2014 (3) KHC SN 15]** a Five-Judge Bench of the Apex Court R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 10 had occasion to examine the scope of revisional jurisdiction under various Rent Control Act prevailing in various States and held that the word 'propriety' coming under Section 20 of the Act does not confer power on High Court to re-appreciate evidence and come to a different conclusion but the consideration of evidence is confined to find out that the finding of fact recorded by the court below does not suffer from any error of law. If finding of the courts by the court below is perverse or arrived at without consideration of material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of evidence or is grossly erroneous, and if allowed to stand it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, then it is open to correction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 13. In **Thankamony Amma & Ors. v. Omana Amma N. & Ors. [AIR 2019 SC 3803 : 2019 (4) KLT 361 (SC) : 2019 (4) KHC 412]** again it has been affirmed that when the findings rendered by the courts below were well supported by evidence on record and could not even be said to be perverse, the High Court could not have re-appreciated the evidence and concurrent findings rendered by the courts below ought not to have been R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 11 interfered by exercising the revisional jurisdiction. 14. The learned counsel for the tenant would content that though R.C.R.No. 11 of 2016 was remanded for determining whether the son of landlady is permanently employed since it has come out in evidence that he has been employed as Placement Officer at Nirmala College Muvattupuzha, no convincing evidence could be adduced in that regard by the landlady. Ext.P6 certificate was marked subject to the objection of the tenant and Rent Control Court categorically found that contents of Ext.P6 is not proved. So in spite of giving an opportunity to prove her case the landlady could not discharge the burden and hence the concurrent order of eviction passed under Section 11(3) of the Act is illegal and improper and is liable to set aside. 15. The learned counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, would contend that, apart from Ext.P6, PW2 was examined to prove that he had no permanent employment either before or at the time of examination before the Rent Control Court and the employment at Nirmala College was temporary. His oral evidence in that regard could not be discredited during cross-examination R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 12 and hence, according to the learned counsel, the evidence adduced by PWs1 and 2 would prove in abundance the _bona fide_ need urged in the Rent Control Petition. 16. In **Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222 : AIR 1999 SC 2507 : 1999 KHC 723]** while dealing with the bona fide need under Section 11(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it has been held that the term bona fide or genuinely refers to a state of mind. The requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'require' is much more higher than a mere desire. The phrase 'required bona fide' is suggestive of legislative intent with a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself on any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. 17. In **Adil Jamshed Frenchman (dead) by LRs v.** R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 13 **Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and others [(2005) 2 SCC 476 : AIR 2005 SC 996]** it has been held by quoting **Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal [(2001) 5 SCC 705)** that _bona fide_ requirement has to be distinguished from a mere whim or fanciful desire and bona fide requirement is in praesenti and must be manifested in actual need so as to convince the court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. 18. In the instant case, the bona fide need urged by the landlady is for starting provision store for PW2 who is her son. Though the tenant raised a contention that PW2 is an MBA graduate and is residing at Kothamangalam 75 Kms away from the petition schedule property and the need alleged is only a ruse for eviction, while disposing R.C.R.No.11 of 2016 the Division Bench found that the bona fide need cannot be doubted merely for the reason that the son of landlady is an MBA holder or that he is residing far away from the petition schedule property. So that finding cannot be reopened after the order of remand. Subsequent to the remand, the son of landlady was examined as PW2 and a proof affidavit was filed solemnly affirming that his R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 14 parental house is at Varappuzha. His father expired in his young years and thereafter himself and his mother were being looked after by the maternal grand parents. Now the maternal grand parents are no more and he is intending to settle at Varappuzha, the home land of his father. Hence, in order to start the provision store, he bona fide require the petition schedule room. PWs1 and 2 deposed in support of the _bona fide_ need projected in the Rent Control Petition for PW2 to start a provision shop. 19. During the examination of PW2, Ext.A6 was marked (subject to objection) to prove that his employment at Nirmala College was temporary. 20. In the aspect of evidentiary value of documents marked subject to objection, the learned counsel for the tenant placed reliance on **R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P.Temple and another [(2003) 8 SCC 752 : AIR 2003 SC 4548]** , **Smt. Dayamathi Bai v. Sri.K.M.Shaffi [(2004) 7 SCC 107 : AIR 2004 SC 4082], L.I.C. of India and another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010) 4 SCC 491], Shalimar Chemical Works Limited v. Surendra** R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 15 ## **Oil and Dal Mills [(2010) 8 SCC 423]** 21. In **R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder** the objection as to admissibility of documents the Apex Court held as follows in paragraph 20: “20.The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes:- (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as 'an exhibit', an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken before the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The later proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 16 to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons: firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to herein above, in the later case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in superior Court.” 22. In **Smt.Dayamathi Bai** also the objection as to admissibility of document came up for consideration. The Apex Court reiterated that objection as to mode of proof falls within procedural law. Therefore, such objection could be waived. They R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 17 have to be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. In the said decision, the Apex Court quoted after approval, paragraph 20 of the decision in **R.V.E.Venkatachala Gounder** . 23. In **Ram Pal Singh Bisen [(2010) 4 SCC 491]** in the context of Regulation 40 of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and Section 49 of the Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956 the Apex Court held that mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof. In other words, mere marking of exhibit or a document does not dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. Under the Law of Evidence also, it is necessary that the contents of the documents are required to be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. At the most, admission of documents may amount to admission of contents but not its truth. Documents having not been produced and marked as required under the Evidence Act cannot be relied upon by the Court. Contents of the document cannot be proved by merely filing in Court. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 18 ## 24. In **Shalimar Chemical Works Limited v. Surendra** **Oil and Dal Mills [(2010)** in the context of Section 31 of Trade and Merchandise Mark Act, 1958 the Apex Court held that the trial court should not have marked as exhibits the xerox copies of the certificates of registration on trade marks in face of objection raised by the defendants. It should have declined to take them on record as evidence and left the plaintiff to support its case by whatever needs it proposed rather than leaving the issue of admissibility of those copies open and hanging, by marking them as exhibits subject to objection of proof and admissibility. 25. In the instant case, Ext.A6 is a certificate issued by the Principal of Nirmala College, Muvattupuzha. So the certificate ought to have been proved through the Principal who issued the same. The respondent raised objection at the right time of marking the document. So the Rent control Court went wrong in marking the document and keeping open the question of admissibility. More over, mere marking of Ext.A6 does not amount to proof of its contents. Without the examination of the Principal and proving the contents of Ext.A6, it can not be acted upon. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 19 Finding of the Control Court on the admissibility of Ext.A6 is perfectly in order. In the judgment dated 17.12.2019 the Appellate Authority has found that Ext.P6 document is not disputed by the respondents. Obviously it is an error, without going through the records of the case. A party is going in appeal aggrieved by an adverse order, will be expecting a higher degree of evaluation of facts and law. The Appellate Authority ought not have committed such a mistake. 26. The learned counsel for the landlady contended that, even if Ext.A6 is left out, the landlady has succeeded in establishing that the employment of PW2 at Nirmala College was temporary. To consider that contention it would be necessary to go through the evidence of PW2. In the affidavit in lieu of chief examination PW2 has stated that from 15.12.2011 to 30.9.2014 he had worked as a temporary employee at Nirmala College, as Placement Officer. He has also stated that, either before the filing of the Rent Control Petition or at the time of his examination before the court, he had not worked permanently in any institution. During cross-examination of PW2, though the R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 20 genuineness of Ext.A6 was challenged, no question was put with regard to his evidence in chief that he was not employed permanently, either before the filing of the Rent Control Petition or at the time of examination before the court, at any place. It is pertinent to note that the suggestion put to PW2 during crossexamination was with regard to his residence at Thiruvananthapuram and also his permanent employment at Thiruvananthapuram. That itself is an indication that even tenant has no case during cross examination of PW2 that he is employed at Nirmala college as Placement Officer. Apart from the suggestion during cross-examination that he is permanently employed at Thiruvananthapuram, which is stoutly denied by PW2, there is no material before the Rent Control Court to infer any such permanent employment of PW2 at Thiruvananthapuram. Mere suggestion during cross-examination will not constitute evidence. RW1 during cross-examination categorically admitted that he had not enquired about the employment and income of PW2. He pleaded ignorance as to whether the job of PW2 is permanent or not. Further, RW1 has categorically admitted that his statement R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 21 that PW2 is earning a salary of Rs.25,000/- is only hearsay evidence and he has not seen any document. In effect, RW1 is quite unaware of the employment of the PW2 and he has not even made any enquiries in that regard. So the oral evidence of PW2 that he had a temporary employment at Nirmala College, Mutattupuzha as Placement Officer from 15.12.2011 to 30.9.2014 is only to be accepted, since as per Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, facts admitted need not be proved. So long as that oral testimony of PW2 regarding the temporary nature of his employment is left unchallenged and when RW1 pleaded total ignorance about the employment of PW2, we find no reason to disagree with the concurrent finding of the Rent Control Court and the appellate Authority that the employment of PW2 at Nirmala College for the period from 15.12.2011 to 30.9.2014 was on a temporary basis. The Rent Control Petition was filed on 22.9.2011. Subsequently PW2 got temporary employment at Nirmala College, Muvattupuzha. So the said fact could not be stated in Rent Control Petition. Hence there is no suppression of facts as alleged by the tenant. R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 22 27. The learned counsel for the landlady contended that the burden to prove that PW2 is employed permanently is upon the tenant and the landlord can not establish a negative fact. He placed reliance on Sections 101, 102 and 103 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to substantiate the said contention. 28. Section 101 of Evidence Act provides that, whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts,must prove that those facts exists. Section 102 provides that, in a suit or proceeding, burden of proof lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Section 103 provides that, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person which has no application in this case since the burden to prove the _bona fide_ need is upon the petitioners themselves. 29. It is the landlady who desires the court to give a judgment in her favour on the ground of _bona fide_ need for own R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 23 occupation. So burden to prove the said fact under Section 101 of the Evidence Act is on the landlady. That burden never shifts. 30. In **Shiv Samp Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222]** in the context of Section Section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, the Apex Court held that the failure of the landlord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. 31. In **Adil Jamshad (dead) by LRs v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and others [(2005 (2) SCC 476]** the Apex Court reiterated principles laid down in **Shiv Samp Gupta** referred to supra. Therefore the contention of the learned counsel for the landlady that the burden to prove that PW2 is employed permanently is upon the tenant can not be sustained in law. 32. Another contention of the learned counsel for the R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 24 landlady is that, it is the tenant who asserts about the employment of PW2 and hence the burden to prove that fact is upon the tenant. We fail to understand the argument so advanced by the learned counsel. Here PW1 admitted during crossexamination that PW2 is working at Nirmala College as Placement Officer, on a salary of Rs.4500/. It was brought out during reexamination that it is not a permanent job. So the burden to prove that it was not a permanent job, but only a temporary one is upon the landlady who asserts that job is temporary. The fact that PW2 has a permanent job is something which tilts _bona fides_ of the need alleged. That is why for that specific purpose the case was remanded by this court. If no evidence is adduced regarding the nature of employment of PW2 it is the landlady who fails and not the tenant. Hence the burden of proof under Section 102 of the Evidence Act is also upon the landlady. The landlady could prove that fact by examining PW2. 33. The learned counsel for the landlady placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in **Secretary to Govt. of India, Minisry of Defence,** R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 25 ## **New Delhi v. Indira Devi [AIR 2003 AP 329]** on the aspect of burden of proof. In that case, the plaintiff's case was that their predecessor is the owner and pattadar of certain agricultural land which was leased out to one particular person and ownership continues with them. They claimed a declaration and injunction. While so, defendant sets up a plea that the suit land forms part of General Land Register Sy.No.586. It was in the said circumstances that it was held in paragraph 20 of the said decision that the burden of proof lies on the person asserts the affirmative of the issue. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the defendants that the burden of proving the fact that the suit scheduled land does not form part of GLR Sy.No.586 lies on the plaintiffs. The factual matrix in the above decision has no application in the case in hand. 34. In the above circumstances, it can safely be concluded that there is no illegality, impropriety and irregularity in the concurrent findings of _bona fide_ need in favour of the petitioners by the courts below. In the result, this revision petition is found to be devoid of R.C.R.No.164 of 2020 26 any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances parties shall bear their respective costs. Sd/- ANIL K. NARENDRAN, Judge Sd/- M.R.ANITHA, Judge Mrcs/6.8.