This is a High Court of Kerala appeal (MACA No. 1405 of 2008) against an order by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pathanamthitta, arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident on 27.10.1998 in Mor Village, Bihar. Respondents 1–3 filed a claim petition under Section 166, later amended to Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, seeking compensation for the death of 52-year-old Sukumaran, who was employed as a storekeeper with Gamon India Ltd. in Bihar and earning about Rs.3,000 per month. The jeep (BPL 6382), in which the deceased was travelling, was driven by the 7th respondent; the lorry (HR-37/3594) by the 1st respondent; the jeep’s owner was the 3rd respondent; the insurer (appellant) contended the policy was an “Act Only” policy that did not cover gratuitous passengers, and that the accident occurred due to the truck driver’s negligence. The Tribunal held all insured parties jointly and severally liable, awarding Rs.2,73,500 with 9% interest. On appeal, the High Court partly allows the appeal: it revises the compensation to Rs.2,49,500, reduces interest to 8% per annum, and notes issues regarding policy coverage, admissibility of the 166 to 163A amendment, and the chosen method of calculating loss of dependency. The insurer’s challenge to the quantum is upheld in part, and it is left open for recovery actions against responsible parties after the award.
The petitioner, M/S TASTY NUT INDUSTRIES, is a leading manufacturer/exporter of cashew-based products. It exported 400 cartons of organic cashew kernels to an overseas agency. The consignment was rejected and returned by Cochin Port with the intention to re-export after curing defects. During inspection, 200 cartons were found unfit for human consumption; the goods were confiscated and a penalty of Rs. 50,000 was imposed under Ext.P9. The petitioner challenged Ext.P9 and later Ext.P16 (an order under Section 128A of the Customs Act, 1962) in a writ petition, contending that Ext.P16 is appealable and that, notwithstanding the availability of statutory remedy, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked under the exceptional circumstances laid down in Radha Krishnan Industries. The respondents contended that the petitioner had previously sought and been afforded the opportunity to pursue statutory remedies; Ext.P16 itself clarifies further remedy under Section 129A/129AI; therefore, the writ petition should be dismissed. Relying on Radha Krishnan Industries and other authorities, the court held that the statute prescribes the remedy, and one must pursue it before resorting to writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, though without prejudice to pursuing statutory remedies under the Customs Act.
The Kerala High Court, in MACA No. 149 of 2017, heard an appeal against a 2014 Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in O.P.(MV) No.1119/2013, arising from a January 2013 road accident in which Afzal died after being knocked down by a motorcycle. The Tribunal awarded ₹4,84,627 as total compensation to the petitioners for the death of Afzal and directed the insurer to deposit the amount with accrued interest. The appellants argued that the Tribunal erred in not applying Ramachandrappa to fix notional monthly income at ₹9,000 and in not reassessing compensation under conventional heads in line with Pranay Sethi. They asserted that, given Afzal’s age (20 at death) and status as a self-employed person, a higher monthly income with appropriate multipliers and future prospects should be used, with appropriate deductions for personal expenses. They claimed enhanced amounts for loss of estate, funeral expenses, and loss of consortium for the parents. The respondents contended that the Tribunal correctly awarded sums for love and affection and pain and suffering, which ought to be excluded from any enhanced figure. The High Court allowed the MACA, recalculating compensation on the modified basis, awarding ₹10,58,800 as additional compensation (with interest), directing payment by the insurer within two months, and permitting recovery from the other respondents; it also directed realization of proportionate court fee on disbursement.
The petitioner, Marykutty Abraham @ Vincy George, wife of George P. Chandy, approached the Kerala High Court with a writ petition challenging the ongoing SARFAESI proceedings and seeking protection of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Matrimonial discord since 1991 and a mortgage by the husband led to eviction attempts by the bank; the petitioner had already obtained aDV protection in 2018 restraining dispossession from the shared household. She sought mandamus orders restraining the bank from dispossessing her and directing initiation of SARFAESI proceedings with notice to her. The respondents argued that Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act has overriding effect and that the writ petition is not maintainable because the proper remedy is an appeal under Section 17 of SARFAESI. They also asserted absence of copies of the required notices under sections 13(1), 13(4) and 14, and noted that a pending appeal exists (Crl. Appeal No. 32/2021). The Court noted that SARFAESI proceedings have been initiated and that the family dispute is being handled by the Family Court; it cautioned that interim remedies should be sought through proper channels. Ultimately, the writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit, emphasizing that the pending appeal is the appropriate remedy and that the petition does not establish grounds to interfere with SARFAESI actions at this stage.
AS No.587/2000 & connected cases (596/2000, 597/2000, 598/2000, 599/2000, 657/2000) Common judgment of the Kerala High Court delivered on 30 June 2015 by Justices Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan and Sunil Thomas, arising from a suit for damages filed by passengers and their dependents against the Peruvayal Grama Panchayath (the 3rd defendant) and others after a ferry boat sank on the Chaliyar river at the Kadavu. The river ferry service was operated under an auction licence granted by the Panchayath in 1993-94 to the second defendant, who employed the first defendant to row the canoe. On 26 January 1994, with about 24 passengers, the canoe developed water ingress and sank mid-river, resulting in six deaths. The suits claimed negligence by the operator, lack of maintenance and inspection by the Panchayath, and vicarious liability of the Panchayath for the contractor. The trial court awarded substantial damages to each set of plaintiffs. The Panchayath appealed, contending that it merely licensed the ferry and did not control day-to-day operations; it relied on the contract theory and on statutory duties under the Kerala Panchayat Act, contending it was not directly liable. The High Court examined evidence including the eyewitness PW7, postmortem reports, and a Port Officer certificate; it held that the Panchayath undertook a duty to ensure reasonable care and caution and failed to inspect or regulate, making it liable along with the contractor under res ipsa loquitur concepts. The appeals were dismissed and costs awarded to the plaintiffs, upholding the trial court's determinations.
WP(C) Nos.9881/2020 & connected cases (including 29361/2019, 33640/2019, 35036/2019, 35334/2019, 3549/2020, 4607/2020, 4614/2020, 8075/2020, 9008/2020, 10452/2020, 10649/2020, 10816/2020, 11085/2020, 11212/2020, 11338/2020, 11353/2020, 11424/2020, 11449/2020, 11652/2020, 11765/2020, 11862/2020, 11873/2020, 11876/2020, 11878/2020, 11879/2020, 11892/2020, 11893/2020, 11978/2020, 12093/2020, 12106/2020, 12151/2020, 12186/2020, 12253/2020, 12269/2020, 12290/2020, 12312/2020, 12319/2020, 12322/2020, 12323/2020, 12329/2020, 12357/2020, 12365/2020, 12367/2020, 12396/2020, 13235/2020, 13290/2020, 14155/2020, 14585/2020, 14848/2020, 15228/2020, 15610/2020, 15613/2020, 16652/2020, 16659/2020, 16853/2020, 17084/2020, 17901/2020, 18256/2020, 18463/2020, 18542/2020, 18543/2020, 20308/2020, 20324/2020, 21339/2020, 22208/2020, 25243/2020, 25290/2020, 25304/2020, 25325/2020, 25904/2020, 26591/2020, 26596/2020, 27914/2020, 28055/2020) This is a consolidated Kerala High Court writ petition judgment delivered on 5 August 2021 by Justice N. Nagareesh, addressing challenges to Government Orders Ext.P2 (GO 16/2020) and Ext.P4 (Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations along State Highways and Major District Roads) issued by the Public Works Department in the wake of removal of IRC guidelines by MoRTH and related regulatory measures. The petitioners, Oil Marketing Companies and franchisees seeking No Objection Certificates (NOCs) to establish petroleum retail outlets, challenge the state’s regulatory regime on grounds of lack of legislative competence (central subject under Petroleum Rules/Act), Article 14/19(1)(g) protections, and violation of natural justice due to non-consultative policymaking. The respondents defend the regime as a legitimate exercise of executive power under Article 162 in the interest of road safety, traffic management, and state regulatory needs post-IRC withdrawal, relying on the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999 and related rules. The Court holds that Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 are set aside, and district authorities erred in denying NOCs under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 by anchoring decisions to Ext.P2/P4. It directs reconsideration of applications under Rule 144 within two months, without regard to Exts.P2 and P4, and leaves other issues open. The judgment emphasizes primacy of central statutory norms and cautions against executive overreach in the name of safety regulation.
WP(C).No.13590 OF 2019(W) Encily Pandaraparambil v. Director of Public Instructions and Others concerns a writ petition filed by Encily Pandaraparambil, a part‑time Hindi teacher seeking appointment as a full‑time Junior Hindi Teacher at BEMP Higher Secondary School, Thalassery. The petitioner challenged the approval of the appointment of the 5th respondent (Beena James V) as Junior Hindi Teacher (Full Time) against a vacancy that arose in 2015, arguing that a Rule 51B claimant is not a teacher under the Kerala Education Rules and that the 2015 appointment was improperly approved, especially since the 5th respondent’s claim originated from compassionate/51B considerations and not traditional teaching eligibility. The respondents contended that the 5th respondent is indeed a Rule 51B claimant and was eligible to be considered for the vacancy, relying on prior orders and decisions to justify the appointment. The court traced Rule 51B, Rule 43, Rule 51A, and Note 1 to Rule 1(1) of Chapter XIV A KER, and cited earlier Kerala High Court decisions (Sreeja, Deepak, Sukumaran Nair) to support the proposition that a non‑teaching staff member with the prescribed qualifications can be considered for teaching posts when no eligible teacher is available. The judge ultimately held that the petitioner was not qualifying on the vacancy date (1.4.2015) and dismissed the petition, upholding the 5th respondent’s appointment and the related orders. The ruling reinforces the precedence for Rule 51B claimants in filling vacancies under the Kerala Education Rules.
Case concerns fixation of pay for T.K. Narayanan, the Headmaster of B.E.M.L.P. School, Payyannur. The petitioner claims the pay fixation was erroneous because provisional service in Government Schools—dated before 1.8.1974 and subsequent periods—should be counted as qualifying service for time-bound promotion to higher grade in aided schools. Ext. P8 (G.O. 8.8.1988) states provisional service would count as qualifying service for time-bound promotion, subject to Government Decision No.2 under Rule 33 of Part I KSR; Ext. P9 (22.9.1990) extends this benefit to aided schools. The audit objection (Ext. P2) challenged the fixation, leading to Ext. P3 and Ext. P7 upholding the higher notional grade. The petitioner contends there was no misrepresentation and seeks a direction to refrain from reducing or re-fixing pay (Exts. P4–P7). He relies on decisions including Satyapalan v. DDE, Sukumaran Nair v. State of Kerala, John v. KSRTC, Jayasree P. v. State of Kerala, Roy v. United India Insurance Co., Sivankutty Nair v. Secretary to Government to argue about misrepresentation or equitable recovery. Respondents argue that provisional Government service cannot count for an aided school grade due to different appointment methods under Rule 33, Part I KSR, and that excess payments must be recovered where statutory rules require. The court ultimately holds that provisional service cannot be counted for the time-bound grade in aided schools and that the fixation was illegal; The writ petition is dismissed. The judgment discusses conflicting authority, including Santhakumari v. State of Kerala (which endorses recovery where no statutory bar exists) and Sivankutty Nair’s later overrule, ultimately affirming recovery where statutory prohibition is absent.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from an injunction suit concerning a road easement. The plaintiff asserts exclusive title to item 1 and a right of way through item 2 to reach item 1, a path allegedly recognized by a compromise decree Ext. A3 in O.S. 52/1993. Defendants acquired item 2 during pendency of the suit, arguing that Ext. A3 is not binding on transferees and that pendente lite transfers cannot affect subsequent purchasers. The trial court decreed in favor of the plaintiff; the first appellate court dismissed the appeal. The central issue was whether Ext. A3, though arising in a prior suit with the plaintiff, binds the present appellants who were not parties to that suit. The court examined the nature of the easement (an incorporeal right annexed to the dominant tenement) and held that the burden on the servient tenement binds a transferee, particularly when the transfer occurred pendente lite. The discussion drew upon Supreme Court precedents confirming that pendente lite transfers are bound by decrees in the case, and that the easement runs with the land. The Commissioner’s report was relied on to confirm the existence and motorability of the road. The High Court concluded that no substantial question of law remained and dismissed the Regular Second Appeal.
The petitioners—Syriac Varghese, Antony, and Biju Philip—challenge as Crl.M.C. No. 1213 of 2013 the legality of a complaint and ongoing proceedings in S.T. No.1343 of 2012 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur, arising from an Annexure-A complaint alleging offences under sections 11 and 12 read with section 23 of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wet Land Act, 2008, for allegedly reclaiming lands identified as paddy land and wet land in Muriyad Village, Mukundapuram Taluk. The petition contends that prosecution under Section 23 can be triggered only for lands which have been notified under Section 5(4)(i) and included in the Data Bank; publication in the official gazette is mandatory to render such lands liable to prosecution. The petition relies on a Kerala High Court decision in Firose v. Revenue Divisional Officer (2011 (1) KLT 868), which held that prosecution under Section 23 requires notification, and that in the absence of such notification, liability cannot attach. The Public Prosecutor concedes there is no notification for the lands in question. After considering the authorities and the statutory framework, the court concurs with the petitioners that the absence of notification bars prosecution. Accordingly, the petition is allowed, Annexure-A is quashed, and all proceedings in S.T. No.1343/2012 are quashed.
This criminal appeal arises from an acquittal in a cheque bounce case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The complainant alleged that the accused borrowed Rs.1,34,116 and, on demand, issued a cheque dated 10 January 2005. The cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds when presented, and after service of a statutory notice, payment was not made. The Judicial First Class Magistrate acquitted the accused under section 255(1) Cr.P.C., finding the complainant’s case improbable; notably, the court doubted the existence of the loan transaction, credited the theory that the signed blank cheques were provided to the complainant by the accused’s brother, and held that there was no proof of notice service under section 138(b) NI Act. The appellant contends the trial court erred in disregarding Ext. P1 (the cheque) and other documentary evidence, and argues that the address on Ext. P6 shows notice was served at the proper residence. The learned Judge examines the record, observes inconsistencies in PW1’s testimony, and notes the defence that the cheque belonged to a burglary of the family home. The judge also considers the defence exhibits and the lack of independent proof of service. Referencing a Supreme Court dictum on limited appellate interference with acquittals, the court concludes there are no exceptional or compelling grounds to reverse the acquittal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the acquittal stands.
WP(C).No. 29610 of 2012 (A) The petitioner, M. P. Mani, a Branch Manager in charge at Tirur Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd., seeks promotion to the post of Branch Manager based on a provisional degree certificate from Tamil Nadu Open University (TNOU). He joined as a Junior Clerk in 1986 and was promoted to Senior Clerk and later Accountant; the next eligible post is Branch Manager. Ext.P1 shows a bank recommendation to grant exemption for acquiring the required graduation, and Ext.P6 shows Mani’s January 2012 degree from TNOU. The bank refused to treat the TNOU degree as valid for promotion unless it is certified as equivalent to a local (Kerala) or recognised university degree, arguing that Rule 186(1) requires a degree from a recognised university. The petitioner argues that, since TNOU is recognised by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and its distance education program is approved by IGNOU’s Distance Education Council (Exts.P10–P12), this degree should be treated as a valid graduation for promotion. Government orders (Ext.P18) suggest that distance education degrees should be from recognised universities for government posts; however, the bank’s interpretation predated amendments and clarifications. The High Court, relying on prior judgments supporting recognition of distance-education degrees, holds that the petitioner is entitled to claim the vacancy, subject to verification of documents, and directs appropriate promotional action if vacancy exists. The interim order restraining filling the substantive vacancy is mentioned as having been previously issued.
WP(C) Nos. 9881/2020 & connected cases This judgment addresses a cluster of writ petitions challenging the Kerala Government’s access-permission regime for Petroleum Retail Outlets (fuel stations) along State Highways and Major District Roads. Petitioners, including Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., and individual applicants, challenge Government Orders Ext. P2 (G.O. 46/2019) and Ext. P4 (G.O. 16/2020) and the accompanying Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations along SH/MDR. The court reiterates that grant/denial of access permission for fuel stations is primarily a statutory function governed by central and state legislation (Petroleum Rules 2002, Petroleum Act 1934; Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act 2002; Kerala Highway Protection Act 1999 and related rules). It holds that Ext. P4 Guidelines, and the Go-issued framework anchored to Exts. P2/P4, impermissibly encroach upon central authority and on fundamental rights (Article 19(1)(g) and Article 14). The Court distinguishes Mary Ulahannan and relies on Reliance Industries Ltd. and other authorities to hold that District Authorities cannot rely on Ext. P4 to deny NOCs under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules. The petitions are allowed with directions to redraft/consider NOC applications under Rule 144 in light of existing statutory provisions, within two months, and to set aside the challenged guidelines and orders insofar as they constrain NOC issuance.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This batch judgment by a single judge of the High Court of Kerala (N. Nagareesh, J.) addresses numerous petitions filed by oil marketing companies (OMCs) and individual applicants challenging government rules and guidelines for granting access permissions to establish petroleum retail outlets along state highways and major district roads. The core controversy centers on Ext.P2 (G.O. No. 16/2020/PWD) and Ext.P4 (G.O. No. 67/2020/PWD) and the underlying Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations along SH and MDR. Petitioners contend these instruments are unconstitutional, beyond legislative competence, violate fundamental rights (Article 19(1)(g)), lack proper consultation, and contravene central law and IRC/MoRTH guidelines, given that petroleum products are a central subject (Entry 53, List I). The respondents defend the measures as regulatory safeguards aiming to ensure road safety and traffic management, relying on executive power under Article 162 and various statutory pillars (Petroleum Rules, 2002; Control of National Highways Act, 2002; Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999 and supporting rules). The court undertakes a detailed examination of the statutory framework, the effect of MoRTH withdrawals of IRC guidelines, and the validity of executive guidelines. It ultimately holds Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 to be set aside, rules to be applied under existing statutory provisions, and directs authorities to reconsider NOC applications under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 without regard to Exts.P2/P4 within two months, while dismissing petitions seeking to challenge the regulatory regime in other respects.
WP(C) Nos.9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated High Court judgment disposing a batch of writ petitions filed by Oil Marketing Companies and their franchisees challenging Kerala Government orders and guidelines on access permissions and No Objection Certificates (NOCs) for establishing Petroleum Fuel Retail Outlets under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002. The petitions question Ext.P2 (GO No.16/2020/PWD) and Ext.P4 (GO No.67/2020/PWD) along with a set of Indian Road Congress (IRC) norms and related State guidelines governing access to state highways and major district roads. The Court engages with the division between Central and State regulatory powers over petroleum outlets and the degree to which State Guidelines can constrain NOC decisions by District Authorities operating under Rule 144. It notes that while the District Authorities can consider public-safety factors under the Petroleum Rules, they cannot rely on Ext.P2/P4 Guidelines to impermissibly substitute for statutory rules. The Court surveys constitutional provisions, central and state statutory regimes, and precedents (Mary Ulahannan, Reliance Industries, G.J. Fernandez, Dr. Krushna Chandra Sahu) to decide the balance between regulatory control and a fair process for applicants, ultimately setting aside the challenged orders and directing a fresh, law-governed reconsideration of NOC applications within two months, without the disputed guidelines.
WP(C) Nos. 19964 of 2021 & 14111 of 2021 The Kerala High Court, in a consolidated hearing of two writ petitions, examines amendments to the bye-laws of the Pulppally Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. The 2015 amendment increased the share value for A-class members from ₹100 to ₹500, which was approved by the Registrar on 10 February 2016. The Petitioner in WP(C) 19964/2021 (Joby P. Joy) contends there was no notification calling for payment of the enhanced share value and hence has not paid; he argues many members were unaware of the increase and seek an opportunity to make up the shortfall to retain A-class status. WP(C) 14111/2021 concerns conduct of elections to the Bank’s Managing Committee. The court frames Section 19 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, which bars member rights until due payments are made, and Rule 28 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, requiring 60 days’ notice prior to election payments. Citing Kadakam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Narayana Bhat, the court emphasizes that payment of the enhanced value is a prerequisite to voting, but must be communicated to members in advance. The court directs publication of notice about the enhanced share value, gives 30 days to pay, and orders that elections be held after 60 days without further delay, thereby disposing of the petitions. The Administrative Committee has been in place since 2018, and immediate elections are required after the payment process is completed.
This is a habeas corpus petition challenging a COFEPOSA detention order against Rabins K. Hameed (detenu) issued on 15-3-2021 and executed on 17-3-2021, and confirmed by an Advisory Board on 20-5-2021. The detenu, an extradited UAE-based participant in a large gold smuggling operation, allegedly financed and facilitated multiple consignments (including a 30.244 kg seizure valued at Rs. 14.82 crores) through a network involving Jalal A.M. and others. Petitioner contends that the detention violates Article 22 and COFEPOSA provisions because crucial materials relied upon for subjective satisfaction were not supplied, representations were not properly considered (notably a 10-6-2021 email representation and subsequent 5-8-2021 representation rejected on 11-8-2021), and there was undue delay and suppression of materials before the Advisory Board. The petitioner also challenges the credibility of key relied-upon statements (including retractations) and argues that the Advisory Board was not properly competent. The respondents counter that all relevant documents relied upon for subjective satisfaction were supplied, no material was suppressed, and the detaining authority properly evaluated the inputs. The High Court, however, held that supply of documents must be limited to those relied upon for subjective satisfaction, rejected the petitioner's contentions about delay and process, and ultimately dismissed the writ petition, upholding the detention order as legal and proper.
The petitioner, P.S. Sasikumar, challenged the rejection of his application for transfer of ownership and change of management of an aided school under Rule 5A of Kerala Education Rules (KER), and sought mandamus directing the Director of General Education to consider the transfer application (filed jointly with the fifth respondent, the Manager of Karuna Upper Primary School) on merits, notwithstanding objections in Ext. P7. The petitioner argued that Rule 5A empowers the Director to grant permission unless the transfer adversely affects the school’s functioning and staff interests, and that no express staff consent is a prerequisite for consideration. He relied on Division Bench decisions Kesava Kurup v. State of Kerala (1988) 1 KLT 77 and P.G. Madhavan v. P.K. Santhakumari Amma (1994 KHC 259) to contend that the impact on staff should be assessed by the DPI rather than being negated by lack of staff consent. The respondents contended that a 1987 circular requires staff consent to accompany the application and that such consent is reflected in the application format. The Learned Judge held that staff consent cannot be a precondition for consideration and that the Director may evaluate any adverse effect on staff at the merits stage. The Court directed the Director to decide on merits if the petition is resubmitted with all required documents except staff consent, within two months of obtaining a copy of the judgment.
This Regular Second Appeal (RSA 1232 of 2017) arises from a long chain of suits concerning a disputed property in Konnathady, Idukki. The plaintiff alleged absolute possession of 1 acre 60 cents of land with a residential building (Sy.No.1/1/1007) and sought injunction to restrain trespass on the plaint schedule property. The defendants claimed the plaint schedule property was not identifiable and asserted possession of land on the north-western side; they argued that boundary demarcation and a proper survey could resolve any conflict. Following initial suits (O.S.56/1996 and O.S.69/1996) and appeals, a remand directed fresh consideration, culminating in a trial court judgment on 31.01.2013 granting possession of the plaint B schedule property to the plaintiff and issuing injunction against trespass. The first appellate court affirmed this, and the second appeal challenged whether the plaintiff could obtain relief for possession of land to which he had no title, merely on possession. The respondents contended that the B schedule property is identical in connected suits and that the decree in O.S.69/1996 is final, invoking res judicata. The court ultimately held that non-appeal in the connected suit bars the present appeal, citing Premier Tyres Ltd. v. KSRTC to support finality. The appeal is dismissed with no costs, and pending applications are closed.
WP(C) No. 9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated judgment of the Kerala High Court (Single Judge, Justice N. Nagareesh) delivered on 5 August 2021, dealing with multiple writ petitions arising from challenges to Government Orders Ext.P2/GO (Ms) No.16/2020 dated 10 February 2020 and Ext.P4/GO (Ms) No.67/2020 dated 16 October 2020, and the related regulatory framework for obtaining No Objection Certificates (NOC) for starting Petroleum Fuel Retail Outlets along State Highways and Major District Roads. The petitioners, Oil Marketing Companies (BPCL, HPCL, IOCL, Nayara Energy, Indian Oil, etc.) and their franchisees, allege that the guidelines imposed by Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 amount to executive overreach, contravene central petroleum legislation (Petroleum Act 1934 and Petroleum Rules 2002), and violate fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g). They argue that only central law governs petroleum matters and that the District Authorities can only act within the Petroleum Rules; while the State contends that Ext.P4 provides a valid executive framework to ensure road safety and traffic management, supported by MoRTH/NH authorities and the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999. The Court held that Ext.P2 and the Guidelines attached to Ext.P4 cannot stand in the face of existing statutory schemes, and directed the District Authorities to reconsider all NOC applications under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 without regard to Ext.P2/P4, within two months, quashing the orders denying NOC where they were grounded on Ext.P4. The judgment also clarifies that while executive instructions may supplement statutory rules, they cannot override them where not grounded in law.
