WP(C) No. 4227 of 2006(C) Mattathur Panchayath Cottage Match Industrial Co-operative Society No.R.40, Paddy, Kodakara, Thrissur District, petitioner, initiated disciplinary proceedings against its third respondent (the society’s Secretary) for alleged misconduct. The Enquiry Officer found her guilty and the petitioner dismissed her. The third respondent challenged the dismissal first before the Project Officer and the District Registrar of Khadi and Village Industries Societies; those authorities declined to interfere. Thereafter, the Government issued Ext.P4 (order setting aside the punishment and directing reinstatement) and Ext.P5 (order confirming Ext.P4 and permitting de novo disciplinary proceedings). The petitioner contends these orders were issued without hearing and, more importantly, that the disciplinary proceedings violated Rule 198(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules by not constituting a sub-committee to conduct the proceedings, thereby denying the third respondent a right to file an appeal under Rule 198(4). The Government’s powers under the Co-operative Societies Act were also pressed. The Court noted that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted without a sub-committee, but held that Exts.P4 and P5 need not be interfered with in its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Citing President, Pudupariyaram Service Co-op. Society v. Rugmini Amma (1996(1) KLT 100), the court affirmed the sub-committee requirement and directed the petitioner to restart proceedings afresh from the enquiry report stage, to be completed within two months."
This is a Civil Revision Petition (CRP No. 142 of 2009) from Kerala High Court arising out of EP 22/2008 in OS 193/1986 before the Munsiff Court, Pala. The 7th judgment debtor, substituted as a legal representative during the execution proceedings on the death of the 1st judgment debtor, moved under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC seeking to adjudicate a claim that he had prescribed title by adverse possession and thus possessed an independent title to the decree schedule property. The decree, in a suit for recovery of possession, was confirmed on appeal in favor of the decree holder. The decree holder contends that a legal representative brought in by substitution cannot assert independent rights beyond what the predecessor possessed; a claim under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is not entertainable where the claimant’s rights are derivative. The revision petitioner argued that he should be entitled to file a claim petition under Order XXI Rule 97/101 CPC, and even seek benefits under the Compensation for Tenant Improvement Act, 1958, placing reliance on Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand (1995) and asserting a right to adjudication. The court, after hearing counsel, held that a legal representative substituted for the deceased cannot set up an independent title to resist the decree, no adjudication is warranted, and the revision is devoid of merit and dismissed.
This original petition, filed by the State of Kerala and its officers, challenges a Kerala Administrative Tribunal order dated 28 September 2018 in TA 4758/2012, which directed payment of arrears to Muraledhara Pisharady K.K., a part‑time sweeper who was regularised in 2012. The history spans decades of pay revisions for part‑time contingent sweepers initiated by G.O. 831/80 and subsequent orders (G.O. 3000/98, 3002/98), clarifications issued in 2003–2005, and the Mercy line of decisions. The Tribunal held that, since the respondent had worked since 1.11.1987, he was entitled to the pay and allowances under G.O. 501/2005, and to arrears computed according to the 1997 pay revision, with protective effect from earlier judgments. It also concluded that the sweeping area had to be measured with reference to carpet area etc., and directed arrears at Rs. 2300 + DA from 19.6.2007. The State challenged the Tribunal’s order, contending that the 7.11.2009 GO does not authorize enhanced wages and that the order should be within the budgeted pay scales; the respondents argued that the arrears and pay protection must be honoured. The High Court upheld the Tribunal’s direction in substance but modified it by granting six weeks to comply and dismissed the petition with costs.
W.P.(C) No. 13730 of 2021 The petition filed by Hindu Seva Kendram challenges Kerala's reservation policy that cumulatively includes Muslims, Latin Catholics, Christian Nadars (including Nadar in SIUC) and Christians who converted to Christianity as socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs) eligible for reservations in education, employment, and related social welfare benefits. The petitioner contends these communities have not been socially or educationally backward, and reliance on Sachar Committee and Paloli Committee reports only reflects historical or policy-based arguments that do not establish current backwardness. It argues that Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) of the Constitution permit the State to make provisions for the advancement of SEBCs only when warranted by present conditions, and that the State’s lists, created via the Kerala State Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993 and the Kerala State Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 1995, are no longer justified. The High Court discusses the constitutional framework post-102nd Amendment and notes the Maratha’s case (Jaishri Laxmnrao Patil) to the effect that Article 342A vests the power to identify SEBCs in the President/Central Government, with state lists prevailing until such identification is notified. It emphasizes the need for a fresh socio-economic study and evaluation, directs timely action, and ultimately dismisses the petition with costs. The decision underscores the binding nature of Maratha’s case under Article 142 and the continued role of the President in SEBC identification.
WP(C). Nos. 5218/2012, 30266/2012, 17922/2013, 11036/2015 The batch of writ petitions filed in the Kerala High Court challenges the unauthorised and visually obtrusive displays on public roads and streets across the state—advertisement boards, arches, banners, flags, buntings, and hanging cables—that obstruct traffic, impair safety, and mar the environment. Petitioners Dr. Johny Kulangara, Khalid Mundappally, Amjad Ali and M. Cyril Roy argue that municipal and state authorities, including Chalakudy Municipality, the Corporation of Cochin, the Local Self Government Department, PWD and National Highways Division, have failed to enforce statutory and regulatory controls (Kerala Municipality Act 1994 and Rules 1999; Kerala Panchayat Raj Act 1994; relevant provisions on vesting of streets, taxation, permits, and removal of nuisances) and thus permit ongoing defacement and hazards. They rely on environmental and safety statutes, including IPC Sections 268/278, Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act 1984, and related environmental laws, to demand removal and cost recovery as arrears of land revenue. Respondents contend certain roads fall under NHAI/PWD control and point to circulars and statutory schemes that allocate removal and regulation to the appropriate authorities. The court surveys extensive statutes (Kerala Municipality Act, Kerala Highway Protection Act, National Highways Act, Plastic Waste Rules, Environment Act) and directs a unified course of action. It emphasizes road safety, ecological preservation, and the need for inter-agency coordination, culminating in stringent removal orders with a three-month compliance window and monitoring by district authorities and state departments.
Kunhava s/o Hydrose, the sole accused in S.C. No. 507/2016, challenges a conviction for multiple sexual offences under IPC and the POCSO Act. The High Court's analysis centers on two alleged acts of sexual assault against his 11-year-old stepdaughter in 2016: first at a farm-house room and second in the accused's house. The prosecution's case rested on the victim's oral testimony (PW1) supported by her statements in Ext P1 and Ext P2, medical certificates (PW6, PW16), and the investigation by PW17. The trial court convicted the appellant under sections 376(2)(f), (n) and (i) IPC and under Sections 5(1) and 5(m) read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act, sentencing him to ten years' imprisonment with fines. On appeal, the High Court found that the farm-house act constituted an attempt to rape under Section 354 IPC, due to undressing and assaultive conduct, while the house incident involved acts leading to vaginal penetration corroborated by PW1 but not definitively supported by medical evidence. The court determined the victim's age under Section 94(2) JJ Act using Ext P6 (DOB), and Ext P8 confirmed age below eleven. Consequently, the Court set aside the 376 offences, convicted for 354 and 511 IPC and for Section 7 read with Section 8 of the POCSO Act, and imposed reduced concurrent sentences with compensation to PW1.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated set of writ petitions (WP(C) Nos. 9881/2020 and connected cases) heard by a single judge, Justice N. Nagareesh, challenging the Kerala Public Works Department’s and Government’s regulatory framework for granting No Objection Certificates (NOC) for establishing Petroleum Fuel Retail Outlets along State Highways and Major District Roads. The petitions attack Ext.P2 (GO/Guidelines for NOC under Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002) and Ext.P4 (Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations) as unconstitutional, ultra vires, or violative of fundamental rights and central powers. The petitioners argue that the District Authorities, under Rule 144, can consider traffic/public-safety concerns but cannot subsume NOC decisions under fuel-outlet-specific guidelines; they rely on Mary Ulahannan v. Union of India (and its subsequent discussions) to press their case that state-mandated distance/volume norms are beyond state competence. The respondents defend Ext.P4 and related GO orders as valid executive instructions under Article 162 to regulate public safety and traffic on state roads, citing the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999 and MoRTH/IRC standards. The judgment holds that Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 (and the guidelines) cannot stand; district authorities must reconsider NOC applications under Rule 144 in light of the Petroleum Rules, not Ext.P2/Ext.P4, within two months, and the petitions are allowed with this direction. The decision also discusses related cases including central regulations, highway access statutes, and the principles of natural justice and administrative law.
This writ petition challenges the orders of the Kerala Lok Ayukta directing payment of interest on General Provident Fund (GPF) and pensionary benefits to the respondent, a former Junior Public Health Nurse, in Complaint No.2122/2005. The petitioners—Director of Health Services, the District Medical Officer, and the Medical Officer at Community Centre, Kanyakulangara—argue that pensionary benefits were sanctioned in accordance with retirement, and that the respondent had not validly established entitlement to interest. The factual matrix shows that the respondent claimed unpaid pension and GPF closure amounts, with discussions tracing back to a presumed voluntary retirement around 1995 and a retirement date of 30.06.2000. Several letters from the Accountant General and Internal Audit bodies indicate contested and unclear records: the official order sanctioning voluntary retirement was not received, the GPF closure was processed on the basis of retirement dates, and there were communications about the closure being in 2004. Lok Ayukta’s Exhibits P23 (07/15/2009) and P27 (03/22/2010) granted 9% interest, while the Lok Ayukta later admitted absence of documentary proof of earlier voluntary retirement and reviewed its earlier decision. The High Court held that the Lok Ayukta acted without statutory basis to review its prior orders and quashed the interest direction, declaring the respondent not entitled to interest from 24.12.2008 onward and allowing the writ petition.
Massive Lulu Mall project in Thiruvananthapuram triggered a public interest writ challenging the grant of environmental clearance (EC) Ext.P1 by SEIAA under the EIA Notification and CRZ norms. The petitioner, M.K. Salim, contended that SEIAA had no authority to grant clearance for a Township/Area Development project with a built-up area of 2,32,400 sq.m, far exceeding the 1.5 lakh sq.m threshold, and that the project was categorized incorrectly under 8(b) as a Township Area Development Project. He also alleged CRZ violations near Aakulam Lake and Parvathy Puthanar Canal and claimed the land was puramboke. Respondents argued that EC procedures were scrupulously followed, KCZMA approval was obtained, and SEIAA had jurisdiction to grant EC under 8(b); the project’s distance from coastal features exceeded prohibition, and the EC imposed conditions to mitigate impacts. The court examined maintainability under Article 226 in light of a statutory remedy under the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010, and ultimately held that while normally a writ petition should yield to the statutory appellate remedy, the peculiar facts enabled adjudication on merits. The court found that SEIAA acted within its powers, that the EC complied with applicable statutes and environmental safeguards, and that CRZ issues did not violate norms. The petition was dismissed with no costs. It highlighted sustainable development, precautionary principles, and monitoring obligations under EC conditions.
WP(C) Nos. 5343/2018, 5356/2018, 7361/2018, 7362/2018 These batch writ petitions arise from CRPF pensioners seeking revision of pension and family pension in light of the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) and post-CPC pay rules. The petitioners—CRPF Subedar Major retirees retired prior to 2006—contend that their pensions should be revised to the pay scale of Subedar Major with the corresponding Grade Pay (Rs. 4800) as provided in CCS (RP) Rules, 2008, and that the revised pension should be no lower than 50% of the minimum pay in the pay band plus the Grade Pay. They rely on Para 4.2 of the Office Memorandum (OM) No. 38/37/08-P&PW(A) (dated 1/9/2008) and the CCS (RP) Rules 2008, arguing for arrears from 1/1/2006 with interest. The respondents counter that pension revision hinges on the post-6 CPC framework and the upgradation principle, citing KS Krishnaswamy v. UoI (2007) and subsequent OM amendments (4/1/2019 and 9/7/2019) which permit revision by aligning pre-2006 cadres to the revised pay scales and grade pays. The court, in a common judgment, holds that pre-2006 pensioners are governed by Annexures R1(B) and R1(C) and the OMs, directing revision of pension and payment of arrears within three months. The matter reflects ongoing policy developments about pension upgradation across CPC reforms and reconciles several connected petitions under a unified order.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P10 award of the Kerala Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSE Council) in OA Nos. 35/18 and 36/18, arising from delayed payments and deductions under tenders for gloves supplied by the 2nd respondent during 2015-16 and 2016-17. The petitioner, Kerala Medical Services Corporation Ltd. (KMSCL), contends that the MSE Council did not follow due process and Rule 5 of the MSE Council Rules, 2006; the proceedings sheet reveals irregular notices and limited opportunities to file objections; Ext.P10 was issued after only cursory opportunities to respond, before the KMSCL could defend the case, and without proper adherence to statutory procedure. The petitioner argues that the order is not an “award” within the meaning of the MSME Act and hence not appealable under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; the writ petition was maintainable under Article 226 given the alleged violation of natural justice and the absence of due process. The 2nd respondent contends Ext.P10 is an award under MSME Act and is appealable, and that the writ petition should be dismissed since an alternative remedy exists and because Rule 5 requires compliance with statutory procedures. The High Court, after examining the record and applying Popcorn Entertainment, held that Ext.P10 was issued without giving KMSCL a proper opportunity to defend and without following Rule 5; the Court set aside Ext.P10 and directed the MSE Council to reconsider the matter within 90 days, ensuring due process.
MACA No. 4077 of 2017 & CO No. 153 of 2018 This Kerala High Court appeal arises from a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in a death case. The insured, New India Assurance Company Limited (appellant), challenges the MACT award of Rs. 21,86,100 in MACT No. 79/2010, while the claimants (respondents) seek enhanced compensation. The accident occurred on 20 December 2009 when a bus, driven rashly by the first respondent, collided with a car carrying Molly, wife of the first respondent and mother of the two younger respondents, who died at the spot. The tribunal held the insurer liable but fixed compensation at Rs. 21,86,100, applying the income of the deceased (Rs. 20,740/month) with 15% future prospects and a multiplier of 11. The insurer contends that the *split multiplier* approach, urged to reflect retirement at 56, is improper in light of the Supreme Court’s standards, notably in R. Valli v. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (2022) 5 SCC 107, which deprecated split multipliers. It further argues for applying ceilings under conventional heads per Pranay Sethi (AIR 2017 SC 5157) for funeral expenses and loss of estate, and for excluding pain and suffering and excessive loss of consortium. The respondents submit that compensation should be enhanced to reflect true dependents’ losses; the court ultimately reduces several conventional heads (funeral, loss of estate, and loss of consortium) in line with Pranay Sethi and Oriental Insurance guidance, holds that pain and suffering is not payable, and allows the appeal to grant a reduced award, with the insurer directed to deposit the balance after deducting liabilities, in two months, with interest. The cross-objection is disposed of.
W.P.(C). No.16128 of 2022 This writ petition challenges Exhibit P3 revenue recovery action under sections 7 and 34 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. The petitioners contend that debt disputes governed by the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act) exceeding Rs.10 lakhs must be adjudicated by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), not by the Revenue Recovery process, and that Section 34 of the RR Act cannot override the RDB Act. The matter traces a line of judicial authority culminating in Allahabad Bank, Unique Butyle, and the decision in Sam J. Mathews (2019), which hold that for such debts the RDB Act provides exclusive adjudication and that RR Act procedures cannot subvert this framework. The High Court notes that Lakshmi Enterprises and Amrutha Oils were not in consonance with Allahabad Bank and Unique Butyle. Relying on the above authorities, the court holds that RR Act action should cease; the banks may pursue remedies under the RDB Act, with SARFAESI remaining available. The court directs quashing of Exhibit P3 notices and leaves open the Banks’ option under the RDB Act. The decision thus furthers the supremacy of the RDB Act and protects against dual jurisdiction in debt recovery beyond Rs.10 lakhs.
CRMC 1028/2023 (Crime No. 1544/2022) Hashir M.H., the third accused in Crime No. 1544/2022 of Ernakulam Town South Police Station, sought regular bail before the Kerala High Court. Presided by Justice A. Badharudeen, the matter was heard on 24 May 2023. The prosecution alleged that on 21 December 2022, 52.08 grams of MDMA were recovered in joint possession of the petitioner and two others, with 12.79 g found in the pocket of the 1st accused, 24.16 g in the pocket of the 2nd, and 15.13 g in the petitioner’s shoulder bag, with claims that the contraband was brought from Bangalore for sale. The accused contended that the contraband was Methamphetamine, not MDMA, and that even if MDMA, the 15.13 g in possession constituted an intermediate quantity under the NDPS Act, allowing regular bail with the Section 37 rider diluted. The Public Prosecutor argued that the total quantity (52.08 g) constitutes a commercial quantity even for Methamphetamine, making bail unlikely. The court reviewed Section 37’s bail rider: when commercial quantity is involved, bail is permissible only if there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for believing the accused is not guilty and will not commit further offences on bail. It relied on Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari and subsequent decisions to interpret this standard, emphasizing that the grounds must be more than prima facie. Ultimately, the court held that the twin conjunctive requirements under Section 37(1)(b) were not satisfied and dismissed the bail application.
MFA(Forest) No. 131 of 2014 This petition under MFA (Forest) No. 131 of 2014 concerns the vesting of land under the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971. The State of Kerala, represented by the Principal Secretary (Forest & Wildlife) and the Custodian of Vested Forests, challenge vesting of a 1 acre 20 cents plot (Sy.No. 2059/4) in Palakkad district, as part of a 7-acre tract whose title and cultivation were historically contested. The applicants had earlier secured exemptions for 4 acres in favour of the petitioner's sons; OA 492/76 and OA 12/2008 under the Vesting Act were involved, with the Commission report in OA 12/2008 describing boundary variations and an apparent purchase certificate error (the survey numbers 2052 vs 2059). The Forest Tribunal held that the 4 acres were exempt and that the remaining lands required adjudication; the respondents argued vesting under a 1977 notification and questioned title, possession and cultivation, while alleging time-barred claims. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal on limitation and private-forest identity but remanded for fresh proceedings, noting that the Commission report relied upon in OA 12/2008 was not reliable for identity and ordering rectification of the purchase certificate. The judgment emphasizes correcting land identity, preserving evidence, and evaluating cultivation and exemption status on the appointed day before a fresh Tribunal decision.
The High Court of Kerala hears MFA(F).83 of 2015 challenging the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode’s OA No.9/2012, which dismissed the applicant’s plea under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. Gopalán contends that the scheduled land, measuring 84 cents in Ambalappara-II village, is not a private forest and seeks declaration to that effect, with exemptions under S.3(2) or (3). The Tribunal found the land to be part of a larger malavaram named Ananganmala, vested with the Government as a private forest, after demarcation and publication. It held the property to be a private forest under S.2(f)(1)(i) and rejected the exemptions due to lack of proof of cultivation on the appointed day. The appellant produced Ext.A1 (1984) and witnesses PW1–PW3, with Ext.A3 (1957) allegedly indicating cultivation pre-1920; however, the Tribunal deemed PW2 and PW3 unreliable and doubted the cultivation or intent required for exemptions. The Commissioner’s Ext.C1/C2 and Rubber Board Ext.A12 show rubber cultivation around 1983-85, which the Court found insufficient to establish cultivation on the appointed day or the owner’s intent under S.3(3). The High Court ultimately upholds the Tribunal’s conclusions, dismissing the appeal and ordering costs to be borne by the parties.“,
CRL.M.C. NO. 3419 OF 2023 This petition under section 482 CrPC challenges the order of cancellation of bail granted to Nishad, the first accused in Crime No.110/2020 of the Kilikolloor Police Station. On 3 February 2020 he was arrested in connection with offences under IPC sections 323, 324, 341, 506(i), 326 and 308 r/w 34. The Additional Sessions Court had granted bail on 4 March 2020 subject to conditions, including a blanket bar on involvement in any other crime while on bail. In 2022 the petitioner allegedly involved in a fresh offence, Crime No.188/2022 at Kollam East Police Station for offences including 324, 326, 307 r/w 149 IPC and section 27 Arms Act. The Investigating Officer moved to cancel bail; the Sessions Judge cancelled bail, observing grave nature of the subsequent crime. The petitioner challenges this order, contending that mere registration of a subsequent crime cannot automatically cancel bail, and that presumption of innocence and potential false implication justify protection. The State counters that Supreme Court authority permits cancellation where liberty has been misused, citing P. v. Madhya Pradesh and others, and that the accused has been involved in multiple crimes within the district. The High Court scrutinises the distinction between setting aside an unjust order and cancelling bail, referring to Gurcharan Singh, Puran, Renjith and Abdul Basit, among others, and ultimately holds that misuse of liberty merits cancellation. The petition is dismissed, though the court notes that surrender for regular bail remains open.
On 10.12.2014, Muthukumar died following a road traffic collision near Thevara Willington Island. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, awarded Rs.60,10,283 to the legal heirs. The appellant owner-driver contends that the scooter collided with a vehicle coming from the opposite direction and that her car had no insurance; Ext.A8 final report and Ext.B4 police reports allegedly show there was no collision with her car. She argues lack of independent witnesses and challenges Ext.B4’s conclusion; she relies on Ext.B2’s forensic finding of a front-end impact. The respondents rely on the charge sheet as prima facie evidence of negligence under S.166 MVA, following New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal (2011 (3) KLT 648). The High Court applies Pranay Sethi’s framework for future prospects (15%) and the notional income approach, noting the Supreme Court’s stance against split multiplier. It recalculates various heads of compensation, finding excesses: loss of dependency (Rs.6,98,587), funeral (Rs.10,000), pain and suffering (Rs.30,000), loss of love/consortium (Rs.1,20,000), loss of estate (Rs.85,000), and mental shock (Rs.10,000). Total deduction: Rs.9,53,587. The court allows the appeal in part, fixes interest at 7% per annum, and directs the balance to be deposited in two months after deducting Rs.10,00,000 already paid and Rs.9,53,587, in equal shares to the respondents, with no costs. The appeal is allowed to the extent stated above.
This is a criminal writ petition (WP(Crl.) No. 397 of 2023) filed by Venugopal challenging actions arising from multiple FIRs registered against him under the Banning of Unregulated Deposits Schemes Act, 2019 and other sections. The petitioner sought to treat Exhibit P-2 (FIR no. 2281/2022, Kottarakkara) as the principal FIR and to club all other FIRs into one set of proceedings, with the subsequent FIRs treated as statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He also prayed for a comprehensive bail order covering all crimes registered and to be registered in future, and for costs. The Public Prosecutor responded by pointing to evolving Supreme Court guidance on clubbing of FIRs, including Abhishek Singh Chauhan, Anubhav Mittal, and Narendrajith Sahani, while emphasizing that clubbing is not an automatic or universal remedy given the distinct nature of offenses and victims. The High Court analyzed divergent precedents, concluded that clubbing of FIRs is not warranted in the present facts, and held that a blanket bail order across existing and future cases is not legally tenable. It directed that arrests in all existing crimes must be recorded within ten days and that future arrests in similar cases should follow Section 41A Cr.P.C with Arnesh Kumar and Satender Kumar Antil safeguards. WP(Crl.) No. 230 of 2023 is dismissed and WP(Crl.) No. 381 of 2023 disposed of accordingly, with a final disposal of the petition.
MACA Nos. 1372/2014, 2267/2014 & 2298/2014 These are three connected Motor Accident Claims Appeals arising from a common award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, in OP(MV) Nos. 2170/2002, 1721/2012 and 859/2013. The accident involved a motorcycle rider and a bus; the Tribunal held both the bus driver and the motorcycle rider negligent, allocating liability in equal shares and directing insurers to pay the awarded sums with interest. The claimant-appellant in MACA 1372/2014 challenges the Tribunal’s apportionment, arguing that Ext. A2 final police report implicating the bus driver should anchor liability on the bus driver’s insurer. The insurer-appellants in MACA 2267/2014 and MACA 2298/2014 contend the Tribunal’s joint-liability finding is sustainable, relying on the scene mahazar and eyewitness evidence showing the rider’s role. The High Court re-examines the evidence, including PW2 and PW3, and reverses the Tribunal’s apportionment, holding sole negligence on the bus driver and the 3rd respondent insurer liable for the entire compensation. It revises the quantum to Rs. 3,52,003 and directs deposit within three months, with the 5th respondent insurer exonerated and half of the remaining amount to be paid by the bus insurer within the same period. The decision is delivered by a single-judge, Justice Ziyad Rahman A.A., setting out detailed directions on liability and quantum.
