WA No. 1004 of 2021 arises from Salimma Joseph’s writ petition challenging KSRTC Ext. P3, which regularised a period of Leave Without Allowances (LWA) on medical grounds from 25-11-1993 to 11-01-1997 but stated that this period would not count for pension. The learned Single Judge held Ext. P3 to be illegal to the extent it imposed a detriment that the LWA period would not count for pension, and directed reckoning of the LWA period for pension, with arrears of revised pensionary benefits to be disbursed within a short period. The Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) and its officers appealed, arguing that no formal LWA application was made, that the period was irregular, and that post-amendment rules allow the sanctioning authority to determine non-qualifying periods; they also pressed arguments based on pre-cutoff vs post-cutoff Rule 26 of Part III KSR, and on Ext.P7 circulars. The Division Bench examined Rule 26 (unamended before 10.06.2010 and amended thereafter), Rule 88 (Leave without allowances) and related provisions, along with Ext.P7 and Ext.P10, and held that the adverse condition in Ext.P3 infringing pension eligibility was illegal for want of natural justice. The judgment directs reckoning of the LWA period for pension, revision of pension and DCRG, and payment of arrears with specified timeframes.
WP(C) Nos.9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated batch of writ petitions filed by Oil Marketing Companies challenging two Government orders/guidelines for access permissions to Petroleum Fuel Outlets along State Highways and Major District Roads. The petitions allege Ext.P2 (G.O.(Ms) No.16/2020/PWD dated 10.02.2020) and Ext.P4 (G.O.(Ms) No.67/2020/PWD dated 16.10.2020) along with the related IRC-based norms were ultra vires, unconstitutional, or otherwise unlawful, violating the Petroleum Rules, 2002 and the Constitution, and infringing Article 19(1)(g). They contend that District Authorities are bound by the Petroleum Rules and cannot be empowered to impose distance, plot-size, or access norms via executive guidelines; the withdrawal of IRC guidelines by MoRTH and Central oversight raise additional questions about the validity and legislative competence of State action. The respondents argue Ext.P4 and the related guidelines are valid executive instruments under Article 162, supported by rule-making powers and safety considerations, and that District authorities may weigh traffic density and public safety while processing NOC applications under Rule 144. The judgment, delivered by a Single Judge (Justice N. Nagareesh) on 05 August 2021, ultimately quashes Ext.P2 and Ext.P4, sets aside district refusals premised on those guidelines, and directs authorities to reconsider NOC applications under Rule 144 in light of the prevailing rules as of the application date, within two months, while permitting cure of defects and dismissing some petitions.
WP(C) Nos. 18820/2021; 18833/2021; 18915/2021; 18948/2021 Four writ petitions—WP(C) Nos. 18820/2021, 18833/2021, 18915/2021 and 18948/2021—were heard together challenging Ext. P2 assessment orders for the 2014-15 year and Ext. P3 common appellate orders under the Kerala KVAT Act. The petitions challenge tax liability on discounts and incentives/credit notes issued post-purchase from suppliers, with arguments spanning several issues in the assessments for AY 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17. The petitioners contended that identical issues across these four cases have been referred to a Full Bench by a reference order dated 27.07.2020 in Memana Agencies v. The Commercial Tax Officer, Cherthala (W.P.(C) No.5467/2017), and therefore the writ petitions should be admitted while awaiting the Full Bench decision. The respondents emphasized that there exists an effective statutory remedy—second appeal before the VAT/Tax Tribunal—and that entertaining writ petitions merely because one issue is referred to the Full Bench is inappropriate, especially since a recovery (RR) process had already commenced. Ultimately, the court granted a breathing time of 30 days to enable petitioners to approach the appellate authority and directed that RR proceedings be kept in abeyance during this period. The petitions are disposed of in terms described, leaving the merits of the disputed tax questions to the Full Bench/appeals while preserving a right to appeal.
WP(C) 9881/2020 & connected cases This is a consolidated judgment of the Kerala High Court delivered on 5 August 2021, addressing a batch of writ petitions filed by Oil Marketing Companies and their franchisees challenging Government orders and guidelines concerning access permissions for establishing petroleum retail outlets along State Highways and Major District Roads in Kerala. The petitions challenge Ext.P2 (GO Ms No. 16/2020) and Ext.P4 (Guidelines for Access Permission to Fuel Stations) together with related GO Nos. 46/2019, 67/2020, 551/2020, 555/2020, and other statutory instruments. The Court analyzes the locus of power to regulate petroleum outlets, scrutinizing whether such regulation can be effected by executive guidelines (Ext.P4) under Article 162 of the Constitution, or whether the matter is exclusively within the domain of central or highway authorities under the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 and the Kerala Highway Protection Act, 1999. While upholding the general principle that District Authorities applying Rule 144 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 may consider public-safety and traffic impacts, the Court ultimately holds that Ext.P2 and Ext.P4 are set aside as unconstitutional or impermissible guidelines that attempt to regulate fuel-outlet locations beyond the statutory framework. The petitions are allowed in part, with directions to consider NOC applications afresh under the prevailing rules, within two months, curing defects as needed; certain related petitions are dismissed. The decision also discusses the ongoing disputes about whether Kerala can legislate distances or other access norms for fuel stations without central authorization, distinguishing prior Kerala cases like Mary Ulahannan while applying Reliance Industries and other precedents to emphasize the supremacy of central statutes and proper highway governance.
This is a bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. filed by Binu Mathew, accused in Crime No.2667/2019 of Muvattupuzha Police Station, Ernakulam District, alleging offences under Section 384 IPC. The prosecution contends the petitioner, posing as a journalist, threatened and extorted Rs.10,000 from the defacto complainant, the doctor and Managing Director of Sabine Hospital and Research Centre, by claiming access to incriminating documents. The facts allege that the incident occurred on 18.10.2019 and a complaint was filed, followed by an FIR on 2.11.2019. The defense submits that the case is false, that the petitioner produced documents (including a license to run a news service and email correspondence) to show his journalistic intent, and that there is no prima facie case under Sec. 384 IPC; annexures include various materials such as a news item published on 31.12.2019 and communications with media. The prosecution, citing separate cases and ongoing investigations (including Crime No.1217/2019 for obstruction and other cases under the Kerala Police Act), opposes bail. The petitioner’s counsel argues for bail and readiness to comply with conditions. The court, applying the bail principles from Chidambaram P. v. CBI (AIR 2019 SC 5272), finds no fit case under Section 438, notes conduct related to media exposure versus police remedies, and dismisses the bail application.
WP(C) Nos. 15555 of 2021 and 17831 of 2021 Two writ petitions, WP(C) Nos. 15555 of 2021 and 17831 of 2021, were taken up together before the Kerala High Court for common questions arising out of the Government’s directives regarding appointments in St. Mary’s High School, Kandanad, Ernakulam. Daliya John, an HSA (Mathematics), sought implementation of Ext. P4, a Government order directing the DEO to approve her appointment from 1.6.2018 and to grant all consequential benefits including arrears, arguing that the Government had already considered the matter and issued directions for her appointment after reviewing the record. The Manager of the school challenged the Government order, contending that the appointment of Daliya John bypassed the rights of a Rule 51A claimant, Jaise M. Abraham, who had been deployed on protection after abolition of the UPST post, and that vital statutory provisions and procedural safeguards were not observed, including compliance with Note 2 to Rule 51A. The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Kerala Education Rules (KER), particularly Rule 51A and its Note 2, and examined prior precedents. It held that the government order could not stand without mandatory compliance with the rules and due process, particularly with regard to the forfeiture provisions and natural justice. The court disposed of both petitions, quashing Ext. P8 in the 17831 petition, directing reconsideration, and closing with directions that vacancy-filling be stayed pending fresh orders.
This appeal arises from the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Wayanad, Kalpetta’s award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, relating to a 23 November 2012 motorbike collision in Sulthan Bathery, Wayand. The claimant, Albin, aged 22, sustained severe injuries while riding a motorcycle (KL-58/7542) and claimed Rs. 3,00,000 in compensation under various heads. The Tribunal held the insurer liable only if the accident was proven to have been caused by rash and negligent riding by the first respondent and ultimately dismissed the petition for lack of proof against the rider, awarding Rs. 1,02,600 and interest at 9%. The insurer admitted coverage but contested liability and the quantum, arguing the petition did not establish negligence. The appellant sought to rely on police material, including Ext.A1–A3 and a police charge sheet in Crime No.547/2012, which implicated the first respondent for offences under IPC 279/338. While the Tribunal did not rely on the charge sheet, the appellant moved to admit a certified copy under Order XLIX Rule 27 CPC as Exhibit A7. The Kerala High Court, relying on a principle from Pazhaniammal, admitted the charge sheet as additional evidence and held that the accident occurred due to rash driving by the first respondent, with the insurance company liable. The court increased the loss of amenities by Rs.5,000, while directing the insurer to deposit Rs.1,07,600 (including an Rs.5,000 enhancement) at 8% interest, and disposed of the appeal with no costs.
CRL.A Nos.356, 369, 370, 379, 426, 438, 452 & 648 of 2021 This batch of eight Criminal Appeals arises from bail refusals by the Special Court for NIA Cases, Ernakulam, in respect of accused linked to a large-scale gold smuggling operation through the diplomatic channel addressed to the UAE Consulate in Thiruvananthapuram. The respondents-complainant being the National Investigation Agency (NIA), represented by the Additional Solicitor General, challenge the pre-trial detention of accused persons. The judgment canvasses core issues involving the scope and application of the UA(P)A, 1967, especially Section 15(1) and its sub-clause (iiia), read with the Third Schedule and the concept of “economic security.” It relies on Muhammed Shafi P. v. NIA Kochi (2021 KHC 145) to emphasize that the Section 15(1)(a)(iiia) triggers only when the acts amount to a terrorist activity as defined in the Act, normally tied to counterfeiting of high quality currency, and not ordinary gold smuggling. The court cautions against deviating from binding precedents and examines whether the final report demonstrates prima facie evidence of a terrorist act. Ultimately, it holds that there is no compelling prima facie case of terrorist activity, while recognizing the need for caution and the possible involvement of transnational factors. The appeals are allowed and the accused are directed to be released on bail with conditions under the terms enumerated in the order.
Raju Sebastian, a draftsman employed with the Kerala Water Authority, sustained serious injuries in a motorcycle accident on 22 July 2010 when his bike was struck by a car. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kozhikode, held the insurer liable to pay Rs. 8,60,307 with 8% interest and framed damages accordingly, while the driver and owner were ex-parte. The appellant challenged the quantum, arguing that compensation under heads such as loss of earning power, medical expenses, and actual earnings were unduly low. The insurer contended that the Tribunal’s award was reasonable and warranted no interference. In addressing the disability record (Ext.C1 shows 86% permanent disability with 50% functional disability) and the appellant’s pre-accident salary (Rs.26,400 per month), the High Court scrutinized the methodology for computing post-retirement earning capacity, noting that the appellant remained employed until retirement and that pension could not preclude additional earnings. Relying on precedents like Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq, Special Grade Kumily Panchayath, and George, the Court adopts a 50% post-retirement income basis and recalculates the compensation, including reinstatement for commuted leave (23.7.2010 to 31.8.2010) and adjustments for medical-bill duplications. Ultimately, the Court directs an enhanced compensation of Rs.7,39,122, to be deposited with 8% interest, rectifying prior deductions and duplications and disposing of the appeal accordingly.
Mat.Appeal No. 563 of 2016; OP 1366/2012 The Kerala High Court, in Matrimonial Appeal No. 563 of 2016, heard on 25 January 2017, concerns a dispute over the status of the deceased Khaleb Titus’s wife and entitlement to pensionary benefits. The original petition (OP 1366/2012) in the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, sought a declaration that the petitioner was the legally wedded wife of the deceased and therefore entitled to retirement benefits and family pension, along with injunctions directing railway respondents to release those benefits. The respondents disputed the petitioner’s status, alleging the petitioner’s marriage to the deceased had not been dissolved and that the second marriage, if any, occurred during subsistence of the first, thus not conferring wife-status. PWs 1–3 and CPWs 1–3 with Exts A1–A6 and B1–B6 were examined. The Family Court held that the petitioner was the legally wedded wife and granted the reliefs sought. The appeal contends otherwise, arguing lack of dissolution evidence and improper reliance on the lower court’s finding. The High Court ultimately agrees with the Family Court, citing Rajkumari v. Krishna (2015) and concluding that the second marriage did not confer wife-status during the subsistence of the first, upholding the lower court’s decision and dismissing the appeal. The railway respondents are directed to comply with the pension order, with costs to be borne by the parties as directed.
This writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India challenges an interim order of the Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (State Commission). Federal Bank Ltd., as bank-financier of the first respondent Peeiyar Exporters (and Peeiyar Anex), extended export packing credit and cash credit facilities since 2016, secured by various movable and immovable properties. Subsequently, the bank observed misutilisation of export packing credit for non-export purposes and, accordingly, recalled this facility while allowing other facilities to continue. The bank also classified the borrower's accounts as non-performing assets (NPAs) on 1 March 2021. The first respondent filed Ext. P3 before the State Commission on 12 February 2021, seeking relief for alleged deficiency of service and damages; an interlocutory application (IA 145/2021) prayed for stay of coercive actions, including declaration of NPAs. On 3 March 2021, Ext. P4, an interim order, directed the bank to refrain from coercive action and from declaring accounts as NPAs. The petitioner contends that Sections 34 and 35 of SARFAESI Act bar such interim relief by a quasi-judicial consumer forum, and that the State Commission’s order is without jurisdiction. The respondents rely on Cicily Kallarackal and argue maintainability, while the court ultimately distinguishes Cicily Kallarackal and holds the impugned order to be ultra vires, quashing Ext. P4 and allowing the writ petition.
The petitioner Rajan filed Ext.P3 before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Kottayam, alleging offences under Sections 7, 11, 12 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, against respondents 2 to 8 (the Tahsildar, Village Officer, Sub Registrar and private individuals) in relation to a Government land dispute. The case centers on a Government land parcel (7.90 ares and 20.26 ares, RS Nos. 422/01 and 422/7 in Mannar Village) where the 6th accused allegedly obtained possession with the help of accused 1–5 and sold it to the 8th accused (and 9th was a government authority) via a false sale deed (document No. 1468/2006, SR Office Mannar). The 4th accused acted as scribe, the 5th as attestor, and the 3rd registered the deed, with the purported sale arising from a conspiracy. The Special Court dismissed the complaint for lack of materials to prove that the land was purambokku land. The petitioner challenged the dismissal under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court declined to interfere, noting that the complaint had not been proven and that the pre-cognizance dismissal may be treated as a rejection of the complaint, relying on the principle from Raju Puzhankara v. State of Kerala to treat pre-cognizance dismissals as rejections. The original petition is dismissed, but the Court clarifies that a fresh complaint with adequate materials may be filed and forwarded for action under law.
This High Court of Kerala, sitting in a Division Bench, hears WA No. 246 of 2016 challenging Ext.P6, a government order cancelling the appellant’s approval of his appointment as UPSA in a Thrissur school. The writ petition W.P.(C) No. 1835 of 2012 argued that, in the absence of Ext.P6, the petitioner would acquire a right under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 to regularize a future vacancy. The petitioner had two spells on daily wages during 2007–2008 and 2008–2009; he claims that the government’s G.O. (P) No.56/11/G.Edn of 26.02.2011 granted pay regularization, later clarified by the 20.11.2011 order as having prospective effect, so those spells should be regularized. The learned Single Judge held Ext.P6 valid, noting the prospective effect of the clarificatory order and the pre-2011 spells could not be regularized. On appeal, the Division Bench upholds Ext.P6’s validity but, applying the ratio of State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih (White Washer), partially allows the appeal to the extent of not recovering excess salaries paid during the pre-clarification spells. Accordingly, Ext.P6’s recovery directions are set aside for those periods, while other aspects of the lower court’s order remain intact, and the appeal is disposed of.
This is a Rent Control Revision under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, filed by Kadavath Meethal Mariyam, the tenant/petitioner, challenging eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff), Mananthavady, on 28.06.2019, directed eviction to enable the landlord to start a ready-made garments business in the petition schedule shop room, finding bona fide need. The landlord sought to augment his income by running his own venture; the tenant contested that the landlord had no genuine need and that he already runs an established business through the family, with substantial properties, and that there were no proven vacant alternative buildings in the locality. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kalpetta, on 26.02.2021, confirmed the Trial Court’s finding, holding that the bonafides were proven and that the second proviso to Section 11(3) could not be invoked due to lack of proof of tenant’s dependence on the income from the subject business and absence of evidence of suitable vacant buildings. The tenant’s Revision petition before the High Court was dismissed, but the Court granted three months’ time to surrender possession due to COVID-19, subject to strict conditions including arrears payment. The judgment underscores the settled legal principles on bona fide need and the restrictive scope of revisional scrutiny.
WA No. 1550/2015; WA No. 30/2016; WP(C) Nos. 18967/2015, 22999/2015, 26523/2015, 13661/2016 This batch of writ appeals and writ petitions before the Kerala High Court arises from contracts between private cable TV operators and the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB) governing the use of electric poles. The Board, starting in 1998, permitted private operators to draw cables on its poles for a nominal rent, which later escalated through a tender-cum-auction process. Exhibit P2 (7.4.2008) set the contractual framework, with Clause 12 obliging payment at rates fixed by the Board from time to time and Clause 15 providing a 10-year term with a 12.5% annual increase. Exhibit P3 (2012) introduced a retrospective hike, and Exhibit P4 (2015) attempted to justify rate revisions by detailing the Board’s past practices. The appellants argued that Clause 15 protected their rates for the 10-year period, and retrospective increases violated Exhibit P2. The Board argued the contracting party is bound by rates fixed by the Board (Clause 12) and that Exhibit P4 was issued in furtherance of fixing proper rates. The learned Single Judge’s interim order required arrears payments and did not adequately address the contractual interpretation, prompting these appeals. The Bench ultimately held that disputes arising out of contract terms are for ordinary contract law, not Article 226 writs, and dismissed the petitions, while granting liberty to pursue other legal remedies.
Dasan, the revision petitioner, challenges a conviction for offences under Sections 420, 465, 468 and 471 IPC arising from a loan transaction of Rs 1 lakh with PW2, the manager of the Manjeri Co-operative Urban Bank Ladies Branch. The prosecution alleged that Dasan forged a cheque, misrepresenting that he had an account with the bank, which was used to obtain the loan; the cheque was presented and dishonoured on the grounds of “payment stopped by the drawer” and “signature different,” and a bank examination purportedly linked the signature on Ext. P-1 to the accused after a comparison with specimen signatures. The trial court convicted, and the Additional Sessions Court, Manjeri, dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction. During the course of the revision, an impleading petition brought in the defacto complainant, and it was settled that this was a predominantly private civil dispute between the parties. The petitioner invoked the High Court’s inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in fit cases, relying on the doctrine laid down in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012 KHC 4530) that criminal cases with civil flavour may be quashed where there is a settlement between parties. On these grounds, the I/A was allowed and the petition, as per the order, quashed the impugned conviction and sentence; the petitioner is to be set at liberty, and bail is cancelled, in view of the out-of-court settlement.”
WP(C).No.4592 OF 2018(Y); WP(C).No.1592 OF 2018; WP(C).No.8334 OF 2018 These writ petitions challenge amendments to the Kerala University Act, 1974 and the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, as applied to reservation in teaching posts across the University of Kerala. The University amended Section 6(2) of the Kerala University Act to implement a system that treats all departments as a single unit for reservation, following Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 14 and Rules 15–17 of the KS&SSR 1958, along with UGC Regulations. Notifications dated 27.11.2017, 20.7.2014 and 25.10.2017 purportedly introduced 100% reservation by category and rotation across departments, thereby creating a single cadre for professorships and other posts (in departments like Aquatic Biology & Fisheries, Zoology, etc.). The petitioners argue this violates Articles 14, 16(1), 16(4) and 16(4A) of the Constitution and that cadre, post and service are distinct; rotational rosters in a single-post cadre lead to total exclusion of non-reserved candidates. The court scrutinizes case law on reservations in single cadres, including PGIMER’s case, Sathi, Chakradhar, and others, concluding that there cannot be reservation in a single-post cadre or by grouping isolated posts. The petitions are allowed; the impugned notifications and amendments are quashed, and appointments pending are subject to further lawful steps with due regard to merit and constitutional principles.
This intra-court writ appeal arises from the CISF termination of Rajendra Prasad Dhaka, a Constable/Driver, on grounds of suppression of information regarding a past criminal case and alleged non-disclosure in the application form for recruitment, as well as for declaring him unsuitable in terms of the Standing Screening Committee’s recommendations. The appellant approached the Kerala High Court after the Single Judge dismissed W.P.(C) No.19586/2018 challenging Ext.P10 (04.05.2018) and Ext.P11 (31.05.2018) termination orders. The appellant’s prayers included quashing the termination orders, reinstate him, and seek declaration of probation/continuance in service. The matter traversed three rounds of writ petitions, with the court ultimately finding that the impugned orders were vitiated by a misapplication of Avtar Singh v. UOI, and by reliance on a flawed conclusion that there was substantial suppression of material facts. The Division Bench held that there was no substantial suppression and that the acquittal in the criminal case (Sec.3 & 25 Arms Act) should be treated as honourable, not a bar to appointment. It further noted reliable past APRs (2016–17) and post-hoc inconsistencies in the earlier determinations. The Court set aside Ext.P10/P11, directed reinstatement within a month, and required decisions on probation to be issued in a forthcoming timeframe, emphasizing objective criteria and holistic consideration of the record.
Mani Jacob, a retired Postal Assistant, challenged a Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) order that withheld retirement benefits (DCRG and gratuity) and granted relief only partially. The CAT had held that withholding the DCRG was illegal and ultra vires Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, since the underlying events (fraudulent activity) occurred in 2009–2010—well before retirement—and the provisions permit action only for events within a four-year window prior to retirement or institution of proceedings. The petitioner argued for full disbursal of retirement benefits, including gratuity and the commuted value, and for interest at 12% on both the withheld and undisputed portions from the date of retirement. She also invoked Rule 68, which contemplates interest on delayed gratuity payments. The High Court, while acknowledging the Tribunal’s findings on the illegality of initiating action for events beyond the statutory window, modified the relief: the undisputed gratuity of Rs. 4,26,840 would carry interest at 8% per annum from 01.07.2019 to 03.01.2020 (date of actual disbursement). The withheld gratuity of Rs. 7,22,616 would carry 6% per annum from 01.07.2019 to 13.04.2021, with directions to grant interest within two months; failure to comply would raise rates to 10% and 8% respectively. The Tribunal’s directions were thus modified and the petition disposed of with the above directions.
Islamic Mission Trust, registered under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging Ext.P4 (03.03.2020) of the University of Calicut and Ext.P5 (08.04.2013) of the State, and sought a writ of certiorari to quash those communications and a mandamus to compel the University to consider Ext.P3 (21.12.2018) for starting a new law college at Poopalam, Perinthalmanna, Malappuram District, with necessary State concurrence/NOC. The University rejected Ext.P3 on 03.03.2020 citing Government guidance that only districts without any legal educational institutions would be considered, noting that Malappuram already had three law colleges. Annexure I records a Bar Council of India moratorium on new law colleges (11.08.2019). The petitioner argued that denial cannot rest solely on the fact of existing colleges; it pressed for reconsideration under the Calicut University Act, 1975, and the Calicut University First Statute, 1977, and for due process. The Court emphasized that statutory orders must be grounded on reasons and be objectively motivated, citing Mohinder Singh Gill, Breen, Alexander Machinery, Chairman & Managing Director v. P.C. Kakkar, Krishna Swami, Malu M. and Sree Dharma Paripalana Yogam. The result: Ext.P4 was set aside; the University was directed to reconsider Ext.P3 within two months, after hearing, and to issue a reasoned decision in accordance with law, with no liability for costs.
