CRL.A. 875 of 2013; CRL.A. 908 of 2013 Two criminal appeals arise from the conviction in S.C. No. 891/2010 of an Additional Sessions Court, Kollam, for murder under Section 302 IPC with aid of Section 34 IPC and for offenses under Section 324 IPC with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution alleged that on 25 December 2004, at Ambalamkunnu Junction, Renjith was attacked by a group including accused Nos. 1–4, resulting in his death; accused No.1 allegedly initiated the assault, while accused Nos. 2–4 participated with swords and a knife. The trial court convicted accused Nos. 2–4 under Sections 302 and 324 IPC with the aid of Section 34 IPC; accused No.6 was acquitted. The State challenged the judgment by two appeals: Crl.A. 875/2013 by accused No.4 Shiju M.S., and Crl.A. 908/2013 by accused Nos.2 and 3 (Shanavas and Abdul Saleem). The High Court relied on the testimony of PW18, a college student who witnessed the incident, and PW21, an injured eyewitness, together with post‑mortem findings showing 57 ante‑mortem injuries and blood‑group analysis of recovered weapons (MO4, MO7, MO16). Despite several witnesses turning hostile, the court held that PW18’s testimony was credible and corroborated by PW21, medical evidence, and weapon recoveries, establishing common intention under Section 34 IPC. It rejected defenses about belated statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and upheld the conviction and sentences, dismissing the appeals. The verdict thus affirmed the trial court’s judgment and the life sentences awarded to accused Nos. 2–4.
This Regular First Appeal arises from O.S. No. 89 of 2008 filed in the Sub Court Palakkad for specific performance of an agreement for sale of five items of immovable property. The plaintiffs, Rubis Tharayil and Devassy So. Kollanoortharail Porinchu, entered into an agreement dated 26.03.2007 with the defendants for sale of a large single plot aggregating about 12.775 acres, with Beena deceased having left behind a minor portion (Beena’s legal heirs) and the 3rd defendant acting as guardian. An advance of Rs. 75,00,000 was paid, with an offer to pay another Rs.75,00,000 by 15.10.2007; the defendants pledged to measure the land and produce title deeds and to obtain the necessary authorization to convey minors’ share. When documents were not made available, the plaintiffs demanded performance, and a suit was filed with an alternative prayer for refund of the advance with interest and for damages on breach. The trial court dismissed the suit for non-deposit of the balance consideration. The plaintiffs challenged the order, and the High Court, after detailed consideration of issues including misjoinder and readiness to perform, held that the plaintiffs were entitled to refund of the advance and, more importantly, that the contract could be partially enforced. The court ultimately allowed the appeal and decreed specific performance for items 1, 2 and 5 upon deposit of the balance, while recognizing minors’ rights require court permission. The result is a partial relief that balances purchaser protections with statutory safeguards for minors.
WP(C).No.15834 of 2018; WP(C).No.15944 of 2018; WP(C).No.16099 of 2018 This batch of writ petitions from the Kerala High Court challenges the timing and procedure for Plus One admissions under the State syllabus for CBSE students who completed Class X in 2018. Petitioners include two minors in the CBSE stream (Master Ajil M. and Kumari Amna Kuruniyan) and others representing unaided and Parent-Teacher Associations. They seek a writ of mandamus to extend the deadline for submitting applications for Plus One admission in the State syllabus, arguing that the window must align with CBSE results and the online application process to ensure students have a fair opportunity after marks are declared. The respondents are the State of Kerala (represented by the General Education Department), the Director of Higher Secondary Education, and the Regional Deputy Director of Higher Secondary Education, with CBSE participation. The court recalls a Division Bench decision dated 26.05.2017 in W.A.Nos.900 and 906 of 2017 which directed keeping the last date open for two days after CBSE results and mandated wide publicity so students can apply online after results. On 29.05.2018, following submissions and CBSE result timing, the court extends the last date for 2018 to two days after CBSE Class X results (three clear working days including the results day) with broad publicity to inform parents and guardians.
This writ petition challenges the authority of the Permanent Lok Adalath (PLA) to decide a dispute under Section 22C(8) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The insurer New India Assurance Ltd. repudiated a medical claim on the ground of suppression of material facts, and the insured sought reimbursement. Conciliation under Section 22C(7) failed, and the PLA proceeded to decide the dispute, holding that the contract’s validity need not be adjudicated as a separate issue, effectively concluding misrepresentation did not vitiate the contract. The insurer contends that the PLA, as an insurance service under public utility service, cannot adjudicate questions of contract validity or interpret contractual terms, especially where the controversy involves the existence or non-existence of rights and obligations rather than a settlement. The court examines the Act’s framework, noting the distinction between “power to decide” and “power to adjudicate,” and emphasizes that the PLA’s jurisdiction is triggered by an element of settlement and pre-existing rights and liabilities. It surveys several precedents, including United India Insurance Co. v. Ajay Sinha, Bar Council of India v. Union of India, Ambika Kumary v. State of Kerala, and New India Assurance Co. v. Jameela, to clarify the boundaries of PLA authority. Ultimately, the court holds that the PLA cannot decide disputes where the rights and obligations themselves are in dispute and sets aside the PLA’s award. It leaves the petitioner free to approach the Insurance Ombudsman or other fora. The decision reinforces the aim of speedy, yet fair, redress through appropriate forums.
This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 582 of 2023) arises from decrees in O.S. No.127/2013 before the Munsiff Court, Sasthamcotta, and A.S. No.28/2020 before the Sub Court, Karunagappally, challenging eviction from a scheduled shop room. Abdul Rahim, the plaintiff/title-holder, claimed exclusive title and possession based on sale deed No. 3301/2008. Earlier suits (O.S. Nos. 140/2008 and 322/2008) culminated in decrees recognizing the defendants’ possession of the shop room and the sale deed being challenged. The trial court granted eviction with a 30-day surrender window and a permanent injunction against trespass or damage, and the appellate court concurred. The appellants argued that the plaint schedule shop rooms could not be identified, but the court found identity of the schedule room is clear from prior decrees. They submitted that no substantial question of law existed and did not press admission to formulate a substantial question. The High Court relies on authorities including Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Others, Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, Biswanath Ghosh v. Gobinda Ghose, and Government of Kerala v. Joseph to reiterate that admission and decision of a second appeal hinge on framing a substantial question of law. Consequently, the appeal is meritless and is dismissed without admission, with a one-month window to vacate subject to an affidavit filed within 10 days; failure to comply permits execution.
This is a Kerala High Court writ appeal (W.A. No. 1233 of 2017) challenging notices and assessment orders under the Central Sales Tax regime as integrated with the KVAT era. The core dispute concerns the time-limit for completing assessments under Rule 6(5) of the CST Rules, 1957. The petitioners (Sterimed Inc.) contend there is no express limitation period under Rule 6(5) and that the old four-year horizon borrowed from Rule 6(7)/(8) should not be extended to Rule 6(5); they rely on the evolution from KGST to KVAT, the deeming provision of Section 21 of KVAT, and Section 25 for escaped turnover. The State argues that Rule 6(5) has no fixed period and that the assessment’s completion must be timely, citing the principle of expedition and the interplay with Section 9(2) of the CST Act; amendments to Section 42 of the KVAT Act (Finance Act, 2016) were discussed but found not to alter the initial completion framework. The judgment considers several connected writ petitions and delineates outcomes for each, ultimately holding that a fixed four-year period under Rule 6(5) is not sustainable and that a reasonable period, potentially up to five years for initiation, can be recognized in light of KVAT provisions and statutory structure. The court ends with an order “Ordered accordingly,” with costs.
The appellant, B. Anil, sought to reverse MACA No. 232 of 2012 challenging the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam’s award in O.P. (MV) No. 2159/2004 and its directive that the insurer deposit only 75% of the compensation due to contributory negligence by the claimant, based on Ext. A2 which notes a smell of alcohol after the 27 December 2003 accident. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 3,43,000 for injuries but held the claimant 25% liable to the loss due to contributory negligence. The High Court, upon review, found the evidence insufficient to substantiate a 25% deduction, noting the absence of a blood-alcohol test or a breathalyzer result, and acknowledging Section 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires clear evidence of drunken driving. Citing Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Vineetha Nair (2016) to emphasize that the mere smell of alcohol is not proof of intoxication, the court held that the tribunal’s inference was unfounded. It also invoked volenti non fit injuria as a doctrine but concluded it did not bar the claimant’s right to full compensation. The High Court set aside the 25% contributory negligence finding, directing the insurer to deposit the full compensation amount with interest within 30 days. The decision clarifies that aroma of alcohol alone cannot diminish a claimant’s right to full recovery where evidence of intoxication is not conclusive.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition (Crl.R.P. No.313 of 2017) arising from a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The revision petitioner Mini C.S. was convicted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur, in ST 3948/2007 (trial conducted in 2010) for an offence under Sec. 138 NI Act and sentenced to one month’s simple imprisonment plus a fine of Rs. 2,00,000 to be paid as compensation (CrPC Sec. 357(3)); in default, another month’s imprisonment. The III Additional Sessions Judge, Thrissur, dismissed the appeal (Crl.Appeal No.291/2011) on 13.01.2017, upholding the conviction and sentence. The petitioner challenged these concurrent verdicts in revision under Sec. 397/401 Cr.P.C. The High Court, after hearing, noted that the courts below had not adequately addressed crucial aspects, including the complainant’s documented transaction details, the absence of material on the complainant’s source of funds, and the sufficiency of the required presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act. It remitted the matter to the appellate court for fresh consideration instead of returning it to the trial court and directed expeditious disposal. The High Court ultimately disposed of the revision petition by setting aside the appellate judgment and ordering remand for fresh consideration.
The petitioners are Kadmath Island residents employed as daily-wage casuals—cook, ayah, toilet cleaner, peon, watchman—in government schools and hostels under the Lakshadweep Education Department. They challenge termination after 31 March 2018 and seek either continuation of service until regular hands are appointed through a proper selection process or regularisation of their posts, or at least permission to continue in service pending a valid recruitment exercise. Their engagement, evidenced by Ext. P1, is sponsored by the Village (Dweep) Panchayat and is limited to the academic year’s end (31 March 2018) with 89-day breaks. The petitioners contend that their casual status and the nature of work in educational institutions justify continued employment and eventual regularisation. The respondents counter that engagements are temporary, tied to 89-day periods for Panchayat-sponsored posts and to the academic year for school staff, with new candidates to be engaged thereafter; Ext. P3 (the court’s prior order) allowed continuation only up to 31 March 2018. The court canvassed authorities—Uma Devi, Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Yogesh Mahajan—to assess whether courts can sanction regularisation of casual or contract workers despite constitutional and statutory recruitment norms. Ultimately, the court held that casual engagements do not create a legal right to continued employment or regularisation and dismissed the petition, upholding the hierarchy of recruitment rules.
Dr. Sheeja George E., Assistant Professor (Botany) at S.N. College for Women, Kollam, challenged the denial of regular appointment status for the period 02.06.2008 to 31.05.2011. She was initially appointed as U.P.S.A. in 2008 for an additional post at St. Augustine’s Higher Secondary School, Aroor (Ext. P1). The post could not be sanctioned at first due to a ban on additional posts, which was lifted by G.O.(P) No.10/10 dated 12.01.2010, after which the post was sanctioned for the academic years 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 as shown in Exts. P2, P2(A), and P2(B). However, the 3rd respondent did not approve the petitioner’s appointment for 02.06.2008 to 31.05.2011 because the manager failed to execute the bond as required by G.O.(P) No.10/10 (dated 12.01.2010). The petitioner sought quashing of Ext. P1(a) to the extent of denial of approval for the earlier period and claimed entitlement to regular pay scale as U.P.S.A. (02.06.2008 to 31.05.2009) and H.S.A. (Natural Science) from 01.06.2009 to 31.05.2011, with arrears. She also filed Ext. P3 (revision petition) under Rule 92 of Chapter XIV A KER. The court relied on Kerala Aided L.P. and U.P. School Mangers Association v. State of Kerala (ILR 2016 (1) Kerala 590) and other precedents to hold that amendments to the KER have prospective application, and disposed of the petition by directing the first respondent to consider Ext. P3 in accordance with law, after hearing, within two months, with arrears to be disbursed within two months thereafter.
The sole accused, Aliyar @ Ali, husband of Khadeeja, was convicted by the Addl. Sessions Court-II, Manjeri under Section 302 IPC for murdering his wife on 29 December 2008 in their rented house at Nelloliparambu, Malappuram district, after allegedly suspecting her chastity. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment with a Rs. 5000 fine, in default two years’ rigorous imprisonment. The prosecution’s case rests on circumstantial evidence since there is no direct ocular witness to the stabbing. The accused was seen with the child in the early hours, and the weapon MO1 (knife) was recovered along with blood-stained clothing MO2 and MO3. A crucial element is an extrajudicial confession attributed to the appellant made to PW2, and a dying declaration by Khadeeja to PW3 and PW4 just before death, both linking the accused to the crime. The defense challenged the credibility of the extrajudicial confession and argued the necessity of strict adherence to the doctrine of circumstantial evidence; they also challenged the reliability of the dying declaration. The Kerala High Court, while upholding the conviction, analyzes the admissibility and weight of the extra-judicial confession under Sections 24–26 of the Evidence Act, the burden under Section 106, and the surrounding circumstances, including motive evidence from PW6 and oath-related testimony (PW10). The court concludes that all links in the chain of evidence are cogent and consistent with guilt, and dismisses the appeal, affirming the life sentence.
Mat.Appeal No. 331 of 2010 This matrimonial appeal challenges the Family Court, Kozhikode’s 24/09/2009 order in O.P.600/2008, which dismissed the petition for recovery of possession and for a declaration of title over the C schedule property in a long‑running dispute between K. Cherunni and his wife Nalini and her daughters. The parties married, had two daughters, and have lived separately since 1996. The petition schedule property was acquired by the petitioner in a partition (No.759/1984) and he constructed a house thereon. A mediator‑led settlement provided that the petitioner would convey title and a half share in another property to the respondents and pay marriage expenses; they withdrew and a joint application for divorce by mutual consent was filed but later withdrawn; the petitioner then revoked the settlement deed by a cancellation deed, claiming the gift (Ext A2) in favour of the respondents had not been accepted. The respondents contended the gift had become final and the cancellation was invalid. The Family Court found that the gift had been completed, and the cancellation was not valid. The High Court held that acceptance of a gift can be evidenced by a document or possession but remains rebuttable; given that the mutual divorce obligation collapsed, there was no acceptance of the gift, so Ext A3 could be treated as valid. The appeal is allowed, restoring title and possession to the petitioner over the C schedule property.
This batch of Land Acquisition Appeals (LA.App. No. 466 of 2012 and connected matters) arises from the acquisition of land in Bangara Manjeshwar Village, Kasaragod, for a Commercial Tax Check Post complex. Notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were issued in 2009; two tranches of land totaling around 3.77 hectares were targeted. The Land Acquisition Officer fixed compensation by relying on sale deeds (Exts. A1–A6) and a basic document (Ext. R4), and the matters were referred to the Sub Court under Section 18. The Reference Court’s common judgment (23/12/2011) adopted the comparable sale method and relied heavily on Exts. A1–A2, along with the Advocate Commissioner’s report; however, concerns were raised about genuineness of Exts. A1–A2, the proximity of the basic document, and the Commissioner's conclusions. The State Government argued that Exts. A1–A2 were not genuine transactions and urged reliance on Ext. R4 and the basic document. The High Court, after considering objections, cross-examination, and pertinent precedents (including Trishala Jain and other SC/Privy Council authorities), held that Exts. A1–A2 could not be treated as genuine sales for valuation in several LARs. It reassessed land values: 1,69,200 per Are for certain LARs and 1,12,745 per Are for others; building value in LAR 65/2010 fixed at ₹12,95,895, with borewell value ₹16,800. The appeals are allowed; judgments and decrees are modified accordingly, with enhanced compensation payable after deduction of prior awards and statutory benefits.
Mat.Appeal Nos. 700 & 908 of 2009 This is a matrimonial appeal (Mat.Appeal Nos. 700 & 908 of 2009) arising from common judgment dated 17 March 2009 of the Family Court, Alappuzha, in OP(HMA) No.360/2005 and OP(OS) No.933/2005. The appellant Muraleedhara Sharma, a retired serviceperson, sought dissolution of marriage on grounds of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) Hindu Marriage Act; the Family Court dismissed the divorce petition, but allowed the respondent’s OS petition, declaring her absolute owner of fixed deposits totaling ₹8,56,635 and restraining the appellant from realizing them. The respondent contended the appellant misappropriated funds deposited in his name; the appellant’s allegations of cruelty included repeated abuse, ill-treatment, and threats, including an incident of throwing a chappal. The appellant claimed the Family Court erred in its appreciation of evidence and that there was sufficient proof of cruelty, while the respondent argued that the cruelty allegations were vague, the acts were isolated, and the deposits belonged to her. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, dismissed both appeals, upholding the Family Court’s finding that cruelty had not been proved and affirming the deposit order in favor of the respondent. The court also observed that cruelty must be pleaded and proved, and that a single stray incident would not amount to cruelty. The matter ends with costs as directed in the Family Court’s judgment.
The revision petition is filed by SURESHKUMAR D., the judgment debtor in E.P. No.136/2016 in O.S. No.1951/2009 on the file of the III Additional Munsiff’s Court, Thiruvananthapuram. He challenges the order dated 11.10.2017 whereby the execution court issued a delivery warrant and Rule 37 notice for realisation of the amount in execution of a compromise decree dated 6.10.2012 in the original suit, which sought to restrain eviction and to protect the hotel business on the plaint schedule property. The compromise decree obliged the petitioner to demolish a shed and vacate the premises within 24 months, with arrears adjusted against the security deposit and license fee fixed at Rs. 3,000 per month from 1.9.2012. Upon default, the decree holders moved for execution. The petitioner contends that the property is a tenancy under the Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, and thus eviction must proceed under the Act; he argues the compromise decree cannot override tenant protections. The respondents contend the arrangement was a license of land for business use, not a tenancy; the compromise decree is valid and enforceable. The High Court, after referring to Shalini Shyam Shetty and Sobhana Nair, held that the compromise decree is valid and the court should not interfere under Article 227; it disposed the revision with conditions to secure arrears and possession, and to provide a four-month stay if conditions are met.
This is a criminal revision petition under Sec. 397 read with Sec. 401 Cr.P.C. by the complainant (Revision Petitioner) Jenson Mathew arising from a conviction under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Judicial First Class Magistrate Pattambi had convicted the accused on a cheque for Rs. 2,70,000 dated 20.02.1995 (Ext.P-1) and sentenced him to imprisonment and fine; the appeal before the Addl. Sessions Court (Fast Track Court-1), Palakkad, resulted in a remand to the trial court on the ground that Ext.P-1 lacked an account number. The revision petition challenged this remand and sought restoration of the conviction and sentence. The High Court previously (5.12.2012) disposed of Crl.R.P.1336/02, reversing parts of the appellate order, but in 2017, after invoking rulings on fair trial and counsel’s conduct (including Vishnu Agarwal, State of Punjab v. Bhullar, Asit Kumar Kar, and others), recalled that revisional order and restored the matter for merits. The Court found the appellate finding that Ext.P-1 lacked an account number perverse, noting that the cheque contained an account number (522) affixed by a rubber seal and drawn on Catholic Syrian Bank, Thrissur. Consequently, the court set aside the appellate remand, directed that the appeal be heard on merits, and disposed of the revision petition with direction for expeditious disposal by the appellate court, while maintaining procedural safeguards for the accused.
WP(C).No. 25669 of 2016 (G) This writ petition challenges Ext.P12, a University decision declining extension of affiliation for two PG courses at the petitioner's college. The petitioner, Sarabhai Institute of Science & Technology, Vellanad, Trivandrum, had approval from AICTE and affiliation from the University for six UG and six PG programmes. By Government Order dated 11 March 2015, Kerala initiated a phased transition of engineering education to Kerala Technological University, making affiliation to the new university mandatory for the 2015-16 academic year. An Expert Committee visited on 21 May 2015 and identified deficiencies such as shortage of faculty and lack of qualified PG faculty, prompting a show-cause notice (26 June 2015) directing rectification by 30 July 2015 or risk withdrawal of provisional affiliation. The petitioner responded on 21 July 2015. The University, later renamed APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University, convened an Appellate Committee which recommended conditional affiliation for some PG programmes subject to qualified faculty by specified dates, while others were not recommended. Ext.P12 (14 May 2016) declined affiliation for the remaining PG courses. The petitioner contends that the time frame should be honored and that the principal could be backed by an additional faculty member (Dr. Valsa Raj). The court ultimately grants conditional relief: if Dr. Valsa Raj’s credentials are approved within three days, the college will be afforded necessary PG affiliation and admissions will be regularised; otherwise the petition is disposed of with no such relief.
This High Court of Kerala, sitting as a single judge, considers a criminal miscellaneous petition filed by Abdul Khader under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash FIR No.368/2014 registered at Chakkarakkallu Police Station, which charged him along with his wife under offences including sections 447, 323, 324, 354, 294(b) and 506 IPC. The accused seeks to quash the FIR on the ground that the matter has been amicably settled out of court with the de facto complainant, Zainaba, and that continued proceedings would amount to abuse of process and be a waste of judicial time. The de facto complainant states she has no grievance and does not intend to proceed; the Public Prosecutor does not object to quashing. The court notes that these offences are personal in nature and involve no public interest. Relying on the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, the judge reiterates that the inherent power to quash must be exercised to secure ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process, particularly where there is a bona fide settlement between the offender and the victim and continued prosecution would be oppressive. On these facts, the court allows the Crl.M.C., quashes Annexure A FIR in Crime No.368/2014, and closes all further proceedings, promoting settlement over protracted litigation.
CRP(WAKF).97/2015; CRP(WAKF).102/2015 The High Court of Kerala, Ernakulam, heard two Wakf revision petitions arising from interlocutory orders of the Wakf Tribunal, Kozhikode, in O.S. No. 33/2013. Defendants 1–4 (revision petitioners) moved against orders in I.A. Nos. 516/2014 and 517/2014, restraining renovation/reconstruction of the Velliyode Juma Masjid, prohibiting collection of funds, and directing disclosure of funds for renovation. A related I.A. No. 519/2014 sought appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to sell usufructs from plaint schedule properties by public auction for one year, with proceeds deposited in court. The respondents (plaintiffs and others) contested these interim measures, asserting disputes over the wakf status and management of the subject property. The Tribunal held that there were live disputes regarding whether the property is wakf and its management, and such issues should be resolved only after full trial, justifying interim orders to preserve the subject matter. The High Court affirmed the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine wakf-status questions as a mixed question of law and fact under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, and modified the injunction to permit fundraising subject to compliance with legal requirements (accounts through a nationalized bank, submission of accounts, etc.). It directed expeditious disposal of the suit and disposed of the petitions with no costs, while maintaining some preservation orders. The judgment cites Rajasthan Wakf Board v. Devki Nandan Pathak (2017 KLJ 717) in support of Wakf Tribunal jurisdiction.
This Kerala High Court ITA concerns the assessee’s claim for additional depreciation under Section 32(1)(iia) for three transit mixers and other vehicles used to transport Ready Mix Concrete (RMC) at a construction site. For the assessment year 2006-07, the appellant procured these vehicles and claimed 20% additional depreciation on their cost, arguing that RMC is a manufactured product and that the vehicles form part of the plant and machinery used in manufacturing. The Assessing Officer allowed the claim but reopened under Section 148, denying the deduction on the ground that RMC is not manufactured and that the vehicles merely transport; the A.O. reasoned that vehicles are road transport devices and not eligible for the extra depreciation. At the ITAT, the Judicial Member held that RMC is a product of manufacture and that the vehicles qualify as plant and machinery; the Accountant Member disagreed, concluding no manufacture and that the vehicles do not qualify. A third Member concurred with the AM. The High Court examined whether RMC can be treated as ‘manufacture’ or ‘production’ for the purposes of Section 32(1)(iia) and whether RMC qualifies as an article or thing. Relying on Larsen & Toubro and other authorities, the Court held that RMC is an article obtained as a result of manufacture and that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of the provision to the extent applicable, remanding for the Tribunal to decide the treatment of the vehicles. The appeal is partly allowed and remanded for a specific determination.
