This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal filed by Cini P. Antony challenging the conviction of the NDPS case. The appellant was convicted under sections 21(c) and 23(c) of the NDPS Act for possessing 1060 grams of heroin at Thiruvananthapuram International Airport on 6 February 2015, with the contraband seized during a detection process by an NCB Intelligence Officer following information under section 42. The prosecution relied on PW1 (the detecting officer) and PW3 (an independent witness) along with other witnesses, the seizure at the CIP lounge, and the admissibility of a section 67 statement. The trial court held the appellant guilty of possession of a commercial quantity (section 21(c)) and attempted export (section 23(c) read with section 28), with sentences of 15 years and fines. On appeal, the appellant argued inherent inconsistencies, misplacement of detection, and non-sustainable evidence for attempted export. The High Court, while noting the two independent witnesses corroborating detection, held that the evidence did not establish export intent for section 23(c) and acquitted the appellant of that charge. The court, however, upheld the 21(c) conviction but reduced the sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment, with a fine of Rs.1,00,000 and a six-month enhanced default term. The CCTV/pass register requests were rejected. Overall, the appeal is allowed in part.
WP(C).No.30433/2018 & Conn.Case (and connected cases) This batch of writ petitions, heard by Justice S. V. Bhatti, challenges two pillars of Kerala's taxation regime: (i) Section 174 of the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax (KSGST) Act and (ii) demands under the Kerala Value Added Tax (KVAT) Act, particularly Section 25(1) read with Section 8. The petitioners contend that Section 174 is ultra vires the state’s legislative competence in light of the 101st Amendment Act (2016) and the distribution of powers between States and the Centre, as reflected in the Union List/List II amendments. They also argue that the demands were time-barred under Section 25(1) KVAT Act. The government pleader relies on the ratio from a prior decision (W.P.(C) No.11335 of 2018) and on constitutional amendments affecting tax powers, suggesting the validity of the contested provisions and notifications. After hearing the parties and considering the cited authority, the court dismisses the petitions, following the 2019 ruling in 11335/2018, and directs that the petitioners may seek relief through statutory appeals or revisions, with possible condonation of delay. The operative order confirms the dismissal and closes the matter without granting the requested relief against the assessments.
Udayan, the appellant in Crl.A.No.2783 of 2008, challenges his conviction for offences under Sections 55(a) and 55(i) of the Abkari Act, 1077, based on a sole prosecution case that on 2 March 2007 he sold Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) in a public locality at Kulamavu, Arakkulam, and was found in possession of 2.750 litres of IMFL without authority. PW4, a Sub-Inspector, testified that he received information, reached the bus station area, observed the appellant pouring liquid from a bottle into a glass and giving it to a person who paid Rs.50, after which PW4 seized the bottle, two other bottles, and other items (Ext.P1 mahazar). The prosecution relied on Ext.P12, a chemical analysis report, which stated the bottles contained IMFL free from noxious ingredients. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to two years’ RI and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 with a default term of six months’ simple imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant argued that the purchaser at the spot (Sajeevan) was not charged or examined, and there was no assurance that Ext.P12 related to the liquid seized from him. The High Court, after considering the chain-of-custody concerns, the lack of corroboration for the purchase incident, and the absence of a definitive link between seized samples and the lab report, acquitted the appellant, relying on several catena decisions and a recent Supreme Court ruling on sample correlation. The Court ultimately allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence.
The petitioner, N.T. Davis, an Assistant Engineer at the Cochin Fisheries Harbour (CFH) under the Cochin Port Trust, challenges Ext.P20, a disciplinary order imposing two years’ withholding of increments and recovery of Rs. 70,570, and Ext.P22, the rejection of his appeal. The charge memo Ext.P13, issued on 03.05.2012, framed allegations of gross misconduct under Regulation 3(1A) and (1C) of the Cochin Port Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1964, arising from the procurement of a 200 mm water meter and ‘T’ Strainer from M/s Goodwill Enterprises for CFH’s Kerala Water Authority supply point, after which tests by Fluid Control Research Institute (FCRI) indicated the meter’s failure to meet metering accuracy across several flow rates. The ENQUIRY report Ext.P19 found the charges proved. Ext.P20 imposed punishment, and Ext.P22 dismissed the appeal. However, the High Court held that the prosecution did not examine witnesses, reliance on documentary items alone was insufficient, and the evidence did not establish petitioner’s misconduct; noting that the authority’s approval and actions sequence did not prove intent or negligence. Relying on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, the Court set aside Ext.P19, Ext.P20, Ext.P22 and allowed the writ petition.
This Kerala High Court writ petition challenges an order of inquiry under Section 65 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 issued by the Joint Registrar (General). The petitioner-bank committee contends that the Registrar cannot rely exclusively on an Assistant Registrar’s report and must form independent satisfaction under Section 65; it also argues that the inquiry into appointment falls beyond the scope of Section 65. The respondents submit that the Registrar ordered the inquiry based on the Assistant Registrar’s report, prepared under direction, and that the Registrar’s satisfaction arises from his independent consideration of the materials before him. The court cites a Division Bench decision in Melukkara Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.PT.152 and Another v. Joint Registrar (General), District Co-operative Society (2018 (2) KHC 143 (DB)) to emphasize that the Registrar must consider all relevant factors and inspect records, and cannot rely solely on an officer’s report. However, the present case involved the Assistant Registrar preparing a report under instruction, after which the Joint Registrar relied on it and recorded his satisfaction that an inquiry was necessary. The Court notes the materials were detailed and induced an application of mind by the Registrar, distinguishing the cited precedent. Ultimately, the petition is dismissed and the Registrar’s Section 65 inquiry remains valid; appointment irregularities can fall within Section 65’s scrutiny.
WA 1936/2017 in WPC 12129/2015 The case concerns a writ appeal filed by Air India Limited (and related Air India executives) challenging a single-judge order in WP(C) 12129/2015 that had quashed an internal transfer of L.S. Sibu, an officer (Apron) in Air India’s Ground Services Department at Thiruvananthapuram Airport. The learned Single Judge concluded the transfer on 25.03.2015 to Hyderabad was punitive, made to vex the employee for whistle-blowing and for union activity, and violated Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (ID Act), as well as related procedure. The Division Bench reverses: it examines whether the transfer was in exigencies of service and whether the employee was a protected workman under Section 33(3) ID Act. It finds that the protected-workman status did not apply since the transfer order had already been issued prior to intimation of protected status; further, the evidence does not establish mala fides or retaliatory motive. The court notes that allegations of mala fides demand particulars and that mere allegations, absent impleading of implicated individuals, are insufficient. The Bench holds the transfer need not be regarded as punitive and allows Air India’s appeal, setting aside the single-judge judgment. The court directs reinstatement of the petitioner with posting per exigency, while treating the intervening period as eligible service for pension but without back-benefits. No costs awarded.
SunTec Business Solutions Pvt. Ltd. challenged a reassessment proceeding initiated under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of the assessment year 2005-06, before the Kerala High Court. The original assessment under Section 143(3) was completed in 2007 with a deduction claimed under Section 10B; subsequent Section 154 proceedings were finalized. In 2012, the Assessing Officer issued a notice under Section 148 proposing to re-open under Section 147, without reasons, which the appellant demanded under GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19. Reasons were supplied in Ext.P8 indicating a proposed disallowance of US$ 1,23,691 under Section 10B (non-compliance with Section 10B(3)). The appellant argued that the re-opening amounted to a mere change of opinion, contrary to Kelvinator of India (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC); further, the deduction had already been disallowed in the original assessment and the extension of time for reopening (six years with possible two-year extension for suppression) should not permit re-opening. The learned Single Judge found the re-opening to be ground-specific, not a mere change of opinion, and directed the AO to proceed within three months, considering whether amounts were already disallowed. The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal, directing limited re-opening, opportunity of hearing, and verification of prior disallowances, with disposal without costs.
Minu Lalitha Madhavu, the petitioner, challenged the selection process for the post of Lecturer in the Department of Futures Studies at the University of Kerala. The central issue was whether the petitioner’s prior teaching experience in a self-financing college could be counted towards the experience marks for determining the ranking in the selection. The University notified vacancies via Exhibit P4 (and corrigendum Exhibit P5) and fixed criteria including 55% marks and eligibility tests. The petitioner contended that she would have been eligible for higher marks if her experience in a self-financing college (Exhibit P3) had been counted, arguing that UGC Regulations Clause 10(1)(f) and (g) require counting past services regardless of management, and that a Full Bench decision in Radhakrishna Pillai v. Travancore Devaswom Board supports this. The University and Respondents defended that Exhibit R1(a) norms restricted counting to service in a University department/affiliated college, and that any experience in self-financing institutions requires proper approval through channels. The court acknowledged the issue but held that the award of marks by the selection committee is not amenable to subjective judicial review, and that the petitioner’s prior self-financing teaching experience cannot be counted without proper approval under the norms. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed, leaving the selection intact.
ITA No. 7 of 2007 (and connected matters) Horace Dansereau v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala High Court, addresses whether Section 195A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 appropriately treats salary paid to foreign nationals deputed to India by a Canadian consultancy and the tax paid thereon, where the employer (KSEB) bears the tax while the consultant pays the salary. The contract between KSEB and SNC-Shawinigan Inc. provides that the consultant would pay the employees’ salary, while the KSEB would handle the income-tax component, with certain non-obstante clauses (notably 1.9.2) and related clauses indicating the consultant’s liability for taxes and duties and the KSEB’s limited involvement. The Assessing Officer initially added the tax borne by KSEB to the employees’ salary, treating this as “income from other sources” under Section 195A, with the Tribunal upholding the Department’s view and the assessees’ cross-objections later withdrawn. The petitioners argued that Section 195A applies only when both salary and tax are paid by the same employer and that the non-obst clause does not create a master–servant relationship. The court analyzes earlier decisions, notably Emil Webber (distinguished), C.W. Steel (on point for salary definition and perquisites), and North British Railway Co. v. Scott (tax as part of salary), and ultimately holds in favour of the Revenue, adopting a reasoning aligned with 195A and directing the Assessing Officer to compute accordingly. The appeals are ordered in favor of the Revenue, with no costs.
This Kerala High Court matter concerns two O.P.(KAT) petitions (No.80/2013 and 1368/2013) challenging the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s dismissal of TA No.2293/2012 and the validity of the Kerala Social Welfare State Service Rules, 2010. The petitioners, Probation Officers Grade II who were promoted to District Probation Officers Grade I, challenged the 2010 rules which replaced the Kerala Social Welfare State Service Rules, 1992. They argued that the 2010 rules undermine the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, and the Kerala Probation of Offenders Rules, 1960, and disrupt the seniority-based promotion ladder, creating arbitrary promocut-offs. The Tribunal held that the 2010 rules cannot be described as manifestly unjust, arbitrary or unequal and thus are within the rule-making power of the State. The High Court, while noting the nine-category structure in both the 1992 and 2010 rules, upheld the Tribunal’s reasoning, and emphasized that the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (Section 4) and Article 254(2) of the Constitution govern over Central statutes where applicable, thereby giving primacy to the State rules. It concluded that the 2010 rules address anomalies and ensure equitable distribution of posts by a ratio (1:10:3) among feeder categories. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed and the Tribunal’s order is sustained.
Crl.Rev.Pet.No.591 of 2017 This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision by Vimal Kumar challenging concurrent convictions under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act arising from a cheque for Rs. 3,00,000. The trial court, in CC 902/2009 (Judicial First Class Magistrate, Paravur), convicted the accused and sentenced three months’ simple imprisonment and payment of Rs. 3,00,000 as compensation under CrPC 357(3), with a further three months’ imprisonment in default. The Sessions Court Kollam, in CRA 74/2016, dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The revision challenges these concurrent verdicts, arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the transaction and that the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of liability under the NI Act. It contends crucial material aspects of the transaction were omitted in the complaint, statutory demand notice, and proof affidavit, and that the defence was deprived of a fair trial due to the trial court’s denial of handwriting analysis and defence witnesses. The petitioner asserts lack of financial capacity on the part of the complainant to lend Rs.3,00,000 and points to contradictions in PW1 and PW2’s testimonies. The High Court found serious illegality and perversity in not considering these crucial aspects, and held the accused could rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities. Consequently, the judgments were set aside and the accused acquitted.
Crl.Rev.Pet.No.1525 of 2014 Padmanabhan, the accused, faced a criminal revision under Section 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arising from C.C. No. 178/2010 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Chavakkad. The trial court, on 18 May 2012, convicted him and sentenced him to one year’s simple imprisonment along with a compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., with a default sentence of four months’ imprisonment. The Sessions Court at Thrissur, in Crl.A. No. 311/2012, confirmed the conviction but reduced the substantive sentence to “imprisonment till rising of the court” and substituted the compensation with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, directing the fine to be paid as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. The present High Court revision petition challenges these outcomes, arguing grave illegality and perversity in the lower courts’ conclusions. The High Court found important aspects overlooked: there was no credible evidence of a prior borrowal transaction or its date, and crucial facts about the transaction and the debtor’s funds were suppressed in the complaint and statutory notice. It relied on Divakaran v. State of Kerala and judgments of the Supreme Court in John K. Abraham and K.Subramani to hold that suppression of material facts, and lack of proof of funds, undermine the entire prosecution case and warrant acquittal. Consequently, the impugned judgments were set aside, the accused acquitted, and the revision petition disposed of. The court also noted deposit refunds may be issued on request.
This is a criminal revision petition under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. by K. M. Johny challenging the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) for issuing a cheque of Rs. 1.5 lakh, which was dishonoured. The trial court, in ST No.132/2013 (Judicial First Class Magistrate, Thodupuzha), convicted the petitioner and sentenced him to simple imprisonment for 4 months with a fine of Rs.1.5 lakh and a default sentence of two months imprisonment, along with compensation under Sec. 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court, Thodupuzha, while upholding the conviction, reduced the substantive sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the court, retaining the fine and default sentence. The petitioner contends that the conviction and sentence suffer from serious irregularities, including the defence that the cheque was a blank signed instrument given as security in a chit business, and that there were grave inconsistencies between PW-1 (the complainant) and DW-1 (the chit firm partner). Crucially, the courts below rejected the demand for expert handwriting analysis of Ext.P-1, which the petitioner argues violated the right to a fair trial (Art.21) and the safeguard of Art.20(3). The Kerala High Court, after noting the alleged denial of a fair opportunity to prove the defence, remitted the matter to the trial court for handwriting analysis by the Government Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) and directed the trial court to take oral evidence from the expert if required, with a view to deciding the case afresh after receipt of the expert report. The petition stands disposed with directions to expedite the process and to complete the trial within a reasonable time.
This is a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court hearing a CRP (WAKF) under challenge to a Waqf Tribunal OA (OA 6/2012) dated 7 December 2013. The original OA was filed under Sec. 83(3) of the Waqf Act, 1995, challenging a CEO order of 27 March 2012 that a certain property was a waqf property and directed encroachers to vacate and deliver possession to the Muthavalli of the Idiyangara Puthiya Palli Paripalana Committee. The Tribunal framed three issues: (i) whether the property is a Waqf property; (ii) whether the impugned order is legal and proper; and (iii) reliefs and costs. It ultimately held that the OA was not maintainable under Sec. 83(3) and that the remedy lay in a suit under Sec. 54(4), leading to dismissal of the OA. The petitioner contends that the Tribunal failed to frame a specific maintainability issue, allowed evidence on framed issues, and deprived him of an opportunity to address maintainability. Respondents assert maintainability as a pure legal question and supported dismissal under Sec. 83(3) with a suit under Sec. 54(4). The High Court remands the matter, directing framing of a specific maintainability issue, opportunities to address it, and otherwise entering findings on all issues if maintainable, citing precedents on procedure under Order XIV CPC and related decisions.
CRL.A. No. 1519 of 2012; Crl.A No. 13 of 2013 These two criminal appeals arise from a conviction under Section 55(a) and (i) of the Kerala Abkari Act in SC No.540 of 2010 of the Court of Session, Kollam, for alleged transportation of a large quantity of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) in Jeep KL7-P2329 on 28-12-2009. The prosecution alleged that the driver (A1) and a passenger (A2) possessed a huge quantity of liquor seized from two shoppers, while a third passenger fled on seeing the police. The trial court convicted A1 and A2 under Section 55(a) and (i) and sentenced them to two years’ imprisonment and fines. On appeal, appellants contended that there was no evidence that A1 possessed, transported, or knew of the liquor’s presence; A2 claimed he merely assisted another passenger who owned the liquor, and that if conviction was possible, it could be only under Section 63. The Kerala High Court scrutinized the evidence, noting the driver’s limited knowledge and the front-seat passenger’s escape; the state’s reliance on seizure and mahazar alone was found insufficient to prove A1’s possession or knowledge. The court held that, based on Mohanan v. State of Kerala (DB), a conviction under Section 55(a) could not stand where knowledge and possession by A1 were not established. Consequently, A1 was acquitted; A2’s conviction under Section 63 was upheld with a fine of Rs. 5,000, and the case was remanded for surrender. The appeals were disposed accordingly—A1 acquitted in full; A2 convicted under Section 63 with limited sentence and conditions.
Seenath, the revision petitioner, was convicted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kodungallur, in CC 357/2011. The conviction was upheld by the Additional Sessions Court, Irinjalakuda, which modified the substantive sentence. The High Court of Kerala on 23 November 2017 heard the criminal revision petition (Crl.R.P.736 of 2017) and, while evaluating the defense that the mortgage of a large sum 5 lakhs involved a scheme with the husband’s business and not a direct transaction with Seenath, found serious questions about the complaint’s particulars and about the complainant’s source of funds. The petition emphasized that the complaint lacked crucial details about the borrowal transaction, the date, the relationship, and the absence of receipts or security. Citing established precedents (notably KK Divakaran and others) the counsel argued for acquittal on grounds of suppression of material facts, and questioned the prosecution’s ability to raise presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the NI Act due to lack of funds. The Court, however, did not acquit; instead, it remitted the matter to the appellate court for reconsideration, set aside the appellate judgment, and directed a fresh hearing with a deadline, thereby ensuring a fuller examination of the contested issues while disposing of the revision petition.
This High Court of Kerala, in CRP(WAKF) No. 211 of 2014 (A), disposed of a revision petition challenging a Wakf Tribunal order that upheld the Kerala Wakf Board CEO’s earlier decision directing the revision petitioner to remove encroachment and deliver possession of Wakf land. The Padamugal Muslim Jama-ath, a Wakf registered with the Kerala State Wakf Board, alleged unauthorised alienation of several Wakf properties and encroachment by a third party. The 1st respondent invoked Section 54 of the Wakf Act, 1995 to issue notices; the revision petitioner (Saidu Mohammed) contended that the land was dedicated by his grandfather as Wakf and that, as a cultivating tenant and later purchaser, he possessed a right to acquire under Section 72(b) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. He claimed an oral sale in 1987 for Rs. 8,750 and subsequent reclamation of Nilam land, including construction of a workshop. The respondents argued that transfer of Wakf land requires prior sanction of the Wakf Board (Section 51(1) Wakf Act, 1995) and that registration and proper instruments were required under the Transfer of Property Act and Registration Act, with no valid transfer having occurred. The Tribunal's conclusions were affirmed, and the revision petition was dismissed for want of legal sanction and for mischaracterising the rights over Wakf property.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case arising from an underlying complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, in relation to a dishonoured cheque dated 15 January 2014 for Rs. 1,75,000 drawn on the account of the 1st accused company. The petitioners—accused 3 (Hiran Venugopalan) and accused 4 (Sunil Raj S.)—seek to quash the impugned complaint/extension of proceedings, contending that they were never directors of the company or in charge of its affairs at the time the offence was committed, and that reliance on vicarious liability under Section 141 NI Act is improper given the lack of materials. The court examines the established jurisprudence that a company drawee makes the company the principal offender and that other directors or officers can be roped in only if they were in charge and responsible for the company’s conduct when the offence occurred, and only on factual material to establish that there was such control. It references Kairali Marketing and Processing Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Pullengadi Service Co-op. Society Ltd. and Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, as well as Achankunju.P.C. v. House of Tiles, to frame the scope of cognizance, vicarious liability, and the necessity of a Sec.202 inquiry. The Court ultimately lays down a careful, staged inquiry: quash cognizance against accused 3 and 4, remit to the trial court for a Sec.200 preliminary inquiry, and require a detailed Sec.202 inquiry with selective production of ROC documents, preserving the complainant’s right to participate, while denying the main quash petition.
Crl.R.P.680/2013 & Crl.R.P.840/2014 These connected criminal revision petitions arise from dishonour of cheques under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, involving two linked transactions where the complainant’s total claim is Rs. 36.10 lakhs, split into two cheques of Rs. 18.05 lakhs each. In C.C. No. 66/2008 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Cherthala, the trial court convicted the accused (A-1 in Cr.R.P.680/2013) and sentenced him to six months’ simple imprisonment and to pay Rs. 18.05 lakh as compensation, with a default sentence. In C.C. No. 67/2008 (A1 and his wife) before the same magistrate, the trial court convicted the couple and imposed one year’s imprisonment with Rs. 18.05 lakh compensation, plus a default term. The appellate court affirmed conviction but reduced substantive sentences to one month and three months, respectively, while maintaining the compensation. The revision petitions were filed seeking only to substitute the substantive sentence with fines while not challenging the conviction. The Kerala High Court, after considering case law (Kaushalya Devi, Damodar Prabhu, Anil Babu, Shahejkhan Pathan, Chhajulal, Narayanan Nambiar, Joseph Moolayil, Donatus Tony Ikwanusi, Ram Jas, Reg. Muhammed Saib, Queen-Empress v. Venkatesagadu, Daulat Derale, etc.), held that imprisonment in default of fine under Sec. 138 NI Act cannot exceed one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment for the offence (two years). It set aside the substantive sentences, imposed fines of Rs. 18.05 lakhs in both matters, and directed fixed time limits for payment, with deterred but limited default imprisonment (six months in Cr.R.P.680/2013 and six months totals for the two petitioners in Cr.R.P.840/2014, with one member to receive four months due to being a lady). The petitions were finally disposed of, with coercive steps deferred to permit payment.
This Kerala High Court ITA appeal arises from a penalty under section 271C of the Income Tax Act for non-deduction of tax at source under section 194A, on interest paid to sister concerns, in the assessment year 2014-15. The Joint Commissioner had levied a penalty of Rs. 95,00,500 after adjustments from an IT assessment, while the assessee contended bona fide omission with no revenue loss because the recipients had already reported the interest income and paid tax; there was reliance on the recipients’ tax compliance. The ITAT Cochin Bench, by its order in ITA 280/Coch/2011, set aside the penalty, taking the line that there can be a reasonable cause and that contumacious conduct need not be shown to impose penalties. The Revenue challenges this order, arguing that section 271C is a strict liability provision and that non-deduction attracts penalty unless reasonable cause under section 273B is pleaded and proven. The court reviews the line of authorities (including Dharamendra Textile Processors and other appellate decisions) and ultimately holds in favour of the Revenue, finding that the ITAT’s reasoning was misplaced and that the penalties can be restored. The appeal is allowed, ITAT’s order is set aside, and the appellate authority’s and assessing authority’s orders are restored with costs.
