Sulaiman, owner of a two-storey building at Mariya Junction, Adoor, contends that unauthorized parking of autorickshaws by respondents 7 to 9 and members of a union blocks the entry to his premises and threatens his safety. He asserts there is no sanctioned parking stand for autorickshaws in front of his building and that information obtained under RTI (Ext. P4) confirms no such permission from the Adoor Municipality. Despite lodging complaints with police, no effective action was taken. The core legal question is whether owners of shop premises abutting a public road have a right to access the road from their land and, if that right is obstructed, whether they can sue for injury even if the obstruction does not constitute a public nuisance. The Court surveys various precedents (Municipal Committee v. Mohammad Ibrahim; Sheonarayan v. Dindayal; Mandakinee Debee v. Basantakumaree Debee; Patna City Municipality v. Dwarka Prasad Singh; Damodara Naidu v. Thirupurasundari Ammal; Tanoor Panchayat v. Kunhiamutty; Joseph v. District Magistrate; Ummer Farookh v. SHO; Jayaprasad v. State of Kerala; Noushad M. v. State of Kerala) to affirm that when a public pathway exists, landowners abutting a highway possess a right to access the road from their land and may seek redress for obstruction. The Court holds that allowing unauthorized parking near the petitioner’s building is unjustified and highlights the municipality’s duty to regulate parking. It directs police protection to remove obstructions, directs the Municipality to constitute a Traffic Regulatory Committee under Section 72 of the Kerala Police Act within two weeks, and to determine a parking location within four months, while keeping a temporary five-vehicle parking arrangement to facilitate the public until a formal stand is established.
This High Court of Kerala, in CRL.MC No.1487 of 2019, addresses whether an absconding/absent co-accused’s acquittal warrants quashing the proceedings against the remaining accused under Section 482 CrPC. The petitioner, Sindhu Jibi, is the second accused in CC No.1385/2018 arising from Thrikunnapuzha Police Station Crime No.395/2014, alleging offences under IPC Sections 406 and 420 r/w 34, the Chit Funds Act (Sections 4 and 5 r/w 76), Kerala Money Lenders Act Section 17, and the Prohibition of Exorbitant Interest Act Section 4. The first accused was acquitted by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Haripad on 06-12-2018, and the petitioner contends that the substratum of the case against her has been destroyed, justifying quashing under Article 482 CrPC. The court invokes Moosa v. Sub-Inspector of Police (2006) KLJ 349 to restate the extraordinary, exceptional nature of Section 482 powers, emphasizing that such powers should only be used to give effect to orders, prevent abuse, or secure ends of justice, and not as a routine remedy. It is held that acquittal of co-accused cannot by itself terminate proceedings against the absconding/remaining accused, and that evidence against the absconding co-accused need not be adduced in the trial of others. The court declines to quash, but directs the petitioner to cooperate in trial; if she surrenders within two weeks and applies for regular bail, the matter will be considered promptly, with coercive measures stayed. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
Prakashan.K., the registered owner of autorickshaw KL-59/M-4627, filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking mandamus to compel the Excise Commissioner to expeditiously consider Ext.P3, a revision petition dated 05.03.2019 under Section 67F of the Abkari Act, and to restrain the Deputy Excise Commissioner from repossessing the vehicle pending disposal. The vehicle had been seized on 15.03.2017 for alleged illicit transport of Indian Made Foreign Liquor; an occurrence report (Ext.P1) was filed and confiscation proceedings under Section 67B were initiated, culminating in Ext.P2 confiscation order dated 27.02.2018. Though an appeal under Section 67E lay, it had to be filed within thirty days, which did not occur. Instead, Ext.P3 was filed after the time limit. The petitioner contends that the Commissioner can exercise suo motu revision under Section 67F before expiry of the 30-day period and that the records should be called for, a view supported by Sindhu Babu v. Commissioner of Excise. The court, however, interpreted the law consistently with that decision and held that the Commissioner cannot entertain Ext.P3 to revise Ext.P2, as the time limit had expired. It cited Santosh Kumar to emphasize that Article 226 cannot circumvent the statutory framework. The petition was dismissed, with the court noting that the remedy under the Abkari Act could not be bypassed by writ petition.
George, aged 56, sustained serious head injuries in a motor accident on 27.06.2014, while employed as a flexboard worker with a claimed monthly income of Rs 10,000. He sought Rs 15,00,000 as compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). The Tribunal awarded Rs 12,31,900. The insurer (National Insurance Company Limited) appealed challenging the quantum, contending that (i) compensation for loss of earnings must be restricted to the period up to the filing of the petition and not for the post-filing period; (ii) the Tribunal erred in accepting 64% permanent disability whereas Ext. X1/MB certificate fixed 49%; (iii) the awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenities were excessive; (iv) the notional income and future prospects were misapplied. The claimant (George) cross-objected, arguing that due to serious brain injuries his earning capacity is severely impaired and that the compensation should be higher. The Judge personally examined the claimant on 22.03.2019 and found communication severely affected. Relying on Syed Sadiq v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2014) 2 SCC 735, the Court fixated the notional monthly income at Rs 10,000 and allowed 10% future prospects for continuing disability, recalculating the quantum. The bench disposed of both appeal and cross-objection, ultimately fixing total compensation at Rs 12,03,820.
This writ petition concerns Balakrishnan Nair, President of Kavassery Pooram Co-ordination Committee, seeking a direction for permission to display fire works during the Parrakkat Sree Bhavagathi Temple festival (Kavasseri Pooram) scheduled for March 2019. The petitioner argues that the festival has historically included a fire works display conducted in a large vacant land area with owner consent, and that all safety norms and statutory requirements have been/are being followed. He asserts that no prior incidents occurred, and that the request is for low-sound displays with restrictions to avoid danger, not for prohibited items such as dynamite. The respondents (District Collector, Additional District Magistrate, and Deputy Chief Controller of Explosives) are urged to grant clearance with suitable conditions, citing past practices and apex court relaxations in similar contexts (Thrissur Pooram, and Noise Pollution jurisprudence). The Government Pleader notes that applications were submitted recently and are under verification, while the petitioner offers assurances of safety measures and insurance. The court ultimately directs that clearance be issued subject to riders consistent with Apex Court standards, imposes safe-distance and barricade requirements, and requires insurance and police/fire/rescue oversight. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
Crl.MC.No. 8095 of 2016; Crl.MC.No. 3386 of 2017 Two criminal miscellaneous petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were filed challenging the order in CC No. 142/2016 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam, arising from ITPA Crime No. 716/2010 of the Ernakulam South Police Station. The petitioners, accused Nos. 2 and 3, contended that the offences under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 are not attracted against them and that the allegations fail to show the premises were used as a brothel for commercial sexual exploitation. They relied on Annexure‑B order in Crl.M.C. No. 638 of 2015 and cited Vijaykumar and others v. State of Kerala and others and Radhakrishnan v. State of Kerala, arguing that sexual activity between adults in a private space cannot attract the Act’s penal provisions. The State Public Prosecutor submitted that the petitions concern questions of evidence and that the court should not quash the proceedings at the threshold under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The judge examined the definitions: Section 3 punishes keeping or managing a brothel; Section 2(a) defines brothel; Section 2(f) defines prostitution as sexual exploitation for commercial gain; to attract the Act, premises must be used as a brothel for commercial purposes, and consensual activity in a private apartment is not an offense. Citing Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary for the scope of 482 Cr.P.C. powers and ends of justice, the court held the ingredients of Sections 3, 4 and 5 are not made out against the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitions were allowed and all further proceedings in CC 142/2016 were quashed.
Antappan @ Antony, the sole accused, challenges a conviction under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Ponnachan before the Kerala High Court (CRL.A.No.504 of 2014). The prosecution case proceeds from a noon-time incident on 29 August 2009 near Phoenix Arts and Sports Club on the Alappuzha–Cherthala coastal road. The accused allegedly stabbed the deceased with MO1 knife on the left chest and right hand, resulting in death en route to K.V.M. Hospital Cherthala. Eyewitnesses PW1–PW5 supported that the stabbing occurred in the presence of the accused, who fled the scene after the attack. Investigations, inquest, scene-maps, and the recovery of MO1 were produced; the knife was recovered from the accused’s house. The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment, despite the defense’s insanity claim. The defense asserted bipolar mood disorder with psychotic symptoms as of the date of the incident and relied on Ext.C1 (psychiatric report) and Ext.D5 (60% disability certificate). The Mental Health Centre medical board later found him fit to stand trial, with Ext.D5 dated years after the incident. The High Court, applying Indian law on the burden of proving insanity and the standard of proof for exceptions, rejected the insanity defense and upheld the conviction. The appeal was dismissed, preserving the life sentence and fine.
Vincent Antony and K.P. Vasudevan, two accused in a CBI case arising from alleged banking irregularities at Mudra Silks and Fashions, faced prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and IPC for alleged large overdrafts sanctioned by a bank manager beyond his authority during 1989–2000. The Special Court (Spe/CBI) Ernakulam convicted both under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) PC Act with aid of Section 120B IPC, while acquitting them of Section 420 IPC. Aggrieved, they challenged the conviction on grounds that the FIR was registered without a proper complaint or basis; CBI did not disclose the information leading to the crime; and that mere sanctioning of a loan beyond authority does not by itself constitute criminal misconduct absent dishonest intent, bribe, or illicit gain. The High Court, noting the absence of a definite Bank complaint and the need for disclosure of information that led to registration, examined the essential elements for a prosecution under Section 13(1)(d) as clarified in State v. Mohanachandran. It held that there was no proof of pecuniary gain or benefit to the public servant or illicit gain to others, and that contractual recovery actions by the Bank do not convert a civil liability into criminal misconduct. Ultimately, the court set aside the conviction and sentence, acquitted both appellants, and discharged bail bonds, releasing them from prosecution.
Crl.MC.No.1619/2019; Crl.MC.No.2158/2019; Crl.MC.No.2175/2019 These three connected Criminal Miscellaneous Cases arise from bail orders issued by the Customs authorities at Cochin International Airport (AIU) under the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioners—Joseph Santosh Kottarathil Alexander, Mohammed Rakheeb, and Rajesh Kumar Bhargavan—were apprehended for alleged smuggling of gold or foreign currency hidden in checked baggage. The offences are categorized as bailable, with bail granted under Section 104(3) of the Customs Act; however, the bail orders imposed stringent conditions (two sureties, routine reporting, reporting to investigators, and a general prohibition on involvement in other offences). The petitioners argue that, as the offences are bailable, bail is a matter of right and such onerous conditions are illegal and beyond the customs officer’s jurisdiction. The respondents contend that the conditions are necessary to ensure appearance and compliance. The Court cites established authorities—Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purushottam Mandkar, Paulose v. State, and Azeez v. State of Kerala—emphasizing that a person charged with a bailable offence is entitled to bail on reasonable terms and that onerous conditions cannot be imposed. The Court holds that the conditions 2-4 are illegitimate and sets them aside, allowing the petitions. The decision reinforces the right to bail in bailable offences and curbs excessive bail conditions by authorities.
N.K. Abdulla, Manager of Thendaparamba Lower Primary School, Kannur, challenged an order dated 12.07.2017 by the Deputy Director of Education directing the re-appointment of the 4th respondent as LPSA in the school, and a show-cause notice dated 20.09.2017. He contended that the Deputy Director had no authority to appoint a teacher under his management and that, being a minority institution, the Manager has exclusive power over appointments, except as regulated by law. The matter involved a shift in staffing due to the retirement of the headmistress and the consequent promotion of the seniormost teacher as Headmaster, creating a LPSA vacancy in an uneconomic school. The 4th respondent, a protected teacher under the Teachers Package, had previously served as Cluster Co-ordinator and was redeployed in Kannur North; such redeployments afforded re-appointment in the parent school upon vacancy, per government orders. The petitioner sought to fill the post on a daily-wage basis under Rule 22A and Rule 51A, contending these would reduce financial burden. The court examined provisions of the Kerala Education Act and Rules (KER), especially Chapters III, V, XIVA and XXIII, and multiple GOs and circulars. Ultimately, the court held that Ext.P2 was not void for lack of authority and that the petition was misconceived; the writ petition was dismissed, with no costs. The decision emphasizes that minority institutions are regulated by law and Government orders to ensure orderly administration and educational standards.
This Kerala High Court judgment deals with the criminal appeal of Ayyppankutty, challenging a trial court conviction for uxoricide under sections 302 and 449 IPC. The prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence since there were no direct eyewitnesses to the night-time murder of Lilly, with the accused having allegedly trespassed into her house and inflicted fatal head and neck injuries using a weapon (MO1). The couple had a long history of marital discord, including filings under 498A IPC and maintenance orders (Exts. P13–P16, Ext. P14). The prosecution argues a motive rooted in the illicit relationship between the accused and Philomina, and the maintenance order, which allegedly provoked the crime. Crucial circumstantial pillars include the recovery of MO13–MO15 on the basis of the accused’s disclosure (despite a hostile witness), extra-judicial confession to PW7, medical and forensic evidence (autopsy findings, FSL report identifying blood on the clothes and MO1), and the absence of an alternative plausible suspect. The defense contends that reliance on relatives as witnesses, lack of DNA/fingerprints, and the credibility of PW7 should negate conviction. The High Court upholds the trial court’s verdict, deeming the chain of circumstances complete and consistent, with motive and confession corroborated by multiple witnesses and forensic results, justifying the conviction and sentence.
This writ petition, heard by a single judge, concerns the refusal by a Village Officer to accept basic land tax for several properties in Cheranalloor and Varappuzha, Ernakulam, in the wake of the 2018 floods and the subsequent need for financial relief under Flood Relief schemes. The petitioners allege that they suffered flood damage and require revenue certificates (such as possession certificates) to access relief assistance; they contend that they hold title by registered sale deeds and that mutations of title have already occurred for many petitioners, with some mutation disputes involving the predecessors of contesting respondents 5 and 6. The core legal question is whether the petitioners fall within the definition of “land holder” under the Kerala Land Tax Act, so that basic land tax can be demanded from them notwithstanding ongoing disputes about title. The court examines the statutory framework: Sec. 3(3) (definition of land holder, including assignees and those liable for public revenue), Sec. 5(2) (duty to collect tax), Sec. 4 (general revenue settlement), and Rule 4 of the Kerala Land Tax Rules, 1972, along with transfers under the Transfer of Registry Rules (1966). It reiterates that mutation is a provisional, revenue-related arrangement and does not vest title, and that mutation and tax collection may be revised later. The judge ultimately directs the 4th respondent to accept basic land tax from petitioners 1–4, issue receipts, and process related revenue certificates; petitioners 5–9 are to be allowed to apply for tax acceptance, with directions to decide within two months, while any adverse possession disputes may be reviewed in due course. The decision emphasizes timely access to relief funds while preserving rights to challenge titles through civil processes.
Death Sentence Ref. No.1/2015; CRL.A.770/2015; CRL.A.783/2015; CRL.A.808/2015; SC No.104/2012; CP No.236/2008; Crime No.74/2008 This judgment from the Kerala High Court consolidates the death sentence reference and three criminal appeals arising from SC No.104/2012 (Crime No.74/08, CBCID, Kannur) relating to the Safiya case, a 13-year-old girl who died under circumstances that allegedly involved multiple accused. The trial court convicted the first accused (K.C. Hamsa) and, in separate proceedings, the other accused (Maimoona and M. Abdulla) for serious offenses including murder, disappearance of evidence, and related offenses under IPC. The High Court, delivering on 29 August 2019, addresses the Death Sentence Reference (DSR No.1/2015) and CRL.A.770/2015, CRL.A.783/2015, and CRL.A.808/2015. It upholds the core findings that Safiya was in the custody of the first and third accused, with evidence including confession statements (Ext.P63, Ext.P48), DNA correlation (PW32), and forensic testimony confirming homicide and dismemberment. However, the Court commutes the death sentence for the first accused to life imprisonment, noting that the case may not meet the “rarest of rare” standard and citing Viran Gyanlal Rajput and other authorities on the quantum of punishment. It also partly allows the 808/2015 appeal by sustaining the 302 conviction but converting the death sentence to life; it quashes the 361 verdict against the 3rd accused and sustains the 201 conviction. The 770/2015 and 783/2015 appeals are allowed, setting aside the convictions and sentences of the 3rd and 4th accused. The judgment emphasizes careful application of the burden of proof (Section 106 of the Evidence Act) and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in a circumstantial case, alongside established Supreme Court principles on evidence, proof, and sentencing.
This criminal appeal, CRL.A.No.1407/13, is filed by the State of Kerala challenging an order of acquittal passed by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram in SC No.296/2005, arising from a fatal assault at Pulluvila, Karumkulam, in March 2003. The six accused—Antony, Wilfred, Mary Dasan, Mary (D/O Antony), Meyamma, and Mary (D/O Mary Dasan)—were charged with forming an unlawful assembly to murder Mettilsy. Eyewitnesses PW1 (CW1, wife of the deceased) and PW2 (CW2, daughter) described two stages of violence: first at PW1’s house where CW1 and others were beaten; later, near a house in front of Clara’s residence, where A1 allegedly threatened and struck Mettilsy with a kattadikkuzha, followed by further blows from A2–A6. Mettilsy died from head injury; post-mortem confirmed the cause. The trial court acquitted all six; the State appealed arguing that the eye-witnesses, medical evidence, and scene evidence collectively establish a homicide beyond reasonable doubt, with motive and place of occurrence adequately supported. The High Court, after reviewing testimonies and forensic material, found the trial court’s acquittal not perverse and dismissed the appeal, upholding the acquittals. The judgment discusses the weight of eyewitness testimony, absence of blood-stains on certain exhibits, and the need to explain injuries to the accused in assessing culpability.
R.C.R. Nos. 328, 339, 341, 353 & 354 of 2017 This is a set of connected revision petitions under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging the eviction orders granted by the Rent Control Court and reversed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The revision petitioners, common landlords, sought eviction of several tenants from petition schedule shop rooms on the ground of bona fide need to start a mini supermarket for the 3rd petitioner, who had completed his studies but lacked employment. The Rent Control Court had allowed the petitions; the Appellate Authority, however, reversed, holding that the need was not bona fide. The Court examines whether the Appellate Authority’s findings were perverse, particularly regarding the 3rd petitioner’s temporary overseas employment and the absence of production of a passport. It relies on jurisprudence including Raveendran M.N. and Another v. V.V. Sivaprasad to hold that temporary employment abroad, especially for a Non-Resident Indian, cannot be treated as a fatal blow to bona fide need; a need can be current and urgent even while abroad. The High Court sets aside the Appellate Authority’s findings, restores eviction, and grants eight months for the tenants to vacate with conditions, including affidavit and arrears deposit, while closing pending interlocutory applications.
WP(C).No.5250 of 2019 (E) Vasantha N.K., owner in possession of 1.88 acres of land in Payyannur Village, Kannur District, seeks relief under Article 226 challenging Ext.P4 (dated 05.12.2016) issued by the Payyannur Municipality Secretary rejecting a building permit on the ground that the property lies within an area proposed for a 9-meter road under a draft Detailed Town Planning (DTP) Scheme proposed in 1993 but not yet sanctioned or published. The petition also contends against Ext.P5 (31.12.2018) Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions order upholding the rejection, and seeks a mandamus to grant the permit independent of the draft scheme. The petition was admitted, and arguments were heard with reference to this Court’s decision in District Town Planner, Malappuram and others v. Vinod and others (2019 (3) KHC 673). The petitioner highlighted that the draft scheme has never been sanctioned, that the municipality constructed a 9-meter road well away from the proposed alignment, and that extant rules should not bar redevelopment. The court reviewed the interplay between DTP Schemes, Section 67 of the Act, and building permits, citing Vinod’s case and Antony Joseph’s case to emphasize the overriding effect of sanctioned DTP schemes and the availability of de-reservation remedies. The bench directed a purchase notice under Section 67 and, if favorable, reconsideration of the building permit application by the Municipality. The writ petition is disposed as above.
Abdul Rehiman, the first accused in Sessions Case 221/2007, challenges a conviction for murder and related offences arising from a 30 March 2004 incident at Andathode, Veliyamkode, Thrissur, in which Hameed Mon died following an attack by a group identified with CPI(M) against IUML followers. The Sessions Court acquitted four co-accused and convicted the appellant under IPC sections 302 (murder) and 449 (house trespass in the course of an unlawful assembly), sentencing life imprisonment and a fine under Sec.302 and ten years’ rigorous imprisonment under Sec.449 with concurrent terms. On appeal, the High Court scrutinizes the prosecution’s evidence, including PW1’s primary testimony, PW2’s testimony (which was hostile to the prosecution), seizure of MO1 (sword) and MO14 (footwear), and the test identification parade. It highlights material inconsistencies: variations between FI statements and trial testimony, the timing and role of each accused, and the reliability of PW1 as a sole key witness; the case diary and Sec.172 Cr.P.C. recording gaps; and questions about the identity of the weapon. The court also discusses admissibility of statements under Sec.27 of the Indian Evidence Act, citing Ajayan @ Baby v. State of Kerala to emphasize authorship of concealment is not sine qua non. The High Court ultimately allows the appeal and acquits the appellant, setting him at liberty.
O.V. Appachan, a 69-year-old member of the Managing Committee of the Wayanad District Wholesale Co‑operative Store Ltd. (a society under the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act, 1969), filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the election to the Board of Directors of the 3rd respondent Federation conducted under Ext.P3 (the election notification dated 17.12.2018). He sought a mandamus directing the 1st respondent Joint Registrar to consider Ext.P6 (dated 09.01.2019) and pass orders after hearing, and a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P4 (08.01.2019) of the 2nd respondent’s Managing Committee; he also sought to set aside the nomination of the 4th respondent on the ground that he was not included in the final voters list published on 01.01.2019, making Ext.P3 nomination invalid. The court noted that Ext.P4 was incomplete and required substitution with proper copies; after several adjournments, notices were issued and the election to the 3rd respondent was scheduled for 24.01.2019. Importantly, the court examined whether it should intervene under Article 226 and concluded that disputes arising in connection with elections must be addressed under the statutory remedy—coe‑operative arbitration under Section 69 of the Kerala Co‑operative Societies Act, within one month from the date of election, as supplemented by Sections 69, 70A and Rule 35A and Articles in Part IXB. Relying on earlier precedents (Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami; Shaji K. Joseph; Reji Thomas), the court dismissed the petition, directing the petitioner to pursue the statutory remedy within the prescribed period.
RSA No. 81/2010 & CO No. 135/2015 This Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 81/2010) and Cross-Objection (Co. No. 135/2015) arise from a suit by the legally wedded wife and children of the deceased Purushothaman seeking declaration of their status and declaration of title to property left by him, along with recovery of possession. The Trial Court declared the plaintiffs as the legally wedded wife and children and awarded title to the plaint schedule property. On appeal, the First Appellate Court combined the plaintiffs’ status with that of the first defendant (held to be the illegitimate son of the deceased) and granted a preliminary decree for partition in his favor. The plaintiffs argued that the suit sought only a declaration of title and status, not partition, and that Exts. A7 (2.4.1998) and A8 (4.6.2000) sale deeds were executed in derogation of co-owners’ rights by a co-owner, potentially affecting the title of others. The High Court held that a partition decree cannot be improvised as a relief when not sought, and that mere declaration of title against purchasers without partition would be ineffective. It distinguished prior decisions on fraud (Exts. A7 and A8) as standing on a different footing. The Court allowed the appeal in part: declaring the plaintiffs’ status as legally wedded wife and children, declaring title to 34 cents 112 sq. links, granting recovery of possession of that extent, and dismissing the suit against respondents 2–5, with costs.
This Kerala High Court judgment arises from ITA No. 222 of 2012, challenging an ITAT Cochin Tribunal order dated 23 March 2012, in a block assessment under section 158BB for the period 01.04.1966 to 29.01.2003 following a search on 29.01.2003. The assessee, a real estate developer, challenged three key additions confirmed or remitted by the ITAT: (i) Rs. 21,00,000 as undisclosed income from the sale of a penthouse; the CIT(A) deleted it on grounds including non-completion and lack of seized material, while the ITAT remitted for fresh consideration in light of seized material; (ii) Rs. 50,81,874 as undisclosed profit on land sale, which the ITAT remitted for fresh examination; and (iii) Rs. 50,00,000 as undisclosed sale proceeds on city centre space, based on statements and documents recovered during survey. The court upheld the ITAT’s remand on issues (i) and (ii), rejecting the assessee’s challenge to remand as perverse. On issue (iii), the court held that evidence from surveys cannot be used to compute undisclosed income under section 158BB and set aside the addition, directing the AO to decide in accordance with law. The matter is to be reconsidered by the Assessing Officer as per ITAT’s directions.
