Ramani, Sujatha, Suseela, and Sumathy (the appellants) challenge the order dated 03.08.2023 of the Special Court for SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Mannarkkad, rejecting their anticipatory bail under Section 438 CrPC in Crime No.126 of 2023. The allegations arise from an incident on 13.01.2023, when the defacto complainant (Thanka), a member of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes community, was allegedly restrained and assaulted by the appellants in connexion with a civil dispute over property sold by a brother of the accused to the defacto complainant’s son. The accused were charged under IPC Sections 341, 323 and 325 read with Section 34, and under Sections 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015. The Special Judge held that there was a prima facie case under the Act and dismissed anticipatory bail. The appellants contend that the civil dispute, the lack of any weapon, their ages (48–54), and the fact that the alleged offences are bailable should entitle them to bail, citing Basheer M. & Anr. v. State of Kerala (2020) and Binesh & Others v. State of Kerala (2019) to argue that 3(2)(va) and 3(1)(s) should be treated with caution. The State counters with CCTV footage and witnesses supporting the assault. The High Court disposes of the appeal by directing the appellants to cooperate with investigation and to appear before the IO on 30.10.2023; if bail is sought on that day, the Special Judge should pass orders promptly.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC challenging the continuation of CC No. 437/2022 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Angamaly, arising from Crime No. 1027/2021 of Nedumbassery Police Station. The petitioners (accused) seek quashing of the proceedings on the basis that the parties have settled their dispute and the victim supports quashing. The prosecution contends that it should not be quashed merely on a settlement, though the parties’ settlement is not disputed. The court reviews the settled jurisprudence on the power of High Courts under Section 482 CrPC to quash non-compoundable offences where the dispute is private and resolved, drawing from Supreme Court decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) and the earlier cases Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab. It is observed that quashing is permissible in private disputes and civil-like disputes where the whole dispute is resolved, provided such offences do not involve serious public interest or heinous elements, and subject to consideration of the accused’s antecedents and conduct. On these principles, the court finds the present case private in nature, accepts the settlement, and exercises the power to quash the prosecution, thereby terminating all further proceedings against the petitioners in CC No. 437/2022. The order reflects a balanced application of settled law to private disputes while cautioning against quashing for serious offences or those under special statutes.
Cochin Port Trust (CPT) and its officers challenged the dismissal of two CPT employees, A.V. Poulose (Driver) and Rasheeda Beevi (Lower Division Clerk), who faced separate disciplinary proceedings for attendance fraud, including unauthorized full‑day attendance by manipulating swipes and proxy usage, and destruction of leave records. The disciplinary authorities convicted them, awarding the major penalty of dismissal. Both petitioners challenged these orders in WP(C) Nos. 22092/2017 and 25148/2017; the learned Single Judge adopted a fresh view of the evidence and set aside the punishment, directing CPT to reconsider the matter from the enquiry stage based on existing evidence. The CPT and delinquents appealed. The High Court, in a Division Bench, analyzed the limits of Article 226/227 judicial review in disciplinary matters, relying on precedents that the court should not ordinarily re‑appreciate evidence; an interference is warranted only where there is total lack of evidence, perverse findings, or violations of natural justice or extraneous considerations. It held that the charges were proved by witness testimony and documents, applying a preponderance of probabilities standard rather than beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the court found the punishment disproportionate and set aside dismissal, directing reconsideration of penalties, even suggesting a minor penalty would suffice. The writ appeals were disposed of accordingly, with no costs."
The petitioner Krishnaprasad K. challenges the Government’s Annexure A10 order dated 20-02-2021 (as part of OA 538/2022 before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal) rejecting his claim for compassionate appointment following the death of his father, who served as a daily-wage Night Watchman at Priyadarsini Institute of Para Medical Science under the Government Medical College, Thiruvananthapuram. The history spans several orders: Annex A1 sanction for compassionate appointment was issued, later cancelled by Annex A3; the Tribunal directed the Government to issue a more detailed order, resulting in Annex A8 and then Annex A10 rejecting the application. The petition argues that the initial consideration and the scheme’s intent must guide relief for dependents of government servants, especially where the death occurred in harness. The Government relies on GO(P) No.12/99/P&ARD (1999) and subsequent GO(MS) orders to define eligibility, emphasizing that the scheme covers contingents, part-time workers, NM R workers, seasonal staff, panchayat and municipal employees, while daily-wage employees are excluded. The Tribunal’s and Court’s analysis discuss the well-settled principle that compassionate appointment is an exception, not a right, and must be strictly construed under the applicable scheme. The Court upholds Annex A10 and dismisses the petition, maintaining that the daily-wage status excludes the petitioner from eligibility under the scheme and that the Government’s decision was properly grounded.
Cap Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India deals with a challenge to a series of demand notices issued under Section 234E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which imposed an equalization fee for late filing of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) returns under Sections 194J and 200(1). The petitioner contends that Section 234E became enforceable only after the amendment to Section 200A(1) on 1 June 2015, which set out the procedure for levying the fee; hence notices for periods prior to that date lack statutory authority and are illegal. The matter traces a line of Kerala High Court decisions, including Olari Little Flower Kuries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, and references a coordinate bench ruling in Sree Narayana Guru Smaraka Sangam Upper Primary School v. Union of India. The court acknowledges that the question of applicability and validity of Section 234E has been contentious in other cases and that the Division Bench had held that the amended 200A mechanism cannot be treated merely as regulatory but as substantive. The Revenue contends that once 234E exists, the later amendments to 200A provide a valid collection mechanism; the petitioner argues otherwise. The judge ultimately allows the writ petition, sets aside the impugned notices, and notes that the constitutional validity issue has already been considered in other proceedings, deferring any ruling on it pending higher court guidance. The matter leaves open potential revenue action if the Supreme Court rules in the Revenue’s favor.
CRL.M.C Nos. 7412 & 7416 of 2023 These two Criminal Miscellaneous Cases were heard by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court on 29 September 2023. Crl.M.C No. 7412/2023 challenges CC 473/2016, the proceedings before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Adoor, arising from Crime No. 2130/2015 at Pandalam Police Station; Crl.M.C No. 7416/2023 challenges CC 472/2016, arising from Crime No. 2129/2015 at Pandalam Police Station. The petitioners (two groups of private complainants and accused) contend that the disputes between the parties are private and have been settled by affidavits of the victims, with no objection to quashing the prosecutions. They invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable offences where the civil/private dispute has been settled and public interest does not require continuing the prosecution. The State Public Prosecutor expressed initial reservations but conceded that the matter is settled. The Court has relied on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) to summarise the scope of the power under Section 482 CrPC in such contexts, noting that the power is not available for heinous/serious offences or for offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, and that offences under Section 307 IPC or the Arms Act form a different category. Based on the private nature of the disputes, the affidavits, and the settled positions, the court held that quashing is appropriate and allowed both Crl.M.Cs, resulting in the quashing of the prosecutions in CC 473/2016 and CC 472/2016.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No. 208 of 2013) from the Kerala High Court. The appellant, Latha Sathyarajan, sustained serious injuries in a scooter- and mini lorry collision on 16 February 2006 on the Cherthala–Alappuzha National Highway. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Alappuzha, had allowed the claim petition against the insurer with a modest compensation of Rs. 22,849, plus interest and costs. The insurer contested liability and the extent of damages, while the appellant contended she suffered a permanent whole‑body disability and was entitled to higher compensation. Notably, the tribunal rejected Ext. A1, a disability certificate certifying 10% whole‑body disability, and did not accord due weight to PW1’s testimony. The High Court, examining Ext. A1 and the medical evidence, held that disability could be established by the examining doctor or medical board, relying on Rajkumar v. Ajayakumar and Union of India v. Talwinder Singh. The court re‑assessed income (notional) to Rs. 4,000 per month, recalculated loss of earnings to Rs. 12,000 (for three months), and awarded Rs. 62,400 for disability, among other heads, resulting in a total enhanced compensation of Rs. 91,249. The appeal was allowed, with a further enhancement of Rs. 68,400, and directions for deposit within two months and liberty to withdraw on deposit."
W.P.(C) Nos. 24439/2020, 24445/2020, 24463/2020, 24500/2020, 24569/2020, 24631/2020, 24632/2020, 24634/2020, 24635/2020, 24657/2020, 24668/2020, 24697/2020, 24792/2020, 24801/2020, 24824/2020, 24834/2020, 24929/2020, 24982/2020, 25026/2020 and 15033/2021 (and connected cases) This judgment consolidates multiple writ petitions filed by fixed-depositors who had deposited money with the Vaikom Taluk Vanitha Co-operative Society Ltd., Kaduthuruthy. The petitioners allege non‑payment of fixed deposits with interest, despite demands, creating irreparable hardship. The Society’s financial troubles are traced to alleged misappropriation by a former Secretary, leading to surcharge proceedings. The court recalls the principle established in Gandhigram Agro Based Industrial Co-Operative Society Ltd v. Marangattupilly Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd (2019) that a writ petition is maintainable to compel disbursal of fixed deposits when a society has failed to repay, particularly where deposits were collected with a commitment to repay. The petitioners rely on documentary evidence (FD receipts/passbooks) to show sums due. The respondents contend the Society’s liability arises from internal malfeasance by the former Secretary, and that recovery must proceed under the Revenue Recovery Act by the District Collector. The Court ultimately disposes the petitions with a constructive remedy: the Society must forward a requisition to the District Collector for recovery under the Revenue Recovery Act, and after funds are realized, depositors are to be paid within two months. The decision emphasizes depositor protection and accountability for misfeasance in a Co‑operative Society.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC in the Kerala High Court, challenging the proceedings arising from Crime No. 571/2020 of Kuttiady Police Station (CP 39/2021). The petitioners, Saleem and Ramseena, were accused in theJFM Nadapuram case, facing offences under sections 201, 307, 324, 326, 506(ii) and 34 IPC. The prosecution contends that the charge under 307 IPC is not prima facie made out; injuries to the victim were to the forearm and thigh. The petitioners and the victim have settled their dispute, and the victim has filed an affidavit expressing no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while initially reserved, consents to the settlement’s effect on the case. Relying on Supreme Court precedents including State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019 (5) SCC 688), Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012 (10) SCC 303), and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014 (6) SCC 466), the High Court held that quashing non-compoundable, private-offence proceedings under 482 CrPC is permissible when the dispute is private and settled, avoiding grave societal impact. The court found the dispute private, accepted the settlement, and allowed the Crl. M.C., quashing all further proceedings in CP 39/2021. The order closes with the bench’s approval for quashing the case.
WP(C) No.13741 of 2019; WP(C) No.22129 of 2019 Two linked writ petitions challenge Ext.P6, a Government order granting sanction to erect a concrete vault cemetery by the 9th respondent church near the Thanneermukkom temple, in Alappuzha district. The petitioners, including Dileep, a resident of Ward XIV in Thanneermukkom Panchayat, and worshippers of nearby deities, contend that the proposed cemetery would breach distance norms and disrupt public order and religious life. The 9th respondent church applied on 29-08-2014 for a cemetery; initial District Collector rejection was influenced by police inputs on potential unrest. Following remand by the Government, Ext.P3 granted licence and Ext.P4 issued a building permit; the High Court later set aside those orders in a common judgment (Ext.P5) for lack of natural justice, directing reconsideration after hearing all stakeholders. On remand, Ext.P6 granted permission, prompting the challenge in both petitions. The petitions criticize Ext.P6 as cryptic and non‑speaking, failing to justify the decision, and highlight Rule 6(7) publication, Rule 6(5) procedures, and the 25/50 metre distance norms for concrete vaults, besides concerns about possible communal disharmony. Respondents insist the order complied with the 1998 Rules, including distance criteria and procedural safeguards, and was issued after hearing all parties. The Court ultimately held that the government acted within the Rules, dismissing both petitions and upholding Ext.P6.
This writ petition challenges Ext P4 (luxury tax assessment under Section 5A of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975) and Ext P6 (order confirming the same) on a two-storey building used partly for residential purposes and partly for medical consultation and related activities. The Tahsildar reassessed the building after measurement, treating the ground floor (plinth area approximately 194.66 m2) as a residential building and the first floor (approximately 102.79 m2) as an “other building,” while continuing to levy luxury tax for 2005-06 to 2010-11 under Section 5A on the basis of an initial single-building assessment. The petitioner submits that the ground floor is residential and the first floor is used for clinic-related activities, with separate numbers assigned by the Panchayat; Exts P2 and P3 show two units, yet Ext P4 imposes luxury tax. Respondents rely on statutory definitions and case law, arguing that a single building with multiple uses can still attract Section 5A if the plinth area of the building, considered as a whole, qualifies, and that concurrent assessments do not alter the building’s character for tax purposes. The learned judge examines Sections 2(e) and 2(l) of the Building Tax Act and relevant authorities, ultimately holding that, in light of Exts P2 and P3, luxury tax under Section 5A is not sustainable for the petitioner. The petition is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.
Sheema, the petitioner, approaches the Kerala High Court challengingSARFAESI proceedings initiated by Mahindra & Mahindra Financial Services Limited. The court immediately notes its jurisdictional constraint: it cannot adjudicate the merits of the SARFAESI measures, citing binding precedents such as Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110, and the Kerala decision in Authorised Officer, SBT v. Mathew (ILR 2018 (1) Ker. 479). Consequently, the court refrains from a merits-based examination of the petition but considers whether leniency can be afforded to allow the petitioners to repay the overdue sums. The bank’s counsel emphasizes recovery as the objective and acknowledges that litigation should not be protracted, while the petitioners’ counsel consents to conditional relief to enable payment. After hearing, the judge directs the petitioners to pay Rs.1,00,000 by 28 February 2019; the balance, with charges and interest, is to be paid in ten equal monthly instalments commencing 30 March 2019, in addition to regular EMIs. Failure to comply would vacate the benefit and allow the bank to continue with SARFAESI proceedings. The court also notes the possibility of account reconciliation, if the petitioners’ totals are adjusted. The writ petition is disposed accordingly, balancing recovery needs with debtor relief.
This High Court of Kerala judgment pertains to FAO No. 94 of 2022, an appeal from an ex parte ad interim injunction in OS No. 4/2022, Thiruvananthapuram. The appellants/defendants—G.M. Sheik, Mehurneza, and Farook Abdulla—challenge an ex parte injunction granted on 1 June 2022 by the Additional District Court-IV, restraining them from carrying on business in alleged infringement/passing-off of Raja Biri’s and Raja Bidi’s marks. A Commissioner, with police protection, was appointed to seize materials and goods supplied to various shops before notice to the appellants, evidencing the trial court’s implementation of the injunction outside a merits hearing. The respondents/plaintiffs include Raja Biri Private Ltd. and several trading entities asserting rights in the marks. The Court scrutinizes the scope and propriety of Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which permits ex parte relief only for enumerated purposes under Section 135(2)(a)-(c) and cautions against broad execution of such orders, especially via Section 36 CPC and Order XXI. Relying on Supreme Court precedents on natural justice (audi alteram partem) and right to hearing, the Court holds that ex parte ad interim orders require careful application and service of notice. Consequently, the Court transfers the interim injunction matter to the Principal District Court to decide within ten days post-Onam holidays, extends the stay, and disposes of the appeal without costs.
Sheeja S., a 57-year-old employee of Kundara KSHEERA Vyavasaya Co-operative Society, challenged Ext.P13 memo of charges (dated 26.02.2018) proposing a fresh disciplinary inquiry on the same set of allegations. She had previously been investigated in earlier proceedings in 2010, 2018, 2019, and 2021, all of which found the charges baseless and exculpatory. The petitioner's contention is that the ongoing enquiry was tainted by malice and bias, intended to prevent her from being promoted and to harass her till retirement. She asserts that her request for legal representation during the enquiry was denied. The petition traces a pattern of attempts by the Managing Committee to stall her career progression despite prior findings of innocence, and highlights that the department's Ext.P12 and Ext.P6 reports corroborate the absence of wrongdoing. The Society argues that the petitioner had used her position for alleged unlawful gains and that the enquiry should not be interfered with. The petition relies on Supreme Court authority suggesting that initiation of disciplinary proceedings does not by itself generate a cause of action, yet also notes that malice or bias may warrant interference. The High Court, emphasizing malice and continued attempts to undermine due process, quashes Ext.P13 and the related proceedings as a rare exception to the general rule of non-interference, albeit keeping a stay on further actions in place. Ultimately, the writ petition is allowed with Ext.P13 quashed.
The writ petition challenges Ext.P3 show cause notice issued on 12.04.2023 by the Regional Transport Officers under Section 19 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1989, threatening to revoke the petitioner’s heavy driving license for alleged overload. The petitioner contends there is no proven violation of the Act and that the Licensing Authority lacks power to suspend a license; he questions the territorial jurisdiction and the absence of an e-challan in the record, relying on the weighment certificate to prove overload. The respondents contend the driver violated Section 19 read with Rule 21(8) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, making the licensee's conduct a nuisance or danger to the public, and rely on Anoop K.A. v. State of Kerala to justify show-cause proceedings. After examining Ext.P3, the weighment certificate, Ext.P4 objection, and the arguments, the court finds no illegality or arbitrariness in issuing Ext.P3 but states it has not decided the merits. It directs the first respondent to finalize Ext.P3 after hearing and considering Ext.P4, and until then the license shall not be revoked. The court underscores that its review is limited to legality of the notice, not its merits, and references Anoop K.A. for context.
Renjith, a driver, suffered injuries in a motor vehicle accident and sought compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Muvattupuzha. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,52,356, prompting Renjith to file MACA No. 3598 of 2015. The core dispute is the quantum of compensation, particularly the applicant’s monthly income for calculating loss of earnings and uplift for Pain and Suffering and Loss of Amenities. The appellant challenged the Tribunal’s notional income of Rs. 4,500 per month, arguing that Kerala’s Fair Wages Act logic ought to apply to private sector drivers, which would yield a much higher notional salary (circa Rs. 15,600). He relied on Manusha Sreekumar and others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2022) to support classification of the driver as a skilled worker under the Kerala Fair Wages Act. The respondent insurer contends that Manusha Sreekumar does not apply to the present case and that Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. should govern notional income; the latter yields Rs. 8,000 per month (as of 2011). The High Court, after considering the evidence and authorities, held that Ramachandrappa’s ratio applies, setting the appellant’s notional income at Rs. 8,000 per month, and rejected the Kerala Fair Wages Act-based claim. It allowed the appeal, revising several heads of compensation and directing deposit within two months.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 4450 of 2021) arising from CC 178/2021 pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pala, in Crime No. 2793/2019 of the Pala Police Station. The petitioner is the fourth accused in a 304A IPC case arising from a fatal accident at the 63rd Kerala State Junior Athletics Meet held at the Pala Municipal Stadium in October 2019, where hammer throw and javelin throw events overlapped in adjacent sectors. The prosecution alleges that a hammer thrower struck 17-year-old Afeel Johnson, a volunteer, causing his death after treatment in hospital; the incident is said to have resulted from rash and negligent acts by multiple officials, including the accused. The petitioner, however, contends that he was the chief judge of the javelin event only and had no role in hammer throw, sector allocation, or signaling, and thus bears no criminal liability. He asserts misjoinder and unnecessary prosecution. After examining the materials, the court notes that while death occurred in an overlapping area, the petitioner neither selected the venue nor directed the hammer throw, and is not alleged to have acted in furtherance of a common intent. The High Court quashes the proceedings against him under Section 482 Cr.P.C., holding no prima facie case against him and exonerating him at the threshold.
This High Court of Kerala, in Crl.M.C. No.4708 of 2023, heard a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of Crime No.241 of 2023 at Venjaramood Police Station, registered for offences under Sections 294(b), 324, 326, and 341 r/w Section 34 IPC. The petitioners—Nithin, Suhas Salim S.S., Rouf Rafi, and Ambady (aka Abijith A)—contend that the dispute between them and the respondents has been amicably settled, and they do not wish to pursue the prosecution. The respondents include the State of Kerala (through Public Prosecutor) and injured persons Adithya Vinesh, Shabin S, and Aswin. The learned Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about termination solely on the basis of settlement but acknowledged there were no other serious crimes against the petitioners, and respondents stated they hold no lasting grievances. The court relied on Supreme Court precedents—State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan (2019), Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab—to frame the test: quashing is permissible where non-compoundable offences are private in nature, do not affect society broadly, and the dispute has been entirely settled; but not for serious, heinous offences or those under special statutes. Here, given the non-serious nature of the conduct and the settled dispute, the court held that quashing would not harm society and would advance ends of justice. The petition was allowed and the F.I.R. and further proceedings were quashed.
This criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 CrPC challenges the continuation of SC No.590/2019 arising from an incident on 21.06.2016 in Attingal, where 18 petitioners are accused of offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 153, 294(b), 323, 324 and 308, read with Section 149. The petitioners request quashing of proceedings on the basis of an amicable settlement with the injured party, supported by affidavits from the respondents. The court directed the investigating officer to verify whether the settlement is genuine and whether the petitioners have any criminal antecedents or any impediment to termination. The Public Prosecutor raised reservations about relying solely on settlement to terminate a criminal case, though conceding lack of ongoing transgressions. The judge reviewed authorities including Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, Parbatbhai Aahir and related decisions, and summarized that Section 482 powers may be exercised to quash non-compoundable offences in private disputes where the parties have resolved their disputes, while reserving the position for heinous or public-interest offences. After weighing gravity of the offences, injuries, circumstances of the amicable settlement, and petitioners’ antecedents, the court concluded that continuing the prosecution would not serve the ends of justice and would be a waste of time. The petition was allowed, quashing Annexure-A Final Report in Crime No.871/2016 and all further proceedings in SC No.590/2019."
Crl.Appeal No.467 of 2017 This is an appeal under Section 374(2) Cr.P.C. by the sole accused, Shaju, challenging a Sessions Court judgment that convicted him for murder (Section 302 IPC) in SC No. 919/2012 and sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of ₹25,000, with default imprisonment. Vishnu, the son of the accused, intervened during a quarrel on 21 July 2012, and the accused stabbed Vishnu on the left side of the neck with a rubber-tapping knife (MO1), followed by a blow to the head, causing fatal injuries. The incident occurred in the steps leading to the family residence in AVT Estate, Punalur. PW1 (father of the accused) initially disputes the prosecution narrative, and Exts P1–P18 and MO1–MO6 were produced during trial along with a post-mortem by PW3, which identified multiple injuries and concluded death by the neck wound. The defence concentrated on inconsistencies, the shape/length discrepancy of the wound relative to MO1, and alleged grave provocation or private defence. The trial court rejected acquittal under Section 232 Cr.P.C. and held the act amounted to murder. On appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction, holding that the act fell within clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, not protected by any exception, and that the evidence supported a murder finding. The appeal is dismissed; the conviction stands.
