Amakkattu Finance, Vazhoor, represented by its proprietor A.C. Ninan, filed Crl.L.P. No. 253 of 2017 seeking special leave to appeal against a judgment of acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in S.T. No. 25/2016 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Kanjirappally. The complainant alleged that the accused borrowed Rs. 4 lakhs and issued a cheque for Rs. 4,50,845, drawn on a bank in favour of the complainant, who runs a money-lending business registered under the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958. The cheque bounced for insufficient funds, and a statutory demand was served under Section 138(1) NI Act. The trial court acquitted the accused on grounds that the complainant had failed to prove his status as proprietor and to connect the complainant with the alleged money-lending business, highlighting the absence of vital records, including the money-lending license, proper registers, vouchers, and ledgers. The court also questioned the authenticity of Ext.P7 promissory note, which was not produced with the complaint. The High Court heard arguments on leave and discussed Milind Shripad Chandurkar v. Kalim M. Khan to underscore the need for the payee's status to sue in a proprietary firm, as well as the principles laid down in Rajasthan and Pudhu Raja on appellate interference. The court ultimately declined to grant leave, affirming the acquittal and dismissing the petition.
The petitioner, Dr. Jagannathan P.K., is the General Secretary of the Principals Council of Unaided Colleges affiliated to Calicut University and also serves as Principal of SNDP Yes College. He challenges the exclusion of Principals of Unaided Colleges from the electoral roll for the Senate elections. Calicut University had notified an election and published an electoral roll that did not include unaided Principals, prompting Ext.P3 and responses asserting that only Principals whose appointments are approved and reported to the University would be included. The judgment surveys numerous precedents, including University of Kerala v. Sankaran Nampoothiry, Rajendran v. University of Calicut, and Abdul Salam V.H. (Prof.Dr.) v. University of Calicut, to hold that Principals of Unaided Colleges have the right to be considered for inclusion in the electoral roll and that the process requires a mechanism for approval of such appointments. The Court emphasizes that the University’s approval system has historically limited recognition to aided colleges, and that the Returning Officer cannot decide approval; instead, approval must adhere to Regulations. The University is directed to devise a mechanism to approve Unaided Principals in accordance with Regulations, and to provide opportunity for these Principals to obtain approval before proceeding with the election. The petition is disposed of with no costs.
Crl.Rev.Pet.No.383 of 2016 This is a criminal revision petition filed by P. M. Gopalan challenging a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act) arising from a complaint by the first respondent. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Perambra, convicted the petitioner on 14.11.2014 for issuing a cheque (Exhibit P1) for Rs. 1,50,000 in discharge of a liability, which dishonoured (Exhibit P2). The complainant alleged a prior loan of Rs. 1,00,000 given in 2005 with security deposits and subsequent agreements (Exhibits P6 and P7). A settlement in 2011 required Rs. 1,50,000 in discharge of the liability, leading to Exhibit P1. PW1 (the complainant) and PW2 (Bank Manager) supported the case, while the defence DW1 claimed there was no transaction and that the accused ran a partnership firm only since 2008, being unauthorized to receive money personally. The Sessions Court upheld the conviction. The High Court, applying Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H and Kaushalya Devi Massand v. (AIR 2010/2011) principles, held that the NI Act offence is essentially a civil wrong with criminal overtones and that compensation can meet ends of justice, reducing the sentence to imprisonment till the rising of the court while sustaining Rs. 1,50,000 as compensation.
This judgment delves into the scope of the Rent Control Court’s power to amend a rent control petition under Section 23(1)(j) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, and whether amendments may extend beyond mere errors or omissions by invoking inherent powers under Section 151 or Order VI Rule 17. The Rent Control Revision arises from a challenge to an eviction order under Section 11(3) and the connected amendments in R.C.P. No. 24 of 2015, as affirmed by the RCC and the Rent Control Appellate Authority in RCA No. 15/2018. The court clarifies that while Section 23(1)(j) permits amendments to cure defects or omissions, it does not authorise new grounds not available at filing; nonetheless, it recognises that tribunals possess inherent judicial power and residuary powers to ensure justice, including widening procedural flexibility when necessary. Citing Abdul Kareem M. v. P. Muhammed Shafi and Associated Cement Companies v. Sharma, the bench discusses the evolving role of tribunals and the non-rigid separation of powers in India. The court ultimately holds that the amendment in this case did not introduce a new cause of action but addressed a post‑filing plan change; hence, the RCC’s amendment was permissible. Consequently, the revision is dismissed, with the tenant granted six months to vacate subject to an undertaking and arrears/payment conditions.
This is a criminal miscellaneous case under Section 482 CrPC in the Kerala High Court challenging the order of the Judicial First Class Magistrate IV, Kozhikode, in CC 435/2010, in which the offence alleged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was being pursued against the respondent. The petitioner, a financial company, had instituted the complaint through its Power of Attorney holder, P. T. Venugopalan (Annexure A2, dated 17.03.2007). When that officer became unavailable due to ill health, the company sought to proceed through a new Power of Attorney holder, S. Noushad, via Crl.M.P. 7220/2012, treating the new appointment as if originally filed by him. The Magistrate dismissed the petition, holding that by executing Annexure A2, the earlier POA under Annexure A1 was revoked, and thus the prior POA could not be used. The High Court, after examining Annexures A1 and A2, observed that the two documents are identical in essential wording, with Clause 16 of A1 and Clause 17 of A2 indicating the POA remains in force as long as the Attorney continues in service unless withdrawn. Absent a specific revocation, the Court concluded that the earlier POA could continue to prosecute the case. Consequently, Annexure A6 was quashed, and Crl.M.P 7220/2012 was allowed, permitting the petitioner to proceed on the basis of Annexure A1. The Court directed expeditious trial of the case.
This criminal appeal contests the conviction of the first accused, Rajamani, under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act for possession of illicit arrack in her residence and related liquor in a scooter. The Addl. District & Sessions Judge (Ad hoc) Court-I, Kollam, convicted Rajamani and sentenced her to one year’s rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, while the second accused was acquitted. The prosecution’s case rests on a search conducted on 01.08.2000 at the accused’s home, with seizure of a 35‑litre can of arrack and three 750 ml bottles of spirit from the scooter; samples were sent to the Chemical Examiner (Exts. P1–P13, MO1–MO3). The defense challenged ownership of the building and the scooter, noting Ext. P10 (certificate of ownership) showing the building belonged to the second accused, Gopi, and highlighting inconsistencies in documented addresses. It also urged a compounding argument of significant delay in investigation. The High Court’s analysis emphasized gaps in proof of possession (ownership of premises and scooter), the reliability of sample sealing/custody, and delays in investigation, supported by case law arguments including Sambasivan and Krishnan H. v. State. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal, reversed the conviction and sentence, and acquitted Rajamani, directing her release and canceling bail bonds.
This is a criminal revision petition (Sec. 397 read with Sec. 401 Cr.P.C.) filed by Saji Mathew challenging a conviction under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, recorded by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Pala (S.T.No.1056/2011) and upheld in appeal by the Addl. Sessions Court-IV, Kottayam, though with a reduced substantive sentence. The trial court had convicted the accused and sentenced him to three months’ simple imprisonment and to pay Rs.5 lakh as compensation under Sec. 357(3) Cr.P.C., with a default term of four months’ imprisonment. The complainant alleged that the accused borrowed Rs.5 lakh and issued Ext.P-1 cheque dated 11.01.2011, which bounced (Exts. P-2, P-3). A statutory demand notice (Ext.P-4) was issued; service is recorded (Exts. P-5, P-6). The defence did not lead oral evidence. The key contention raised by the accused was suppression of material facts in the complaint and the transactional particulars, which, if true, would undermine fair trial, citing K.K. Divakaran. He also argued credibility issues regarding the balance in the account and the dates of loan and cheque, emphasising suspicious circumstances and the resultant potential to rebut the statutory presumption under Sec. 139 NI Act (citing Vijay v. Laxman and Bhaskaran). The High Court, however, remitted the matter to the appellate court for fresh consideration to address these contentions and possibly dispose within 3–4 months, while directing both sides to file arguments. The revision petition is finally disposed of with directions for rehearing by the appellate court.
CRL.A. No. 487 of 2012 (A) Roja P.K. v. R1 to R10 is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal arising from an acquittal in a bigamy prosecution under section 494 IPC r/w 34. The complainant alleged that the first accused married the second accused during the subsistence of the first marriage, with accused 2 to 10 alleged to have abetted the second marriage. The trial court recorded acquittals on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish a valid first marriage or a valid second marriage solemnised by customary rites, and that the independent witnesses’ evidence was unreliable. On appeal, the High Court examined the evidentiary record, including PW1–PW3 and Ext. P1, and noted the pivotal role of admissions contained in the counter statement (where the first accused admitted the prior marriage). It observed that such admissions are substantive evidence under sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, but still required proof of both marriages according to customary rites. The court discussed prior proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and a divorce petition under the Hindu Marriage Act, noting their admissibility. Citing Savithri v. Sankaran, Laxmi Devi, Bhaurao Lokhande, Bharat Singh, Priya Bala Ghosh, and other authorities, it emphasised that both marriages must be proved to be valid and recognized by law or custom. Finding gaps in the record, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and remanded the case to the trial court for fresh disposal, with directions regarding evidence and personal attendance.
This is a pre-arrest bail plea under section 438 CrPC by the seventh accused in Chalakudy Police Station Crime No.1229 of 2017, registered for murder with allied sections (364, 384, 302, 120B read with 34 IPC). The respondent State, through the Public Prosecutor, contends that the petitioner is deeply implicated in a conspiracy with the fifth accused to abduct, torture and kill Rajeev, and that the petitioner’s role extends to coercing the deceased to sign documents. The defacto complainant/intervenor alleges that the petitioner’s professional and personal ties with the deceased, along with close proximity to the fifth accused and others, evidence a calculated plan. The petitioner contends innocence, asserts a spotless reputation as a lawyer and Special Prosecutor, and argues that his arrest would be prejudicial and not essential for investigation. Prosecution highlights call records and communications between the petitioner, the fifth accused, and others around the time of the crime. The court relies on the principles laid down in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra to assess likelihood of tampering, gravity of the accusation, and necessity of custodial interrogation. Ultimately, the judge concludes custodial interrogation is essential to establish nexus and gather further evidence, refuses anticipatory bail, and vacates interim orders; the bail application is dismissed.
Varkey Thomas v. G. Vijayendra Kurup and others, AS No. 428 of 2000 (A), is a suit arising from Ext.A1, a 1992 sale agreement under which the defendants agreed to sell 5.43 acres of land with a building at Rs 1950 per cent, performance within four months, and an advance of Rs 1,10,000 paid at execution. The plaintiff contends that the sellers failed to hand over title deeds and that the title details were incomplete; subsequent measurement showed 4.61 acres, not 5.43, and additional lien holders including a minor were not disclosed. The plaintiff repudiated by Ext.A9 dated 23.12.1992 and sought return of the advance. The defendants argued that they were always ready to execute the sale deed and that the amount paid was earnest money liable to be forfeited for breach; the trial court held the plaintiff in breach and refused to return the advance. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court ignored Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The High Court held that Section 74 permits reasonable compensation even when damage is difficult to prove and that forfeiture requires proof of legal injury; citing Haryana Financial Corporation v. Rajesh Gupta, State of Kerala v. United Shippers and Dredgers, and Kailash Nath Associates. The suit was allowed; a decree for Rs 1,10,000 with 6% interest was granted; no charge decree and no costs.
CRL.RC 611/2018 & Connected Cases This is a consolidated criminal revision proceeding arising from Suo Motu Proceedings under the Administrative Committee’s resolution dated 18.09.17, challenging orders in various St Nos of 2013–2014 and running across multiple criminal revisions in Kollam. On 12 June 2024, the Hon. Justice P. Somarajan heard CRL.RC No.611/2018 along with connected cases. The core legal issue centers on the power of a Magistrate to stop proceedings under Section 258 Cr.P.C. in summons-like cases where the prosecution, having tried to locate the accused, reports failure or excessive costs, and where such stoppage may lead to an acquittal or discharge. The court records recital of the relevant statutory provision and emphasizes the settled legal position that a Magistrate may stop proceedings if satisfied that reasonable steps to locate the accused have failed or costs would exceed the maximum fine, and that such stoppage is permissible under Section 258 Cr.P.C. The court also cites a Division Bench decision in a 2023 Kerala High Court Online judgment (2023 KHC Online 821) regarding the application of Section 258 in Suo Motu proceedings, extracted for reference. Ultimately, the court holds that stoppage of proceedings by the Magistrate deserves no interference and that the revisions fail and are closed, effectively upholding the Magistrate’s order and dismissing the challenges to stoppage.
Arb. Appeal No.24/2011 (S) This arbitration appeal arises from an order of the Principal Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram, in OP(Arb) 29/2002, challenging an arbitral award in favour of the claimant contractor for works under KI & TCDB – Formation of Melila West Distributory (Ch. 3 km to 10 km; Package II Part III; Ch. 3750 m to 5005 m) including CD works. The arbitrator allowed two heads of claim out of nine claimed sums, totaling Rs. 7,98,024, and the Sub Court declined to interfere under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The appellants/ respondents (State of Kerala and three government engineers) challenge the validity of the arbitration and seek to set aside the award on multiple grounds. The State contends that the appointment of the Arbitrator was beyond the time limit fixed under the Local Competitive Bidding (LCB) conditions (Clause 52), since the defects liability period ends six months after completion; the completion certificate and the certified completion date were not issued. The respondents counter that the defects liability period commences from the date of completion certificate, which was not issued, hence the time bar cannot defeat the arbitration. The High Court ultimately holds that completion certificate is essential for triggering the defects liability period and thus the time-barring argument fails; it also notes that the 1992 schedule of rates may be used, reduces the rate of interest from 18% to 9% per annum, and otherwise confirms the award. The appeal is allowed in part with no costs.
WA Nos.676/2020, 52/2020, 395/2020, 800/2020, 711/2020, 721/2020, 712/2020, 713/2020, 754/2020, 735/2020, 743/2020, 790/2020, 1382/2020, 765/2020, 801/2020, 773/2020, 774/2020, 805/2020, 1391/2020, 1400/2020, 821/2020, 1363/2020, 1377/2020, 823/2020, 1491/2020, 1416/2020, 1381/2020, 802/2020, 803/2020, 859/2020, 873/2020, 871/2020, 883/2020, 3705/2018, 961/2020, 1036/2020, 1112/2020, 1101/2020, 1338/2020, 87/2022, 1206/2020, 11649/2017, 12570/2017, 12619/2017, 12959/2017, 17753/2017, 19310/2017, 20196/2017, 20283/2017, 1718/2020, 21946/2017, 24228/2017, 1705/2020 This batch judgment of the Kerala High Court (Division Bench of S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji JJ.) deals with writ appeals challenging the retrospective operation of Section 42(3) of the Kerala Value Added Tax (KVAT) Act, 2003, introduced by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016 (Act 18/2016). The provision empowers reopening of time-barred assessments by treating certain omissions as ‘pending’ and makes the reassessment potentially permissible even where five-year/other statutory limits under KVAT Section 25 would have barred it. The petitioners (Dealer-owners/assessees and others) argued that retrospective enactment impairs vested rights, undermines certainty in tax law, and that the fiction of ‘treated as pending’ is illegitimate; the State argued that the Legislature may enact retrospective legislation and that the Note on Clauses and related authorities justify Section 42(3). The court, while recognizing the legislative competence to enact retrospective provisions, proceeded to harmonize KVAT with post-GST realities, noted that the ‘treated as pending’ fiction is a legislative device, and ultimately upheld the retrospective operation, dismissing the writ appeals and disposing of connected writ petitions. Precedents cited include Ghanshyam Das, Ramdas Laxmidas, Taj Mahal Hotel Secunderabad, Vatika, New Delhi v Vatika, Maruti Suzuki, Uttam Steel, and Baiju A. A./Najeem lines of authority. The judgment emphasizes predictability in tax administration while balancing strict interpretation of statutory provisions.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (Crl.MC No. 3573 of 2014) filed by the accused Mohanan challenging an interim custody order under Section 482 CrPC, issued by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Perumbavoor, in a case arising from Crime No. 3593/2013 under the Kerala Money Lenders Act (Section 17). Following a search at the accused’s residence, police seized Rs 21.50 lakh under Section 102 CrPC, with the prosecution maintaining the amount was not satisfactorily explained. The learned magistrate had granted interim custody of the seized amount on condition of depositing a bank guarantee. Relying on Sasikumar v. State of Kerala (2013 (2) KHC 886), the lower court’s order imposed the bank guarantee as security. The petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Money Lenders Act for confiscation of the seized money and insists that a bank guarantee is unnecessarily stringent; he offers to furnish property security instead and argues that the cited Sasikumar principle allows sufficient security rather than cash only. The Public Prosecutor defends the lower court’s decision as lawful and appropriate under the circumstances. The High Court ultimately modifies the order, allowing security by property and maintaining other conditions, while setting aside the bank guarantee requirement.
This High Court of Kerala case concerns a criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by Baburaj K, the Branch Manager of KSFE, Kanhangad, seeking to quash FIR VC No.1/2023 of VACB, Kasaragod. He is accused No.6 in a conspiracy involving accused Nos.1–5, allegedly aimed at wrongful gain through forged security documents and manipulated valuations. The FIR details a forged title deed (bearing No.3234/1996) and the substitution of the original security land with another property near Periya Central University, with accused No.2 obtaining title through accused No.5. A valuation team, led by the petitioner, purportedly inflated the land’s value from under Rs.7 Lakhs to Rs.1 Crore 41 Lakhs, despite the petitioner not owning the land described in the title deed. The case traces to a KSFE complaint (Cr. No.194/2021) at Hosdurg Police Station; VACB subsequently registered VC No.1/2023 following directions from senior officials. The petitioner argues he acted on a legal opinion and disbursed funds only after regional managerial approval. He also contends that VACB registered the crime before any preliminary enquiry as directed by Lalita Kumari. The State contends that the material prima facie discloses cognizable offences under IPC Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 409 and PC Act Section 13(1)(a) r/w 13(2), and that quashing at the preliminary stage would thwart prosecution. The court emphasizes that Section 482 quashing should be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases; it should not function as an appeal on merits during investigation. On these considerations, the court holds that the petitioner’s arguments fail to establish a lack of prima facie offences and that the petition Lacks merits, hence is dismissed. The decision underscores the principle that the court must refrain from weighing or re-evaluating the evidence at the threshold and should allow the investigation to proceed to test the allegations in due course.
The present writ petition challenges Ext. P6 series of Revenue Recovery notices issued under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act and the Central Sales Tax Act for arrears in respect of several financial years, as stated in the memorandum of writ petition. The petitioner, S. Vijayan, is a registered dealer under both the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and the Central Sales Tax Act. In 2020 the Government announced Amnesty Scheme 2020 through Finance Bill 2020 and Circular No. 2/2020 dated 04.04.2020, offering settlement at 40% of the total arrears. The petitioner submitted an application on 29.11.2020 under the Amnesty Scheme, and by an order dated 12.02.2021 he was directed to pay Rs. 1,28,373 against an outstanding Rs. 3,20,930 (40% of arrears). The petitioner later sought to adjust Rs. 5 lakhs allegedly due to him against the amount settled and requested the balance to be refunded; the 2nd respondent did not act on this request, while Revenue Recovery notices continued. The Amnesty Scheme does not contemplate adjustments; if any amount is due, the petitioner may pursue a remedy. The petitioner relied on a prior decision, M/s Steel Exchange India Ltd v. The Assistant Commissioner, but the court distinguished it on the facts, noting that the Amnesty Scheme does not permit such adjustment. The petition is dismissed.
WP(C) Nos. 28466/2023 & 29663/2023 Sebastian P. Joseph and Manoj Thomas, employees of the Mahatma Gandhi University, challenge disciplinary proceedings initiated for alleged missing blank degree certificate forms from the PD(V) Section. The first petitioner, formerly the Section Officer, and the second petitioner, who took over the charge on 02.06.2023, faced suspension and later penalties after discovery that 54 blank certificate forms were missing. The inquiry report relied on evidence from witnesses other than those named by the petitioners, and the petitioners were allegedly not provided notice or an opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses. They contend this violates Statute 46 of Chapter 4 of the Mahatma Gandhi University Statutes, 1997, which guarantees cross-examination and the right to defend with witnesses. The court accepts that the enquiry was vitiated due to non-compliance with statutory procedure, and cites Supreme Court authority (Chairman, LIC of India v. A. Masilamani; Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya; UP State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. RS Pandey; Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu) to hold that when an enquiry is not properly conducted, the matter must be remitted to the disciplinary authority to proceed from the point of vitiation and cannot reinstate the employee. Consequently, Ext.P17 to P21 in WP(C)29663/2023 are quashed and the disciplinary authority is ordered to resume the inquiry from the witness stage, with suspension continuing pending final outcome.
This Division Bench of the Kerala High Court deals with a public interest complaint arising from Ombudsman Report No. 39 of 2022 (Complaint No. 52 of 2022) concerning the disposal of waste generated during the Thrissur Pooram festival in the precincts of Sree Vadakkumnathan Temple. The petitioner-complainant, Narayanankutty K, alleged improper burial of biodegradable waste in land belonging to the Cochin Devaswom Board, specifically Pallithamam ground near Thekkinkadu Maidanam, alleging water contamination in a nearby well. The respondents, including the Cochin Devaswom Board, the managing Devaswoms, and Thrissur Corporation, argued that waste disposal is the responsibility of the Thrissur Municipal Corporation and that space constraints necessitated current disposal practices; the corporation contended that waste is handled scientifically and that funds flow to Kudumbasree groups for management, with no separate facility for such waste. The Ombudsman had urged the High Court to craft appropriate arrangements for disposal and environmental safety. Throughout, the court references prior directions (DBP 32/2023, 35/2023) and a common judgment in K.B.Sumodh, emphasizing strict adherence to waste management norms and prohibitions on using Thekkinkadu Maidan for disposal. The court ultimately disposes of the DBP with directions for a DBA to be filed by the Cochin Devaswom Board and related bodies to address solid waste management for Thrissur Pooram 2024, while ensuring compliance with earlier orders.
This Regular Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 r/w Order XLII Rule 1 CPC by the plaintiffs in O.S.134/2007, Manjeri Munsiff Court, challenging the concurrent decrees of the trial court and the first appellate court. The appellants claimed title to 4 cents of plaint schedule property in Vazhakkad Village and that a flour mill was legitimately constructed thereon. They asserted that the western boundary adjoined a public road and contended that the mill stood on their property under Ext. A1 (Sale Deed No. 1491/1982) and Ext. A2. After 2002 the building permit (Ext. A5) and its conditions were allegedly satisfied, but the respondent Panchayat argued the mill was erected in puramboke/ Government land and that the construction violated permit conditions, particularly regarding distance from the road and non-encroachment of government property. The trial court rejected the injunction claims; the Sub Court and the High Court found the mill to be situated on government land acquired for road widening, with the plaintiffs’ title being unproved for the portion overlapped by government land. The court discussed multiple commissions, extents of land, Re-Sy numbers, and the conflicting village records, ultimately holding that no substantial question of law arose and dismissing the appeal. The dispositive holding is that the appeal is meritless and must be dismissed, with interlocutory orders vacated.
Cont.Case (C) No. 2370 of 2019 This Contempt of Court case arises from a group of petitioners (petitioners 6, 10, 13, 14, 15, 23, 26, 27, 34, 37, 43, 44, 46, 49 & 54) in W.P.(C) No. 37236 of 2015 who move under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, alleging willful disobedience of the directions contained in the judgment dated 12 October 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 37236 of 2015 and connected matters. The petitioners complain that the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) has not duly implemented the pension-scheme amendments and option rights mandated by the 2014 amendment and subsequent developments. The respondents’ position centers on the Supreme Court’s 2022 judgment in Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B. (and connected Civil Appeals Nos. 8143-44 of 2022), which held the G.S.R. 609(E) notification (dated 22 August 2014) legal and valid and laid down directions for applying the amended scheme to existing employees, including extension of options. The Kerala High Court acknowledges these apex-judgment directions, directs EPFO to undertake a lawful reconsideration of entitlement to higher pension in light of the 2022 decision, and closes the contempt petition, reserving EPFO’s right to finalise entitlements consistent with the apex judgment. The decision references Article 142 and reads down the amendments as appropriate to the facts before it.
