This is an OP (Tax) petition filed by the State of Kerala challenging an order of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries handling, specifically relating to penalty under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 1979. The matter arises from the assessment for the return period 2012-13 after an inspection in 2012 revealed that luxury tax on banquet hall charges had not been properly accounted for, with turnover to be reckoned under Rule 3C of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Rules, 1976. The Department contended that despite the omission of Section 4(2B) of the Act (effective 01.07.2006), Rule 3C retained its functioning for calculating penalties under Section 17A. The first appellate authority and the Tribunal had held in the Department’s favor, concluding that Rule 3C could be applied and penalty could be levied, though a prior order in TA 70/2014 and 71/2014 had held otherwise. The respondent dealer contended that estimation of turnover amounts to an unlawful assessment, relying on decisions that estimation cannot be carried out in penalty proceedings and that penalties require a proper assessment. The High Court, agreeing with the Tribunal, ultimately held that penalties could not be imposed on the basis of estimation and that the Department’s appeal should fail. The petition was dismissed, upholding the Tribunal’s view that penalty was unsustainable.
This is a Kerala High Court revision petition challenging an eviction order under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The revision petitioner, E.C. Jose, resists eviction from a residential building claimed by respondents as their own, challenging the title and the bona fide need asserted for eviction. The Rent Control Court (Munsiff, Thrissur) allowed eviction under Section 11(3) and the Rent Control Appellate Authority (IV Additional District Judge, Thrissur) dismissed the appeal in 2023. The petitioner contends that the petition schedule building is not theirs; he alleges the lease Ext. A1 dated 19.06.1995 is forged using signed blank papers and that an alleged sale agreement with Smt. Malathy Amma exists for Rs. 20,000, after which occupancy could be formalized. He argues the respondents’ need for eviction is not bona fide and disputes the title. The respondents rely on Exts. A1–A6 and PW1, asserting a bona fide need for self-occupation. The court notes the need for bona fide occupancy must be sincere, real and honest, not a mere pretext, citing Adil Jamshed Frenchman; Shiv Samp Gupta; Deena Nath; Ammu v. Nafeesa; and Gireeshbabu T. P., among others. It also cites Rukmini Amma Saradamma, Hindustan Petroleum, and Thankamony Amma to emphasize that revisional jurisdiction cannot re‑appreciate evidence, only legality, regularity and propriety. Consequently, the High Court dismisses the revision petition, affirming eviction, and grants six months for surrender with conditions: affidavit of surrender, arrears deposit, and prohibition on third-party occupancy.
This motor accident claims appeal arises from O.P(MV) No.203/2017 before the Addl. MACT-II, Thodupuzha, challenging an award of Rs.39,04,250 in favor of the claimants following the death of Sinu C.G., aged 42, in a motor vehicle collision on 06.12.2016. The respondents, the wife and children of the deceased, along with other dependants, had claimed Rs.44,00,000 as compensation. The Tribunal found negligence on the part of the car driver and held the insurer liable to pay, directing payment of the award with interest at 9% per annum. The insurer appealed contending that the computation of loss of dependency was inflated, arguing the daily income was Rs.688 based on basic pay, food allowance and DA; contending that the Rs.210 daily food allowance represented the deceased’s personal consumption and should be excluded from income for dependency calculation. The insurer also invoked a Supreme Court principle in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sathinder Kaur (2020) to limit double compensation for loss of love and affection, and sought reduction of the pain and suffering head. The High Court accepted that the Rs.210 food allowance constituted personal consumption, excluded it from dependency, and recalculated income to Rs.475 per day; after applying 25% future prospects and other heads, it fixed the revised total of Rs.30,81,750, deducting double counts under love and affection. The appeal is allowed; the insurer must deposit the amount within three months with interest and costs.
This writ petition concerns the promotion and recruitment rules within the Cochin Port Trust. The petitioner, D. Ajithkumar (Junior Engineer turned Assistant Executive Engineer in Electrical), challenges Ext.P14, the order promoting the 3rd respondent as Executive Engineer (Electrical), and also questions the Cochin Port Trust (Recruitment, Seniority, and Promotion) Regulations, 2010 (RSP 2010) to the extent they include Safety Officer as a feeder category for promotion. The petitioner contends that the 3rd respondent joined later and has less seniority in the Electrical cadre, and that the RSP 2010 changes were made without protecting seniority; Ext.P10 terminated the 3rd respondent’s lien to the Electrical cadre,.Absorbing him as Safety Officer, and Ext.P14 promoted him to Executive Engineer, despite the petitioner’s longer service and qualifications. The respondents defend the 2010 restructuring as a necessary, policy-based effort to standardize cadres in major ports, and argue that the 3rd respondent satisfied the eligibility criteria under the RSP 2010, which the petitioner contends would diminish his prospects but does not violate the statute. The court examines the legality of subordinate legislation, its conformity with the parent Act, and whether the challenge to promotions can succeed given the policy considerations and the vacancy in 2016. It ultimately dismisses the petition, upholding the regulatory framework and promotion. The case involves a detailed scrutiny of recruitment rules, seniority, and the balance between policy decisions and individual grievances in public HR management.
This is an original petition under Article 227 challenging orders in execution proceedings arising from OS 48/2016 before the Sub Court, Ottapalam. The decree-holder-plaintiff and respondents had settled via Ext P2 compromise and Ext P3 judgment, with the respondents liable to pay Rs. 8,76,68,273 with 16% interest within 11 months from 01.06.2016. Two properties were given as security; a shortfall could be recovered from the firm’s other assets. The decree-holder sought attachment of properties through EA No.1/2018 (Order 21 Rule 54 CPC) in EP 56/2017; the Execution Court dismissed, holding the properties belonged to the partnership firm Blue Chips Mines and Industries and not to the individuals, since the firm was not a party. EP 56/2017 for realisation was dismissed on the grounds that Ext P6 had attained finality, and an Order 21 Rule 49(2) application to appoint a Receiver was likewise dismissed. The petitioner contends these orders are illegal. The Kerala High Court relied on Sobhana v. Catholic Syrian Bank Ltd (1989 KHC 45) to reiterate that in the execution of a decree against a partner personally, the partnership property cannot be attached; the firm’s assets cannot be attached when the firm is not a party. The court dismissed the original petition, upholding the challenged orders and leaving the petitioner to pursue remedies in law.
This is a bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. by Thomas Daniel, accused no. 1 in ECIR KCZO/32/2020 registered by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) for alleged offences under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The petitioner, a long-standing managerial figure in Popular Finance, contends that post-COVID financial strains and pandemic-related constraints impeded repayment of deposits, that the investigation has progressed and that he has cooperated, surrendered his passport, and the assets of the business remain intact and being revived through potential takeover by D Capitals Portfolio Investments LLC. He argues that huge deposits (tens of thousands, with claims of up to around Rs. 1,600 crore) and the depositors’ interests can be safeguarded if he is released, especially since the second accused (his daughter) was granted bail earlier under proviso to Section 45(1) of the Act. The ED counters with a detailed objection, asserting massive fraud: deposits collected from about 30,000–3,000 depositors amounting to about Rs. 1,000 crore, laundering through Australia and Dubai, gold re-pledging, and assets spread across India and abroad. It argues risk of tampering, non-cooperation, and possibility of disposal of ill-gotten assets, justifying continued custody. The court ultimately dismisses the bail application, finding gravity, risk, and likelihood of flight and witness tampering to be significant, and determines that the amendments and twin conditions under Section 45 cannot be ignored in a bail context.
In CRL.MC No.6537 of 2023, before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, the petitioners—Shamil S., Sharath A., Rahul R., Vivek R., Nandu N., Roshan P., Ashwin Kuma B., and Vishnu aka Kuttan—seek to quash Crime No.202/2023 registered at Melparamba Police Station, Kasaragod, for offences under Sections 143, 147, 341, 324 and 294(b) read with 149 IPC. The respondents are the State of Kerala, represented by the Public Prosecutor, and Ashkar P.T. The petitioners contend that the dispute has been resolved amicably and that there is no objection from the victim to quashing the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor acknowledges settlement but expresses reservations about quashing solely on that basis. The court examines the governing law from the Supreme Court: State of Madhya Pradesh v Laxmi Narayan (2019) (5) SCC 688, with reliance on Gian Singh v State of Punjab (2012) and Narinder Singh v State of Punjab (2014). The judgment clarifies that while Section 482 CrPC power to quash non-compoundable offences is available when the matter is civil in character and settled between the parties, it should not be used for heinous offences or crimes under special statutes, nor for cases where charges include Section 307 IPC or the Arms Act. It also permits the high court to assess the nature of injuries and the stage of investigation to determine if quashing is appropriate. On the facts, the court finds the dispute private in nature and accepts the settlement, quashing the proceedings.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. The petitioners, accused Nos. 1 and 2, Shafeeq and Siyad, challenge the order in C.C. No. 1431/2022 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of First Class – II, Kollam, arising from Eravipuram Police Station crime No. 569/2022. The offences alleged include sections 341 and 506 IPC and section 24 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act. The petitioners contend that the dispute with the defacto-complainant, who is their father Muhammed Mustafa, has been settled, as reflected in the victim’s affidavit, and there is no object in continuing the prosecution. The Public Prosecutor initially expressed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but conceded that the matter is settled. The court referred to established holdings in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) and the accompanying decisions in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, to recognize that a High Court can exercise its power under section 482 CrPC to quash non‑compoundable, private offences where the entire dispute has been resolved. The court held that the dispute is private in nature and the settlement is acceptable, thus quashing all further proceedings in CC 1431/2022. The order is by a single judge, P.V. Kunhikrishnan.
This Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case arises under Section 482 CrPC, challenging the continuation of proceedings in Crime No. 303/2023 of Poonthura Police Station before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner, Sufiyans, is charged with offences under IPC sections 341, 294(b), 323, 324, 326, and 308 r/w 34. The core issue is whether the criminal proceedings should be quashed in light of an amicable settlement between the accused and the victims (Respondents 3–5), supported by affidavits (Annexures A2–A4). The investigating officer was directed to verify the genuineness of the settlement and whether there are any impediments or antecedents. The Public Prosecutor voiced reservations about terminating the case solely on the basis of settlement, while acknowledging no other outstanding complaints. The court references a line of Supreme Court decisions including State of MP v Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, and others to lay down the governing law: quashing under 482 CrPC is permissible for non‑compoundable offences with predominantly civil/private character where there is a settled dispute, except for heinous crimes or serious public offences (e.g., murder, rape, dacoity, or certain statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act). After evaluating the nature of the offences, injuries, and the lack of ongoing grievances, the court concludes that continuing the prosecution would not serve the ends of justice and that quashing the FIR and proceedings is justified. The petition is allowed and the proceedings are quashed for the petitioner.
The Kerala High Court, sitting as a single judge, consideres a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC filed by five accused (petitioners) challenging the order/judgment in CC 1104/2021 of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Hosdurg. The accused, charged with offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 147, 148 and 143 r/w 149 IPC, seek quashing of the continuing proceedings on the basis of a settlement reached with the de facto complainants. The counsel for the petitioners submits that the parties have amicably settled the dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution; affidavits from respondents support this stance. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about invoking the High Court’s inherent power, but concedes there are no other serious crimes against the petitioners. The court lays down the governing law from Supreme Court decisions, notably Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, and State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan, to outline the contours of Section 482 powers. It holds that while quashing is permissible for non‑compoundable offences with predominantly civil character where the dispute is settled, it is not appropriate for heinous or serious offences or those under special statutes, or where public interest is implicated. After evaluating gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the settled atmosphere, the court concludes that quashing would serve ends of justice. The petition is allowed, and the Final Report and further proceedings in CC 1104/2021 are quashed.
This is OP (FC) No. 55 of 2023 before the Kerala High Court, involving Muraleedharan Nair (represented by his wife Deepa) as petitioner and Manjukumary T. M. as respondent, arising from proceedings in the Family Court, Attingal. The respondent had filed OP No. 1133/2013 seeking recovery of gold ornaments and money, which led to an ex parte decree dated 30.09.2013; in OP 1134/2013 a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act was granted on the ground of cruelty. The petitioner moved I.A. No. 4270/2019 under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree and I.A. No. 4269/2019 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of about 2224 days. The respondent filed Ext. P7 objections. The petition seeks supervisory relief under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, urging urgent consideration and stay of coercive steps in E.P. No. 91/2017 until Exts. P5 and P6 are decided. The court quotes Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Rafeek v. K. Kamarudeen, emphasizing a liberal, reasonableness-based approach to condonation of delay, while distinguishing inordinate delay (prejudice) from short-delay scenarios. The judgment ultimately directs the Family Court to decide Exts. P5 and P6 within one month and defers coercive actions in EP 91/2017 pending those orders, with the matter disposed accordingly.
These two matrimonial appeals, under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, arise from common Family Court, Attingal orders in O.P.(G&W) No.2388/2013 and O.P. No.1071/2015. The father, Micky Premchand, and the minor children Vaiga Micky and Vaishnav Micky, challenged the Family Court’s disposal in matters involving custody and maintenance, while the other petition sought recovery of jewellery and money. The Family Court partly allowed custody relief?—it declined permanent custody to the father and granted visitation on Saturdays for the minor children, while simultaneously the gold ornaments claim was considered and the court found no established misappropriation. The respondents, parents of the deceased Soumya (wife of the petitioner in the 2nd set of petitions), resisted custody to the father, citing years of alleged cruelty and lack of suitability to raise the children, and challenged the gold ornaments claim as misappropriated. The High Court, presided over by a Division Bench of Justices Amit Rawal and C.S. Sudha, examined welfare of the minor children as the paramount criterion, relying on established custod y doctrine and jurisprudence. It confirmed the trial court’s factual findings and concluded there is no valid ground to interfere; both appeals were dismissed, maintaining the court’s emphasis on the best interests of the children and the stability of their present environment.
This Regular First Appeal from Kozhikode concerns a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of properties B and C, originating from Ext.A1, an assignment deed dated 03/06/1954, made in the name of Sivanathan when he was a minor and represented by his mother, with subsequent family settlement and dissolution of a partnership affecting ownership. The appellant, P.M. Parthakumar and his legal heirs (Nalini Parthan, Sajna Subash, Sanath) challenge the plaintiffs’ title and the decree of possession, contending that Ext.A1 is a binami transaction and that the property accrued to the father or through a valid family arrangement, not to the minor. They invoke the Apex Court reference in Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra to argue that evidence is required to prove a binami arrangement and that the funds of the minor were not shown to have been contributed by his father. The respondents assert title and tenancy rights, arguing that the properties formed part of family assets and that tenancy matters were adjudicated in rent-control proceedings; they rely on prior transactions (Ext.A18, Ext.A22) and the dissolution of partnership. The High Court discusses the jurisdiction under Section 11(1) with the second proviso, the interpretation of the non-obstante clause, and remands for eviction-ground proceedings under the Act, while confirming the title declaration. The appeal is allowed in part, with no costs.
This is a Kerala High Court writ petition by Patricia Prabha Edwin, legal heir of Thresia Mary Flora, seeking release of two fixed deposit amounts under Ext. P1 Will held with the SBI, Thiruvananthapuram. The petitioner contends that probate of the Will and a succession certificate are unnecessary for the release of the deposits, relying on favorable judgments in Kerala; she furnished indemnity bond and related documents. The respondents argued that probate and succession certificates are required under general succession law, citing proviso to Section 370 of the Indian Succession Act and the Division Bench ruling in Kurian @ Jacob Vs. Chellamma John (2017 (5) KHC 257). The court examined John K. Philip (Dr.) v. Treasury Officer, Kumbanad (2017 (4) KHC 561), which held that for Indians Christians, probate may not be mandatory and that indemnity bonds can safeguard against rival claims, especially with Kerala Amendment to the Succession Act. After considering the contentions and the cited authorities, the court concluded that probate and succession certificates are not necessary for release of the FD amounts. It directed the bank to disburse the sums to the petitioner on execution of an indemnity bond and an affidavit stating no subsequent Will exists, without insisting on probate or succession certificate, within specified time.
This is a writ petition under the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, by T.V. Vipin, a dealer in Ujala products (Ujala Supreme and Ujala Stiff & Shine), challenging revenue recovery for arrears of VAT for the year 2011-12. The petitioner was assessed under section 25(1) at 12.5% rather than the conceded 4% (later argued to be 4%/5%), a dispute that led to dismissal of the First Appellate and Tribunal orders and, subsequently, to OT Revision before this Court. The manufacturers and dealers had long contested the applicable rate; the Supreme Court in MP Agencies v. State of Kerala (SC) held the correct rate to be 4%/5% for Ujala goods, and that taxpayers remitting more than 4%/5% were not entitled to refunds. The petitioner contends that Article 265 of the Constitution requires levy by law, and estoppel prevents the department from demanding amounts not legally due, given the Apex Court’s ruling. The respondent contends that Ext. P1 is final and that MP Agencies judgment was pronounced after Exts. P3 and P4, so recovery could proceed. The court ultimately holds that MP Agencies (supra) establishes the 4%/5% rate as the law of the land, and the revenue notices demanding amounts in excess of 4%/5% are illegal. Exts. P3 and P4 are set aside with liberty to issue fresh demands at the correct rate.
MFA (Forest) No.11 of 2009 Kunhan (Died) S/o Mayan and Satheesan K. S/o Kunhan (the appellants) challenged a Forest Tribunal order under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting & Assignment) Act, 1971, seeking a declaration that the scheduled land in Kongad Ammoni (Sy. No. 113/4) belongs to them and is not covered by the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949. The appellants asserted that a patta cheet dated 10th Kumbham, 1134 M.E. gave them possession, that the land and a nearby eastern property form a single unit, and that the eastern area had been exempted from vesting; they contended that the scheduled land was not within the MPPF Act and that their title and possession as on 10.05.1971 were established. The Forest Tribunal rejected several bases: eligibility of the land under the Vesting Act, title and possession, and the exemption claim under S.3(2). The Tribunal found limitations in favor of the applicant but held that the applicant failed to prove title, possession, cultivation, or that the land fell outside the MPPF framework. It noted Exts. A1–A6 were unpersuasive or irrelevant to the scheduled property. The Commission report showed minimal tree growth and suggested the land did not match the claimed unit. The High Court upheld the Tribunal on limitation and declined to interfere, relying on the Full Bench decision in State of Kerala v. Chandraleka, and dismissed the appeal with costs to the respondents.
Mat.Appeal Nos.25 and 282 of 2019 This is a Kerala High Court matrimonial appeal by Anoop Vijayakumar, the father of a child born on 19.04.2016, challenging orders that granted custody and guardianship to the child’s maternal grandparents. The original petitions before the Family Court, Kottayam at Ettumanoor, sought permanent custody by the father (O.P. G&W No.1130 of 2017) while the grandparents’ petition for guardianship and custody (O.P. G&W No.426 of 2017) was allowed, with custody to the grandparents until the child attains the age of 12, and interim custody to the father was permitted upon any application. The Family Court’s common judgment of 17.12.2018 declined permanent custody to the father, noting welfare favored the grandparents. The appellant argues he is the natural guardian and that relocation to Doha with his wife would safeguard the child’s interests; the respondents counter that the father’s alleged cruelty, the mother’s suicide, and a pending IPC investigation (498A, 306) indicate risk if custody is given to him. The High Court interacts with the child, its findings, and relevant authorities. Citing Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka (AIR 2022 SC 3511), the court reiterates welfare-of-the-child as paramount and upholds the Family Court’s decision, while granting structured interaction and interim custody during visits.
This is the second regular bail application under Section 439 CrPC by the ninth accused in Crime No. 777/2022 of Kondotty Police Station, Malappuram, seeking bail in a case under the NDPS Act involving a commercial quantity of MDMA. The earlier bail petition (B.A. No. 10345 of 2022) was dismissed on 15 February 2023, with the court observing that accused Nos. 1–9 allegedly transported 92.30 grams of MDMA in a tourist car driven by the ninth accused, and that the offence involved a commercial quantity under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner contends innocence, claiming he was merely the driver unaware of the contraband's presence. The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor and SR PP, contends that the ninth accused joined with others in transporting the contraband and, given the commercial quantity, bail should not be granted. The court reiterates the NDPS Section 37 requirement: where a commercial quantity is involved, bail is permissible only if there are “reasonable grounds” to believe the accused is not guilty and that he will not commit any offence on bail, a standard explained in Union of India v. Shiv Shankar Kesari as more than prima facie. The court, after reviewing the case diary, finds no such grounds and dismisses the bail application, emphasizing the continued strength of the prosecution case and the risk of re-offence.
MFA (FOREST) Nos.105 of 2005 & 33 of 2006 This is a consolidated set of appeals (MFA (Forest) Nos. 105 of 2005 and 33 of 2006) by the State of Kerala and various appellants challenging a common Forest Tribunal order in three Original Applications (OAs 52/2001, 53/2001, 54/2001) from Kozhikode. The challenged properties lie in Thondernad and Perambra in Kozhikode, claimed as private forests under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, and as such may be liable to vesting unless exempt. The Tribunal framed two core issues: (i) whether the subject lands were private forests as on 10.5.1971, and (ii) whether the appellants were entitled to the exemption declarations sought, under S.2(f)(1)(i)(B)-(D) of the MPPF Act. The Tribunal predominantly held that the burden lay on the applicants to prove non-inclusion under the Vesting Act and denied exemption on several plots, relying on documentary evidence and joint-commission findings. The appellants relied on authorities including Parameswara Sastrigal and Mohammed Basheer to argue that a Purchase Certificate under S.72K could be conclusive proof of exemption, while the State contended that certificates were merely evidentiary. The High Court, after considering the record and relevant precedents, allowed the appeals in part, remanding the matter to the Forest Tribunal for fresh consideration on the existing evidence without permitting pleadings or new material. The court upheld the principle that the onus remains on the applicant to establish exemption and that conclusive proof may be derived from purchase certificates, but remanded for re-evaluation. The final order directs remand to the Tribunal with costs to follow.
This petition challenges Annexure A, an order of the Fast Track Special Court, Palakkad, dismissing an application under Section 228(1)(a) Cr.P.C filed by the accused seeking transfer of his trial from the Special Court to a Magistrate’s court on the ground that the offences charged against him (IPC sections 447, 354C, 509) and S.119(1)(b) of the Kerala Police Act are triable by a Magistrate. The trial in Crime No.153/2019 was conducted by the Palakkad Fast Track Special Court as per S.28 POCSO and the State contends that the Special Court has all the powers of a Court of Session and may try IPC offences as incidental thereto. The accused maintains that the court below, being designated for POCSO offences, lacks jurisdiction to try non-POCSO IPC offences and that S.28 and related provisions do not extend its remit to IPC crimes. The High Court, after hearing arguments and examining Cr.P.C provisions including Ss.26, 228, 227, and the POCSO framework, as well as the cited Sudhir v. State of Madhya Pradesh, held that a Special Court designated as a Court of Session under S.28 can exercise jurisdiction to try IPC offences and to try such offences along with POCSO offences. The challenge is dismissed; Annexure A order stands.
