All the land acquisition appeals arise from a common notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act dated 30-08-2006 for the construction of the Kannur University Head Quarters. The proceedings involve classification of land into ‘Garden land’ and ‘Nancha’ (wet land)/‘Semi Garden land’, with initial awards of Rs. 39,754 per cent for garden land and Rs. 16,933 per cent for nancha. The Reference Court, under Section 18, enhanced garden land to Rs. 69,794 per cent and treated semi-garden land as garden land-like, ultimately reclassifying portions as “semi garden land.” Revenue records, however, continued to show Nancha. The High Court, in this consolidated judgment, departs from the 50% reduction practice for semi-garden land and adopts a fresh comparative framework, relying on earlier decisions (notably L.A.A No. 359/2014) and exemplar Ext. A1 to A4, to fix garden land at Rs. 1,04,000 per cent and semi-garden land at Rs. 52,000 per cent. The court dismisses the State’s appeal (LA.A 107/2014) and allows cross-objections in part, directing re-fixation of land values for the respective extents (312.45 cents garden land and 268.10 cents semi-garden; and in another matter 76½ cents garden land and 3 Acres 31.98 cents semi-garden). It also grants statutory benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2) and 28 and exempts interest on enhanced compensation for delay. The judgment adopts a common approach given the common notification and locality, disposing of all connected matters in a unified order.
Crl.MC.No.7977 of 2018 (F) & OP(Crl).No.234 of 2019 These matters arise from proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (the Act), disposed of by a common judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala. The second respondent (the wife of the third respondent) filed Annexure A1 under Section 12 of the Act against the petitioners (Latha P.C. and Jyothi P.C., who are the mother and sister of the third respondent) seeking inter alia protection from violence, return of gold ornaments, maintenance and alternate accommodation. The petitioners contended that the allegations do not constitute domestic violence and that the proceedings are civil in nature, amounting to abuse of process; they urged quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The State, and the respondent-named parties, resisted, arguing that the allegations, if true, would constitute domestic violence and justify reliefs under the Act. The court emphasizes that DV proceedings are civil in nature except for certain criminal aspects under Sections 31 and 33, and that inherent powers under Section 482 should not generally be invoked to quash Section 12 proceedings, citing Vijaya lekshmi Amma v. Bindu. It also cautions against indiscriminate inclusion of relatives as respondents, invoking the need to prevent harassment. The court ultimately disposes of the petitions, but without prejudice to the petitioners’ right to approach the Magistrate for reliefs under the Act, directing consideration of such reliefs in light of Vij ayalekshmi’s principles. The request for time-bound disposal of Annexure A1 is declined for now.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case in which the sole petitioner, Retnamma, seeks to quash the final report (Annexure-B) and all further proceedings in Crime No. 943/2014 of Thiruvalla Police Station. The final report, filed by the first respondent, alleges offences under Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958 (Section 3 read with 17) and Section 4 of the Kerala Prohibition of Charging of Exorbitant Interest Act, based on a complaint by the 2nd and 3rd respondents. The petitioner contends that she was not carrying on the business of money lending; at most there was a single loan to the 2nd and 3rd respondents (husband and wife) and no material to show that lending is her main or subsidiary occupation. She argues that Section 17 requires a money-lending business; merely advancing Rs.5,75,000 does not establish such status, referencing Kurian V.V. v. Leelamma Sebastian to argue casual lending cannot trigger prosecution. The court examines the statutory definition of “money-lender” in Section 2(7) and its explanations, concluding that there is no evidence of money-lending as a business. It also notes lack of proof of charging exorbitant interest. Consequently, the court invokes its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quashes Annexure-B and all further proceedings, and allows the Crl.M.C. The matter hinges on whether lending constitutes a ongoing business, which the record here does not prove.
Dr. Bindu George, the appellant in WA No. 500 of 2021, challenges disciplinary proceedings arising from a suspension at Aquinas College, Edakochin. The sequence begins with a complaint against her, followed by Ext.P2 denial and Ext.P4 dropping the proceedings with a warning in May 2020. The Manager, acting as disciplinary authority, then revived the proceedings (Ext.P6) and suspended her. The petitioner obtained interim relief in WP(C) 13641/2020 allowing the college to proceed but with a time-bound directive for finalization, subject to cooperation. Subsequently, a memo of charges added new counts, and an enquiry officer prepared an enquiry report dated 24.11.2020, which was accepted by the then disciplinary authority. A show-cause notice (Ext.P11) was issued by a newly appointed disciplinary authority proposing punishment based on that enquiry report. The learned Single Judge held Ext.P11 unsustainable because the new authority could not act as both investigator and decision-maker, and because the copy of the enquiry report was not supplied with the show-cause. On appeal, the Division Bench clarified that the challenge is confined to the legality of Ext.P11, set it aside, and directed a fresh show-cause proceeding enclosing a copy of the enquiry report and providing a full opportunity to respond and be heard. The court extended three months for the disciplinary proceedings, emphasizing due process and impartiality in disciplinary actions.
This is an appeal by the New India Assurance Company challenging an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, which directed the insurer to pay compensation to a gratuitous passenger in an auto rickshaw. The claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arose from a 11.12.2013 accident. The tribunal held in part for the claimant, awarding Rs. 1,34,780 with 8% interest and costs, despite the insurer contending that Exhibit B-1 was a Limited Liability/Statutory policy and did not cover gratuitous passengers without an additional premium. The appellant relied on judgments including Asha Rani and Tilak Singh to argue that a statutory policy under the Act only covers third‑party risks, and that the insurer’s liability for gratuitous passengers requires premium, with recourse to the insured under Section 149. The respondents argued that Supreme Court precedents permit pay‑and‑recover directions in certain cases, citing Saju Paul, Manuara Khatun, Shamanna, Swaran Singh and Laxmi Narain Dhut. The Kerala High Court ultimately held that, on the facts, additional premium was not paid, the passenger was gratuitous, and Exhibit B-1 did not cover them; therefore the Tribunal’s award directing payment was erroneous and liable to be set aside, upholding the insurer’s non‑liability under the Act policy.
Antony Paul Vazhappilly, a 56-year-old instructor, challenged a Kerala Administrative Tribunal interim order that refused to promote him to the post of Lecturer in Mechanical Engineering (Polytechnics) under the 35% in-service transfer quota. He asserts that vacancies existing before 1 March 2019 must be filled by transfer from the feeder cadre of 1st Grade Instructors, in line with the Special Rules for Kerala Technical Education Service Rules, 2010, and as clarified by this Court in Suresh v. State of Kerala (2021) 1 KLT 566. The OA sought regular promotion, back pay, and arrears. The respondents argued that due to the model code of conduct during elections and the need for a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC), the process could not be completed before the petitioner’s retirement on 31 March 2021, and that regular promotion can only be through the DPC process. The High Court notes the Tribunal’s observation and the Election Commission constraints, and cites Suresh to support filling pre‑2019 vacancies by transfer. However, given the election code and procedural limitations, the court declines to issue interim or mandamus directions and refuses to grant temporary or regular appointment. It directs that pleadings be completed and that the OA be disposed of expeditiously. The order records that retirement will not bar the applicant from benefitting on seniority on notional promotion.
Aggrieved by Ext.P7 judgment passed in CMA No.20/2022 by the Sub Court, Attingal, the petitioner Saju filed OP(C) 1715/2022 challenging the appellate order. The suit (O.S. 145/2022) was for permanent prohibitory injunction to restrain the respondents from breaching the Ext.P2 agreement for quarrying on plaint properties. Ext.P2 is styled as an agreement but functions as a license; it obliged the petitioner to obtain statutory clearances and to bear road construction costs, with 45% sharing of profits and a ten-year tenure. The petitioner spent substantial sums and, with respondents’ consent, even entered Ext.P3 with a fourth party to construct road access (Ext.P3). The respondents allegedly refused consent for obtaining clearances and sought to assign consent to third parties. Ext.P6 granted injunction by the Trial Court; Ext.P7, however, reversed by the Appellate Court. The High Court held that Ext.P7 is patently erroneous, exceeded jurisdiction, and prejudged issues. It remitted the matter to the Appellate Court to rehear Ext.P4 afresh after hearing both sides and considering Ext.P5 objection, with directions to decide expeditiously (within two months). The decision underscores that issues such as validity of Ext.P2, authority of the second respondent, and revocation of power of attorney must be examined in the suit rather than in injunction proceedings, preserving trial court and appellate jurisdiction over substantive disputes.
The appeal arises from an ex parte decree in OS 536 of 2012, passed on 27 August 2014 in the Additional Sub Court, Irinjalakuda, after Sunilkumar, the defendant, failed to appear due to being abroad and later medical ailment. He sought to set aside the ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Trial Court dismissed both interlocutory applications by its 8 April 2016 order. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, allowed the appeal by applying a liberal, justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay while cauterizing the possibility of misuse of such leniency. Relying on Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee and Rafeek (DB judges in this Court), it held that the concept of “sufficient cause” is elastic and must further substantial justice, with strict scrutiny for cases of inordinate delay. The court found the 312-day delay could be condoned given the defendant’s heart ailment, Gulf travel, Ext. P1 passport, and other circumstances, and directed setting aside the ex parte decree, restoring OS 536/2012, and imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000 payable to the plaintiff. The matter is to proceed expeditiously, with both parties appearing on 26.06.2023 before the trial court.
This is a Motor Accidents Claims Appeal under MACA No.46 of 2011 arising from O.P.(MV) No.459 of 2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, seeking enhanced compensation for the death of Viswambharan, who died after a road accident on 23.12.2002 when travelling as a pillion rider on KL-8/C-8264 and being hit by bus KL-8/C-8435. The insurer denied coverage; the owner and driver faced issues of driving licence; Tribunal held negligence on the bus driver and liability on insurer, with right of recovery against the owner and driver due to lack of valid licence. Tribunal awarded Rs.2,12,400 with 7% interest and costs. On appeal, the claimants contend that the quantum of compensation must be enhanced substantially. The Kerala High Court relies on Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi and post-2017 judgments to recalibrate notional income, dependency deduction, multiplier and the conventional heads (loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenses, pain and suffering, etc.). The court fixes a more appropriate multiplier (7) for a 61-year-old, re-fixes monthly income, and endorses standardised conventional heads under Pranay Sethi and Magma, including spousal, parental and filial consortium and 15,000-40,000-15,000 style thoroughly revised figures with a provision for 10% uplift every three years. The appeal is partly allowed; an additional compensation of Rs.2,04,000 with 8% interest is awarded, and the insurer is directed to satisfy within two months, with apportionment among appellants as directed. No costs.
RP 915 of 2022 / OP(C) 798/2022 This is a Kerala High Court review petition by the Sreenarayana Bhakta Paripalana Yogam (represented by its Administrator) challenging an interim injunction order dated 29 April 2022 in OP(C) 798/2022. The order restrained the first respondent Yogam from allowing KV Sadanandan, a person claimed not to be a Yogam member (Membership No. 3756), to contest the management committee election slated for 30 April 2022 and restrained reinstatement of Sadanandan as a member for two months. The petitioners contend that the Original Petition was for speedy disposal of pending interlocutory applications, but the main interim relief overstepped by effectively prejudicing the election process. They argue that the Returning Officer (RO), appointed on 14 March 2022, is the competent authority to conduct the election; the draft and final voters lists were published in March 2022; and the administrator cannot override the RO’s election decisions once process has begun. They further assert that KV Sadanandan was not made a party and that the RO was not properly impleaded, making the injunction void. Respondents contend that the prior order had been violated and that the RO’s appointment and election process required continuity. The High Court ultimately held that there was an error on the face of the record and allowed the review petition, recalling the impugned order.
This writ appeal arises from a Kerala High Court decision relating to actions taken under the CGST Act, 2017 by the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) and allied departmental authorities. The appellants, Suresh Kumar P.P. (Managing Director) and Aboobacker Sidhique (Director) of Kerala Communications Cable Ltd. (MSO service provider), allege that illegal proceedings were undertaken; raids were conducted at their offices and residences, they were kept in custody overnight, and a sum of Rs 1 crore was extorted from them. They sought quashing of a notice issued under Section 65 (audit) and invalidation of seizure under Section 67 (search and seizure), a refund of the Rs 1 crore, a declaration that revenue-share payments to a Local Cable Operator are not taxable under GST, and damages to reputation. The learned Single Judge found the petition premature with no substantiated harassment and declined relief. The Division Bench, after hearing senior counsel, upheld the Government’s actions as authorized under the CGST Act, observed that the parallel audit and investigation can run concurrently, and held that the seizure order (Exhibit P4) did not require DIN in the presence of the assessees. The court held the payment of Rs 1 crore as voluntary under Section 74(5) and rejected the contention of coercion. Ultimately, it dismissed the appeal, leaving costs to the appellants.
RP639/2020 in W.A.1833/2019; RP678/2020 in W.A.1820/2019 Two review petitions, RP639/2020 in W.A. 1833/2019 and RP678/2020 in W.A. 1820/2019, arise from a common judgment of the Kerala High Court upholding a 2:1 ratio between Higher Secondary School Teachers (HSSTs) and Headmasters/Headmistresses (HMs) for appointment to the post of Principal in LMS Higher Secondary School. Sajeev S., a HSST, was appointed as Principal-in-Charge, while Sreelatha P.R., the Headmistress, sought appointment as Principal claiming entitlement under Chapter XXXII of the Kerala Education Rules which prescribes a 2:1 ratio in favor of HMs. The review petitions challenge Rule 4 and the implementation order directing HM’s appointment, with the Government and education authorities contending that the original order should stand and that proper seniority/selection be conducted if other eligible HMs exist. The court recounts the earlier proceedings, the Supreme Court’s Special Leave Petition withdrawal with liberty to move a review, and the reliance on the settled contours of review under Order 47 Rule 1, as explained in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta. The court, finding that the review petitions could have been argued earlier and that the annexures relied upon are not shown to be admissible, rejects the petitions in limine, thereby sustaining the prior judgment and the 2:1 ratio.
W.P.(C)No.14052 of 2020 (F) The petitioner, Madhusoodhanan P.M., filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking to quash Ext.P4, a cancellation deed (No.945/1/2020 dated 19.05.2020) registered by the 3rd respondent, Unnikrishnan V. Alapatt appears as R3 counsel, which unilaterally cancelled Exts.P1 and P2 (settlement and rectification) that, in 2019, transferred 11.33 ares of land in Sy.No.1459/1/1622 of Vannapuram Village in favor of the petitioner and placed a residential building thereon. Ext.P3 evidenced tax payment in the petitioner’s name after mutation. Ext.P4, registered by the Sub Registrar at Karikode, prompted the petitioner to seek: (i) quashing Ext.P4; (ii) a mandamus to strike off Ext.P4 and not to reflect it in encumbrance records; (iii) an encumbrance certificate excluding Ext.P4; and (iv) declaration of the petitioner as absolute owner in possession. The 3rd respondent, aged 92, reportedly resides with the petitioner. The court examined the consequences of unilateral cancellation of a settled transfer, relying on Section 23(1) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (failure to provide basic amenities may render the transfer void); it cited Subhashini, Pavakkal Noble John, Hamsa P.A. and others to emphasize that registration of cancellation deeds requires consent and compliance with transfer- and registration-related provisions. Consequently, Ext.P4 is quashed and the Sub Registrar is directed to remove Ext.P4 from the register and issue encumbrance certificates if applicable, with a two-week production-and-registration timeline.
This writ appeal challenges a Kerala High Court judgment requiring prior approval of the Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) before starting a B.Pharm program, even where AICTE approval has already been obtained. Lisie Medical and Educational Institutions sought to commence a B.Pharm course and argued that PCI approval should be required only after a course begins for examination purposes under Section 12(1) of the Pharmacy Act, and that AICTE clearance suffices for a proposed program. The appellant further contended that Sections 10 and the PCI Regulations, particularly Clause 9(1), are ultra vires and that the AICTE Act governs technical education, not pre-empt PCI approvals for pharmacy education. The University of Health Sciences and the government authorities countered that AICTE approvals are often granted without full inspection, and hence PCI prior approval should be mandatory before commencement to ensure compliance with pharmacy-specific standards. The High Court’s analysis references the Kerala University of Health Sciences Act, 2010, the University Statutes of 2013, and the relevant sections of the Pharmacy Act and AICTE Act, concluding no direct conflict between the two regulatory regimes and upholding PCI’s role. The appeal was dismissed, with directions to PCI to treat a later application for approval of the 2018-2019 cohort as an approval for that year, subject to a four-week decision period.
The seven petitioners—Abdulkhayyum, Abid, Fahad, Noushad, Shameer, Lemin, and Ansal—were accused Nos. 1 to 7 in S.C. No. 855 of 2015 before the Principal Assistant Sessions Court, Irinjalakuda, for offences under IPC Sections 143, 147, 148, 324, 326 and 308 read with Section 149. They approached the Kerala High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings on the basis that the dispute had been amicably settled and the parties no longer wished to pursue prosecution. The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, opposed quashing, arguing that the case involves non-compoundable offences and that there are reservations about exercising inherent jurisdiction, though there were no other serious crimes against the petitioners. The Court reviewed established jurisprudence—State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, and the earlier decisions Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab—stating that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash non-compoundable offences arises where the dispute is civil/private in character and the settlement is complete, provided the offence is not heinous, or under special statutes, and the court may assess factors like the gravity of the offence and the antecedents of the accused. Having considered the circumstances, including the amicable settlement and lack of ongoing grievance, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners, bringing ends of justice and peace. The court notes that Annexure-1 Final Report and further proceedings in S.C. No. 855 of 2015 are quashed.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA) filed by the claimant Thomas K.D. challenging the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Thrissur’s award in OPMV No.1291/2008 dated 31-08-2016. The accident occurred on 18 May 2008 when the claimant, a registered head-load worker, was struck by a tipper lorry (KL-8Z4514) owned by the first respondent and driven by the second, with the third respondent insurer. The Tribunal held the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving, and awarded Rs. 3,34,895 under various heads after considering the evidence (including PW1’s union letter and PW2’s disability certificate). The insurer admitted coverage but contested breaches of policy conditions and liability, and the owner/driver were ex-parte. On appeal, the High Court increased the compensation by addressing deficiencies in the Tribunal’s assessment: (i) enhanced earnings capacity from the claimed Rs. 20,000 to a modest Rs. 7,800 per month based on the local wage structure for head-load workers; (ii) applied a 130% multiplier for future prospects; (iii) computed permanent disability at 25% of whole body impairment, leading to Rs. 3,95,460 for loss of earning capacity; (iv) revised awards for pain and suffering (Rs. 25,000) and loss of amenities (Rs. 50,000). The court also noted precedents (Syed Sadiq; Rajesh V. Rajbir Singh) supporting inclusion of future prospects. Ultimately, the appeal was partly allowed with an additional Rs. 2,11,716 awarded, to be deposited with interest and disbursed subject to fixed deposits. Costs were allocated between the parties.
RP.No.167 of 2019 in WA.112/2017; RP.No.220 of 2019 in WA.111/2017 These two review petitions arise from a common judgment directing that the dependent, Dincy Davis, be accommodated in a vacancy in the Full-Time Menial cadre (LPSA/UPSA). The dependent’s mother, a teacher, died in 1993; the daughter was born in 1988 and became major in 2006. She had sought compassionate appointment, filing applications in 2007 (rejected) and again after obtaining TTC qualification; the Government eventually directed consideration for appointment. The Corporate Manager challenged the appellate direction in writ appeals, arguing that the initial rejection (Exhibit P1) was based on alleged defects in the application, including missing documents and lack of consent from the widower, and that the income of the family exceeded the Government Order. The Division Bench rejected these contentions and held that the dependent was entitled to consideration for the post of Full-Time Menial. The review petitions argued that mere defects in an application cannot be a ground to dismiss and that the appointing authority should have afforded an opportunity to rectify defects, with specific notice of the defect, citing Shreejith v. Deputy Director (Education), Kerala. The High Court, however, concluded there was no error apparent on the face of the record and dismissed the petitions, with costs to both sides."
This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed by Dany Siby, a second-year BBA student at Rajagiri College of Social Science (autonomous, affiliated to MG University), challenging the decision denying condonation of shortage in attendance and seeking directions to issue hall tickets for End Semester Examinations scheduled in March 2018. The petitioner contends that he was afflicted with chickenpox from late January to early February 2018 and produced medical certificates (Exts. P1, P2) and an application for condonation of attendance. Respondents 3 to 5 refused condonation, noting that he had already availed condonation in the 3rd semester and that the college’s Examination Manual permits condonation of shortage of attendance twice during the entire programme, but only once in an academic year. The university Regulation and the college’s Examination Manual are relied upon; the Manual prescribes that condonation may be granted seven days before examinations, with specific limits, and that the college’s Autonomous status allows its own Manual to govern examinations, subject to university remarks. The court examines the entitlement under the Manual, observes that the petitioner’s current attendance (59.32%) and a 15.68% shortage fall short of the permissible condonable limits, and cites Ashok Kumar Thakur and Santosh Kumar to emphasize limits on judicial interference with statutory/regulatory processes. Ultimately, the writ petition is dismissed with the court affirming the regulatory framework governing condonation and examination, while noting the petitioner’s earlier condonation in the 3rd semester.
WP(C).No. 5069 of 2018 (G) Mini Devadas, who retired as Chief Accountant of the Kottayam Co-operative Urban Bank Ltd., filed a Writ Petition (Civil) under Article 226 seeking a mandamus to compel payment of gratuity amounting to Rs.14,71,349 and for a declaration in her favour. LIC remitted Rs.14,71,349 to the Bank under the Employees’ Group Gratuity Life Assurance Scheme, but the Bank released only Rs.10,00,000, citing the second proviso to Rule 59(iii) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. The petitioner relied on Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, which permits a higher gratuity where the employee is entitled to better terms, and argued that the Central Act overrides any inconsistent State law under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The Full Bench decision in Chandrasekharan Nair v. Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. and others (2017 (4) KLT 276) was cited, and the Court noted that the liability to pay gratuity does not shift to the insurer; the insurer’s liability is restricted to the maturity value, while any deficit remains with the employer under Section 4(2). The Court held that the employee is entitled to higher terms if opted under Section 4(5). It directed the Bank/Employer to pay Rs.4,71,349 plus 9% interest from 25.10.2016 within two months, and quashed Circular No.5/2016 to the extent it contradicted this view.
Sky High Motors Pvt Ltd, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, challenges actions taken by The South Indian Bank under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act (SARFAESI Act), with the debt eventually assigned to Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC) Phoenix Arc Pvt Ltd, as trustee of Phoenix Trust FY-17-8. The High Court frames the matter against the backdrop of established jurisprudence limiting its interference in SARFAESI‑driven measures where efficacious statutory remedies are available, citing Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110 and its Kerala follow‑up in Mathew ILR 2018 (1) Ker. 479. The petitioner seeks a One Time Settlement (OTS) under applicable schemes and contends the debt was assigned to ARC for Rs.16,55,36,000 on 17.03.2017, expressing willingness to pay that amount plus interest to settle in full. The 1st respondent bank argues that OTS decisions lie with ARC, as the assignee, leaving no role for the bank. ARC, represented by counsel, states a readiness to consider a short window for OTS if requested within a few days, noting upcoming possession actions scheduled for 13.02.2019. After discussions, the court directs the ARC to consider a settlement offer within four days of receiving a copy of the judgment, after hearing the petitioner’s representative, and to communicate its decision within two weeks. Meanwhile, SARFAESI actions are deferred; if settlement fails, the bank may proceed under SARFAESI. The petition is allowed with these directions, aiming to close the debt honorably through settlement.
