Divakaran, the appellant, challenges the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda’s award in OP(MV)1599/2007. On 14 August 2007, while riding a motorcycle, he collided with another vehicle driven by the second respondent, allegedly due to rash and negligent driving. The vehicle was owned by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent; the policy’s liability depended on the license status of the second rider. The Tribunal partly allowed the claim and awarded Rs 44,300 with 7.5% interest and costs, directing payment by the owner and recovery from him. The petitioner claimed higher compensation arguing that his notional income, based on his status as a ration shop dealer in 2007, should be Rs 5,000 per month, citing Ramachandrappa v. Manager, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd for notional income. The respondents contended the petition was not maintainable and that negligence lay on the petitioner; the insurer contended policy guidelines were violated as the rider did not possess a valid license. The High Court examined Ext A3 (final report) indicating collusion between the petitioner’s bike and the offending vehicle (due to the second rider’s negligence). It accepted the Supreme Court’s approach in Ramachandrappa to determine notional income, fixing Rs 5,000 per month, and recalculated heads of compensation. The tribunal’s disability award of 10% was not accepted due to lack of proof. The court enhanced compensation by Rs 12,000, with 7.5% interest from petition date to realization, and proportionate costs, with deposit within two months; insurer to recover from the owner.
Kamalam, a 64-year-old senior citizen, files a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the delay in disposal of suo motu proceedings initiated by the Land Tribunal, Pattambi (S.M. No.155/2021) for assignment of right, title and interest of the landlord vested in the Government under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 and for issuance of a certificate of purchase under Sections 72 and 72K read with Rule 14. The land in question is 0.0404 hectares of Re.Sy. No.292/5 in Kuthanur-I Village, Palakkad. The petitioner seeks a mandamus to compel expeditious enquiry and disposal within a timeframe to be fixed by the Court. The Land Tribunal’s suo motu initiation relies on Rule 5 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970 and related provisions. The Court references Narayanan Namboodiri v. Special Tahsildar (Land Reforms) (2018) to emphasize that disposal must follow seniority and that senior-citizen cases should be prioritized, with timelines (six months for senior citizens; up to 18 months for others) and the seniority not to be broken. The judgment also cites G.O. 2018/ RD provisions enabling village officers to furnish reports. The Court ultimately disposes of the petition by directing compliance with Narayanan Namboodiri’s directions, with no costs.
WP(C) Nos. 20325 of 2019 & 9208 of 2021 Two linked writ petitions challenge encroachment on Government land in Kumarakom (thodu puramboke) and seek relief under Kerala government land and revenue rules. WP(C)20325/2019, filed by V.R. Anil Kumar, contends that encroachers obstruct access to a public water source from a thodu and seeks police protection; a police report records obstruction of a public tap and access to the kadavu. WP(C)9208/2021, filed by Ponnachan KV as Secretary of the Kumarakom Sakha of Prathyaksha Raksha Daiva Sabha (PRDS), seeks mandamus to consider assignment of the same land under GO MS 40/2020 Revenue, arguing PRDS’s long-standing occupation of the puramboke land where Aradhana Mandiram is located. The Government, through Tahsildar and other officials, counters that the land is Kayal/puramboke and not assignable; the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960 and the Land Assignment Rules govern proper disposition, with Rule 7 prioritizing allocations and Rule 24 permitting residuary assignments only in the public interest. The court recalls Supreme Court guidance that encroachments by religious bodies on public land must be removed and that puramboke/kayal land cannot be casually assigned, emphasizing public interest. It holds that allowing encroachers under GO 40/2020 would negate public interest. Ultimately, the court dismisses WP9208/2021 and allows WP20325/2019 with the relief of police protection for water access, while directing Panchayat to consider encroachment complaints in accordance with law.
WP(C).No.7048 of 2021 (E) This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the suo motu initiation of S.M. No.144/2021 by the Land Tribunal, Tirur, under Rule 5 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Vesting and Assignment) Rules, 1970, for the assignment of rights vested in the Government under Section 72 and for issuance of a certificate of purchase under Section 72K read with Rule 14 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, in respect of 5.94 Ares of land described as Re-Sy.No.78/4-1, Thavanur Village, Malappuram District. The petitioner Ibrahim, aged 60, seeks a mandamus to the Special Tahasildar (Land Reforms) and the Land Tribunal to expeditiously conduct enquiries and dispose of S.M. No.144/2021 within a time frame fixed by the Court. The judgment repeatedly cites Narayanan Namboodiri v. The Special Tahsildar (Land Reforms) and another (W.P.(C).No.28398 of 2017, dated 14.03.2018), which held that tribunals should preserve seniority and pursue expeditious disposal, including obtaining Village Officer reports to expedite processing. The Court endorses those directions, emphasizing seniority-based disposal within six months for senior-citizen petitions and within 18 months for others, and directs the Tirur Land Tribunal to proceed strictly in accordance with law and Narayanan Namboodiri’s directions. The petition is disposed of with no costs.
This matrimonial appeal arises from a Family Court order dismissing OP No. 484/2012 (dissolution of marriage) on grounds of cruelty. The appellant, Rajesh Chandrasekhar, asserts that his wife, Prathiba Rijesh, subjected him to persistent mental cruelty, filthy language, abdication of domestic duties, and attacks that included an incident in 2009 where she allegedly slapped and scratched him; she allegedly made access to their newborn child difficult and alienated him from the child. After the marriage in 2008, the couple lived in Ahmadabad and later Mumbai; repeated mediation and reconciliations occurred but the appellant contends cruelty persisted. The respondent denies cruelty and seeks dismissal of the petition. On trial, the Family Court found insufficient evidence of cruelty and dismissed the petition. The High Court, relying on evidence from the appellant and corroborating witnesses (PW2- PW5) and documentary exhibits (A2, A4, A7) and the Supreme Court precedent Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, holds that cruelty may be mental or physical and need not be grave; the pattern of abusive language, repeated quarrels, and alienation of the child constitutes mental cruelty. The court concludes that there is no chance of reconciliation, grants dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia), and sets aside the Family Court’s judgment, thereby dissolving the marriage. No costs.
This writ petition challenges Exts.P9, P10 and P11, orders fixing the tuition fee for NRIs in a private medical college at Rs. 35 lakhs per annum for 2017-18 and 2018-19. The petitioner, Lakshmi Rajendran, a MD student in Dermatology at the 6th respondent’s Medical College, joined on 25 May 2017 under the NRI quota after an allotment dated 21 May 2017 by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations and paid Rs. 35 lakhs as fee per Ext.P3. She contends the 2016-17 fee of Rs. 18.5 lakhs should have continued for the subsequent year and that the sharp hike is unwarranted and arbitrary. Her counsel invokes Section 6(5) of Act 19 of 2006 to claim a three-year non-revision protection of fees, arguing the Fee Regulatory Committee (FRC) lacked authority to revise within that period. He also relies on the Supreme Court’s stance in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra recognizing limited, regulated NRI seats and the objective of subsidizing economically weaker students, noting that NRIs may not be charged indiscriminately. Respondents assert the 2017 Act replaced 2006 Act, with the Fee Committee determining the fee after considering multiple inputs and institutional data, and that the fee fixation is non-arbitrary. The High Court ultimately upheld the fee, holding the petition without merit and dismissing it. The decision reflects statutory transitions and regulatory considerations for NRI admissions in private medical education.
CRP(WAKF) NO. 412 OF 2012 HPCL operated a petroleum outlet on Wakf land in Kozhikode. The Wakf Board, acting under Section 54 of the Wakf Act, issued an order to remove encroachment after finding that the lease to HPCL was executed by the mutawalli beyond his powers and for a period exceeding the permissible limit without Board approval. The Wakf Tribunal upheld this view, holding that a Wakf property could not be leased for ten years by the mutawalli and that HPCL’s occupancy amounted to encroachment under Rule 2(ha) of the Kerala Wakf Rules, 1996. HPCL challenged the order in OA 5/2011 and finally in CRP(WAKF) 412 of 2012. It contended that (a) the lease and the ESSO transfer under the ESSO (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974 gave it fixity of tenure and rights to continue; (b) the vires of clause (ha) could be tested in revision under Section 83; and (c) Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act provided protection. The respondents argued that Section 54, as amended by the 2013 Wakf Amendment, requires eviction through the Wakf Tribunal if encroachment is proved, and that the definition of encroachment is broad and inclusive. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, rejected the petitioner’s challenge to the vires of Rule 2(ha), held that the Wakf Act overrides other laws on Wakf properties, and dismissed the revision petition.
This writ petition concerns whether a child in elementary education can be retained in the same class at the parents’ request. The petitioner, father of a 10-year-old student in the IV standard at Kendriya Vidyalaya, Kattaribag, sought directions for the child to be detained in the same class for another year due to concerns about his academic progress and disruptions caused by COVID-19, arguing the child is below average and that supervision during online classes was inadequate. The respondents contended that the child attended 77% of online classes in the 2020-21 session and secured an overall A grade; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan had adopted a No Detention policy for the pandemic year, and under no circumstances could the child be held back. The court cites Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh to reaffirm the fundamental right to education under Article 21 and the progression of this right through Article 21A and the RTE Act, 2009 (Act 35 of 2009). It explains that Section 16 provides for examinations in 5th and 8th classes and conditions for holding back, with the government’s permission required for detention, and notes the policy against detention. Ultimately, it dismisses the petition, emphasizing potential harm to the child and urging counselling for the family.
WP(C).No.7592 of 2021 (Y) and WP(C).No.7602 of 2021 (A) These writ petitions challenge the elections to the offices of President and Vice-President of Avinissery Grama Panchayat, conducted on 30.12.2020 and 17.02.2021. Petitioners Geetha Sukumaran (WP 7592/2021) and Hari C. Narendran (WP 7602/2021) belong to the National Democratic Alliance; the fifth respondents were candidates aligned with the Left Democratic Front. After each election, the President and Vice-President reportedly resigned immediately, alleging unwillingness to discharge duties, and the State Election Commission treated the resulting vacancies as casual vacancies under Section 153(16) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, prompting fresh elections. The petitioners asserted that the resignations in the name of political strategy and the open-ballot process wasted public funds and misused a constitutional institution; they contended that the willingness to discharge duties is a sine qua non for candidacy and argued that the second-highest vote-getter should be declared elected, citing T.A. Abdul Azeez v. Kerala State Election Commission (2006 KHC 1046). The respondents argued that once oath is taken, vacancies arise as casual and must be filled by fresh elections. The learned Judge examined statutory provisions (Sections 153(1), 153(13), 153(16), 2(v.i), and 156), the Rules of 1995, and the 2000 resignation Rules, and concluded that the constitutional duty to have a President and Vice-President overrides evasive conduct. The court ultimately allowed the petitions, declaring the petitioners entitled to be declared elected and to be administered oath as President and Vice-President.
Petitioner C.S. Sujith, an Indian citizen residing in Kochi, seeks registration of his intended marriage with Nakaji Takako, a Japanese national, under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. He asserts that both parties are mature, eligible, and capable of giving valid consent, with no living spouses, and that there is no express prohibition in the Act against marrying a foreign national. He attaches Exts P-2 to P-4, including passports and consular certificates, to establish the foreign fiancée’s single status and marriageability under Japanese law. The respondent Registrar declined to register, apparently on the ground that one party is a foreigner. The court notes established authority—Rajeev v. State of Kerala (2001) 1 KLT 578 and Vivian Varghese v. State of Kerala (2015) 3 KLT 21—that the Special Marriage Act does not prohibit solemnization where one party is a foreigner, and that Sec. 6 obligations operate within Indian territory; it also discusses Sec. 4 conditions (age, consent, lack of impediments) and Sec. 6 (notice and publication). The judgment rejects reliance on a public notice claiming no Indian marriage officers abroad and clarifies that foreign nationals may marry Indian citizens within India under the Act, provided formalities are observed. The petition is allowed and directions are issued for processing the marriage registration accordingly.
WP(C).Nos.20245 of 2018 and 20308 of 2018 The petitioners, two Thrissur-area mining entities (Manikkampara Granites Pvt. Ltd. and M/S Three Star Granites, Thrissur), challenged the non-communication of Environmental Clearance (EC) for quarrying leases despite the recommendations of DEEAC and DEIAA under the Environmental Impact Assessment regime. Each petitioner had sought EC under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006, after submitting LOIs and mining plans (Exts P1, P4, P7, P9, P10). Under Para 8 of the 2006 notification, the regulatory authority must decide within specified timeframes and, if not communicated within 105 days from complete applications, the EC is deemed granted or denied by operation of law. The respondents contended that the lands were assigned for agricultural/house-site purposes under the Arable Forest Land Assignment Rules (1970) and thus unsuitable for quarrying, with Pattas restricting such use. The court found the petitioners entitled to a deemed licence under Para 8(iii) and directed the first respondent to issue the deemed EC promptly (within a month of judgment). The judgment clarified that its decision addresses only the deemed-licence issue and does not extinguish other statutory scrutiny. It also notes a controversial earlier Division Bench decision in One Earth One Life, cited as a point of reference but not controlling here.
WP(C).Nos.16529/2009(I); 23631/2009; 25319/2009; 28531/2009 This is a consolidated Kerala High Court writ petition dealing with counting of service for seniority of protected teachers deployed during protection following reduction in staff. Petitioners challenge the counting of protection-periods for seniority to the post of Headmistress in aided High School/Vocational Higher Secondary School, Mannady, Pathanamthitta. The court analyses Rule 37(1) of Chapter XIV A KER as it stood before the 23.07.2010 amendment and recalls the dictum of Abraham A.G. and others v. State of Kerala and others (2009) which held that seniority must be determined by continuous service in the unit and that service rendered while under protection is not qualifying service for seniority; a protected teacher is not a member of the parent-school staff and has a limited right to re-appointment under Rule 51A when vacancies arise. The petition by K. Girija Devi (WP 16529/2009) seeks to retain seniority against the earlier incumbents, arguing protection-periods should count. The court, distinguishing a later Division Bench decision (Thyagarajan P. K. v. Santhosh T. Alexander), holds the pre-amendment rule applies, and ultimately allows WP 16529 while dismissing the others. The judgment clarifies that protected service generally cannot be counted for seniority for the pre-amendment period, reinforcing the seniority of earlier incumbents.
The petitioner, T.L Parthasarathi, was employed as a Senior Manager in Kollam District Co-operative Bank and challenged the bank’s method of filling the Deputy General Manager (DGM) post. Promotion and direct recruitment were the two methods, in a 1:1 ratio under Rule 185 of the Co-operative Societies Rules. The Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) invited applications on 03.12.2009, and the petitioner was ranked No.3 in the PSC list published on 28.09.2011, whose validity was alleged to be 4½ years. After various vacancies were filled by a mix of direct recruitment and promotion, a fourth vacancy arose upon the retirement of Smt. B.S. Radhadevi. This vacancy, the petitioner contends, ought to have been filled by direct recruitment and advised to the PSC, but instead another candidate was promoted. The petitioner had previously challenged Ext.P4 judgment (dated 15.03.2016) in W.P.(C) No. 36352/2015, which directed direct recruitment for that vacancy; Ext.P5 (03.10.2016) upheld Ext.P4 in a writ appeal, though the bank later faced contempt proceedings for non-compliance. The petitioner argues that the bank’s inaction to implement the Ext.P4 directive, especially after the writ appeal was dismissed without a stay, violated the petitioner's rights and the court’s order. The court ultimately held that the bank’s obligation to appoint arose as early as 15.03.2016, and directed the bank to appoint the petitioner as DGM against the fourth vacancy, based on his position in the 2011 rank list, within three weeks, with consequential benefits, citing the State of Kerala v. Sreekantan precedence.
John Sales, a retired secretary of the Chirakkadavu Service Co-operative Bank, approached the Kerala High Court under Article 226 seeking a mandamus to the Joint Registrar (General) to ensure payment of gratuity of Rs.16,16,859 to him, with interest from 1.6.2017, and a declaration of entitlement to the full gratuity amount on retirement after a service of over 31 years (retired 31.5.2017). The LIC policy amount was transferred to the bank (as per Exhibit P1 dated 26.05.2017), but the bank paid only Rs.10 lakhs as gratuity. The petitioner relies on Section 4(5) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, arguing that employees covered by the central act are entitled to better terms than statutory limits under Section 4(2). The decision of the Full Bench in Chandrasekharan Nair v. Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (2017) 4 KLT 276 is cited to sustain that liability to pay gratuity does not shift to insurer and that any excess beyond the gratuity payable would go to the employee, while the insurer’s liability is limited to the master policy’s maturity value. The judgment also scrutinizes the second proviso to Rule 59(iii) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, Article 254 of the Constitution, and the overriding effect of the central Act (Section 14). It quashes circulars/interpretations that misconstrue the law and affirms the central act’s supremacy in cases where both central and state laws apply. The petition is disposed with a direction to disburse the balance gratuity and interest.
These two connected second appeals arise from a suit for partition of properties belonging to Sankaran Nair. The plaintiff Bhavani Amma claimed a 1/5 share on the failure of the heirs to agree after Sankaran Nair’s death; defendants 2 and 3 contended for their rights while the first defendant claimed a Will by Sankaran Nair diverting properties to him; alternatively, he asserted that defendants 2 and 3 released their rights. The trial court found the Will not genuine and held that properties devolved on Sankaran Nair’s death; it passed a preliminary decree in favor of the plaintiff for a 1/5 share. The appellate court reaffirmed that the Will was not genuine and held that the Ext.B2 letter estopped the third defendant from claiming a share, while also noting that a prior finding in O.S. 59 of 1981 could operate as res judicata against the first defendant. The High Court, however, re-appraised the estoppel issue and held Ext.B2 could not preclude the third defendant’s claim. It also held that the finding in O.S. 59 of 1981 would operate as res judicata against the first defendant. Ultimately, S.A. No.598/1999 was dismissed and S.A. No.518/1999 was allowed, with a preliminary decree for partition of a 1/5th share in favor of the third defendant over the suit properties.
The petitioner, ShaJi K.M., availed a loan of ₹5,00,000 on 13.03.2013 from the Thodanal Service Co-operative Bank Ltd., mortgaging his property in Meenachil. He challenged Ext.P5 (demand) and Ext.P6 (sale) notices issued by the 3rd respondent under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashment of the notices and a declaration that he be allowed to settle dues in instalments. The petition also sought a stay of sale under Ext.P6 pending consideration of Exts.P7 and P8 representations dated 07.06.2018. The bank’s counter shows default, resulting in an award (Ext.R4(a)) in ARC No.1733/14 dated 09.10.2014 for ₹5,97,579 plus interest and costs, which attained finality as no appeal was filed under Section 82(1)(d) of the relevant Act. Only a partial repayment of ₹40,000 was made on 26.10.2016. The petitioner contends that there is a prospective purchaser for the property and argues financial incapacity to clear all dues promptly. The court admitted the matter, stayed proceedings for a month on condition of a ₹75,000 remittance, and thereafter found petitioner’s conduct to be non-bonafide and an abuse of process. The bench relied on Prestige Lights to emphasize the necessity of full disclosure and clean hands in exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction, ultimately dismissing the petition as not maintainable.
SA.744/1999 & SA.745/1999 These are two connected second appeals arising from O.S. 619/1996 in the Munsiff Court, Irinjalakuda, concerning temple properties B and C (components of A schedule) held or claimed by an illom. The plaintiff, a member of the erstwhile Namboothiri illom, sought possession of B and C schedule plots on the ground that the Karanavan’s lease and subsequent transfers violated the illom’s partition (Ext. A1) and were not binding on the temple. The first defendant contended that a lease to Narayanan Namboodiri (Ext. B3) and subsequent assignments had vested ownership in B schedule and then C schedule properties through chains of title; the second defendant pleaded further assignments and adverse possession. The trial court found that B and C schedules are temple premises and that Ext. B3 lease was invalid for exceeding the terms of Ext. A1; it ordered possession to the plaintiff. The appellate court held that the illom had divested ownership to the temple and that the plaintiff could sue as a temple beneficiary, but not for a decree of possession against the temple. The Kerala High Court, on 30-11-2018, allowed the appeals, set aside the lower courts’ decrees, and dismissed the suit, clarifying that the deity or trustee may sue in accordance with law, but not normally obtain possession where neither deity nor trustee is a party.
The petitioner, Sudheesh T.S., a poor street vendor, operates a movable bunka-style stall on the northern side of Government Girls High School in Kodungalloor, within the territorial limits of the fourth respondent Kodungalloor Municipality. He claims to have been granted a valid identity and to have carried on his livelihood from 2001 onwards without causing hazards or obstructing traffic. The bunk is located on the right side footpath of NH-66 near a curve to Kodungalloor Govt. Hospital but does not abut the highway itself; nonetheless, the authorities contend it constitutes encroachment and threatens pedestrians, prompting Exts. P3 and P5 show-cause/eviction notices against him. The petitioner also submitted Ext. P6 under RTI seeking alignment maps and related records, which he alleges remain unanswered. He seeks quashing of the notices (P3 and P5), a mandamus to prevent demolition and to dispose of the RTI application, and ultimately to obtain permission under Section 24(2) of the Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 to use the bunk. The respondents argue the stall occupies highway land and obstructs the footpath, calling for removal under highway land regulations and asserting that street vending on national highways is not contemplated by the 2014 Act, which does not override older statutes. The court considered these submissions, admitted the petition, and issued a status quo order while directing a focused inquiry into RTI compliance and possible license/permission under the 2002 Act, culminating in a final disposal with detailed directions.
This is a writ appeal filed by TP Constructions challenging a Kerala High Court single judge’s order directing the Kerala State Housing Board to resume scrutiny of tenders from the technical bid stage and to accept the writ petitioner Abdul Nazar’s technical bid. The Board had invited online tenders for construction of an indoor stadium at LBS College of Engineering, Kasaragod. Three bids were received; Abdul Nazar’s technical bid was not admitted because he allegedly did not submit a valid A-class registration certificate. He approached W.P.(C)14966/2017 seeking a mandamus to process his financial bid. The learned Single Judge held that the writ petitioner possessed a valid registration on the date of submission and that the Board’s rejection of his tender was arbitrary and illegal, directing re-opening. On appeal, the court held that the tender conditions required a valid registration on the date of submission and that non-submission of a scanned registration with a signature-only-endorsement beyond March 31, 2017 could not be treated as a mere technical defect. The bench reaffirmed the importance of a strict, rule-based interpretation of essential tender conditions, while maintaining judicial restraint in contractual matters, ultimately reversing the single-judge order and dismissing the writ petition. The decision stands, and the Board’s rejection of the technical bid is upheld.
This is a Second Appeal arising from a suit (OS 134/1986) filed by the Diocese of Travancore Cochin CMS Anglican Church, represented by the Bishop, seeking declaration and permanent injunction to restrain Rev. K.M. Chacko from trespassing into the plaint schedule property, which the Diocese asserts was obtained for the Church and is under its control. The plaintiff contends he is the duly consecrated Bishop of the Diocese and that the Diocese, as the principal, governs the assets, with the defendant acting as Secretary and Power of Attorney holder who allegedly continued in possession after suspension and an alleged ordination as bishop. The trial court held the plaintiff to be the Bishop in office as of the suit, found the defendant’s claimed resignation and ordination unsustainable, and granted a prohibitory injunction while declining declaration of title. The first appellate court, however, reversed on the basis that the suspension was invalid, rendering the defendant in possession. The appellants argued that the suit was essentially for enforcing Diocese rights in property and that the Diocese owned the property; if the plaintiff is the Bishop, the defendant cannot hold against the Diocese as its agent. The High Court, after examining evidence and legal principles, held that the defendant, as Secretary, is an agent of the Diocese, and possession by the agent is possession by the principal. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the appellate decision, and restored the trial court’s decree.
