OP (CAT) No. 3761 of 2011 This Kerala High Court judgment concerns an original petition challenging the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Ernakulam, OA No. 714 of 2010. The petition was filed by BSNL and certain officers seeking to challenge the CAT’s order dated 25 September 2011, which directed the BSNL to reconsider the compassionate appointment application of Arun V. (the 1st respondent) under the old norms and to implement the decision within four months. The applicant’s father died on 5 April 2007, before the 27 June 2007 introduction of the weightage-point system. The applicant’s mother had submitted the claim, and the application was rejected in 2008 under the new policy scheme. The applicant relied on Apex Court precedents (notably State Bank of India v Jaspal Kaur) to contend that the pre-2007 norms ought to govern since death preceded the Scheme. The BSNL contended that the weightage-point system, introduced in 2007, was designed to ensure uniformity and that compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right; Rajkumar (2010) is cited to argue the framework that applies. The High Court ultimately holds that the reconsideration must be under the Weightage Point Scheme of 2007, and disposes of the petition by directing BSNL to issue orders within two months of receiving a copy of the judgment.
The Kerala High Court heard WA No. 1175 of 2017 (and connected matters) challenging notices and assessments issued under the Central Sales Tax Act/ CST Rules and the Kerala Value Added Tax Act for assessment years spanning 2006–2007 to 2010–2011. The core issue is limitation for completion of assessment under CST Rule 6(5). With KVAT, Section 21 deems assessment complete on filing a return; Section 25 fixes five years for initiation of escaped-turnover proceedings, while Section 24 prescribes three years for certain assessments. CST Rule 6(5) contains no explicit period of limitation, unlike Rule 6(7)/(8) governing assessments of escaped turnover (four-year limit). The learned Single Judge held that assessments must be completed within a “reasonable time,” capped by Rule 6(7). The State challenged this, invoking Parisons Foods (P) Ltd. and other precedents, arguing against a fixed limit for Rule 6(5) and in favor of applying existing four-year or five-year notions. The Court reviewed Abdul Majeed P.A., Bhattinda, Gurbax Singh, Indian Aluminum Cables, Bharat Steel Tubes, and Parisons Foods, distinguishing or applying them to interpret “reasonable time” under Rule 6(5). It ultimately held that a reasonable period may be five years for initiation under CST Act, though Rule 6(7)/(8) remains four years for escaped turnover. The judgment disposes of the petitions by varying degrees of rejection or allowance on limitation, with directions to file objections within 30 days of a certified copy and to pursue quantum appeals separately.
This writ petition challenges Exhibit-P1, an award dated 5.12.2009 of the Industrial Tribunal, Kollam, in I.D.No.8 of 2006, which upheld the dismissal of the petitioner, Shibu S., from service as a bus cleaner of St. George Central School. Shibu S. joined the school in 1992 and was dismissed on 6.1.2006 after a domestic enquiry, conducted with the apparent participation of an advocate; the petitioner attended the first three days but then abstained, and the founder-manager (aged over 72) was allegedly abused by the petitioner. The industrial dispute was espoused by the second respondent union, which did not participate in the Tribunal proceedings, leading the Tribunal to proceed ex parte against the union. The Tribunal found clear evidence of misconduct by the petitioner and dismissed him. The petitioner, claiming violation of natural justice due to the union’s non-appearance, sought certiorari and, in the alternative, reinstatement with continuity and back wages, or remand for fresh adjudication. The High Court analyzed powers under Article 226, citing Grindlays Bank and Anil Sood to support the admissibility of recalling an ex-parte award and remanding for merits, while acknowledging conflicting authorities on ex-parte recall. Ultimately, the Court remitted the matter to the Tribunal for a limited consideration: whether monetary compensation/benefits could be granted to the petitioner in lieu of reinstatement, given 14 years of service, and directed notices and impleadment as needed. The petition was disposed of accordingly.
The petitioner Radha Surendran sought a writ of mandamus under Article 226 to obtain more time to settle arrears and to regularise housing loan HL-131 after mortgage of her property, challenging coercive actions under SARFAESI Act. The loan of Rs.8,00,000 was sanctioned in 2011 for 15 years (till 2026) with monthly installments of Rs. 8,819. Default occurred, with payments only up to 25.05.2016, despite remitting around Rs.4,00,000. The bank resorted to coercive action and took symbolic possession on 18.06.2018 under SARFAESI, following notices. The petitioner requested time to pay arrears, but the bank demanded full settlement. By filing the writ petition on 20.06.2018, she claimed she was not a chronic defaulter and sought installment payments to regularise loan account HL-131, but relied on scant records—Exts. P1 (pass book), P2 (demand notice), and P3 (receipts)—without a complete statement of total outstanding or overdue amounts. Respondents argued the borrower was irregular since inception; as of 27.06.2018 liability was Rs.9,98,484 with overdue Rs.2,92,339, and that due process under SARFAESI had been followed, including possession after notice. The court highlighted lack of documents and reliance on suppressing facts, invoking Prestige Lights for the clean-hands principle, and held that the writ petition is not sustainable where a statutory remedy under Section 17 is available. Ultimately the petition was dismissed, but the petitioner retains the right to challenge under Section 17 and to seek regularisation from the bank; no costs.
Raju M. Koshy, a domestic consumer of the Kerala State Electricity Board (KSEB), challenged a 4 March 2011 bill (Ext. P-1) demanding a substantial amount as proportionate current charges for an unauthorised load detected after a 21 July 2006 inspection. The premises had been used by a tenant for commercial purposes under tariff LT VIIA, while the consumer held a domestic connection. The 2006 inspection revealed a connected load of 24 kW against a sanctioned 9 kW, with 15 kW deemed unauthorised. Based on the inspection report (Ext. R-1(a)), KSEB issued a penalty on fixed charges for the relevant period and continued to levy fixed charge penalties in subsequent months (15.6.2007 to 12.7.2008). After the tenant vacated, the petitioner converted the connection to domestic LT-IA. In 2011, KSEB issued Ext. P-1 for Rs. 1,16,170 as proportionate current charges for the unauthorised load for 15.6.2007 to 12.7.2008, which the petitioner challenged. The petitioner contended that Ext. P-1 seeks recovery of charges not properly assessed earlier and that Clause 51 of the 2005 Terms and Conditions of Supply is unconstitutional. The court cited Sulabha Marketing (P) Ltd. v. KSEB (DB) and held that where the extra load existed in the same premises for the same purpose without tariff change, assessment under Sec. 126(6) should be limited to twice the fixed charges, not twice the energy charges unless regularisation necessitates upgradation. Ext. P-1 was quashed, and the petition disposed of accordingly.
Grace Joseph filed WP(C) 6636/2014 challenging a building tax assessment on a three-storey structure constructed on her property. She contends that the tax authorities treated the building as a single unit even though portions of the first and second floors were sold to third parties before completion. She produced Exts P1 (occupancy certificate) and Exts P2–P3 (sale deeds for sold portions) to show that substantial construction and sales occurred prior to full completion; Ext P4 indicates that the first and second floors were completed only by 1-9-2010, after Exts P2 and P3 were executed. She argues that once only portions had been completed, the tax should have been assessed on those completed portions rather than on the entire building; similarly, luxury tax was later assessed considering the portions sold before completion. The respondents contend that the law requires assessment of the whole building once complete, regardless of sales, and that Ext P13 (luxury tax representation) should be considered. The High Court found inconsistencies between Ext P1 and Ext P4 and acknowledged Bavasons Constructions (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala to the effect that sale of a portion does not absolve tax liability but allowed reexamination. It disposed of the petition and directed the District Collector to reassess, after hearing, with respect to both building and luxury taxes, and to consider the Ext P13 representation within four months, keeping the interim stay in place.
WP(C) Nos. 23239/2010 and 4611/2014 Petitioners, members of the Kadadanad Service Co-operative Bank, challenged the recruitment and promotion of respondents 6 to 8, arguing violations of circulars and lack of proper procedure. The writ petitions also questioned entrusting recruitment to an outside agency and the role of the managing committee’s president and bank secretary. The court examined locus standi and aggrieved person concepts, citing Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan on the need to show a legal injury, and noted that petitioners 1 and 2, as bank members, had an interest in the Society’s governance, though their conduct showed laches. Petitioners 3 and 4 were found to have acted promptly, but the court still dismissed on grounds of laches and estoppel. The respondents argued that the recruitment complied with clarifications and circulars, and that there was no need to join the employer bank as a party since the Society could be represented by its secretary. Relying on precedents such as Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar and Saurabh Jain v. State of Kerala, the court held that estoppel cannot bar judicial review in constitutional rights matters, but that laches defeats the challenge where the aggrieved rights are not shown timely. Overall, the court dismissed the petitions, holding illegality cannot be justified merely because similar issues existed earlier and refusing to grant relief.
Petitioner Janaki Kochuveli, widow of freedom fighter Kumaran, challenged Ext.P7 which denied arrears under the Kerala Freedom Fighters' Pension Rules, 1971. Kumaran had submitted Ext.P1 on 21 July 1981 for a pension; he died on 19 April 2002; After delays, the District Collector sanctioned a continuous freedom fighter's pension only on 17 July 2009 with prospective effect. The petitioner had earlier approached this Court in W.P. (C).No.5294/2008, which this Court disposed of on 25 November 2008, directing the State to treat Ext.P4 as a reminder of the original application and to decide within three months. Ext.P6 followed, but Ext.P7 (dated 24 January 2011) rejected arrears beyond the prospective period. The petitioner sought (i) quashing Ext.P7, (ii) arrears from the date of Ext.P1 application, and (iii) reconsideration of Ext.P6 as per the court’s dicta in State of Kerala v. Raghavan/Pauly v. State of Kerala. The State contends Rule 18 of the Kerala Freedom Fighters' Pension Rules, 1971 requires pension from the sanction date and cites Pauly to justify prospective payment. The Court held that Rule 18 is not arbitrary, but where there is long delay, Art.226 powers permit directing payment from an earlier date, balancing the rules’ safeguards with equity. Ext.P7 is set aside; pension is ordered from 20.04.2002 with arrears to 16.07.2009, to be paid within two months.
OP(C).No. 869 of 2017 (O) This Original Petition (OP(C) 869 of 2017) arises from an ex parte decree in O.S. No.14 of 2002, a suit for recovery of possession filed by the respondents-plaintiffs before the Munsiff's Court, Perinthalmanna. The petitioner, the first defendant Pocker, challenges Exts.P4 and P5 orders dated 23.02.2017 passed in I.A. Nos.552/2015 and 919/2017, which dismissed the applications to set aside the ex parte decree and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to record the petitioner’s oral evidence. The suit had previously been decreed ex parte on 24.03.2015 after the defendants were set ex parte on 03.03.2015. The petitioner contends that he could not appear on 03.03.2015 due to illness and cancer treatment; he filed I.A.552/2015 within the statutory period and sought to lead evidence and to appoint a Commissioner. The Kerala High Court cites G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada to emphasize that “sufficient cause” must be liberally construed to do complete justice, and that absence on the fixed date should not penalize the party if there is no mala fide. The court ultimately sets aside Exts.P4 and P5 with a cost of Rs.5,000 payable to the plaintiffs, directing deposit within three weeks, and requires the trial court to reconsider I.A.552/2015 and 919/2017, expeditiously, while maintaining the interim stay on delivery in E.P. No.54/2015 until further orders.
WP(C).No. 19309 of 2015 (S) This Public Interest Litigation, filed by NIYAMAVEDI, challenges India's 2014 deep-sea fishing policy and the accompanying guidelines (Ext.P3 of 12/11/2014 and Ext.P4 of 28/11/2014) that regulate fishing in the Indian EEZ beyond territorial waters. The petitioner contends that extending unfettered deep-sea fishing rights to LOP holders would lead to environmental damage and threaten the livelihoods of traditional coastal fishermen who operate in near-shore zones. Relying on the Murari Committee Report (Exhibit P6) and the earlier Deep Sea Fishing Policy, the petition seeks quashing Ext.P3 and Ext.P4, implementing Murari's recommendations, cancelling LO permissions for 270 vessels, seizing LOP vessels violating terms, and initiating disciplinary action against respondents 4–11 for data gaps and non-reporting. The government counters that deep-sea fishing beyond territorial waters falls under Entry 57, List I, and that Ext.P3 provides a simplified yet mandatory framework to regulate migratory tuna stocks, with necessary security clearances and reporting to prevent resource monopolization. The court acknowledges policy-making is primarily a executive function but emphasizes adherence to Ext.P3 and related guidelines, while dismissing the petition. It directs that the Centre ensure strict compliance with the guidelines within the Indian EEZ and outside territorial waters.
The petitioner, M. Devadasan, was the Headmaster of Puliyanambram Muslim U.P. School and challenged Ext.P5, the Government’s revision order that promoted the 7th respondent as Headmaster. A vacancy arose on 01.05.2008; the Manager had appointed the petitioner, and the proposal was sent to the 5th respondent (AEO), who declined promotion in Ext.P2 on the ground that the 7th respondent was senior for promotion. The appeal mounted by the petitioner led to Ext.P3, which allowed promotion to the petitioner with effect from 01.05.2008 and Ext.P4, dated 17.09.2009, granted appointment approval retroactively. Subsequently, the 7th respondent filed a revision, resulting in Ext.P5, which upheld the 7th respondent’s promotion as Headmaster. The petitioner contended that Ext.P1, the 2003-04 seniority list, showed him as senior to the 7th respondent (who started as part-time Urdu teacher in 1979 and became full-time in 1980), and that Ext.P1 remained unchallenged, thus entitling him to the benefits of seniority. The court examined staff-fixation (1992-93) and minority-status considerations, noting later judicial developments. It quashed Ext.P5, holding the petitioner’s Ext.P1 seniority should govern promotion and that the cited minority-status principle has retroactive effect per Supreme Court precedent. The writ petition is allowed, with the promotion of the petitioner recognized as regular from 01.05.2008.
The petitioner, Ahammed Kutty, a stage carriage operator on the route Mukkam-Areakode-Thamarassery-Mavoor-Koodaranhi, seeks a writ of certiorari under Article 226 to quash Ext.P4 (14.06.2017) decision of the State Transport Authority (STA) and a writ of mandamus to direct the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Kozhikode, to issue a regular permit for his vehicle KL-18/ -8883. The petition was admitted and interim directions were granted to consider the petitioner’s application for a temporary permit within a week, untrammelled by the STA’s 2017 decision, for two months. On 14.08.2018, the interim order was extended. The matter connects to a batch of petitions challenging the STA’s fixation of vehicle age limits in granting permits. In a judgment dated 15.10.2018 in W.P.(C) No.24680/2017 and connected cases, the High Court held that the 14.06.2017 fixation of age limits for stage carriages cannot stand, being arbitrary and violative of natural justice for lack of reasons. Citing Subhash Chandra, K.M. Ismeth Ummer, M.C. Mehta, and Shaheed Khan, the court affirmed that motor vehicle regulation serves public safety and welfare over private interest. The present petition is disposed of in terms of those directions, directing the STA to reconsider, with notice to affected parties, within two months, and to defer new regular permits until a fresh decision is taken, while maintaining status quo until further orders.
W.P.(C) No. 17365 of 2016 (U) This batch of writ petitions concerns compounding of offences under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) and the related Kerala Rules governing mining and transport of minerals, notably the Kerala Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2015 (KMMC Rules) and the Kerala Minerals (Prevention of Illegal Mining, Storage and Transportation) Rules, 2015 (Transportation Rules). The petitioner, Aloious s/o Joseph, owner of a lorry seized during alleged illegal mining/transportation of minerals, contends lack of uniformity in the fixation of compounding fees and calls for coherent guidelines. The Court traces prior jurisprudence: Digil v. Sub Inspector of Police (2013(1) KLT 600) and Sivakumar v. State of Kerala (2013 KHC 2757) had directed compounding at Rs.25,000 with release of vehicles under earlier statutory regimes (MMDR Act and 1967 Rules). With the 2015 amendments, the old standard no longer applies; Kuriakose (2015(3) KLT 288) held that penalties guide compounding, while Sreejith (2015(3) KLT 986) stressed uniformity. The Court ultimately directs that, in the interregnum, compounding be fixed by the Government considering penalties and rules, with interim guidelines: goods vehicles double the value of goods plus double royalty plus Rs.50,000; JCBs Rs.75,000. The Government is directed to issue formal guidelines within three months and ensure uniform application. The petitions are disposed with no costs, and a deterrent stance against repeated offences is emphasized.
The petition concerns four contract employees serving in the Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme (ECHS) Polyclinic, Thumpamon, who seek renewal of their contractual appointments beyond the fixed terms. The petitioners had been appointed from 2009 to 2013 in posts of Medical Officer, Dental Officer, Driver and Physiotherapist, each on contracts for 12 months, with extensions thereafter. After Ext.P5 invited fresh applications and a new selection process was conducted, the petitioners challenged Ext.P5, arguing they were entitled to renewal of their contracts and that there was no justifiable reason to replace them with new hires. The respondents contended that the engagements were purely contractual with fixed periods, terminable on expiry, and that policy and discretion vested in the appointing authorities to renew or not renew; the ECHS scheme aims to monitor high-quality care for ex-servicemen and dependents, with staffing decisions governed by policy, performance and administrative discretion. The petition relied on Punjab & Haryana High Court’s Division Bench decision in LPA 1691/2015 and urged continuity; the respondents relied on the Himachal Pradesh High Court Full Bench decision in Pawan Kumar v. Union of India (supra), holding fixed-term appointments do not confer a right to renewal. The Kerala High Court ultimately agrees with the HP Full Bench, finding no legal right to renewal in contract appointments and dismisses the petition.
WP(C).No. 20675 of 2013 (H) The petitioner, Latha K.K., seeks appointment as HSA (Mathematics) for the period 24.06.2003 to 01.06.2006, based on an earlier regular vacancy appointment. The Government denied approval on the ground that the post in the newly opened SNTHSS Cheriyanad required a protected teacher, and the petitioner’s appointment could not be approved. The petitioner pursued a revision petition (Exhibit P7) which the Government eventually considered via Exhibit P8, noting that a protected teacher was working in the school during 2004–2007 and that the petitioner was senior to Smt. P.M. Bindu, who had been granted approval with effect from 24.06.2003; however, the approval was granted only from 01.02.2006, under GO (MS) No. 19/2009. A subsequent order (Exhibit P13) stated the SNTHSS Cheriyanad was a newly opened school and vacancies should be filled by protected teachers, without any clear assertion that the Deputy Director of Education had furnished a list of protected teachers to the Manager. The petitioner challenged this order, arguing that binding decisions of this Court (Moosakutty, Nadeera, Unninarayanan) require consideration of approval with reference to such lists or, at least, direct that the Government comply with prior directions. The Court found Exhibit P13 void for lack of proper consideration, relied on Nadira’s case, and set aside the impugned order. The petition was allowed, directing the relevant authorities to approve the appointment for the period in question and to disburse benefits within four months.
WA.No.20 of 2008 in WP(C).35713/2007 This is a five-judge Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court arising from WA No.20/2008 and related WP(C)s challenging motor vehicle tax demands for periods during which the vehicles were in police custody. The core issue is whether exemption from tax can be granted for periods of detention in police custody when an offence was involved, either due to non-payment of tax or for other offences. The court traces the statutory scheme: The Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976 imposes tax on vehicles used or kept for use and provides exemptions under Section 5 (non-use) and refunds under Section 6; Rule 10 and Form G govern the procedural claim for exemption under S.5; Section 22 empowers the Government to grant exemptions/reductions under SRO 878/75; Earlier Full Benches, notably Abdurahiman’s case, held that exemption for non-payment of tax requires compliance with Section 5, Rule 10 and Form G, while another decision (Jomon’s case) suggested exemptions could extend beyond Form G for custody due to offences other than non-payment. The five-judge bench distinguishes these authorities, clarifying that (i) for detention due to non-payment of tax, exemption must follow S.5 as read with Rule 10 and Form G; (ii) for detention due to offences other than non-payment, exemption follows Section 22 read with Clause 27 of SRO 878/75; and (iii) refunds under Section 6 remain available. The court allows the writ appeals in part, quashes corresponding tax demands for custody-for-offence cases, and remands the remaining petition for appellate consideration as directed.
WP(C).No.22159 of 2011 (T) The petitioner, M/S Sudarsan Clays and Ceramics Ltd., challenged continued Revenue Recovery (RR) proceedings for collection charges after the requisitioning authority had withdrawn RR proceedings upon remittance of the entire amount due. The dispute centers on the chargeable collection costs under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1968. A demand of Rs. 32,81,226 plus interest and collection charges was issued under Section 36 of the RR Act for arrears from 1986-87 to 2002-03. The petitioner remitted the amount and sought waiver of interest; government communications indicated no arrears remained, yet RR collection charges at 7.5% were pursued. Interim orders directed withdrawal on deposit of Rs.32,81,226, and Ext.P6 confirmed that the demand was fully paid with no arrears. Despite this, RR proceedings persisted, with attachment of land under RR in reliance on a requisition. The court invoked the principle from Malabar Organics Ltd. v. State of Kerala (2009) that RR collection charges are limited to 1% and cannot function as a revenue source; details for higher charges were not furnished. Consequently, the court held that the collection charges should be dropped, allowed the writ petition, and directed withdrawal of the bond and closure of RR proceedings.
WP(C).No. 16415 of 2016 (B) The petitioner is an association of the parents of the students of the Campion School, Edappally, Cochin, which is CBSE-affiliated with a government NOC. The writ petition challenges admissions-related charges, alleging that the school imposes capitation and donations beyond the published fee, in particular an admission fee of Rs. 8,000 for standard I, which is claimed to be beyond the fee structure published on the school website. The petition seeks mandamus-type reliefs: to stop capitation/donations, to ensure CBSE affiliation compliance, to direct the school to conduct PTA with norms, and to enforce the Right to Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. The school counters that the petition is not maintainable since the petitioner is not a recognized association as on the petition date, and that the admission fee is permissible under CBSE bye-laws, which permit schools to fix fees and other charges within the notified framework. The school also argues that Exts. R6(a)–R6(e) reflect the current fee structure for 2016-17, and that Rs. 8,000 is an approved admission fee per the 7.3.2015 decision of the School Management Committee. After interim orders and counter-replies, the Court dismisses the petition, holding non‑maintainability due to lack of per‑member court-fee, while noting the merits and upholding the current fee regime as compliant with bye-laws.
WP(C).No.18028 of 2016 (C) Mass emission standards for Bharat Stage IV (BS-IV) were introduced under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules as amendments to Rule 115, governing emissions from motor vehicles under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The batch of petitions, including WP(C).No.18028 of 2016, challenge Ext.P1, the latest amendment, and Ext.P3, a circular clarifying its scope, alleging that BS-IV should apply only to four-wheeled vehicles manufactured on or after 1 April 2016, and that vehicles with more than four wheels fall outside its ambit. Petitioners, Autobahn Trucking and Autobahn Trucking Corporation Pvt. Ltd., argue that Ext.P1 places four-wheeled vehicles in a separate category and that the fifth proviso finally clarifies only four-wheeled vehicles, thereby excluding multi-axle vehicles from BS-IV. The Respondents contend that Rule 115(15) covers BS-IV for 'M' and 'N' category vehicles, which include multi-axle vehicles, and that Ext.P1's amendments reflect a national policy of phased implementation. The Court notes the absence of a clear exclusion for vehicles with more than four wheels in the rule and examines the scheme, headings, and context. Drawing on Bhinka, Sankalchand, and Towne v Eisner, the court concludes that the extant amendment extends BS-IV to all M and N category vehicles manufactured on or after the relevant dates, and disposes of the petitions with dismissal.
WP(C).No. 16916 of 2016 (L) The petitioner Abdul Hameed filed W.P.(C.) No.16916 of 2016 challenging Ext.P4, a decision of the 5th respondent rejecting his nomination for the 092 Peerumedu Assembly Constituency on the ground of an incomplete affidavit. The petition asserts that the rejection is per se arbitrary and seeks relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, arguing that the nomination was filed in good faith and the defect noted is curable, or that at least a direction should issue to allow the process to proceed. The counter-submissions from the 7th respondent (Election Commission of India) explain that improper rejection of a nomination can be challenged in an election petition under Section 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and contend that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 329(b) because the electoral process was already well advanced. The court canvasses Supreme Court jurisprudence, citing Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar and constitutional bench decisions in N. P. Ponnuswami and Mohinder Singh Gill to delineate when judicial intervention is permissible during an ongoing election. It notes that by 2–6 May 2016 the contest list, symbols, and postal ballot preparations were completed, and interference at this late stage would disrupt the process. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable, with liberty to pursue relief through the prescribed election petition route, leaving contentions for appropriate fora.
