This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case (CRL.MC 4681 of 2023) filed under Section 482 CrPC challenging the continuation of proceedings in CC 124/2017 from the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court I, Perinthalmanna, for offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, and 341 r/w 149. The petition asserts that the accused Nos. 1 to 5 formed an unlawful assembly on 22.10.2016, restrained the de facto complainants, and attacked them with sticks, resulting in injuries. The defence contends that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and do not wish to pursue the prosecution; affidavits from the respondents support this. The Public Prosecutor, while noting no other crimes against the petitioners, expresses reservations about quashing solely on settlement, urging caution given the nature of the offences. The court places reliance on Supreme Court rulings in State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan and the earlier Gian Singh and Narinder Singh decisions, which hold that the power under Section 482 CrPC to quash non-compoundable offences may be exercised where the dispute is civil/private, the settlement is genuine, and the offences are not heinous or of public interest significance. After weighing gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the amicable settlement, the court concludes quashing would further ends of justice and peace, and therefore quashes the proceedings. The petition is allowed.
This Regular Second Appeal under Order XLII Rule 1 read with Section 100 CPC challenges the decree and judgment in OS 262/2014 of the Munsiff Court, Devikulam, and the subsequent appellate decisions in AS No.34/2019, Thodupuzha District Court. The appellant-plaintiff seeks a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants and men under them from trespassing into the plaint schedule property, annexing a portion into their possession, destroying boundaries and cultivation, or causing any waste or interference with peaceful possession. The plaintiff claims possession based on an unregistered agreement dated 28.04.2009 executed by K.V. Paulose, and on a prior agreement dated 01.08.1988, arguing transfer of right and possession over 2.5 acres including the suit property. Defendants deny; they contend the agreement was created in collusion and that Paulose never possessed the property; no item of property covered by the agreements existed. The trial court dismissed, holding Ext. A1 (the 2009 agreement) requires registration under Section 17 Registration Act and cannot be used for collateral purposes. It rejected Exts. A2 and A11 as unproven. The appellate court concurred. The High Court held Ext. A1 resembles a sale deed and thus requires registration; it underscored that government property and private instruments have no binding effect on the State. Citing Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah, Government of Kerala v. Joseph, and Nazir Mohamed, the court stressed strict scrutiny in cases involving public property. The appeal is meritless and is dismissed without admission; directions include enquiry into Exts. A2 and A11 for future action.
WP(C) Nos. 43298/2023, 43327/2023, 43331/2023 These three writ petitions, heard together on the same day owing to the analogous facts and reliefs sought, challenge the imposition of the Kerala Construction Workers Welfare Fund (KCWWF) cess by the Kerala Water Authority (KWA). The petitioners, including KOYA AND COMPANY CONSTRUCTION LIMITED (WP(C) Nos. 43298/2023 and 43331/2023) and G. Soman Nair (WP(C) 43327/2023), contend that they are engaged only in supplying materials for pipeline works and have no direct involvement in construction, and thus cannot be held liable for the KCWWF cess. They allege automatic deduction from bills without any assessment or hearing. They rely on earlier Kerala judgments (Poulose v. State of Kerala and others, 1993 (3) ILR Kerala 675, and Kerala Construction WWF Board v. State of Kerala, 1995 (2) KLT 724) as supporting authority. The KWA’s stand is that a contractor’s involvement with KWA, including material supply as part of construction, triggers cess liability under KCWWF. The learned Judge notes factual disputes and emphasizes that a unilateral deduction without a proper assessment and hearing would violate principles of natural justice. He allows the petitions, quashes the impugned proceedings, and directs the KWA to hear and assess the contractors’ claims, defer any recovery pending order, and consider returning any amounts collected if liability is determined not to lie. The decision reiterates the need for hearing and documented assessment in determining liability under KCWWF.
This Criminal Misc. Case (Crl.M.C. No. 6956 of 2023) challenges CC No. 961/2021 arising from Crime No. 1415/2021 of Puthoor Police Station before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kottarakkara. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 are Adarsh Ashok and Sreeraj, charged under sections 294(b), 323, 324, 326 read with 34 IPC. The petition seeks exercise of the inherent power under section 482 CrPC to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings on the basis that the parties have amicably settled their dispute. The victim has filed an affidavit supporting the settlement and has no objection to quashing, while the Public Prosecutor initially expressed reservations about quashing solely on the basis of a settlement but conceded that a settlement exists. The High Court cites the Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh and Narinder Singh to outline the limited circumstances under which non-compoundable offences can be quashed when disputes are private and resolved, emphasizing the need to evaluate the nature of the offence, the public interest, and the accused’s conduct. After careful consideration of the facts, the record, and the settled position in law, the Court holds that the dispute is private in nature, accepts the settlement, and allows the Crl.M.C., quashing the continued proceedings in CC 961/2021. The order ends with quashing of the proceedings."
Dr. Aby Paul, the Principal-in-charge of Chaldean Syrian Higher Secondary School, Thrissur, challenged Ext. P13, a Government order directing the Director of General Education to conduct an enquiry, and Ext. P14, the ensuing enquiry report. The petitioner submitted that the Government lacks power to order disciplinary proceedings by itself under Section 12A of the Kerala Education Act and Rule 75A, unless the Manager of the aided school has failed to act after intimation. He pointed to the Manager’s memo of charges (Ext. P6) and the prior disciplinary process as the proper channel. The Government, however, had extended the suspension and directed a formal enquiry by the DGE, arguing that Rule 75A contemplates government intervention when the Manager does not initiate timely action. The Court examined the statutory framework, noting that the Manager had already initiated action and that there was no ongoing requirement to call for a formal enquiry by the DGE. It held Ext. P13 unwarranted, and that Ext. P14 report was based on an enquiry ordered without proper procedure. Consequently, the writ petition was allowed, Ext. P13 set aside, and it directed the disciplinary process to proceed from the memo stage under Rule 75 & Section 12A, with a fresh notice to the petitioner, and without expressing any opinion on the merits. The decision clarifies the proper locus for disciplinary action in such cases.
Shaju M.S., the accused in C.C. No.396/2017 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Kalady, challenges the continuation of the prosecution under sections 406 and 420 IPC on the ground that the dispute between the parties has been settled and they do not wish to pursue the case. The petitioner contends that the settlement should lead to quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC, citing the civil character of the dispute and the need to end private quarrels. The victim's counsel supported the settlement and stated there was no objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging the settlement, expressed reservations about quashing solely on that basis, emphasizing the State’s duty to uphold public interest and deter non-compoundable offences. The High Court of Kerala referred to the Supreme Court decisions in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others (2019) 5 SCC 688 and the classic decisions in Gian Singh and Narinder Singh, explaining that the power under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked in non-compoundable offences when the dispute is private and the entire matter has been settled, provided serious ingredients of public interest are not offended. After examining the facts and the antecedents of the accused, the Court concluded that the dispute is private, the settlement is genuine, and the proceedings can be quashed. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and C.C. 396/2017 stands quashed. The Court notes that the exercise of the power has limits and cannot be used when investigation is ongoing; the settled, private nature of the dispute bolsters the decision to quash.
This OP (CAT) challenges two Central Administrative Tribunal orders (OA No.180/00498/2020 and RA No.180/12/2022) arising from the retrenchment and pension eligibility of a railway employee who began as a casual labourer in 1984, was retrenched in 1985, and later appointed as Trackman in 2004 under post-Apex Court directions. The core issue is whether the applicant, K. K. Sathyan, can be treated as ‘regularised’ from 03.11.2003 for the purpose of pension under the Old Pension Scheme, despite his appointment after 01.01.2004 when the New Contributory Pension Scheme was in effect. The matter traverses Supreme Court directives in Inderpal Yadav and others v. Union of India directing Railways to prepare divisional lists of retrenched project casual labourers and consider them for future engagement; the subsequent notifications in 2003 invited applications for Trackman vacancies; the applicant’s appointment occurred on 11.10.2004. The Tribunal held that the applicant is entitled to consider 03.11.2003 as the date of regularisation and to be eligible for the Old Pension Scheme, following Union of India & Ors. v. C. Devadhasan & Ors, and prior CAT/WP precedents (23757/2010; 352/2017). The respondents challenged these orders, but the High Court dismissed the petition, aligning with the cited precedents. The decision clarifies pension entitlement for retrenched casual labourers regularised after 2003 and maintains the transition from Old to New Pension Scheme as applicable.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 949 OF 2014 This criminal revision petition arises from the conviction of the 3rd accused for offences under Sections 16(1-A) read with Section 2(i-a)(a) and (j), and Section 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and Rule 29 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, in S.T. No. 1545/2008 (J.F.C.M.I., Thamarassery). The Trial Court held the 1st and 2nd accused not guilty, but convicted the 3rd accused as the manufacturer, imposing one year’s simple imprisonment and a Rs. 2,000 fine, with default imprisonment. The Appellate Court confirmed the conviction. The petitioner challenges the legality of the judgments, arguing that the Public Analyst’s report (Ext. P11) was based on analysis in a laboratory not notified under Section 23(1-A)(ee) of the Act, rendering the prosecution unsustainable in light of the Supreme Court’s Pepsico India Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Inspector and Rasheed v. Food Inspector, which hold that where laboratory analysis is not conducted in a properly notified laboratory, the prosecution cannot stand. The Public Prosecutor countered that Pepsico’s ratio should be reconsidered and that Section 8 empowers appointment of Public Analysts, suggesting Pepsico’s rule does not apply universally. The High Court, applying the Rasheed interpretation and the Pepsico ratio, concluded that without a laboratory defined under Section 23(1-A)(ee), the analysis cannot sustain the prosecution. Consequently, the revision petition is allowed, the lower judgments are set aside, and the accused is acquitted and discharged, with bail bonds canceled.
BAIL APPL. NO. 282 OF 2024 This is a bail application under Section 439 CrPC filed by the sole accused, Sanoop alias Ratheesh, in crime No.612/2023 of the Aluva West Police Station, Alangad, Ernakulam, registered for offences punishable under sections 457, 380, and 361 r/w 34 IPC. The accused was arrested on 01.12.2023 and remanded on 02.12.2023. The prosecution alleges the accused trespassed into the home of a caretaker on 01.12.2023 at about 3:30 a.m. and robbed Rs.1,000 from a drawer. The applicant contends innocence and false implication, and expresses willingness to comply with conditions. It is argued that the offences are punishable for a period of less than ten years, and that the final report has not been laid within the statutory 60 days from remand, invoking the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC to claim statutory bail. The Public Prosecutor partially concedes the technical facts but notes the offences are less than ten years and that the final report has not been laid within the time limit. The court relies on a trilogy of decisions—Sanjay Dutt v. State (through CBI), Bombay; Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra—and the Hitendra Vishnu Thakur doctrine to explain the indefeasible right to bail in default of filing challan. Since no final report was laid within the period, the court holds the petitioner is entitled to statutory bail and grants bail on specified conditions.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case arising from challenges to two interlocutory applications (CRL.M.P. 6809/2023 and 6810/2023) in CC No.452/2011, where Biju Menon, accused under Section 498A IPC, faced prosecution for alleged bigamy or related offences with Priya as the de facto complainant. The core issue is whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to summon a baptism certificate from CSI All Souls Church, Coimbatore, and to recall PW1 (the de facto complainant) to prove that the petitioner had converted to Christianity just prior to the marriage. The petitioner contends there was no valid marriage under the Special Marriage Act and that the prosecution cannot fill evidentiary lacuna at the fag end of trial. He relies on Kerala High Court precedents such as Vijyadas K.V. and Manoj G. to argue that Section 311 CrPC recall cannot be used to shore up the prosecution’s case. The respondents argue that, in the peculiar facts, recalling PW1 and obtaining the baptism certificate are essential to determine whether a valid marriage existed, citing Varsha Garg (SC) and Satbir Singh (SC) to support broader discretion under Section 311 CrPC to do justice. The High Court ultimately dismissed the Crl.M.C., holding that the petitioners’ challenges to the trial court’s orders do not warrant interference and that the trial court’s orders can stand.
Rajan.K., a Central Government employee, was admitted as a member of the Central Government Employees & Workers Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. within the Trivandrum District under the society’s bye-laws which require one year of continuous service. Subsequently, he was transferred to Kochi, outside the Society’s area of operation. The third respondent moved the Joint Registrar for removal from membership on the ground that the member no longer satisfies the eligibility criteria by working outside the territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner contended that transfer beyond the area of operation does not amount to cessation of membership, since Clause 11 of the bye-laws enumerates only death, resignation, expulsion, and retirement, and that membership, once acquired, cannot be lost merely due to relocation. The Court examined Rule 16 of the Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, noting that (i) Rule 16(1)/(2) regulate admission, (ii) Rule 16(3) permits removal of a member who becomes ineligible, and (iii) Rule 16(4) allows the Registrar to declare cessation with opportunity of hearing. The Court held that a member who loses eligibility by transferring beyond the area ceases to satisfy bye-law requirements and can be removed under Rule 16(3)/(4). It concluded the Registrar’s removal order was legal and refused to interfere, dismissing the writ petition. The decision rests on the interpretation that transfer outside the area of operation triggers ineligibility under the bye-laws and rules, justifying removal.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1500 OF 2011 This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition (CRL.R.P. No.1500 of 2011) by the accused, Prabhakaran, challenging a Palakkad Court of Session judgment in Criminal Appeal No.385/2010, which convicted him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.40,000 with two months’ simple imprisonment in default. The original complaint (S.T. No.4334/2004) alleged that the accused, after bidding in a kuri, issued a cheque for Rs.27,755 which bounced for insufficient funds; notice was issued but payment was not made. The Trial Court acquitted under CrPC 255(1). The Appellate Court reversed, convicting and sentencing as stated. The revision argues that Exts.P8 and P8(a) with Exts.D1–D2 show a Rs.7,000 remittance from 2002–2004, reducing the due amount to Rs.19,000 plus interest, making Ext.P4’s Rs.27,755 claim incorrect and the prosecution bad. It contends the revisional jurisdiction should correct patent illegality or misreading, not substitute the Appellate Court’s view. The respondents defend the appellate verdict, relying on the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 NI Act, and the reverse-onus doctrine, arguing the accused did not rebut the presumptions and remained silent in reply to notice. The High Court ultimately dismissed the revision, upholding conviction and sentence, and directed payment of the fine by a specified date with execution deferred.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Criminal Misc. No.5123 of 2023) filed in the Kerala High Court, Ernakulam, under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings arising from S.C. No.1459 of 2022 in the Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram, relating to a 2019 incident involving accused Nos.1 to 5 and the respondents for offences under IPC Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323, 324, 308, and 294(b) read with Section 149 IPC. The petition contends amicable settlements between the accused and the victims/complainants and affidavits in support, seeking quashing of the proceedings so the parties can move forward peacefully. The Respondents, led by the Public Prosecutor, oppose quashing solely on that basis, though concede no additional crimes against the petitioners. The court surveys Supreme Court precedents, including State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan, Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, and related cases, to articulate the permissible scope of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash non‑compoundable offences with civil character arising from private disputes where the entire dispute has been resolved. The court concludes that, considering the gravity, injuries, antecedents, and the amicable settlement, quashing will not adversely affect society. The petition is allowed and Annexure 1 (Final Report) and further proceedings in SC 1459/2022 are quashed, with a note correcting the lower court’s name.
This Kerala High Court judgment deals with an appeal under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, filed by the employer (the Manager, SML Motors) against an order of the Employees' Compensation Commissioner (Industrial Tribunal), Idukki, which had awarded compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased Albert @ Suresh for injuries sustained in a road accident during the course of his employment as a mechanic. Albert died on 16 January 2011 following injuries suffered on 7 January 2011 while performing duty as an assistant mechanic. The Commissioner awarded Rs. 4,27,140, with 12% interest, Rs. 5,000 for funeral expenses and Rs. 2,135 costs. The appellant contends that the auto-rickshaw involved was not received for repair on 7 January 2011 and that the accident occurred after duty hours, when the deceased allegedly drove the vehicle at the owner’s instance, thus not arising out of or in the course of employment under Act 8 of 1923. The respondents claim reliance on the workshop-entry evidence and assert the accident was work-related. The High Court evaluates Ext. R1 and Ext. R2, and RW1–RW3 testimony, concluding the evidence does not establish a causal connection between the accident and the appellant’s employment. Relying on established tests from Jyothi Ademma, Regional Director v. Francis De Costa, and Sakuntala Shreshti, the court finds the impugned order perverse and sets it aside, allowing the appeal. The final outcome is that compensation is not payable to the respondents.
BAIL APPLN Nos. 4062/2023 & 4037/2023 These are concurrent regular bail applications in Crime No.686/2022 of Sasthamcotta Police Station, Kollam, filed by accused no.1 Aswin and accused no.2 Akhil under the NDPS Act. On 08.05.2022, at Bharanikkavu Junction, police intercepted an Innova bearing KL 03 AB-5511 and recovered 46.78 kilograms of ganja, allegedly transported from Andhra Pradesh to Kerala. The prosecution contends the contraband constitutes a commercial quantity, invoking Section 37 NDPS Act to bar bail. The petitioners contend they have been falsely implicated, are in custody since 09.05.2022, and that investigation has been completed with a final report laid, while a Part-B inquiry into other accused had been permitted for further investigation under Section 36A(4) NDPS. They rely on several decisions from the Delhi and Punjab & Haryana High Courts and Kerala decisions to argue that statutory bail should be granted where the investigation is incomplete or a final report is submitted but further investigation is allowed. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, highlighting that the charge sheet (Part-A) is already filed as SC No.2001/2022 and that mobile data verification for other accused remains pending, necessitating continued custody. The Court, after analyzing the cited authorities and the facts, concludes that in this case the investigation was complete, the final report filed, and the Part-B inquiry does not justify statutory bail for the petitioners. Consequently, the bail applications are dismissed, though the order notes that regular bail may be pursued on different grounds.
This writ petition by Santooommena Alexander seeks correction of the petitioner’s date of birth in CBSE records. The petitioner asserts the true date of birth is 27.12.1989, supported by Ext.P1 (Birth Certificate), Ext.P3 (Passport), and Ext.P4 (Aadhaar). The CBSE-issued Ext.P2 (Marks Statement, 2006) and Ext.P2(a) (All India SSCE Pass Certificate, 2006) wrongly record 27.12.1990. The petitioner filed Ext.P5 seeking correction and issuance of fresh certificates reflecting 27.12.1989. The petitioner’s counsel relies on the Supreme Court’s Jigya Yadav v. CBSE (2021) SCC Online SC 415, arguing that corrections to CBSE certificates to align with school records are permissible under reasonable conditions and time limits. The respondent CBSE’s counsel submits that the matter can be disposed of in light of Jigya Yadav’s observations. The court reiterates Jigya Yadav’s conclusions (paras 169–172): corrections aligned with school/public documents may be allowed with conditions (affidavit, indemnity, surrender of original certificates, fees, and potentially public notice). It directs the CBSE to process correction or change per Jigya Yadav, directing the 4th respondent to consider Ext.P5 within four weeks and the 3rd respondent to issue the certificate within six weeks after records are transmitted, with no costs incurred, and requires the petitioner to produce a copy of the judgment for compliance.
Writ Appeal No. 996 of 2022 This is a Division Bench appeal by the Regional Cancer Centre (RCC) and its Director challenging a single-judge order in W.P. (C) No. 41168 of 2016, which had granted benefits based on earlier orders and mandamus directing payment of service benefits for the period when the employee was not in service. The petitioner, nursing superintendent Flower Augustine, had her probation terminated in 1993, with successive orders treating the hiatus as duty, or as fresh service, and an order in 2012 counting that period for monetary benefits; however, subsequent government actions questioned the legality of these orders. In 2016, the High Court by Ext. P15 issued mandamus for payment of benefits within four months. Later, Ext. P21 (Sept. 2016) recalled those orders, noting illegality and resulting in a substantial financial implication. The Division Bench held that the Government’s Ext. P21 recalling of prior orders was permissible to correct illegalities and that the prior mandamus could not override binding judgments where the Government action was tainted by non-disclosure and recklessness surrounding the extension of benefits. The court distinguished the Nagabhushana principle and upheld Ext. P21, directing disbursement of only legitimate amounts and setting aside the learned Single Judge’s judgment. The matter underscores the balance between finality of judgments and corrective governmental action in cases involving public funds.
This High Court of Kerala original petition challenges a sole arbitrator’s Exhibit P9 order in ARC No.112/2019, alleging the arbitrator exceeded or misapplied his jurisdiction under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The petitioner, Mujeeb Rahman, and respondent, Haseena V., are partners who entered into Exhibit P1, a partnership deed dated 11.09.2012. The respondent filed O.S. No.64/2017 for recovery of Rs. 17,50,000, prompting the petitioner to invoke Sec.8(1) of the Act, seeking referral to arbitration per Clause 17(e) of Exhibit P1. The Civil Court relegated the disputes to arbitration via Exhibits P3–P4; subsequently, the Court of this Court appointed a sole Arbitrator by Exhibit P5 to adjudicate the disputes. The claimant filed Exhibit P6 before the arbitrator; the petitioner challenged maintainability arguing that dissolution of the firm is required before any monetary claim can be resolved, since the dissolution affects the status of the partnership. The arbitrator, by Exhibit P9, held the dispute arbitrable. The petitioner contends the dissolution of the firm is a statutory remedy to be pursued in civil court (citing Kadeeja v. Manjusha); the respondent contends the arbitration clause covers such disputes. The judge ultimately dismisses the petition, holding that the petition lacks merit and that, post-Kasim VK and Deep Industries, the arbitration framework is a self-contained code with limited scope for interference. The petition is dismissed with reasons grounded in statutory/arbitral law and jurisprudence on self-contained arbitration.
This is a criminal miscellaneous petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by Mohammed Shafi, guardian of the victim, challenging Annexure-A6, the motor occurrence report filed by the Assistant Commissioner of District Crime Branch, Kollam, in Crime No. 01/2015 arising from a fatal accident on the National Highway near Meenad on 01.01.2015. The petition contends that the second investigation leading to Annexure-A6 was illegal and conducted under improper influence. It argues that the Kerala State Road Safety Authority’s standing instructions require investigation by a officer of Dy.S.P. rank or higher when three or more persons die, and that the second investigation was not conducted accordingly. The petitioner asserts that Annexure-A6 exonerates Nixon Aby Mathew, the driver of the car, and that the real culprit is being shielded to enable compensation from MACT, supported by Annexures A7 (scene mahazar) and A8 (sketch), and by statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The matter centers on whether the second investigation was a legitimate exercise or a contrived effort to whitewash the driver. The learned Judge ultimately finds the Annexure-A6 report to be unreasonable and liable to be quashed, allowing the Cr.M.C. petition. The decision underscores judicial scrutiny over police reports in post-accident compensation disputes.
WA No. 48 of 2020 (and connected batch) This is a batch judgment of the Kerala High Court arising out of writ appeals (WA Nos. 48/2020 and several connected cases) challenging the validity and application of amendments to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act (KVAT) introduced by the Kerala Finance Act 2017 (11 of 2017) and the Kerala Finance Act 2018 (5 of 2018). The core dispute concerns the scope and retrospective/prospective operation of the amended Section 25(1) KVAT and the third proviso thereto, the extension of the period for reopening escaped assessments, and the competence of the State Legislature to amend the KVAT post the 2016 Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act (CAA). The Court examines doctrinal principles on retrospective legislation, vesting of rights, and the saving/transition provisions under the Kerala GST regime (KGST Act) and the Kerala GST Act, as well as constitutional entries, notably Article 246A and Entry 54 of List II. The bench, consisting of S. V. Bhatti and Basant Balaji JJ., concludes that the batch appeals are to be dismissed, upholding the impugned judgments and casting doubt on the broader retrospective reach of the 2018 amendments. The decision engages with authorities such as Baiju A.A, Hajee Abdul Shakoor, Calcutta Discount Co., Jyoti Traders, Mohit Minerals, and Reliance Industries, to articulate the limits of retrospective amendments and the shifting legislative landscape post-GST regime.
