WA 676/2020 (lead); and connected WA Nos. 52/2020, 395/2020, 800/2020, 711/2020, 721/2020, 712/2020, 713/2020, 754/2020, 735/2020, 743/2020, 790/2020, 1382/2020, 765/2020, 801/2020, 773/2020, 774/2020, 805/2020, 1391/2020, 1400/2020, 821/2020, 1363/2020, 1377/2020, 823/2020, 1491/2020, 1416/2020, 1381/2020, 802/2020, 803/2020, 859/2020, 873/2020, 871/2020, 883/2020, 3705/2018, 961/2020, 1036/2020, 1112/2020, 1101/2020, 1338/2020, 87/2022, 1206/2020, 11649/2017, 12570/2017, 12619/2017, 12959/2017, 17753/2017, 19310/2017, 20196/2017, 20283/2017, 1718/2020, 21946/2017, 24228/2017, 1705/2020 This batch of writ appeals before the Kerala High Court challenges the retrospective enactment of Section 42(3) of the Kerala VAT Act, introduced by the Kerala Finance Act, 2016 as Act 18/2016. The Department sought to reopen otherwise time-barred assessments by treating certain returns as “pending” and allowing retrospective reassessment beyond the period of limitation prescribed in Section 25 of the KVAT Act. The State contends that the Legislature could enact retrospectivity and that Section 42(3) should be read with Sections 20–25 of the KVAT Act, with a reasonable time limit on reopenings; the objective is certainty, uniformity and proper revenue realization. The dealers/respondents argue that retrospective application is unconstitutional, violates vested rights, and that the provision is vague and inconsistent with the KVAT scheme, Rule 58(20), and Section 25(1). The judgment, delivered by a Division Bench of Justices S. Bhatti and Basant Balaji on 30 November 2022, holds that Section 42(3) is valid in retrospection but must be read with a reasonable limitation to reopen time-barred assessments; it rejects unlimited reopening, distinguishes several older precedents, and ultimately disposes of the batch by dismissing the writ appeals. The decision emphasizes certainty, consistency, and prudent interpretation of fiscal statutes.
This is a revision under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, filed by Sujeesh Kumar challenging a Family Court, Kozhikode order in MC No.341/2019 passed on 13 May 2022 granting maintenance to the wife and the minor child. The respondents are the wife, Sharanya T.P., and the minor Vaiga, who contended that they had no means of maintenance, while the revision petitioner claimed to be earning only modest amounts through contract/ security work. The Family Court considered evidence and held that the revision petitioner could reasonably earn Rs.1,000 per day for 20 days a month, totaling around Rs.20,000 monthly, and accordingly awarded Rs.5,000 to the wife and Rs.4,000 to the minor per month from the date of petition. The petitioner challenged these figures, arguing illness and incapacity, and the respondents opposed the challenge, maintaining that maintenance is warranted in view of the parties’ needs and the wife’s and child’s circumstances. The High Court observed no convincing medical documentation for illness or incapacity and found the petitioner’s stated job as a security guard unsubstantiated by documentation. On these findings, the court upheld the Family Court’s reasoning that the maintenance amounts were reasonable and not excessive, and dismissed the revision petition, thereby confirming the maintenance order.
This High Court of Kerala rent-control proceeding arises from an eviction petition (OP (RC) No. 82/2017) filed by Beeran Haji (landlord) against Ali and Haris (tenants). During trial, the tenant sought to cross-examine the landlord using photocopies of the rent agreement and to mark those copies as evidence. The landlord objected, but the objection was overruled by a speaking order. The case centers on two issues: (i) the admissibility and marking of photocopies of the rent deed as evidence, and (ii) insufficiency of stamp duty on the instrument. The landlord contends that the photocopies are not admissible as primary evidence and that the original lease deed is at issue; the tenant argues the photocopies can be admitted as secondary evidence if properly authenticated and stamped. The court references Sections 65 and 66 of the Indian Evidence Act to delimit secondary evidence and the obligation to adduce secondary evidence following due process. It also cites the Kerala Stamp Act, Section 34, and the necessity that instruments be duly stamped to be admissible. The judgment discusses the principle that photocopies presented as secondary evidence cannot bypass stamp duty requirements and that improper stamping necessitates impounding or appropriate procedure. Ultimately, the court remits the matter to the Rent Controller to decide afresh, permitting the respondent tenant to adduce evidence based on photocopies if properly stamped and authenticated, and sets aside the impugned order. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
BAIL APPL. NO. 980 OF 2024 This is a bail application under Section 439 CrPC filed by the second accused in an NDPS case registered by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Cochin Zonal Unit, at Ernakulam. The prosecution alleges that a parcel from Germany containing LSD was received, and on controlled delivery at the Foreign Post Office, Kochi, 10 blots of LSD weighing 0.24 gms were found; on interrogation, first accused allegedly confessed involvement of accused 2 and 3, leading to further recoveries including 200 blots from the third accused and other linked acts. The petitioner argues that he has been falsely implicated; there is no material linking him beyond extrajudicial confessions, which are inadmissible in evidence in view of established precedent (Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, and Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau). He contends that he has no criminal antecedents, investigation is nearly complete, and the stringent rigour of Section 37 NDPS should not be applied, warranting bail. The Special Public Prosecutor counters with incriminating materials—monetary transactions, WhatsApp exchanges, and recoveries—which corroborate the petitioner’s involvement; the contraband is in commercial quantity and the investigation is at a nascent stage, so bail should be denied to protect the investigation. The court applies the NDPS bail framework, including the “reasonable grounds” test, and, after considering the gravity and stage of the case, concludes there are no reasonable grounds to grant bail, dismissing the application.
BAIL APPL. NO. 3397 OF 2024 Harikrishnan, aged 23, is the fourth accused in Crime No.60/2023 of Ambalappuzha Police Station, Alappuzha, charged under sections 406 and 420 read with 34 IPC. He moved bail under Section 438 CrPC seeking pre-arrest bail. The prosecution case alleges that the accused, in concert with others, induced the de facto complainant to invest in a real estate venture, promising profit. The de facto complainant transferred Rs. 2,67,000 to the petitioner’s bank account, but profits or return of capital were not paid. The defense asserts there is no direct transaction between the petitioner and the complainant; the first accused introduced the parties and later returned the entire amount by cheques which bounced; the dispute is civil in nature and custodial interrogation is unnecessary; there is no recovery to be effected at this stage. The learned Public Prosecutor contends that incriminating materials substantiate the petitioner’s involvement and that custodial interrogation is necessary for proper investigation, with the investigation potentially hampered if pre-arrest bail is granted. The court cites Supreme Court lineage emphasizing that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted only in exceptional circumstances and not as a routine rule. It notes the petitioner had a prior order denying pre-arrest bail by the Sessions Court. After evaluating the materials, the court finds the petitioner to be a beneficiary of the proceeds, warrants custodial interrogation and recovery, and consequently vacates the relief sought. The bail application is dismissed.
RCREV. NO.27 OF 2024; RCREV. NO.28 OF 2024; RCREV. NO.32 OF 2024 These Rent Control Revisions arise from concurrent eviction proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, challenging orders of eviction under Section 11(3) and 11(4)(v) of a three-storey commercial complex, the ‘Mammu Shopping Complex’, at Thalassery. The landlord sought eviction on bona fide need to occupy the ground and first floors to run a hotel business; the petitions also invoked Section 11(4)(v) on the ground that the tenant had ceased to occupy the premises. The Rent Control Court granted eviction under Section 11(3) after a finding of bona fide need and declined 11(4)(v) eviction. On appeal, the Rent Control Appellate Authority dismissed the appeals and upheld eviction. The tenants challenged the order in three Rent Control Revisions under Section 20 of the Act in the Kerala High Court. The High Court (Anil K. Narendran, J., with G. Girish, J.) dismissed the revisions, holding that the first proviso to Section 11(3) has no application where the landlord seeks to occupy the entire ground and first floors for hotel purposes, even if some rooms on other floors are in possession. The court relied on decisions including M.L. Prabhakar, Ram Narain Arora, Vasantha Mallan, Dineshan Pillai, Rukmini Amma Saradamma and others to emphasize that revisional jurisdiction tests legality, legality, and propriety rather than reappraising evidence, with narrow exceptions for perverse conclusions. Ultimately, the revisions were dismissed, but the court granted five months to vacate, with conditions to balance landlord’s need and tenant livelihood.
This is a bail application under Section 439 CrPC by the second accused, Saleelkumar, in Crime No. 42/2023 of the Thrissur East Police Station (CB EOW TSR-47/2023) registered for offences under Sections 406 and 420 IPC and Section 3 r/w 21, 5 r/w 23 of the BUDS Act. The petitioner was arrested on 15.12.2023 and has remained in judicial custody for about 60 days, with the final investigation report not yet laid. He seeks statutory bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC on the grounds of innocence, lack of involvement, and delay in investigation. The respondents concede the custody period but emphasize ongoing investigation and the accused’s alleged involvement in multiple crimes, arguing against bail. The court, however, places emphasis on the statutory entitlement to bail under 167(2) where the final report has not been laid within the prescribed time, citing decisions of higher courts. It notes that the first accused has already been granted bail in a related matter, underscoring parity. Relying on Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, Azharudheen v. State of Kerala, M. Ravindran v. DRI, and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), the court reiterates that the right to bail is protected to the extent of statutory provisions, and that delay cannot justify indefinite detention. Consequently, the petition is allowed, granting bail subject to bonds, two sureties, and standard conditions, with a clear admonition on compliance and potential cancellation for violations. The investigating agency retains authority to pursue inquiries and recoveries while bail is in effect.
The petitioner, Anil Kumar, approached the Kerala High Court seeking to compel the 2nd respondent bank to disclose the total amount due to close the loan and to permit full repayment so as to release documents submitted at the time of availing the loan. He further sought to restrain the Sub Registrar from registering the Sale Certificate issued in favour of the 3rd respondent. The bank had sanctioned a loan in 2005 secured by mortgage of the petitioner’s property; on default, the property was auctioned and purchased by the 3rd respondent, who obtained Ext.R3(a) Sale Certificate and possession by 2009. The bank then proceeded under SARFAESI, and the petitioner's efforts to redeem were thwarted, including an ex-parte decree against him and a dismissed application to set aside that order. The petitioner relied on Surinder Pal Singh v. Vijaya Bank and Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors to contend that redemption rights survive until the Sale Certificate is registered and possession is handed over. The respondents argued that the loan account was NPAs, the property was sold, and Ext.R3(a) had been registered; a civil court decree had been obtained, and hence redemption rights could not be asserted. The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it, noting the prior ex-parte proceedings and delivery of possession to the 3rd respondent.
Petitioners S. Prasannan and Asha S., auction purchasers, seek mutation of an auctioned property mortgaged by the defaulter to the State Bank of India. The property was mortgaged on 11-02-2008; sale in the Debts Recovery Tribunal (OA No.231/2009) occurred in 2013 and a sale certificate was issued on 05-02-2014. The petition for mutation (Ext.P6) remained pending, while the RTI‑based inquiry (Ext.P7) revealed post‑mortgage liabilities including civil court attachments, tax arrears, and a criminal‑court compensation order amounting to Rs.15,00,000, with revenue recovery proceedings continuing. The Government Pleader argued that government dues enjoy priority over the bank’s mortgage rights, and that penalties under the Money Lenders Act create a statutory charge. The petitioners contended that civil court attachments levied after the mortgage date cannot impede the bank’s mortgage enforcement, and that penalties and compensation orders post‑date of mortgage should not obstruct mutation. The court cites Madhan S. v. Sub Registrar, Kollam, and Travancore Devaswom Board v. Deputy Examiner, Local Fund Audit and Others, to support the principle that post‑mortgage attachments do not affect mortgage rights. It holds that mutation can be made absolute subject to payment of penalties under the Money Lenders Act (Rs.5,000 and Rs.20,000 with interest), and that post‑mortgage attachments and the compensation order cannot stand as impediments. Interim order dated 23-07-2015 is to be treated as absolute upon payment within one month. Writ petition disposed of with directions.
This writ petition challenges the arrear property tax demand raised by the Palakkad Municipality under the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, against the petitioner who claims title and possession of a Kalyanamandapam acquired via court auction and delivery in 2010. The petitioner asserts that after purchasing the property in a court auction and obtaining delivery in 2010, he became the owner in possession of the Kalyanamandapam and its land, and began paying property tax and Luxuries Tax as required. He contends that due to procedural delays, revenue records could not be updated to reflect his ownership. The dispute centers on alleged tax liability computed from a half-yearly tax fixed by the first respondent and the validity of the arrear notice dated 06.06.2017 (Ext. P3) demanding Rs. 8,37,645, including interest, under Sections 231-233 of the Kerala Municipality Act, read with Rule 3 of the Rules for publication of notices regarding new taxes. He argues no assessment under Sections 233(10) and 233(11) had been made and no notice issued, so the petitioner was denied an opportunity to be heard. The court notes a prior order in WP(C) 5213/2013 quashing Ext. P4 and directing reconsideration, and holds Ext. P3 unsustainable, directing the 1st respondent to reconsider the matter strictly under the statute. The petition is disposed of with Ext. P3 set aside.
Bail Appl. Nos. 8929/2023; 8973/2023; 8981/2023; 1672/2024; 1677/2024; 1681/2024; 1682/2024; 1683/2024; 1684/2024; 1685/2024 This is a consolidated pre-arrest bail judgment of the Kerala High Court (Ernakulam) dated 21 March 2024, arising from a batch of bail applications under Section 438 CrPC filed by Abdul Hameed Anakkaran Thayale Purayil, the petitioner in multiple Chandera Police Station cases in Kasaragod (Crimes 957/2020, 610/2020, 577/2020, 1017/2020, 1023/2020, 1037/2020, 1041/2020, 1044/2020, 1050/2020 and 1065/2020). The petitioner, aged 64, is alleged as a director involved in inducement of defacto-complainants to invest in Fashion Gold International Pvt. Ltd., Nujoom Gold Pvt. Ltd., Qamar Fashion Gold Pvt. Ltd., and Fashion Ornaments Pvt. Ltd., with promises of dividends and return of capital, but with non-payment of dividends and non-repayment of investments. The offences include Sections 406, 409 and 420 IPC, and provisions of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019 (3 read with 21(1)-(3) and 5 read with 23), and Section 5 of the Kerala Protection of Interests of Depositors in Financial Establishments Act. The court relies on Annexure A1 (common order in BA 8880/2023 dated 05.12.2023) granting pre-arrest bail in a batch of similar cases, finding custodial interrogation unnecessary. Consequently, the applications are allowed with standard conditions: surrender before the Investigating Officer within one week; production before the jurisdictional court on arrest; bond of Rs.1,00,000 with two solvent sureties; cooperation with investigation; no witness intimidation; no other offences; and potential cancellation of bail for violation. The order reinforces that observations are not merits and cites Sushila Aggarwal for bail-related guidance.
CRP No.2819/2002, WA 1346/2022, WPC 32871/2022, OPC 3827/2012 & OP 33731/2002 These connected matters challenge a sale of Devi Vilasam Palace (Item No.9 in the partition suit) conducted in 1992 in Os No.1/1964, Palakkad District Court, allegedly to clear tax arrears. The lead Original Petition (OP 33731/2002) was filed under Article 227 of the Constitution seeking to set aside the sale, arguing that the tax dues did not exist and that the sale was based on wrong facts. The batch also includes CRP 2819/2002, WA 1346/2022, WPC 32871/2022 and OPC 3827/2012, with petitions by the co-sharers and heirs challenging the sale or seeking to nullify or properly account for the proceeds. The Court undertakes a thorough examination of whether the sale, ordered in 28.01.1983 and confirmed later, was merely a compromise decree (arising from a partition suit) or an execution sale under the Partition Act. It concludes that the sale was the product of a party-to-party compromise decree approved by the Court, not a sale under Section 2 of the Partition Act, 1893, and that the compromise decree, once approved, attains finality. Citing Bimal Kumar v. Shakunata Debi (2012) and a Supreme Court civil appeal (1996) Nos. 13216-13217 (1997) 2 SCC 623, the Court holds that challenges under Article 227 fail. Accordingly, CRP 2819/2002, WA 1346/2022, WPC 32871/2022, OPC 3827/2012 and OP 33731/2002 are disposed of, with the sale upheld and the petitions dismissed. The writ appeal pertaining to the registrability of the sale is disposed of with directions to act in accordance with law. The District Court Palakkad is directed to take steps to reflect the sale or provide appropriate relief. The proceedings end with the court dismissing the petitions and non-interference with the sale order.
The petitioner Anil Kumar, an employee allegedly present at Toddy Shop No.9 in Ranny Excise Range during 2005-2006, challenges Ext.P1, an order of determination under the Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1969, and the consequential revenue recovery under Ext.P2. Ext.P1, issued under Section 8 of the Act, fixed liability for welfare fund contributions due to alleged default by the employer in remitting contributions for the shop’s workers. The 4th respondent states that the petitioner admitted, during proceedings, his role in running Shop No.9 and his responsibility to settle the welfare dues; the petitioner had previously maintained that he was only an employee and not the employer, arguing that the employer should bear liability under Section 4. The case examines who qualifies as an “employer” under Section 2(c) (employer means a person who employs one or more employees and includes anyone with a licence for toddy under the Abkari Act) and whether the liability can extend to persons other than the licensee, including those conducting the business. The court cites Welfare Fund Inspector v. Jaya (2006 (3) KLT 988) and Sasi V. and Others v. State of Kerala (2016 KHC 694) to support joint/extend liability and to require a reconsideration of the determination order. The High Court sets aside Ext.P1, directing the 4th respondent to re-evaluate in light of these decisions and stays revenue recovery until a fresh assessment order is issued within two months.
The appellant Thapas Berman @ Thapas was convicted under Section 302 IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge-III, Pathanamthitta, for the murder of Nani Gopal Das at Chickinns Restaurant, Pathanamthitta, on 22 August 2016. The prosecution relied on the oral testimony of PW1 (restaurant owner), PW2 (supplier) and PW3 (security staff), who stated that the deceased and the accused, both Bengalis, quarreled inside the kitchen over cooking matters, after which the accused allegedly stabbed the deceased with a knife kept in the kitchen. CW2, Pintu Barman, claimed witness to the quarrel, was not examined, prompting defence to argue that the case rests on circumstantial evidence and hearsay under Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act. The trial court nonetheless convicted and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 50,000. On appeal to the Kerala High Court, a Division Bench examined admissibility under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act (res gestae) and found the evidence of PW1–PW3 admissible as part of the same transaction, corroborated by CW2’s information and hospital records. The court rejected the claim of insubstantial evidence due to minor time discrepancies and upheld the prosecution’s case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal is thus dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence.
Richard S. Austin, a former Assistant Salesman of the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation, challenges a disciplinary regime that culminated in his dismissal for alleged misconduct related to loss arising from duties. He contends that the disciplinary authority did not supply him with a copy of the enquiry report, a crucial document in procedural fairness, and therefore the decision-maker could not fairly rely on the report. Although the enquiry was conducted (the report prepared by the enquiry officer on 13.10.2010 and subsequent communications), the copy of the enquiry report was not served to him until 15.02.2013, after the show-cause notice and during the pendency of the appeal. The respondents argue that furnishing the enquiry report was not mandatory and that the petitioner should have demanded it; they claim prejudice is not established since the copy was eventually provided during the appeal stage. The court surveys a line of constitutional and Supreme Court precedents on natural justice, notably Union of India v. Mohammed Ramzan Khan, Manager Director ECIL v. B Karunakar, Avtar Singh, and A.N. D’Silva v. Union of India, to hold that supplying the enquiry report and enabling the delinquent to respond are essential. The court finds non-compliance with natural justice, quashes several interlocutory orders, and directs that the enquiry report copy be supplied, with an opportunity to file objections and be heard, restarting the process from the point of violation if necessary.
This writ petition challenges Ext.P11, an order by the Tahsildar (LR), Kottayam, rejecting the petitioner’s request to mutate the name of the pattadar in revenue records from the erstwhile Bellerose Institute of Medical Sciences Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. KIMS Bellerose Institute of Medical Sciences Pvt. Ltd. The petitioner-company traces its lineage to sale deeds and corporate reorganizations: Ext.P1 deed transferring land to Bellerose, subsequent MOUs and agreements dated 2012–2013, and Ext.P2’s certificate of incorporation changing the company’s name to KIMS Bellerose Institute of Medical Sciences Pvt. Ltd.; Ext.P4 tax receipts still show the earlier entity as pattadar. Representatives Exts.P5 and P6 sought change of name, and an interim order Ext.P10 directed consideration. Ext.P11 refused the change, citing objections by the 5th respondent, pendency of S.L.P. No.569/2019 before the Supreme Court, FIR No.411/2019 of Crime Branch, and ECIR proceedings by the Enforcement Directorate, plus alleged non-due stamping under Sections 39 and 42 of the Companies Act, 2013. The petitioner contends that mutation affects only fiscal records and is not barred by those proceedings, and urges reliance on Park Residency v. State of Kerala and related judgments. The High Court ultimately sets aside Ext.P11 and directs the 3rd respondent to reconsider Exts.P5 and P6 in light of Park Residency and Exts.P8–P9 judgments, with hearing, within one month.
This writ appeal (W.A. No. 1958 of 2023) arises from a writ petition (W.P.(C) No. 36914 of 2023) filed by Adv. Rajesh Kumar C., a candidate for the Managing Committee election of the Thiruvalla Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. The petition sought police protection at polling venues on 12 November 2023, CCTV installation, videography of polling, verification of voter identity using Form 6A with Form 6B, and appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to oversee the process. The petitioner alleged that the election is polarized along political lines (UDF vs CPI(M)) and that CPI(M) members would resort to violence or irregularities to secure a favourable result. The learned Single Judge disposed of the petition by directing police protection and CCTV at the polling site, and ordered verification of identity measures focused on disputed issues. The appellant challenged that order, seeking broader verification of all voters and an Advocate Observer. The bench held that the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and Rules, particularly Sections 69, 70A and Section 94, together with Rule 35A, govern disputes and election conduct, and that the High Court cannot appoint an Advocate Commissioner for overseeing polling in such elections, relying on Malanadu Service Cooperative Bank Limited. It nonetheless directed specific security and verification measures, including a Police Bandobast Scheme and videography, to ensure a fair election on 12 November 2023.
WA Nos.1498/2022; 1808/2022; 1807/2022; W.P.(C) Nos.4646/2022; 6955/2023; 19871/2022; 20313/2022; 26745/2022; 32204/2022; 36142/2022 This batch of writ appeals and associated writ petitions before the Kerala High Court concerns the recruitment process conducted by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) for Police/Armed Forces (CAPFs, NIA, SSF, AR). The court reviews the challenge to the common judgment dated 09.12.2021 which had directed SSC to complete the recruitment in light of earlier orders, including setting apart a substantial number of posts (243 and odd) from the notified vacancies for consideration of petitioners in earlier rounds. The core issue is whether the court can order filling of all unfilled posts across the merit list and whether the “actus curiae neminem gravabit” principle justifies undoing the injustice caused by past interim orders that kept apart postings. The High Court, while acknowledging that pushing all remaining vacancies into a single pool would derail a completed selection process and the associated training and appointments, modifies the directive. It holds that SSC should complete recruitment for 73–83 candidates from the available merit pool within eight weeks and that the balance unfilled vacancies may be carried forward to future rounds, preserving the already concluded selection. The court emphasises balancing fair consideration with the practicalities of a finalized recruitment process, and it clarifies that candidates who already accepted appointment orders did so with knowledge of pending litigation. The judgment relies on established constitutional and administrative law principles, particularly the limits of executive discretion and the necessity of avoidable prejudice in court actions.
This is a Motor Accident Claims Appeal (MACA No.1745 of 2013) arising from an award dated 23.08.2012 in O.P.(M.V.) No.2228/2004 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Thiruvananthapuram. The appellants, as legal heirs of the deceased Anith George (age 28), challenged the Tribunal’s finding of negligence attributed to the driver of lorry KL 06/3537, owned by the 1st respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent. The Tribunal had awarded Rs.2,84,900 with 9% interest, holding the insurer liable and directing deposit of the amount. The appellants argued for enhancement on several heads, contending the deceased’s income was higher, future prospects should be added, and losses including funeral, loss of estate, and loss of consortium merited appropriate compensation. The court criticised the income assessment, noting lack of evidence for Rs.8,000/month and applying Ramachandrappa to accept Rs.4,500/month as a baseline for 2004. It also applied Pranay Sethi (2017) to add 40% future prospects and to deduct 50% for personal expenses. After recalculations, it awarded an additional Rs.4,75,200 and ordered deposit with 8% interest, while condoning 229 days of delay for the appeal with a caveat on interest for the delay period. The decision modifies the MACT award and allows the appeal in part.
TR.P(C) Nos. 550 & 700 of 2022 This is a common order of the Kerala High Court, Ernakulam, disposing of two transfer petitions (Tr.P(C) Nos. 550/2022 and 700/2022) arising from matrimonial disputes linked to the marriage of Madhu Sankarankutty with his late wife Bindu. The petitions seek transfer of proceedings from the Family Court, Chavara, to the Family Court, Mavelikkara, invoking Section 24 CPC on the ground of convenience and to avoid hardship for the family. The petitioners (the husband and close relatives) assert they are permanent residents of Chettikulangara, Alappuzha, and travelling to Chavara is burdensome, especially since they had earlier engaged in separate O.P.s in Mavelikkara for divorce and related issues. The respondents (Ravi and Vasumathy) oppose transfer, arguing that the custody matters involve children who currently reside and study within the Chavara jurisdiction, making transfer disruptive and burdensome for the children. The court notes, relying on prior Supreme Court and Kerala High Court authorities, that the welfare of the woman and children governs transfer decisions in matrimonial disputes. The judge ultimately holds that the children’s convenience, given their residence and studies in Chavara, outweighs the petitioners’ travel inconveniences. Exercising no discretionary transfer power under Section 24 CPC, the petitions are dismissed, keeping the matter in Chavara. The order is by Justice C. S. Dias, dated 23 March 2023.
