Ex.FA Nos. 9/2021; 11/2021; 12/2021; 13/2021; 14/2021; 15/2021 These six execution first appeals arise from common orders passed by the Trial Court in six applications under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC, filed by claimants who asserted ownership rights over properties attached in execution of a Decree originally passed by the Bombay High Court and subsequently transferred to the Kerala District Court, Thrissur for execution. The properties were attached in 2019, long after the 2012 transfers alleged by the claimants. The Cotton Corporation of India Limited (appellant) contended that the relief sought should be treated as a defence and not barred by limitation; they relied on a 2002 decision (Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi And Another v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi) to argue that an attachment under Order 21 Rule 58 CPC is a protective measure rather than a remedy constrained by the Limitation Act, and thus not subject to a strict three-year bar under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The respondents contended that the belated attachment cannot be permitted under Section 53 or as a defence to the claim, since a three-year limitation applies to such applications from the date of alienation/transfer. The High Court, however, rejected the appellant’s broad reliance on that authority and held that any application or suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act must be barred if filed beyond three years from the date of execution of the alienation, distinguishing the cited authority. The Court ultimately held that all six appeals fail and were dismissed without cost, upholding the trial court’s common order that lifted the attachments. The decision clarifies the circumscribed scope of Section 53 in attachment proceedings and reiterates the protective but time-bound nature of such applications.
This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arises from a Rent Control eviction order in which a mediation settlement directed the tenant to surrender the petition schedule building to the landlord by 5 December 2022 and to pay Rs 3,000 monthly rent with 10% annual increase. The landlord pursued execution (EP 251/2022) after the tenant failed to vacate, yielding Ext. P4 (15 February 2023) for delivery of possession. The tenant then filed this OP (RC) 64 of 2023, seeking to set aside Ext. P4 and to grant one year’s time from today to vacate, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. The High Court, after analyzing jurisprudence on Article 227, held that the execution court cannot go beyond the decree and that supervisory interference is limited, particularly where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or gross denial of natural justice. It found no basis to interfere with Ext. P4, noting that the mediation settlement schedule had expired and that the petitioner’s request for extended time was an abuse of process. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the eviction order under Ext. P1 remained in force, with possession to be delivered as directed.
J. Jacob Kallummoodan, the defacto complainant, filed CRL.M.C. 4867/2017 challenging a bail order (CMP 4599/2017) passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class II, Kollam on 24 June 2017 in Crime No.1412/2014 of Shaktikulangara Police Station. The case concerns offences under IPC sections 143, 147, 294(b), 326, 506(i), and 307, read with 149, and Arms Act Section 27. The petitioner argues the bail order is illegal because the Magistrate did not assign reasons for granting bail, a serious crime involving possible custodial interrogation. It was also noted that no custody application was filed within 15 days of arrest, and the order states that there was no custody application filed even after 6 days; therefore the order is vitiated and per se illegal. The Public Prosecutor conceded that the order lacks reasons and that there was violation of the time frame for custody applications under Cr.P.C. The Court refers to the principle that bail orders must be reasoned (citing Mansab Ali v. Irsan) and that non-filing of a custody application in time alone cannot justify unconditional bail. It observes that the police custody has a statutory limit under 167(2)(a) Cr.P.C., and the Magistrate is obligated to provide reasons for grant of bail, especially in very serious offences. The court ultimately disposes of the petition with directions to conclude committal proceedings within four weeks and to communicate the order to the lower court.
This is a Kerala High Court writ petition (Criminal) challenging a preventive detention order under the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (KAAPA). The petitioner, mother of the detenu Jithin Joseph, seeks certiorari to quash Ext.P2 detention order (dated 28.04.2022), a habeas corpus to produce the detenu and set him at liberty, and a mandamus to facilitate the court registry’s numbering/translation of documents. Detention was based on three pre-detention cases (Cr. Nos. 149/2019, 832/2019, 221/2022) at Iritty Police Station, classifying the detenu as a known goonda/rowdy and asudden anti-social actor under KAAPA Sec.2(p)(3) read with Sec.2(t) and Sec.2(a). Ext.P2 was approved by the Government (Sec.3(3)) and confirmed on Ext.P4 after an Advisory Board hearing. The four principal contentions pressed by the petitioner were: (A) non-consideration of bail conditions attached to the first case; (B) acquittal in the third case rendering the third case irrelevant; (C) the detention lacking public-order orientation; and (D) failure to consider bail-cancellation for the first case. The Court ultimately quashed the detention order (Ext.P2) and the confirmation (Ext.P4), holding that the non-consideration of bail-cancellation was a fatal flaw in the decision-making process, and directed release of the detenu. The judgment emphasizes the KAAPA framework, application of mind, and alignment with constitutional safeguards (Arts. 21, 22).
The petitioner, Mani P.S., aggrieved by Ext P3 order and Ext P5 sale proclamation in EA 43/2022 in EP 47/2016 before the Munsiff Court, Kattappana, has filed this original petition challenging the sale of his residential property. The respondent decreeholder initiated execution to realize Rs. 4,10,248 on the basis of an award in AP 1763/2016. The property, measuring 2.83 ares, is claimed by the petitioner to be exempt under Section 60(1)(c) CPC as a mason by profession. The petitioner filed EA 43/2022 under Section 47 CPC to resist attachment and sale of his house; Ext P2 is the objection. The court below dismissed Ext P1 and proceeded with sale via Ext P5. The petitioner also raised an objection to the draft sale proclamation (Ext P4), which the court did not properly consider. The court in Ext P3 held no illegality and proceeded to sale; the petitioner’s plea that only a portion of the property should be sold was rejected under Rule 90(3) of Order 21 CPC. The High Court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, confirms that the petition is meritless, emphasizes that exemption under Sec.60 must be raised at the first opportunity (citing Bhaskar Traders v. Kunjiraman), and declines to interfere with the district court’s orders. Consequently, the original petition is dismissed.
The petitioner, Varghese Mathew @ Ajinithya, is the sole accused in C.C. No.859/2019 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court (Economic Offences), Ernakulam. He faced prosecutions under sections 505(1)(b) IPC, 67 IT Act, 2000, and 118(e) Kerala Police Act, 2011, in connection with a Facebook/WhatsApp post titled a casting call for a film named Kataribagh. The poster depicted satirical undertones, portraying a casting notice for a project meant to attract artists, and the complainants — the Commodore, Commanding Officer, and Station Commander Navy — contended the content could denigrate the armed forces and undermine morale. The investigation began as IT Act Section 67, with cognizance taken in 2018 and the case numbered 859 of 2019. The petitioner’s counsel argued the post was a satirical, creative expression by a film professional, lacking any lascivious content or intent to alarm the public, and thus not attracting the cited offenses. The Public Prosecutor contended the post was aimed at degrading the Navy. The Kerala High Court invoked its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC, relying on Bhajan Lal guidelines, and held that the uncontroverted facts do not disclose any offense. Result: the petition is allowed and the entire proceedings in C.C.859/2019, including the final report, are quashed.
This High Court of Kerala, in OP(C) No. 602 of 2023, exercises superintendence under Article 227 to review an Ext.P3 order of a Munsiff’s court in Ele. O.P. No. 1/2021 challenging the election of Ward No. IV, Manjappally, Kanjirappally Grama Panchayat held on 10.12.2020. The petitioner, V.N. Rajesh, was declared elected with 610 votes; the 1st respondent, Sibu Devasia, challenged the result on the ground that five electors—PW10, PW11, PW12, PW13 and PW17—cast votes in two constituencies, violating Section 102(1)(d)(iii) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, which could render their votes void and potentially affect the margin (three votes). The Munsiff’s Court found that these five votes were cast twice and passed Ext.P3 setting aside the petitioner’s election. The petitioner contends this finding rests on improper naked-eye signature comparison under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, urging the Court should refrain from acting as an expert; he relies on State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram and other precedents to limit judicial experimentation. The respondents defend the impugned order, arguing the court’s overall material supports double voting and that it properly followed Neelalohithadasan Nadar and other Kerala precedents. The High Court ultimately upholds the lower court’s approach and dismisses the petition, emphasizing expeditious disposal of election petitions and limiting supervisory interference.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1582 OF 2012 This is a criminal revision petition filed by Revathy Karthik challenging a conviction under the Abkari Act (Sections 8(1) and 8(2)). The prosecution case, based on PW2, excise inspector, alleges that on 07-11-2007 at around 5:30 p.m., the accused was found in possession of two litres of arrack in a plastic bottle near Southupara Government High School, leading to seizure and a charge sheet under Abkari Act. PW1, an independent witness, turned hostile; PW2 alone supported the case, having detected, seized, and investigated the contraband. The trial court convicted the accused and imposed one year of simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh, with default imprisonment. The appellate court dismissed the appeal, sustaining the conviction. The High Court’s scrutiny focused on the chain of custody of the seized sample and whether the sample sent for chemical analysis was the very sample seized at the spot. The court highlighted material lacunae: illegible specimen seals in the seizure mahazar, discrepancy between the sample seal on forwarding notes and the mahazar, and absence of examination of theExcise Guard or other chain-of-custody witnesses. Relying on Kerala High Court decisions on seal integrity and link evidence, the court found reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused, setting aside the conviction and sentence. The revision petition is allowed accordingly, and the accused is released.
The appellant, Dr. Radhika T., a Scheduled Caste candidate, approached the Kerala High Court seeking certiorari to quash Ext.P4 (20.04.2022) and Ext.P6 (16.09.2022) issued by the Cochin University of Science and Technology and its Registrar, respectively, and to direct appointment as Associate Professor-Inorganic Chemistry in the Department of Applied Chemistry from Ext.P2 rank list. Ext.P1 notification (22.10.2019) invited applications for posts including a vacancy earmarked for SC candidates; Ext.P2 rank list for the post showed four SC candidates with the appellant as the 2nd rank holder, while the 1st rank holder, Anitha C. Kumar, secured 66 marks. Anitha Kumar was relieved on 30.03.2022 to take up employment as Professor at MG University; subsequently, Ext.P6 denied appointment citing that the communal rotation turn after the relief was reserved for LC/AI. The Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition. The appellant contends that Ext.P2 was valid for two years under Section 31 of the Cochin University Act, 1986 and KS&SSR, and Annexures A and B (GO 15.07.1992 and Circular 23.09.2019) govern reservations. The respondents rely on the roster rotation and the fact that the vacancy cannot be treated as reserved for SC after the relief of the first rank holder. The High Court ultimately upholds the lower court’s view, holding the appellant has no legal right to appointment and dismisses the writ appeal, with no costs.
Abdul Majeed, then 17 years old at the time of the 1991 offences, manipulated his school admission register to reflect a birth date of 05.04.1970 to meet emigration rules. He applied for a passport in 1991, and was charged with forgery under IPC sections 468 and 471 and Section 12(1)(b) of the Passport Act, 1967. The Judicial First Class Magistrate convicted him on 06.12.2003; the Sessions Court affirmed the conviction on 31.03.2006, though it reduced some sentences and set aside one fine. The appellant challenged these orders in criminal revisions, raising a core question about the scope and applicability of Juvenile Justice laws enacted in 2000 and 2015 to a case arising from acts committed in 1991 when the accused was governed by the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand clarified that the 2000 Act would apply to pending proceedings if the juvenile had not completed eighteen years as on 1 April 2001, with the reckoning date being the date of offence. Amendments by Act No. 33 of 2006 and the 2015 Act’s Section 25 further govern pending cases. The High Court held that the petitioner should be treated as a juvenile under the amended framework and directed forwarding to the Juvenile Justice Board for appropriate orders, while upholding the underlying conviction for the substantive offences.
The petitioner, I.B. Satheesh M.L.A., is a member of the syndicate of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University. He challenges Ext.P6, an order of the Chancellor suspending Ext.P3 (the Syndicate Standing Committee on University Administrative Affairs) and Ext.P5 (the Board of Governors’ resolutions) until further orders. Ext.P3 created a committee to give administrative support to the Vice Chancellor and Registrar, while Ext.P5 deferred transfer orders of employees. Ext.P6 purportedly suspended these resolutions under Section 10(3) of the APJ Abdul Kalam Technological University Act, 2015. The petitioner contends that the Chancellor’s order violated Section 10(3) because it did not provide an opportunity to show-cause prior to passing the suspension order, as mandated by the proviso to the section. The respondents concede that no show-cause was given before Ext.P6, but argue that immediate action was warranted given alleged illegality, and that a post-decisional show-cause could suffice. The court unanimously rejects this argument, holding that compliance with the statutory procedure is mandatory and cannot be circumvented. Citing Nazir Ahmad, Singhara Singh, and other authorities, the court emphasizes that a show-cause must precede any suspension order. Resultantly, Ext.P6 is quashed, with directions that the university may proceed afresh under Section 10(3) of the Act, preserving the petitioner’s rights. The decision underscores strict adherence to due process in university governance and suspension powers.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous petition (CRL.MC No. 3637 of 2016) by Rajeevan, the second accused in CC No.804/2014, challenging his prosecution under sections 3(2)(d) and 7(1)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Order 25 of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985. The petition seeks to quash the criminal proceedings on the ground that the allegations arise from a registration of crime by a Sub-Inspector of Police, who lacked the authority to act under the Fertilizer Order. The facts: on 29.11.2012 a lorry carrying fertilizer sacks was found near a depot; documents were not produced; a crime was registered; The petitioner contends that only an inspector or duly authorized officer under the Fertilizer Order could initiate such actions; The matter cites Supreme Court precedents Avatar Singh v. State of Punjab (2023) and Abdul Rashid v. State of Haryana, Raj Narain @ Kuka v. State of Punjab. The court explains the Fertiliser (Control) Order, 1985, Chapter VII on enforcement authorities, appointment of registering authorities (26, 26A), appointment of inspectors (27), qualifications (27A), and powers (28). The judge notes that only a properly qualified inspector can conduct search and seizure; In this case, the Sub-Inspector did not have necessary qualifications, rendering the seizure and the proceeding illegal. The court cites Avatar Singh for the principle that actions must be taken in the prescribed manner; and Dharani Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. v. UOI for the broader principle that powers must be exercised as prescribed. The petition is allowed and all further proceedings in CC No.804 of 2014 are quashed.
Arbitration Request No.34 of 2021 before the Kerala High Court concerns a joint venture arrangement between Sindhu Joji (the applicant) and several opposing parties in relation to the 5th respondent company. The applicant invoked Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to appoint an arbitrator to resolve disputes arising from Annexure A (Joint Venture Agreement) and related notices (Annexures A–C). Clause 19 requires mediation through an Auditor or a Practicing Company Secretary before arbitration; the arbitration clause provides a fallback to arbitration on failure of mediation. The respondents argued that the pre-arbitral mediation must be attempted and completed before invoking arbitration, and questioned the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, while the petitioner pressed for appointment of a Sole Arbitrator. The High Court noted that a mediation process had been conducted under the High Court Mediation Centre with sittings in June 2022, but could not secure a settlement. Citing Tulip Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v Trade Wings Ltd. and Visa International Ltd. v Continental Resorts (USA) Ltd., the court held that where it is evident that the parties do not intend to settle, the pre-condition of mediation will not hinder arbitration. Consequently, the court negatived the respondents’ objection and ordered that an arbitrator be appointed: retired Justice S. S. Satheesachandran was provisionally nominated as Sole Arbitrator. The order directs disclosure under Section 11(8) r/w Section 12(1) of the amended Act (Act 3 of 2016), communication of the order to the arbitrator, and the arbitrator’s fees per Schedule IV with costs to be shared equally. The registry is to place the disclosure before the court for confirmation; the arbitration proceeds under Annexure A.
WP(Crl.) Nos. 230 of 2023 and 381 of 2023 These two writ petitions, filed by Praveen K.P. alias Praveen Rana, arise from a string of criminal cases registered against him across multiple police stations in Kerala. The petitioner seeks to club together all FIRs arising from a single business transaction and transfer them to a Designated Court under the BUDS Act, contending that they are interconnected and stem from a common scheme. In WP(Crl.) No. 381 of 2023, the petitioner also seeks bail in all cases by treating the first crime as the principal FIR and argues that judicial custody should be reckoned from 13.01.2023, the date of remand in the first case. The respondents counter that the FIRs relate to separate transactions involving different complainants, deposits, and periods; thus clubbing risks prejudice to numerous depositors and would undermine victims’ rights. They note that 263 crimes have been registered and that investigations are ongoing under the Crime Branch with the BUDS Act invoked. The court surveys precedents (Abhishek Singh Chauhan, Anubhav Mittal, Narendrajith Sahani, Arnesh Kumar, Satender Kumar Antil, Vinubhai Malaviya, Vinay Tyagi) to determine whether single-offence clubbing is warranted and whether a universal bail regime is permissible. It ultimately declines to club the FIRs, rejects a comprehensive future bail order, and directs timely arrest recordings with Cr.P.C. safeguards. WP230 is dismissed; WP381 is disposed of with directions.
This is a criminal revision petition filed by O.K. Omana challenging the conviction of offences under Sections 55(a), 55(b), and 55(g) of the Kerala Abkari Act by the trial court (Asst. Sessions Court, Hosdrug) and the confirmation of the conviction by the Sessions Court (Kasargod) with increased penalties. The prosecution alleged illicit distillation of arrack on 29-11-1999, revealing apparatus, 1 litre of arrack, and 20 litres of wash fit for illicit distillation. PWs 1–6 and Exts. P1–P12 (MO1–MO3) were relied upon; Omana was convicted and sentenced to one year imprisonment on each count with Rs. 1,00,000 fines in each count, with concurrent sentences and set-off. On revision, Omana’s counsel questioned the integrity of the seizure and custody chain, highlighting a 22-day unexplained delay in producing the seized property Ext. P10 (produced on 21.12.1999), the absence of the specimen seal, and inconsistent statements about safekeeping and destruction of contraband (Exts. P9, P12). The High Court cites Baburaj and Sathi to emphasize strict compliance with Abkari Act formalities and non-applicability of presumptions. It further endorses Ramachandran and Chandran on the fatality of unexplained delays in sample production. Ultimately, the court allows the revision petition, acquitting Omana, and cancelling bail bonds. The decision underscores the gravity of statutory compliance in Abkari prosecutions and the need for robust chain-of-custody evidence.
This batch of Kerala High Court writ appeals concerns the ambit and retrospective/ prospective effect of amendments to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act (KVAT) made by Kerala Finance Acts 2017 and 2018 in the wake of the introduction of the GST regime. The core issue is whether amendments substituting ‘five years’ with ‘six years’ for Section 25(1) of KVAT (and the third proviso) are retrospective or prospective, and whether they can reopen assessments for years where limitation had already expired, especially in the context of the KGST/ GST framework and the CAA 2016 transition. The court undertakes exhaustive statutory construction, considering Article 246A, the repeal of KVAT, and saving clauses under KGST, with emphasis on whether the legislature intended retroactive effects or merely prospective change. It cites landmark cases on retrospective operation (Calcutta Discount Co., Hajee Abdul Shakoor, Baiju A A, Jyoti Traders, Mohit Minerals) and the Gujarat/Telangana line of authority, ultimately concluding that the 2017 amendment operates prospectively and that the 2018 amendment lacked legislative competence to extend beyond the saved rights, and the appeals are dismissed. The bench comprises Justice S. V. Bhatti and Justice Basant Balaji.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 1356 OF 2005 This is a criminal revision petition filed by S. Sukumaran Chettiyar, Inspector of Police, Kadakkavoor Police Station, challenging an order under Section 250 Cr.P.C. that directed the revision petitioner to pay compensation to an accused in a prior case (S.T. No. 25/1997, Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Varkala). The High Court examines whether compensation under Section 250 Cr.P.C. can be imposed on the police officer who registered the crime when the acquitted/ discharged person is the accused in a case registered suo motu, not on a complaint or information. The Magistrate had held that there was no reasonable ground for the accusation and ordered Rs. 5,000 as compensation, a finding upheld by the II Additional Sessions Court. The revision petitioner contends that compensation under Section 250 is available only where the proceedings were instituted upon a complaint or information to a police officer or to a Magistrate, not for suo motu registration, and therefore the order is without jurisdiction. The State contends that courts may award compensation when a false case is registered due to personal enmity of police officers. The Judge discusses Section 250(1)-(2), clarifies the scope (case instituted upon complaint or information), and cites Krishnan Moopan M.B., Balakrishnan Nambiar, and Pankajakshan P.R. The court ultimately holds that the compensation imposition was irregular and sets aside the order, allowing the revision petition, while noting that civil remedies for malicious prosecution remain available.
OP(KAT) No. 82/2022; OP(KAT) No. 148/2022 These Original Proceedings arise from the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s common final order dated 22 February 2022 in OA(Ekm) Nos. 8/2020 and 1311/2019, concerning recruitment for the post of Full-time Hindi Language Teacher in Malappuram and related districts. The core issue is whether CTET (Central Teachers Eligibility Test) holders are exempt from the KTET (Kerala TET) requirement for KTET Category IV, as mandated by Annexure-A1 notification of 18 August 2017 and Government orders GO(P) 145/16/G.Edn (30 August 2016) and GO(P) 206/16/G.Edn (8 December 2016), in light of subsequent Government circular Annexure-A12 (09 March 2018) and SCERT guidelines. The Tribunal held in the applicants’ favour on questions of eligibility and exemption, but denied relief in one OA for the Malappuram case because the applicant could not attend the interview, prompting two OPs before the High Court. The High Court, noting the issues overlap, delivered a common judgment. It held that Annexure-A12 is not merely clarificatory and that CTET holders are exempted under the preexisting Go orders; however, it partially modified the Tribunal’s relief in OP(KAT) 82/2022 to ensure fair inclusion in the ranklist and appointment process, while directing the State to reconsider qualifications and revise norms regarding CTET versus KTET equivalence. The judgment directs expeditious actions within defined time limits and cautions that benefits will be restricted to those who actively pursued relief in time.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case under Section 482 CrPC, filed by five accused (PetitionersNos.1 to 5) challenging the continuation of prosecution in CC No.413/2018 (Judicial First Class Magistrate Court III, Thiruvananthapuram) arising from Cr.No.2032/2017 of Thampanoor Police Station. The accused were charged under IPC sections 143, 145, 341, 294(b), 323 and 324 for an incident on 29.12.2017 at about 10 pm, when the defacto complainant allegedly was abused and assaulted in an autorickshaw, resulting in injuries. The petition contends that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and do not wish to pursue the case further; Annexure-B affidavits/records support this, and the investigating officer was directed to verify the settlement and check for any impediments or antecedents. The Public Prosecutor expressed reservations about quashing solely on settlement but conceded the absence of other crimes. The High Court reviewed the law on quashing under Section 482, citing a line of Supreme Court decisions beginning with State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan and including Gian Singh, Narinder Singh, Parbatbhai Aahir and others, to hold that quashing is permissible when offences are private in nature, non‑compoundable, and the disputes are settled, and there is no serious societal impact. After weighing gravity, injuries, and antecedents, the court concluded that quashing would promote peace and ends of justice, and allowed the petition; proceedings against petitioners and the connected case were quashed.
This writ appeal challenges a learned Single Judge’s order that dismissed an industrial dispute filed by three workmen as belated under Section 2A(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The appellants allege denial of employment by HDFC Bank Ltd. from 10 April 1991, culminating in termination, and sought to raise the dispute directly before the Labour Court after the conciliation process, as permitted by Section 2A. The respondents maintain that the three-year limitation in Section 2A(3) from the date of termination governs the maintainability of the claim, and that the dispute was raised only after about 25 years; they further argue that the moment of service of the termination order is not a sine qua non for invoking the ID Act remedy. The appellants rely on Nusli Neville Wadia v. Ivory Properties (2019 KHC 7018) and Sukhbiri Devi v. Union of India (AIR 2022 SC 5058) to challenge the limitation posture. The High Court, in a Division Bench, clarifies that Section 2A provides an independent remedy for an individual workman and that the limitation accrues from the date of termination, even if the termination order’s service is in doubt. While acknowledging the acquittal in a related criminal case, the court holds the appeal devoid of merit and dismisses it, without traversing merits of the underlying dispute.