The petitioner, Preetha Cletus, owner with possession of 165.12 acres in Thrikkovilvattom, Kollam Taluk, challenged Ext. P4 and sought reliefs including certiorari to set aside Ext. P4, mandamus to direct the Tahsildar to entertain Ext. P2 under the Kerala Land Tax Act, and direction to the High Court Registry to translate vernacular documents. The land initially received permission for non-agricultural use under Rule 6(2) of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order (KLUO) and Ext. P1 records an order from 2004. The petitioner filed Ext. P2 under Section 6A of the Kerala Land Tax Act seeking reassessment and entry updates, while Ext. P4 (May 2022) issued by the Revenue Division Officer under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (KCLWA) suggested pursuing the 2008 Act. The respondents argued the petitioner had resorted to KCLWA proceedings (Form-7 leading to Ext. P4) and would need to comply with those provisions. The court relied on Sealand Builders Private Limited v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Fort Kochi (2020) 5 KLT 56 to hold that pre-30/12/2017 Rule 6(2) applications must be decided under the KLUO, not the 2008 Act, and that Ext. P1 rights remain applicable. Consequently, the court disposed of the petition by directing the Tahsildar to consider Ext. P2 and pass orders within two months, while setting aside Ext. P4.”
Santosh Karunakaran, a former Ranji Trophy cricketer and member of the Thiruvananthapuram District Cricket Association, challenged a sequence of orders issued by the Ombudsman-cum-Ethics Officer of the Kerala Cricket Association (KCA), seeking quashing of Exts.P11 and P13 and a mandamus directing the Ombudsman to ensure compliance with Lodha Committee recommendations and implement the same in the District bye-laws, as well as to ensure that KCA elections occur only after district association elections. The writ petition before a learned Single Judge contended that the KCA’s governance reforms, the Lodha-inspired bye-law changes, and district level elections should be aligned and that the Ombudsman’s orders were defective for not recognizing a common bye-law for all district associations. The single Judge dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner did not approach the court with clean hands and had raised baseless allegations, leading to dismissal under Article 226. On appeal, the Kerala High Court examined the chronology of orders dated 13.02.2020, 25.02.2020 and 10.03.2020 directing impleadment of district associations, and found suppression of material facts by the petitioner. The Court reaffirmed that suppression disentitles a party from relief and that the petitioner failed to disclose crucial events, including prior orders and communications. Ultimately, the Division Bench upheld the dismissal, noting the petitioner’s conduct and the lack of merit in challenging the Ombudsman’s directions.
This criminal appeal under Section 374 CrPC challenges the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 8(1) and (2) of the Abkari Act, 1077, by the Additional Sessions Judge (Adhoc) II, Kalpetta, in Sessions Case No.173 of 2007. On 27.10.2006, the appellant was found in possession of 3.2 liters of arrack in a jerrycan at Kaniyambatta, leading to arrest and seizure by PW1 (an Excise Inspector) and PW2. The case relied on Exts. P1–P8 and MOs for evidence. After investigation, a Section 50 report was submitted and cognizance taken; the matter proceeded to trial with a charge under Abkari Act. The defense contends laches by the prosecution in seizure and sample preparation, and a nine-month delay before filing the final report, arguing prejudice to the appellant. The Public Prosecutor asserts PW1’s testimony is corroborated by PW2 and that lack of seal on Ext. P3 is not fatal since the sample reached the lab intact (Ext. P7). The High Court acknowledges delay under Section 50 but finds no prejudice from it. However, considering authorities including Moothedath Sivadasan and Vijay Pandey, it holds that absence of a specimen seal on the seizure mahazar can break the chain to chemical analysis, creating reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction is set aside and the appeal allowed, with release if in custody and refund of any fine.
This is a writ petition under Article 226 challenging the denial of renewal of a stage carriage permit. The petitioner, a stage carriage operator on the Payyannur Railway Station–Kozhichal route, held permit KL-59/F-5599 valid till 31.8.2018. He sought renewal of the permit (Ext.P3) and, in support of Ext.P2, asked for no objection certificate (NOC) from the financier, the State Bank of India (SBI). SBI refused the NOC on the ground that the loan account is classified as non-performing asset, and thus joint renewal with the financier’s objection could be blocked. The petitioner contends that the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Section 51, contemplates the registra- tion authority’s power to renew despite financier objections, after giving an opportunity to be heard. The court references Shabu Sukumaran v. Regional Transport Officer, Trivandrum and others, which held that the financier’s objection does not bar renewal where the registering authority, after hearing, may renew if warranted by the circumstances. The judge clarifies that the authority must consider the financier’s objections but exercise discretion to renew, ensuring the applicant’s entitlement is adjudicated fairly. The writ petition is disposed of by directing the 1st respondent to decide Ext.P3 after notifying the financier and the petitioner, expeditiously, within a month of receiving a certified copy of the judgment, in accordance with the Shabu Sukumaran ruling.
This motor-accident claim appeal arises from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, which awarded Rs. 4,22,434 in a petition filed by Muhammed Sheriff (claimant) for injuries sustained in a road collision on 07.09.2007 near Kalamassery University junction. The accident involved a tempo van; the driver (first respondent) was alleged to be negligent; the RC owner (second respondent) and insurer (third respondent) faced liability. The Tribunal found negligence by the first respondent and held the insurer liable to pay the loss; however, the claimant’s monthly income of Rs. 12,000 claimed in the petition was not supported by evidence, and the Tribunal notionally fixed it at Rs. 3,500. The claimant contends this figure is too low and seeks enhancement across all heads of compensation. The insurer concedes the policy but disputes excess liability or the quantum. The court surveys the legal framework and, relying on Ramachandrappa, Syed Sadiq and Raj Kumar, approves a notional income of Rs. 6,000 per month, given the claimant’s lack of evidence and the general economic context. It acknowledges the 12% permanent disability (medical board) and recalculates losses: additional loss of earnings, nourishment, bystander expenses, and future disability-related damages, culminating in enhanced compensation of Rs. 93,250 with interest at 7.5% per annum. The insurer is directed to satisfy the enhanced amount within two months, with costs to each party as applicable, and the claimant to provide bank details for payment.
This Kerala High Court decision under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. deals with a challenge to a protest complaint that led to calendar CC No.161/2015 in the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-II, Hosdurg, arising out of Crime No.633/2014 of Bekal Police Station, Kasaragod. Petitioners Rugmini, Pankajakashan Nair and Rema, elderly residents, moved to quash Annexure AI protest complaint and all further proceedings, contending that cognizance on the protest complaint was illegal after the police refer report concluded the dispute was civil in nature. The private complaint by the 2nd respondent Thambayi spawned a private protest before the Magistrate under Sec.156(3) Cr.P.C., which the police had referred; the Refer Report dated 04.10.2014 found civil disputes, yet cognizance was taken and the matter has now proceeded to calendar CC. The petitioners argue that such action is ultra vires, supported by decisions like Parameswaran Nair v. Surendran, and by Dalal V.R. and Paramjeet Batra that turning civil disputes into criminal cases amounts to abuse of process. The court, after hearing, finds the protest complaint to be a repetition of earlier civil allegations and notes there are pending civil suits; there are no new materials justifying cognizance. Consequently, it quashes the proceedings and directs that the matter be resolved by civil remedies, avoiding abuse of process.
Kurian, the sole accused in S.C.No.390/2002, challenges his conviction under Sections 326, 324 and the first part of Section 304 IPC, as recorded in the Sessions Court, Ernakulam. The prosecution case alleges that on 19 August 1999, after a failed attempt to settle a rape case, Kurian emerged from PW1’s house with a chopper hidden under his shirt and struck the deceased on the neck, while also assaulting PW1 and others. The injuries to PW2 and PW3 and the fatal neck wound, established by autopsy Ext.P20, led to death by homicide. The trial court convicted Kurian of 324 (hurt with dangerous weapon), 326 (grievous hurt) and the first part of 304 IPC, and sentenced accordingly, while holding that grave and sudden provocation reduced the culpable mental state and that the killing did not amount to murder. On appeal, the Kerala High Court examined the evidence, including the testimonies of PW2 and PW3 (injured witnesses), which were partly corroborated by medical evidence, though some witnesses turned hostile. The High Court found the evidence credible and concluded that private defence was not established; yet it accepted grave and sudden provocation as a factor and reformulated the offence to 304 Part II IPC, with modified sentences and a direction for compensation, while upholding the 324 and 326 convictions with reduced sentences. Thus, the appeal is allowed in part.
WP(C).5345/2019(P) & con.case.; WP(C).7534/2019(N) These writ petitions challenge Circular No.79/2011 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Kerala), which requires that the written tests for certain cooperative society posts be conducted through an “Outside Agency” and may include individuals. The petitioners contend the circular is vague, imprecise, and confers untrammelled discretion on Societies to appoint any agency or person to conduct examinations, inviting nepotism, corruption and lack of transparency. They point to notifications published in newspapers with limited circulation, depriving eligible candidates of notice, and seek striking down or read-down relief to ensure proper empanelment, credentials, and oversight by government authorities. The court notes the absence of concrete guidelines for empanelment or credentials and records distress at the government/Registrar’s stance, referencing prior judgments such as Hakkim E. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (which upheld Circular No.79/2011) and a contrasting position in W.P.(C) No.37441/2009 that criticized the practice. The Judge considers the need for scrutiny of the selection processes, directs the Joint Registrar to review records, and requires the Registrar to revisit Clause 4(c) of Circular No.79/2011, potentially empanelling agencies with proven credentials, and to issue necessary proceedings within one month, applying general directions under Section 66A of the KCS Act for all societies in Kerala.
This Kerala High Court judgment arises from MACA No.3129 of 2015 and Cross Objection No.20 of 2016, challenging and defending the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Muvattupuzha, in OP(MV) No.174/2013 (death of Sebastian, aged 59, on 04.02.2013). The insurer, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd., appeals against the Tribunal’s total compensation of Rs.14,93,000 awarded to the wife and two adult children (claimants), while the claimants cross-appeal seeking additional compensation. The court examines the deceased’s income: pension Rs.15,350 per month and commission as an SBI Life Insurance agent evidenced by Ext.A8, arguing the Tribunal erred in determining monthly income (citing Rs.18,000 by including Rs.4,500 commission). A central dispute is whether family pension should be deducted in calculating dependency. The insurer contends partial deduction or deduction of family pension; the claimants argue that family pension is not deductible from the earnings to compute loss of dependency. The court relies on prior Kerala Division Bench rulings to hold that family pension should not be deducted and fixes the monthly income at Rs.20,000 for computation, subject to future prospects. It also revises heads of compensation for pain and suffering, funeral expenses, loss of estate, and loss of consortium, guided by Pranay Sethi. Ultimately, the court orders additional compensation of Rs.2,28,000 to the claimants and closes interlocutory applications, while leaving other directions intact.
The petitioner, Syam Sundar S., seeks to direct the 1st respondent to register the marriage with his wife Havana Eileen M. Joseph without mandatorily requiring their personal presence, and to issue the marriage certificate at the earliest. The marriage between the petitioner and the 4th respondent was solemnised on 25.11.2020 at Nagarukavu Viswabrahma Deva Temple, Thiruvananthapuram. The 4th respondent, a nurse, had to rush to the UK due to the COVID-19 pandemic and is presently unable to return promptly for registration. Ext.P1 (joint application) and Ext.P2 (temple certificate) were filed, but the Registrar required personal appearance and signature of both parties, which could not be provided due to travel and pandemic constraints. The petitioner relies on this Court’s prior approach in T.K. Mathew v. The Secretary and Registrar of Marriages, which held that video conferencing can satisfy personal appearance for registration under the Kerala Rules, and on the Government of Kerala GO 1721/2021/LSGD authorising remote/virtual registration using latest technology. The Court ultimately directs registration via video conferencing, authorises an affidavit by a designated signatory for the 4th respondent, and prescribes steps to ensure the eventual personal appearance, while safeguarding the validity of the marriage certificate and future registrations.
The petitioners, numbering 17 individuals, approached the Gratuity Controller seeking gratuity for the period they allege they worked directly under the first respondent prior to the formation of the second respondent society. The Gratuity Controller and the appellate authority rejected the claim, holding that past service under a contractor cannot be reckoned for gratuity and that gratuity already paid by the society after its formation sufficed. The petitioners argued that they were engaged directly by the first respondent, with Ext. P1 showing gratuity calculations by the society for the period in question, implying direct employment and an admission by the first respondent to the service; they contended there were no contractors involved. The first respondent asserted that the petitioners had worked under various contractors before the society’s formation and that the society’s post-formation gratuity payments were all that could be due. The court emphasized the limited jurisdiction of the Gratuity Controller and that a bona fide dispute about employment status cannot be resolved through the controller; such disputes must be resolved by the appropriate forum under law (Industrial Disputes Act and Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act). Citing Food Corporation of India v. V. Mohammed Manzil and Others, the court reiterates that contract employees are not entitled to gratuity from the principal employer. The judgment concludes that the question of direct employer-employee status requires determination by the competent authority, and the petition is dismissed with no costs.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal arising from the conviction in SC No.124 of 2013 (Palakkad Sessions Court) of the appellant for murder under section 302 IPC and for a separate offence under section 324 IPC, together with related proceedings in CP 28/2003 before the JFCM Mannarkad. The incident occurred on 7 April 2002, when the accused allegedly attacked his wife over suspected infidelity, slaughtered a goat, and chased and stabbed his nine-year-old son Prajeesh, who died from the injuries. The trial court examined 19 witnesses and marked numerous exhibits (Exts. P1–P20, MO1–MO9) while the defence cross‑examined. The defence relied on contradictions in the Section 164 CrPC statements and argued that the evidence did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt or the required intent, urging re‑appreciation or acquittal. The State contends that the eye witnesses (PW14, PW17, PW18, PW1), together with the weapon MO1 and the postmortem findings (Ext. P11), prove the sequence of events and the offender’s intent. The High Court, while acknowledging the evidence’s gravity, reviews the authorities cited, including Virsa Singh and Steane, and concludes there is no ground to interfere with the Sessions Court’s verdict. The appeal is dismissed, leaving the conviction and life sentence intact.
This motor-accident claims appeal arises from an award under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kasaragod, in which Suresh sought compensation for injuries sustained in an Omnibus accident on 17 December 2008. The Tribunal held the first respondent-driver liable and the insurer vicariously liable for indemnification, awarding Rs. 3,22,000 in total. The appellant challenged the quantum, arguing inadequate compensation for medical expenses, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, permanent disability, and bystander expenses; the insurer argued the Tribunal’s award was just and questioned proof of income. The High Court undertook a meticulous reassessment of the claim, noting the claimant’s evidence and Exts. A3–A4 showing grievous injuries and a 25% permanent disability (Ext. X1) along with 30 days of bystander expenses and inpatient treatment. Relying on Ramachandrapa, Raj Kumar, Sarla Verma and Pranay Sethi principles, the court fixed notional income, applied the proper multiplier, and recalculated damages under pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads. The result: the appeal was allowed, with enhanced compensation of Rs. 1,41,500, plus 6% interest from the petition date, to be paid by the insurer within two months, following certification and bank details submission.
Appellant Ciron Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. challenges Exts.P5, P13, P18 and P28 orders by the Kerala Medical Services Corporation Ltd. that blacklisted three Ciron products (Glimepiride Tablet 1 mg and 2 mg, and Diclofenac Sodium Tablet 50 mg) for a period of three years and barred Ciron from participating in related tenders. The tender contract provides quality testing via a Drugs Testing Laboratory; Clause 6.29 declares the test reports final and conclusive for contract purposes, with sub-clauses 6.29.1 to 6.29.3 detailing testing laboratories and the government’s Drugs Control Department reports as binding. Clauses 6.29.8 and 6.29.9 cover blacklisting, while Clause 6.39 prescribes a show-cause procedure and Clause 6.40 provides an appellate remedy before the State Government. The Appellate Authority’s Ext.P28 order, and the learned Single Judge’s dismissal, relied on the conclusiveness of the Drugs Control Department’s lab reports and the appellant’s failure to pursue remedies under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, with apparent exclusion of independent test evidence. The appellant argued that the show-cause process and reliance on other independent laboratory tests could rebut the presumption of conclusive reports for contract purposes. The respondents urged strict adherence to the Act and contract clauses treating drug-testing reports as final and conclusive. The High Court allows the writ appeal, sets aside Ext.P28, and directs the Appellate Authority to decide afresh after hearing within two months, considering Ciron’s evidence and independent test reports, limiting its observations to blacklisting and not affecting penalties under the Act.
WP(C) No. 34521 of 2011; conn. Case; WP(C) No. 2473 of 2012 The judgment concerns a dispute over seniority of Assistants (Senior Grade) in the University of Calicut. Petitioners, 76 in number, including Manoj M.V. and others, and respondents, comprising university officers and several assistant branding authorities, challenged a December 2011 revision of the seniority list (Ext.P5) that re-ordered seniority in a manner they claim violated Rule 28 of Part II KS & SSR and relevant statutory provisions. The petitioners were recruited on the same day as the respondents, completed probation, and many had cleared the Departmental Test (Lower) during probation. They argued that promotions to Senior Grade should be governed by probation completion and test qualification, with the date of test completion determining eligibility for upgrade, and not by results declared later in 2010. They relied on Suseela Devi v PSC to contend probation must be satisfactorily completed before promotion, except in specific Head of Department scenarios, and criticized reliance on Gopinathan Unnithan, which they argued was distinguishable. The University contended the petitioners were not test-qualified at the time of vacancies and that Rule 28(iA) and its Explanation supported the revision. The court found the revision without prior notice improper, considered the relevant KS & SSR provisions, and ultimately set aside the order, directing a hearing and fresh assessment consistent with law. The decision emphasizes fair procedure and lawful interpretation of seniority rules in the promotion process.
CRL.A No. 1527 of 2018; CRL.A No. 773 of 2019 Two criminal appeals (CRL.A Nos. 1527/2018 and 773/2019) arising from SC No. 407/2007, II Addl. Sessions Court, Thodupuzha, were heard together by a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court on 21 February 2023. The prosecution’s case concerns the murder of Brijitha, a 63-year-old widow living alone, allegedly at the hands of Ruban (A-1) and Isaac @ Kishore (A-2), who had been implicated in a dacoity-murder. The trial court initially acquitted A-1 and convicted A-2 on numerous incriminating links including: (i) the presence of A-2 at the scene evidenced by fingerprints on recovered items and MO-6 shawl with hair; (ii) recovery of MO-1 to MO-3 gold ornaments and MO-5 cash from A-2’s residence; (iii) a shawl with hair corroborated by FSL hair analysis; and (iv) a postmortem finding of death due to smothering with 13 ante-mortem injuries on the victim. On appeal, the High Court examined the admissibility of Ext.P-13 (confession by conduct) and Ext.P-8/P-27 fingerprint reports, noting deficiencies but ultimately holding that Sec.27 of the Indian Evidence Act permits admissible facts discovered through such information when directly connected to the discovery. After substantial scrutiny of FIR timing, arrest records, and the forensic evidence (including hair analysis and fingerprint testimony), the court affirmed the conviction of both appellants and dismissed the appeals. The judgment underscores the limitations of forensic evidence and emphasizes the need for careful appraisal of circumstantial links in murder-robbery cases.
This writ petition challenges an endorsement on a basic land tax receipt that labeled the payment as provisionally accepted subject to the court decision in WP(C) 40002/2016. The petitioner, absolute owner in possession of property covered by partition deed No.1947/2006 (Ext P2), seeks quashing Ext P3, removal of the provisional endorsement, and issuance of regular tax receipts, along with possession certificate, location sketch, ROR certificate, and village records. The case cites Ext P4 proceedings under the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, which were set aside by this Court in 7.11.2018 (W.P(C).No.40002/2016 and connected cases), and relies on a common judgment dated 31.1.2019 (W.P.(C).No.1783/2019 and connected cases) directing issuance of revenue certificates irrespective of pendency in related matters. The respondents contend that the subject land may be exempt under Sec.81(1)(e) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act as plantation land and that fragmented plots could be under scrutiny for non-exempted use. The Court ultimately directs the Village Officer to issue revenue certificates (Possession Certificate, location sketch, ROR) and fresh land tax receipts without endorsing pendency, while preserving scope to verify exemption claims with due process. The petition is disposed of with directions in line with prior common judgments, including the regime for possession and revenue records.
The appellant, T.G. Polymer and Company, challenged a conviction in CC 123/2009 by a Judicial First Class Magistrate for an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, alleging that a cheque for ₹1,34,391 issued by the accused in discharge of a goods transaction bounced for insufficient funds. The trial court acquitted the accused under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. on grounds that the prosecution failed to prove the execution of the cheque and the existence of a liability. The Kerala High Court, on 30 June 2017, dismisses the criminal appeal and upholds the acquittal. The court acknowledged that the cheque bounced and that statutory notice was issued, but held that the prosecution failed to prove due and conscious execution of Ext. P1, and that Exts. P8–P18, covering transactions up to July 2008, did not establish a December 2008 liability or a direct link to the accused as the signatory in the transaction. The defence claim that Ext. P1 is a signed blank cheque allegedly handed over years earlier and later misused was not credibly disproved. In the absence of proved execution, there is no basis for invoking the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 NI Act. Consequently, the court confirmed the acquittal and dismissed the appeal, maintaining the trial court’s verdict.
Vijayan Pillai V.N., a retired secretary of Chirakkadavu Service Co-operative Bank, filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking a mandamus to direct the Joint Registrar (General) to ensure payment of gratuity and to declare that he is entitled to Rs.13,34,371 as gratuity on retirement, with interest from 1.12.2015. The LIC had transferred funds to the bank, but only Rs.10 lakh was paid as gratuity. The petition focused on whether employees of Co-operative Societies covered by the Payment of Gratuity Act could obtain better terms under Section 4(5) of the Central Act, despite the state Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules (Rule 59(iii) and its second proviso). The court relied on the Full Bench Chandrasekharan Nair case (2017 (4) KLT 276), which held that liability to pay gratuity does not transfer to the insurer; the maturity value under the master policy goes to the employee and any deficit must be met by the employer under Section 4(2). Section 4(5) allows better terms, and the central Act overrides conflicting state enactments (Article 254(1)-(2) and Section 14). The judgment clarifies there is no repugnancy preventing higher gratuity where the employee is covered by the Central Act. The court ultimately directs payment of the balance gratuity (Rs.3,34,371) with 6% simple interest from 1.12.2015, within two months, and records no costs."
WA.No.2608 of 2017 in WPC.25831/2008 These writ appeals challenge a common judgment dated 16.11.2017 of the learned Single Judge disposing of W.P.(C) Nos. 20392 of 2008, 20540 of 2008 and 25831 of 2008, all filed by Ambili Ramachandran Nandanam. The disputes concern appointment to the post of High School Assistant (HSA), Mathematics, at A.E.P.M. Higher Secondary School, Irumanangad, Kollam. The appellant began as Upper Primary School Assistant (UPSA) in 1996 and was promoted to HSA (Mathematics) in 1998 following the vacancy created by the promotion of Smt. K.G. Santha as Headmistress. Santha’s promotion was challenged, delaying approval of the appellant’s appointment. A subsequent vacancy arose again when Girijakumari was promoted to HSST; the Manager shifted the appellant to the new HSA (Mathematics) post, and her appointment was approved with effect from 16.09.1998. In 1999-2000 there was a division fall that reduced HSA (Mathematics) posts to three, and the appellant was protected as UPSA but continued teaching in the High School section. Government Exhibit P4 (07.01.2002) created a new cadre for HSA English by reallocating posts among core subjects, to be implemented from 2002-03. Manuja was appointed as HSA (English) in 2002 under Exhibits P7/P8; subsequent litigation culminated in Exhibits P12–P14. The learned Single Judge held that Exhibit P4’s changes negated the appellant’s claim. The High Court, in a combined hearing of WA Nos. 2608, 2607 & 2617, allowed the appeals, set aside the Single Judge’s order, restored Exhibit P14, and directed consequential orders to give effect to the restoration, effectively reinstating the appellant to the HSA (Mathematics) vacancy from 06.08.1999 onwards.
