WA.No. 291 of 2016 (and related WA Nos. 2557/2015 and 2605/2015) These writ appeals arise from a common judgment of a learned Single Judge in WP(C) 26069/2015 and relate to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003. The assessee, AMON & COMPANY CALCUTTA PVT. LTD., operates a hotel and obtained a beer-and-wine parlour license in 2009. Initially, the department permitted compounding for turnover from cooked food at 0.5%, but the subsequent beer-and-wine operation rendered the compounding option inapplicable to the premises for the beer and wine sale. The department later demanded penalties for alleged offences, and the assessee paid sums under compounding while challenging the department’s right to regular assessment for the cooked-food turnover and the validity and amount of the compounding fee. The Single Judge addressed two streams: (i) the legality and quantification of the compounding fee under Section 74 of the Act (with amendments in 2009 and 2011), and (ii) the challenge to regular assessment due to supposed non-cancellation of the compounding permission. The High Court held (a) no coercion in the compounding process, (b) the statutory amendments to Section 74 extended the maximum fee to Rs. 4 lakhs (and Rs. 8 lakhs subsequently), and (c) on limitation and cancellation, the assessee’s contentions merit consideration. The appeals were disposed of with mixed outcomes, staying or setting aside certain orders, and upholding others, with directions for refund in part and sustained liability for the higher compounding fee.
WP(C) No. 25209 of 2020 (and connected cases) The judgment addresses a batch of writ petitions challenging actions affecting employees of Unit Run Canteens (URCs) run under the Canteen Stores Department (CSD) of the Army, primarily contending that URCs should be treated as ‘State’ or ‘other authorities’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, thus amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Kerala High Court, applying the inclusive tests developed in Ajay Hasia and subsequent cases (Ramana Dayaram Shetty, Sukhdev Singh, Chander Mohan Khanna, Zee Telefilms), examines creation, finance, and control of URCs. It finds URCs to be private undertakings formed by Army orders AO/19/2003/QMG, financed by regimental non-public funds and loans from CSD rather than Consolidated Fund of India, and managed via SOPs and unit-level administration rather than direct Government control. The court concludes that URCs do not meet the “State” or “other authority” criteria under Article 12 and are not amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Consequently, the petitions are dismissed with liberty for petitioners to seek remedy under industrial or private avenues; no costs are awarded. The decision is delivered by a single judge, Justice Basant Balaji, on March 4, 2024.
This writ appeal challenges a Labour Court award denying reinstatement to Sreekumar K., a daily-wage worker employed by KTDC Ltd (a 100% government undertaking) as a waiter from 1990 until termination on 13.10.1997. The Labour Court held that he was not a permanent employee and did not have 240 days of continuous service in the preceding 12 months, thus denying relief under the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly section 25F. The High Court, overturning both the Labour Court and the earlier single-judge dismissal, clarifies that permanency is not a prerequisite for reinstatement under section 25F; the crucial test is the requirement of 240 days of continuous service under section 25B. It is observed that the appellant had long, continuous engagement in various roles (waiter, waiter trainee) across KTDC units since 1990, with documentary evidence (W1–W3) and Exts. P1–P4 supporting his case. The court cites Anoop Sharma and Ramesh Kumar to interpret the scope of section 25F and the meaning of “workman” under section 2(s), emphasizing casual employees can fall within protection if 240 days are proved. The bench condemns the Labour Court’s misdirection in focusing on permanency, and holds that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement in terms of similar relief granted in analogous cases, with consequential back benefits and costs. The decision underscores that the management’s arbitrary treatment and discrimination against similarly situated workers cannot stand.
This writ appeal (WA No.1339 of 2016) arises from a dispute over the sale of land treated as bought-in-land under the Revenue Recovery Act. The appellant, a rice and paddy dealer, faced recovery of dues under the General Sales Tax Act. When the revenue-recovery sale was conducted due to non-payment, the appellant urged that the sale be treated as a loss of tenure or restitution rather than reconveyance of land after settlement of dues. The learned Single Judge had dismissed the writ petition, holding that reconveyance of bought-in-land is not permissible in view of this Court’s judgments (George Jacob; Laxmi Devi Tile Works; Sibi Francis) which restrict reconveyance after sale. On appeal, the Division Bench recognized that the factual matrix was distinct and involved restitution rather than mere reconveyance. The Bench examined whether the sale itself remained valid after the Tribunal’s Exhibit P1 order, which set aside the assessment and eroded the basis of the revenue-recovery action, even though the sale had been confirmed in favour of the Government. Relying on Supreme Court precedents on restitution and unjust enrichment, the Court held that restitution, not reconveyance, is the appropriate remedy where the foundation for the sale collapses, and ordered return of the land to the appellant by cancelling the sale and its confirmation. The appeal was allowed.
WA 811 of 2020 (and connected cases) This is a consolidated batch of writ appeals under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 arising from a common judgment dated 25 February 2020 by a Single Judge in WP(C) 2019–2019 and connected matters, concerning pension under the Employees' Pension Scheme, 1995 and its amendments (notably the 2014 amendment under GSR 609(E) of 2014). The petitions argued for computing pension on actual salary and permitting higher contributions to the Pension Fund upon remittance beyond the statutory maximum pensionable salary, contending such a construction was authorised by Sasikumar P. v. Union of India and the SC’s decision in RC Gupta. The EPFO, Union of India, and related trustees opposed this, arguing the pension scheme is contributory, and allowing retroactive higher-contribution pensions would erode the corpus and upset actuarial projections. The Full Bench refers to eminent precedents including Pawan Hans Ltd. and Sunil Kumar B., and ultimately directs a reconsideration by EPFO guided by Sunil Kumar B., to ensure no erosion of corpus and to extend the empowerment to eligible employees within a brief period. The matter balances the scheme’s actuarial viability with employees’ pension expectations, inviting actuarial valuation and possible legislative steps to address long-term sustainability.
St. Teresa's Arts and Science College, an unaided minority institution affiliated to the University of Calicut, challenged Ext.P7 (26 March 2018) and Ext.P10 (14 May 2018) orders denying additional affiliation for B.Sc. Mathematics and B.Com Taxation. The petition argued that the university’s orders contained no reasons, violating the established principles of natural justice and the right to a reasoned decision. The court surveyed jurisprudence emphasizing that administrative or quasi-judicial orders must be issued with reasons, linking the mind of the decision-maker to the conclusion, and that mere mechanical action or post-hoc explanations render such orders vulnerable to invalidation. It cited Gordhandas Bhanji; Mohinder Singh Gill; Breen; Alexander Machinery; Krishna Swami; BA Linga Reddy; and United Commercial Bank v. P.C. Kakkar to stress the requirement for reasoned, non-arbitrary decisions. The court also referred to Krishna Swami and the rule of law that decision-makers must provide reasons to prevent arbitrariness and to enable judicial review. It noted a related precedent in W.P.(C) No. 17415 of 2018 directing reasoned orders. Consequently, Exts.P7 and P10 were set aside, with directions to issue a reasoned order on Ext.P2 within 10 days, in accordance with law.
This original petition (OP (FC) No. 512 of 2017) before the Kerala High Court concerns the mode of recording evidence in a Family Court proceeding involving a marital dispute between Shemeera (wife/petitioner) and Shani (husband/respondent). The Family Court, Chavara, had ordered joint trial of connected proceedings (O.P. Nos. 259/2014, 280/2014, 476/2014) and appointed an Advocate Commissioner to record witness evidence. The petitioner sought permission to adduce oral evidence directly before the Court rather than through the Advocate Commissioner, arguing that CPC provisions should apply to Family Court proceedings subject to the Family Courts Act, 1984, and that the Judge’s memorandum of the substance of deposition cannot be delegated to an Commissioner. The respondent contended that the Court has discretion to determine whether evidence is recorded by the Court or by an Advocate Commissioner, and defended the amendment to the CPC (Act 46 of 1999) enabling commissions for examination of witnesses. The Supreme Court and high courts’ jurisprudence on cross-examination, the sanctity of face-to-face testimony in marital disputes, and the constitutional preference for in-court proceedings are discussed, including references to Odgers’ remark, and Santhini v. Vijaya Venketesh, and Salem Advocate Bar Association cases. The High Court ultimately holds that evidence shall be recorded by the Court unless the parties agree to Commission, setting aside the impugned order and allowing the petition.
The appeal is by Shriram General Insurance Company Limited challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, in O.P.(MV) No. 427/2013. The accident occurred on 26.3.2013 when the deceased, a driver by profession, died after the lorry collision; compensation was awarded to the legal heirs (wife and two minor children) as dependents of the deceased who was the sole breadwinner and aged 45. The Tribunal fixed the notional income at Rs. 9,000 per month for the deceased, and awarded Rs. 1,00,000 to each claimant under the head of loss of love and affection. The insurer argued that such an amount is exorbitant and unsupported by firm evidence of salary; the claim that Rs. 1 lakh per head under love and affection is not an absolute rule. The respondents contended that the Tribunal’s award should stand given the family circumstances. The Kerala High Court acknowledged that there is no rigid rule on love-and-affection awards and, drawing on judgments like Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, held that, in light of special circumstances (a jobless wife and minor children, deceased as sole breadwinner), it is just and reasonable to reduce the total amount under love and affection to Rs. 1.5 lakh. The other heads of compensation were left intact. The appeal is allowed in part, directing deposit of Rs. 1.5 lakh (with 9% interest) and apportionment among heirs as ordered by the Tribunal.
Chippy R Nair, the owner of 6.47 acres in Manakkad, Idukki, seeks removal of her land from the Data Bank under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 and Rules. The land, located in Block 010, Sy.No.416/7-2-1, was included in the Data Bank in 2012. Form 5 was filed before the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) for removal, which was rejected by Ext.P4, relying on the Agricultural Officer’s report and LLMC’s observations that there were crops and paddy cultivation in and around 2008, with water channels and water logging across the property; no trees were found, and LLMC recommended retention. The petitioner argues Ext.P4 violates the Act and Rules and demonstrates non‑application of mind: the RDO did not independently assess the land’s status as of 12.08.2008, nor verify the Data Bank with satellite imagery as contemplated by Rule 4(4F). The Court recalls earlier precedents (Arthasasthra Ventures, Muraleedharan Nair, Aparna Sasi Menon) mandating independent assessment by the RDO and consideration of whether removal would affect paddy cultivation or wetlands. The Court ultimately quashes Ext.P4 and directs the RDO to reconsider Ext.P3 Form 5, after considering Ext.P5 KSREC report and the binding precedents, within two months, with the petitioner’s writ petition to be produced before compliance. The petition is thus disposed of with directions.
OT.Rev.No. 219 of 2014; OT.Rev.227 of 2014 These are cross-revision petitions filed by the State of Kerala challenging the concurrent findings of the First Appellate Authority and the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal, which had set aside the assessment and penalty imposed on M/s Rani Matha Arcade (Yuvarani Residency) for the assessment years 2007-08 and 2008-09. The Intelligence Officer (IB) had found that the banquet bills issued by the hotel indicated VAT at 12.5% on only 60% of the amount realized for cooked food, resulting in short levy of tax: Rs. 92,904 for 2007-08 and Rs. 75,077 for 2008-09, and penalties under Section 67(1) of KVAT for evasion. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the VAT Appellate Tribunal remanded and ultimately held that 60% of the total banquet bill could be treated as cooked food turnover for KVAT and 40% as rent for purposes of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, resulting in no penalty. The Revenue contends that such bifurcation is not permissible under the KVAT Act, and that the entire amounts shown on the bills for cooked food alone should be taxed under KVAT; it also asserts that the evidence establishes mens rea and evasion. The High Court, after analysing the statutory provisions and prior decisions (notably M Far Hotels Ltd.), holds that KVAT does not permit such segregation and thus answers the question in favor of the Revenue. Nevertheless, since part of the turnover is taxable under KLT, the penalty may be reduced to the actual tax evaded; the OT.Rev Nos are allowed in part; no cost.
This is a motor vehicle accident appeal consolidated with another MACA against a common award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Perumbavoor, in OP(MV) Nos. 695/2010 and 700/2010. The collision occurred on 8 January 2010 between two motorcycles, resulting in fatal injuries to the pillion rider of the other bike and injuries to the appellant’s pillion rider. The Tribunal jointly heard both petitions and issued a consolidated award, granting Rs. 17,31,000 to the claimants of the deceased and Rs. 3,78,576 to the injured. The appellant challenges several aspects: (i) negligence on the part of the other vehicle and the Tribunal’s reliance on Ext.A3 (police charge sheet) as prima facie evidence; (ii) the validity of the driver’s licence, with Ext.B1 marked as the appellant’s licence but later found to be possibly forged, with details showing it likely belonged to another person; and (iii) the quantum of compensation under various heads, including loss of dependency, future prospects, loss of love and affection, consortium, funeral expenses, and pain and suffering. The respondents contest the findings on negligence and licence, and defend the Tribunal’s quantum as largely just. The High Court ultimately allows MACA 1297/2016 in part, refixing compensation to Rs. 13,21,000 for the deceased’s claim, while dismissing MACA 1352/2016 for the injury claim, with various directions on recovery from excess payments if any. The judgment clarifies that pay-and-recovery remains applicable where needed.
WP(C) Nos. 2517/2020, 25202/2020, 25209/2020, 25213/2020, 26222/2020, 27386/2020, 22466/2021, 23782/2021, 27795/2021, 29919/2021, 30508/2021, 30564/2021, 30652/2021, 30668/2021, 30679/2021, 7461/2022, 27478/2022, 29383/2022, 35026/2022, 35173/2022, 35231/2022, 35246/2022, 453/2023, 456/2023, 1548/2023, 13827/2023, 16984/2023, 17289/2023, 25635/2023, 25814/2023 (connected cases) The Kerala High Court confronts whether Unit Run Canteens (URCs), operated under the Canteen Stores Department for Army units, can be classified as ‘State’ or ‘another authority’ under Article 12 of the Constitution, for the purpose of Article 226 writ jurisdiction. The petitions challenge amendments and employment conditions of URC staff (ex-servicemen, dependents and civilian staff) and seek mandamus reliefs, including retention and relief from contractual amendments. The court surveys the arc of jurisprudence on the inclusive definition of ‘the State’ (Ajay Hasia, Ramana Dayaram Shetty, Sukhdev Singh, Zee Telefilms, Layak Ram, Rudani, Andi Mukta) to determine whether URCs are state-like entities. It reasons that URCs are created not by statute but by Army orders AO/19/2003/QMG; funded by regimental non-public funds, with staff hired under SOPs rather than as government servants; and are controlled by unit commands rather than centralized MoD funding. Applying the three Ajay Hasia tests (creation, finance, control) and related authorities, the court concludes URCs do not constitute ‘State’ or ‘other authority.’ Consequently, writ petitions under Article 226 are not maintainable, though liberty is granted to pursue other remedies like industrial disputes. The judgment emphasizes the broadening, but restrictive, interpretation of Article 12’s ‘State/other authorities’ concept and the limits of writ jurisdiction over quasi-private welfare institutions within the armed forces.
This is a criminal appeal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, heard by a Kerala High Court single judge (Justice Mary Joseph) on 10 January 2017. The appellant/complainant Ashraf O.C. challenged the acquittal of the accused Riyas Bavootty T. by the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kunnamangalam, in a prosecution under NI Act Sec. 138 arising from a dishonoured cheque for Rs 1,50,000. The cheque (Ext. P1) was drawn on ICICI Bank, Kunnamangalam, and bounced for insufficiency of funds. A lawyer’s notice (Ext. P3) demanded repayment; Exts. P4–P6 prove service. The trial court, relying on para 10–11 of its judgment, held the complainant’s evidence unreliable and acquitted the accused. The High Court reversed, holding that the presumption under Sec. 139 of the NI Act arises upon admission/proof of issuance of the cheque and that the complainant’s evidence suffices to discharge the issuance issue despite some dates being inconsistent. Relying on Viswanathan v. Ramachandran Nair and subsequent dicta (including Shihabuddin Ahammed and Santosh Arora), the court held that errors in the notice’s cheque number do not vitiate the process. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal reversed, and the accused convicted and sentenced (later modified by a 2023 order to Rs.3,00,000 compensation).
This Insurance Appeal challenges the Employees Insurance Court's judgment (I.C. No.29/2013, Alappuzha) holding that Illahia College of Engineering and Technology is not covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act (E.S.I. Act). The appellant, Employees State Insurance Corporation (and the Assistant Director, ESI), contends that the Act can be extended to other establishments by notification after consultation and with Central Government approval under Section 1(5), and that the State Government validly extended ESI coverage to educational institutions through notification and a Government Order. The 1st respondent, Illahia College, argued that as a minority institution it should be answered by the Central Government and that the State notification, potentially contrary to AICTE directives, is illegal. The court examines Section 1(5) and Section 2(1) to determine who the appropriate Government is and whether notification extending the Act to educational institutions is permissible. Citing the Division Bench decision in CBS E School Management's Association v. State of Kerala (2009 (3) KLT 421), the court notes that the appropriate Government can extend provisions to other establishments, including educational institutions, by a liberal, beneficial construction of the statute. Ultimately, the High Court sets aside the EI Court’s order and remands the matter for fresh consideration in light of the provision extending the Act.
This Kerala High Court Land Acquisition Appeal (LA.A.No.153 of 2014) arises from a reference under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The State challenged the Sub Court’s reference judgment in LAR 816/2009 (dated 15-07-2013) which fixed the land value after a batch of references at Rs. 21,60,000 per Are and awarded nominal sums for structures and trees. The acquired property (0.50 Ares with structures) lay in Category B, and the Land Acquisition Officer’s initial award had valued land at Rs. 2,69,906 per Are. The State sought to reduce the land value to align with contemporaneous orders in related LARs (notably a refix at Rs. 9,84,700 per Are in similar cases), while the claimant pressed for enhanced compensation for structures based on Ext.C1 and Ext.C1(a). The court considered the role of the Commissioner’s report, cited precedents such as Abdul Nazar, Jayaram, and Somawanti regarding admissibility and effect of such reports. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal, refixed land value at Rs. 9,84,700 per Are, and dismissed the cross-objection for structure value, directing payment of the revised land value with statutory benefits and interest.
The case concerns a writ petition WP(C) 12173/2012 filed by Jameela, a resident of Malappuram, challenging the rejection of a life-insurance claim linked to a housing loan taken by her deceased son Yahiya. The loan was from State Bank of India Tirur Branch and insured with SBI Life Insurance Co. The policy had a certificate of insurance Ext.P1 dated 2.4.2008 with terms, notably Clause 5: no claim within the first 45 days from date of admission, except death due to an accident; Yahiya died on 23 March 2008, the date of his marriage, due to heart attack. The insurer rejected the claim by Ext.P5 on 11 August 2008, despite the death occurring within 45 days, arguing the death was not covered; the petitioner argued the death was accidental and should be paid; she invoked a Supreme Court decision LIC of India v. Hira Lal (2011) to support accident classification; the respondents argued limitation and time-bar, absence of original policy, and that Ombudsman route should be pursued. The High Court reviewed Ext.P1 and the clause, and found that accident death and scope of the accident exemption are not clearly defined in the policy. The court invoked Insurance Ombudsman Rules 2017, allowing delay condonation, and disposed: the petitioner may file a complaint before the Ombudsman with a delay-condonation petition within three weeks; the Ombudsman will decide; interim recovery stayed; the petition disposed of with open merits. The decision emphasizes using Ombudsman remedy and keeping measures in abeyance pending its decision.
The writ petition challenges Ext.P7, an order of the State Election Commission disqualifying the petitioner under the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999. The petitioner, elected from Ward No.6 of the Keerampara Grama Panchayat in December 2020 as an independent candidate, filed Ext.P1 declaring that she had the support of CPI(M)/LDF after the election. She argues that filing a declaration under Rule 3 of the Kerala Local Authorities (Disqualification of Defected Members) Rules, 2000 is a statutory requirement only if a candidate contested with party/coalition support, and even then, mere declaration does not prove joining; there is no admissible proof of joining CPI(M) or CPI. A member of the Panchayat (a rival) filed Ext.P3 alleging disqualification. The petitioner contends that Ext.P7 rests on joining that is not proven and cites Sampada Yogesh Wagdhare (2019) 5 SCC 682 to emphasize a high standard of proof and specific allegations. The State Election Commission maintains that the petitioner, though elected as independent, had aligned with a political front; the declaration in Form 2, the record in the Register (CPI(M)/LDF), voting for LDF candidates, and LDF’s nomination for Vice President show joining, attracting Section 3. The court held that the deeming provision in Rule 3 (2)(a) ensures such membership and found no illegality in Ext.P7, dismissing the petition.
Being aggrieved by two interim orders passed by a learned single Judge in W.P.(C) No.4986/2020 dated 22 June 2022 and 7 July 2022, the appellant challenged the continuance of status-quo in I.A.5/2022. The appellant, Arakkanattil Oommen Iype, argued that these orders undermine the court's earlier judgment in W.A.No.555/2022 and disregard merger and the effect of withdrawal of proceedings. He contends there is no encroachment and the matter involves only the regularisation of construction, with Respondent No.1 being a stranger to the dispute; there is no necessity for continuing interim relief. He also points to Exhibits P31, P17 and P24 to allege illegality in the underlying premises and asserts that I.A.5/22 suppresses the real contents of WA 555/2022. The respondents urged posting the writ petition for hearing on 22 August 2022 and extending the interim orders until then, arguing that the counter-affidavit to I.A.5/2022 has been filed. The Division Bench, relying on the decision of K.S. Das v. State of Kerala (1992 (2) KLT 358 (FB)) and subsequent cases (W.A. No. 348 of 2022, W.A. No. 149 of 2022), held that, ordinarily, an appeal lies against interim orders only when they substantially affect rights, and declined to intervene. The appeal is disposed of, with liberty to approach the writ court for early disposal.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal revision petition by the husband (Baby Michael) challenging a magistrate’s order under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and the subsequent confirmation by the appellate court. The Judicial First Class Magistrate, Perumbavoor, sanctioned protection and monetary relief under Sections 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Act in M.C. No. 2 of 2015, directing maintenance to the wife at Rs. 12,000 per month (with a rent set-off of Rs. 5,250), maintenance to the elder daughter at Rs. 4,000, and to the younger daughters at Rs. 2,000 each, along with Rs. 1,00,000 as compensation, and restraining the respondent from harassing or entering the petitioner’s residence. The Additional District & Sessions Court, Muvattupuzha, on appeal, upheld these orders. The revision contends that there is no explicit finding of domestic violence by the trial court; it challenges the maintenance to grown children and seeks to negate the compensation and other reliefs, arguing inter alia that the proceedings amount to res judicata in light of earlier actions and settlements, and that the evidence does not support the DV reliefs. The respondent counters that there is clear domestic violence evidenced by various acts and that the appellate courts rightly sustained the orders. The judgment analyzes revisional jurisdiction, res judicata principles, and theDV Act’s definitions, relying on multiple precedents to justify the court’s approach and final disposition.
WP(C) Nos. 7240 of 2013 & 7979 of 2010 Two writ petitions are disposed of by a common judgment addressing whether the Advocate General’s legal opinions given to the Government are exempt from disclosure under the RTI Act, 2005. The petitioners—Secretary to the Advocate General, the State Public Information Officer, and the Appellate Authority—challenged orders of the State Information Commission directing disclosure of legal opinions relating to the Lavalin case and other government legal advice. The State Information Commission and Government argued that the information falls within fiduciary communications between the Advocate General and the Government and is exempt under Section 8(1)(e) RTI Act; they also argued that the relationship between the Advocate General and the State is essentially that of an attorney and client. The court examined constitutional provisions (Art. 165(1)-(2), 163), RTI provisions (Sections 2(f), 3, 8(1)(e), 22), and the Indian Evidence Act (Sections 126, 129), and relied on authorities including Joginder Singh Wasu v. State of Punjab; Kunjukrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala; State of UP v. UP State Law Officers Association; Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh; CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay; Central Public Information Officer v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal, among others, to establish a lawyer–client fiduciary relationship between the Advocate General and the Government and to treat such opinions as confidential information. The High Court held that legal opinions of the Advocate General are protected under 8(1)(e) and that RTI overrides conflicting provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, so the information cannot be disclosed. Accordingly, Exts. P10 and P11 were quashed/set aside, and it was declared that such legal advice is exempt from disclosure.
