WP(C).No. 20549 of 2008 (U) The petitioner, The Cochin Malabar Estates and Industries Ltd, challenges Ext.P4, an order of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (EPFAT) directing payment of 70% of damages levied under Section 14B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act for delayed EPF contributions. The company, a public limited tea and rubber plantation operator in Kerala, faced a severe financial crisis beginning in 1998-99, with several estates not functioning and wages unpaid, resulting in delayed remittance to the EPF from the period around 2011 to 2003 (periods noted in the pleadings). Ext.P2 initiated damages proceedings, and Ext.P3 was the petitioner’s appeal; Ext.P4 reduced damages but did not wholly absolve liability. The Appellate Tribunal found liability could not be avoided solely on financial constraints, though it reduced the damages, relying on precedents like Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. v APFC and Hindustan Steel Ltd. v State of Orissa, which held that Section 14B provides no discretionary waiver and that Paragraph 32B(c) enables reduction up to 50%. The petitioner argues that financial hardship and rehabilitation measures (Ext.P1) warrant greater relief and that the Tribunal failed to consider the broader financial context. The High Court remands the matter for reconsideration, noting the need to evaluate Ext.P1 and other documents and to re-examine the grounds for any reduction in light of financial crises and rehabilitation schemes. The writ petition is disposed of with directions to reassess after hearing both sides.
CRL. M.C. No. 6189 of 2023 Manoj, the accused in CC 165/2022 arising from Crime No. 922/2021 of Cherpu Police Station, Thrissur Rural, seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the entire dispute between the parties has been settled. The offences charged are under Sections 294(b) and 506 IPC (filthy language and criminal intimidation). The petitioner and the complainant have filed a joint affidavit indicating settlement and lack of objection to quashing. The Public Prosecutor initially expressed reservations about quashing merely on the basis of settlement, but conceded that the matter is settled between the parties. The judge recalls the principle that the High Court can exercise its inherent power to quash non-compoundable offences where the dispute is essentially civil/private in nature and the settlement is genuine, citing State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, Gian Singh, and Narinder Singh. The court emphasizes that such power should not be exercised for heinous offences, offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act, or where the offence is of grave public concern (e.g., Section 307 IPC). The court further notes that the settled case requires consideration of the accused's antecedents and conduct. On the facts, the court finds the dispute private, the settlement genuine, and the public interest not violated. Consequently, the criminal miscellaneous case is allowed and all further proceedings in CC 165/2022 are quashed.
WP(C).No.13769 of 2016 (U) The petition, filed by K.G. Gangadharan, a nearby resident of a quarry operated by the 7th respondent, seeks to interdict the quarry on grounds of threat to life and property, and ecological degradation. The 7th respondent held a quarry lease over 2.0249 hectares of Patta land in Koottickal, valid till 2020, with lease granted by the 4th respondent. The petitioner relies on Exhibits P2 (1993 CESS land-use/hazard report), P3 (Kerala Biodiversity Board 2013 study on quarries near Koottickal and impact on flora/fauna; recommending cessation and PA declaration), P4-P5 evidencing encroachment on puramboke land, and P6 (MoEF notification under Environment (Protection) Act 1986 prohibiting quarrying in Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESA) including Koottickal). The Petitioner argues that ESA restrictions and biodiversity concerns, along with encroachments and a potential landslide risk, justify immediate quarry closure. The 7th Respondent counters that the lease is valid and mining is permissible; P2 is old, P3’s recommendations are contested, and draft ESA notifications show reductions and exclusions (Koottickal excluded). The court emphasizes that MOEF notifications contemplate restrictions on new/expanded activities, not immediate cessation of existing mines, and directs a survey (within two weeks, to be completed in three months) by the District Collector, with expert input from Kerala State Biodiversity Board and consideration under environmental acts. The petition is disposed with the 7th respondent barred from quarrying during the survey period and costs allocated.
Jayasree, wife of Rajesh Kumar, challenged a Family Court order dismissing her original petition (O.P.371/2013) seeking a decree for the return of gold ornaments and money, along with damages and marriage expenses. The marriage took place on 29.4.2007; at nuptials, her parents gifted 15 sovereigns of gold and a further 5 sovereigns were gifted to the respondent. Her father allegedly entrusted Rs.1,00,000 to the respondent at engagement; she also claimed misappropriation of ornaments and Rs.2,00,000 allegedly entrusted in 2008, amid allegations of dowry harassment and domestic violence for which maintenance was granted in a DV petition. The appellant contends that misappropriation, entrustment, and damages have been proved, warranting a decree for recovery of 18 sovereigns of gold, Rs.3,00,000, Rs.5,00,000 as compensation, and Rs.1,00,000 for marriage expenses. The respondent denies misappropriation, claiming the marriage dissolved by a prior divorce decree and that the couple lived separately since 2007; he asserts the ornaments were with him only briefly and some items were gifts to the petitioner. The High Court re-evaluated evidence in light of Alphonsa v. Neetha and Royson Mathew v. Minimol, upholding that the initial burden lies with the claimant to prove entrustment and misappropriation. It ultimately allows the appeal only to the extent of Rs.1,00,000, with other reliefs left intact; limits costs between the parties.
WP(C).No.9400 of 2020 (Suo Motu) This is a suo motu writ petition instituted by the High Court of Kerala in response to the nationwide COVID-19 lockdown and the ensuing inability of litigants to access courts. The bench, comprising Chief Justice S. Manikumar and Justices C.T. Ravikumar and Shaji P. Chaly, delivered a comprehensive order on 1 March 2021. The judgment traces the sequence of events beginning with the 24 March 2020 lockdown and the Court’s earlier direction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to extend interim orders expiring during the lockdown by one month. It emphasizes access to justice and protection of personal liberty under Article 21, while acknowledging the practical difficulties of litigants, lawyers, and staff in the wake of the pandemic. The court cites Supreme Court directions in Suo Motu W.P.(C) No.1/2020 (Contagion in Prisons) and recalls the need to form High Powered Committees and to consider parole/interim bail for undertrials. It also discusses RBI moratorium guidance as deferment, not waiver of interest, and highlights concerns about NPAs and credit ratings, while preserving constitutional safeguards. The order culminates in a directive that interim orders across the Courts/Tribunals in Kerala be extended for one more month from today (1 March 2021), with copies published and distributed to the District Courts and Tribunals for compliance—effectively extending judicial relief during the continuing pandemic.
This is a Kerala High Court review petition challenging the dismissal of S.A.No.195/1994 on merits, with the review petition filed after a lengthy delay. The petitioner Nelson seeks condonation of 680 days in filing the review petition, explaining that the original suit was filed against his late father and, during the appellate proceedings, his family became legal representatives and pursued the appeal. The second appeal was dismissed on 06.03.2008, but crucial events—death of the 4th appellant, the 1st respondent, and the 8th respondent, the resulting non- impleadment of their legal heirs, and the counsel’s failure to inform the petitioner about the disposal—were not communicated to him. The petitioner contends that family disputes, miscommunication, and lack of notice caused the delay, and that his conduct was bona fide and not negligent. The respondents dispute the petition’s factual averments, argue that the appellant was aware of the appeal, and fault the absence of timely impleading legal heirs; they stress that the merits of the SA were not vitiated by the delay. The court relies on Jacob v. Vironi to underscore that non- impleadment cannot invalidate a merit-based dismissal, yet applies the settled law on “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, citing Basawaraj and University of Delhi, among others, and ultimately finds the delay inordinate and the explanation not bona fide. The petition is dismissed, CMA 765/2010 and R.P.889/2010 are dismissed; no costs awarded.
This writ appeal arises from a writ petition (WP(C) No. 30797 of 2023) filed by Malanad Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. to secure police protection for the cooperative society’s elections scheduled on 15 October 2023, videography of the polling process at the society’s expense, verification of voters’ identity cards from Form 6B, and appointment of an Advocate Observer to oversee polling and counting at Government High School, Vagamon. The Single Judge granted police protection and videography on request but declined the appointment of an Advocate Observer. The appellant relied on Exts. P1–P3 (election notification, a protection request, and a 2013 police circular) and argued that other nearby co‑operative banks had received Advocate Observers. The respondents contended that the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act provides exclusive dispute resolution through the Cooperative Arbitration Court (Section 70A), and that the appointment of an Advocate Observer was unwarranted; videography could be provided if requested and at the petitioner’s cost; general steps were already taken to ensure peaceful elections. The Division Bench ultimately dismissed the appeal, holding there is no merit in appointing an Advocate Observer and affirming the Single Judge’s order, while permitting videography if sought, and police protection for the election. The Court emphasized the Act’s exclusive arbitration mechanism for disputes and applicable penal provisions for corrupt practices.
WA 1027/2022 & Connected Cases This judgment deals with a batch of writ appeals filed by managers of aided private higher secondary schools challenging Government orders regulating Plus Two admissions for the 2022-23 academic year. The core issue concerns GO(MS) No.121/2022/G.Edn dated 07.07.2022 (extending a 20% management quota for private aided schools) and the connected directions including a 10% community quota to be reserved for students of the community to which the management belongs. The petitioners argued that the 10% community quota, created for managements other than minorities and SEBC/OBC communities, is unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 15(1), 29(2), and Article 29, and that it amounts to discrimination against other communities and to an impermissible delegation of admission policy. The State contended that admission quotas are policy decisions within the executive domain, and that the 10% community quota has a rational basis connected to the community’s contribution to the establishment of the school. The Division Bench follows a long line of constitutional and Supreme Court authority, notably Akhila Kerala Dheevara Sabha (2003) and Unni Krishnan, to hold that community-based quotas outside recognized constitutional categories are invalid. It upholds the policy shift reducing management quota from 30% to 20% for non-minority managements and rules that any unused 10% community quota must merge with open merit; it also emphasizes policy considerations and the need for clear future orders. The judgment disposes of the writ appeals with the stated directions and observations.
The defendant Thundiyil Abdurahiman challenges two orders passed by the Munsiff Court, Nadapuram, in I.A.511/2017 in O.S. No.16/2016: an order dated 5.10.2017 directing production of his original passport and a consequential order dated 8.12.2017 striking out his defence for non-compliance. The suit, based on a promissory note allegedly executed by the defendant, was defended by him on the ground of non-execution of the instrument and non-liability; the plaintiff sought to verify signatures by comparing the passport signature with the disputed promissory note and to obtain an expert handwriting opinion under Order XI Rule 14 CPC. The defendant’s wife, who holds his power of attorney, admitted the document signatures were not in her possession and he argued that production of the actual passport would deprive him of his right to stay in the United Arab Emirates; he offered to furnish a photocopy instead. The trial court, applying the broad discretion under the rule, allowed the application, leading to non-compliance and the subsequent strike-out of the defence. The petitioner approached this Court, contending that the orders override fundamental rights and that the court should restrict production to a photocopy or for limited inspection. The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sasanagouda to emphasize that production under Order XI Rule 14 is conditional on expediency, justness, relevancy, and potential hardship, and that it cannot be invoked to destroy a defence. Consequently, the impugned orders were set aside and the petition allowed.
George Varghese, the petitioner in OP (FC) No. 539 of 2022, challenges the order dated 27 July 2022 (Ext. P5) disposing of I.A. No. 2009/2022 in O.P. No. 220/2022, which sought return of the original petition. The respondent wife Treesa Sebastian had filed a petition under Order VII Rule 1 CPC and invoked reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Sections 18, 19, 20, 21, 22) along with Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The petition concerned three children born to the parties during the marriage and their custody, maintenance claims, and other ancillary reliefs including property rights and protection from domestic violence. The applicant contended that if the DV Act reliefs are allowed under Sections 18–22, the remedy under Section 12 would be rendered redundant, creating a nonsensical clash with appellate pathways, and that the Family Court has no original jurisdiction to entertain such combined reliefs due to Section 28 of the DV Act. The respondents argued that the 18–22 reliefs could be granted within the pending petition, and that the 12 remedy is not exclusive and may be pursued in other proceedings; Amicus Curiae supported the view that 18–22 reliefs can be claimed alongside the 12 reliefs. The High Court examined Section 12, Section 26, and precedent including Raju Narayana Swamy v. Beena M.D., Neetu Singh v. Sunil Singh, Brundaben Patra v. Rajalaxmi Patra, and Vineet Ganesh v. Priyanka Vasan. It held that an aggrieved person may elect between 12 or 18–22 reliefs, but the petition was without merit, and the I.A. was rightly dismissed. The petition, therefore, was dismissed for want of merit.
This is a writ appeal (WA No. 633 of 2021) before the Kerala High Court arising from a dispute over disciplinary action against Rasheeda Beegum K.M., then Headmistress of an aided school. The Manager of Calicut Girls Vocational and Higher Secondary School suspended the petitioner in May 2017 following alleged misconduct. An enquiry by the Deputy Director of Education (Ext. P5) found two charges proved, leading to a show-cause notice asking why the enquiry report should not be accepted and punishment imposed. The Deputy Director refused sanction for removal as disproportionate (Ext. P12–P13), and after various proceedings the Manager issued a fresh show-cause notice proposing a different major penalty following Ext. P13’s dismissal of the prior revision. The petitioner challenged the show-cause, and the learned Single Judge quashed Ext. P14. On appeal, the Division Bench held that a sanction refusal pertains to a specific proposal and does not bar the Manager from proposing another punishment based on the same findings, citing Muhammed v. Secretary to Government. The Court set aside the quashing, and modified the punishment to banning one increment without cumulative effect, with suspension treated as eligible leave (and exempting ratification under the Kerala Education Rules). The appeal is thus allowed with the modified sanction, and a formal order is to be issued within two weeks.
The petition challenges the Kerala Motor Vehicles (1st Amendment) Rules, 2017 which prescribe a maximum distance of 140 km for Ordinary Limited Stop Services (OLS). The petitioners, private operators holding regular permits on routes Kollengode-Kozhikode and Ernakulam-based routes, contend that the Amendment and related Gazette notifications (Exts. P5, P6) alter the terms of the scheme and violate Sections 71, 80, 96 and 212 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as well as Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. They seek a declaration that the Rules are ultra vires and a writ of certiorari quashing Ext. P1 decision granting renewal and conversion of service as well as converting private permits into stage carriages. The Respondents rely on the statutory scheme under Sections 99, 100, 102 to reform transport services in the State, citing the need for transparency and fairness. The Division Bench decision in Saju Varkey’s case (Kerala SRTO) is invoked to support the procedure, while the High Court ultimately quashes the distance clause of Ext. P13, and the challenge to Ext. P12’s amendments is rejected, directing renewal consideration in line with law.
This Motor Accidents Claims Appeal arises from a MACT award (Thrissur) under which the insurer was held liable to pay compensation to V.K. Suresh for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, with the award being passed on 30.01.2012 in OP(MV) No.1279/2004. The insurer challenged the award before the Kerala High Court, arguing that the act of a vehicle’s owner permitting the rider to operate the vehicle places the user in the owner’s shoes, not as a third party, thereby absolving the insurer of liability under Section 163A and Section 147, as interpreted through the jurisprudence on no-fault liability. The petitioner (Suresh) and the owner contended that the insurer could still be liable; they relied on judgments indicating that the claimant’s status and the driver’s relationship to the owner must be proven and that the burden falls on the user or insurer depending on pleaded facts. The High Court ultimately held that the rider who borrowed the motorcycle was in the shoes of the owner and not a third party; consequently, the insurer had no liability under Section 163A. The award against the insurer was set aside, and quantum was not addressed since it was not pressed. The decision clarifies the application of Ningamma, Sasikala, and related precedents in the context of authorized use of a vehicle.
This appeal arises from an award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Attingal, in O.P. (MV) No. 418 of 2009, where Sulaiman died in a road accident on 21 January 2009 after a mini lorry collided with his motorcycle KL-22-6865. The claimants, widow and five dependants (including two minors represented by their mother), sought compensation of Rs. 17 lakh under heads including loss of dependency, future prospects, funeral expenses, loss of estate, and damages for love and affection. The Tribunal held the driver negligent but contributed to the death with equal responsibility (contributory negligence) and assessed the insurer’s liability; it also adopted monthly income of Rs. 5,000 and a notional calculation of damages. Applying well-known precedents, the High Court re-evaluated the quantum: fixing the deceased’s monthly income at Rs. 7,000 (Ramachandrappa), applying 40% future prospects, and reducing personal expenses to one-fourth under Sarla Verma. It recalculated loss of dependency to Rs. 13,23,000 and, following Pranay Sethi and Satinder Kaur, adjusted the heads for loss of consortium, love and affection, funeral expenses, and loss of estate. The result enhanced the total to Rs. 15,38,000, with the far higher enhanced amount payable at 50% due to contributory negligence. The appeal was allowed in part, with directions for deposit and release through the Tribunal.
In MACA 1224 of 2012, Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd. appeals a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal award in Kasaragod that held the insurer liable for compensation to Bheema and Baijumon. The Insurance Company argued exoneration on the ground that the 1st claimant was a gratuitous passenger in a goods autorickshaw and thus not covered by the policy. The Tribunal rejected this argument, finding liability on the insurer. The High Court, in a detailed statutory-interpretation exercise, examines Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the post-1994 amendments, notably Section 46 of the 1994 amendment. It traces precedents like Satpal Singh, Baljit Kaur, and the New India Assurance Co. v. Asha Rani line of decisions; it notes that Satpal Singh has been overruled by Asha Rani, and that subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence clarifies that after the 1994 amendment, liability for the owner of the goods or their authorized representative is covered in specific circumstances. On this basis, the court holds that the insurer cannot be held liable to pay compensation when the owner of the goods or its representative is involved; the owner's liability to pay the decree is established. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the insurer is exonerated.
This is an appeal under MACA (Motor Accident Claims Appeal) by the legal heirs (additional petitioners 2 to 4) of Devasia Thomas challenging an award in OP(MV) 975/2006 of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Pala). Devasia Thomas was injured in a jeep collision on 02-09-2006 and died on 01-07-2010; his heirs sought compensation. The Tribunal initially awarded Rs. 6,13,957, and on remand the matter was reconsidered. The appellants contended that the deceased, an agriculturist, should have an income of Rs. 4,000 per month (supported by Ramachandrappa) and that Pranay Sethi’s ratio permitting a 10% add-on to dependency should apply, making Rs. 4,400 per month. The Tribunal’s calculated loss of dependency (Rs. 3,87,200) exceeded by Rs. 1,23,200 the amount already granted (Rs. 2,64,000). The appeal also sought enhanced conventional heads: funeral expenses (from Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 15,000) and loss of consortium (Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 1,20,000). The court noted that the death occurred after a lengthy survival, but did not reduce damages for pain and suffering or loss of amenities, emphasizing that the injury-caused suffering persisted through treatment. The appeal was partly allowed, enhancing the total by Rs. 2,18,200, with interest at 7.5% from the petition date and a two-month deposit obligation to the appellants’ names.
Regional Cancer Center (RCC), a state-owned society running a cancer care hospital in Thiruvananthapuram, implemented a series of cancer care schemes under the umbrella of ‘Cancer Care for Life’ (CCL) to provide free treatment to enrollees. The 3rd respondent joined the scheme in 1994 with three family members after paying a Rs. 1,700 membership. Diagnosed with cancer, the 3rd respondent reported on 03.02.2006 and received free chemotherapy at RCC, but required a specialized ‘Targeted Therapy’ (Mabthera). The patient paid Rs. 4,40,466 for Mabthera and ward charges. Alleging deficiency in service, the 3rd respondent filed Ext. P4 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum (CDRF) seeking refund of the Mabthera cost and compensation. The CDRF, by Ext. P8 (30.07.2015), held deficiency in service and directed reimbursement of Rs. 4,40,466, but did not award compensation. RCC appealed to the State Commission under Section 15 CP Act; Ext. P10 (09.10.2019) dismissed the appeal. Enforcement action followed (Ext. P11). RCC approached the High Court by W.P.(C) No.1998/2020 challenging Ext. P8 and Ext. P10, and seeking Article 226 relief. The Single Judge refused interference, noting availability of statutory remedies. The Division Bench ultimately held that the CP Act provides a self-contained, hierarchical mechanism, and that no exceptional grounds warranted Article 226 interference. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.
Raishad K.T. filed this Division Bench Kerala High Court writ petition (Criminal) challenging the detention of his brother, Ramees K.T., under the COFEPOSA Act, 1974. The detenu was allegedly a major conspirator in a gold-smuggling racket routed through diplomatic baggage via Dubai, with evidence including statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. An Ext.P1 detention order was issued on 19.11.2020 and executed on 24.11.2020 while the detenu remained in custody in separate Customs and UAPA prosecutions. The petitioner sought habeas corpus and certiorari to quash the detention and argued six core grounds: (i) delay of about four months between the most proximate prejudicial activity and Ext.P1, severing live links; (ii) non-provision of documents relied upon in the grounds of detention (WhatsApp chats, prior activities, CCTV footage); (iii) detention based only on confessional statements; (iv) failure to consider that the detenu was in judicial custody with bail prospects; (v) denial of a hearing to the detenu’s counsel before the Advisory Board; and (vi) incompetence of the Advisory Board under Section 8 COFEPOSA, especially in light of a 17.3.2020 notification. The Union of India and agencies defended the detention, arguing substantial evidence and proper procedure. The Court rejected all grounds, held no delay (distinguishing earlier precedents on delay), accepted that relied materials were supplied, and that confessional statements under Section 108 are admissible evidence. It also held that CCTV footage need not be supplied if not relied upon, and that the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction sufficed. Importantly, the Court held that the Advisory Board need not be the Central Government’s board under 8(a); a state-level Advisory Board suffices under Article 22 and COFEPOSA. The petition was dismissed, and the detention sustained.
This Kerala High Court judgment (ITA No. 772/2009) is a revenue appeal challenging an ITAT Cochin Bench order (IT A 72/Coch/2001, dated 11.08.2006) for the assessment year 1997-98. The Assessing Officer had made four disallowances under section 143(3): (i) depreciation on current securities, (ii) broken period interest on securities purchased, (iii) gratuity payable to retired employees, and (iv) a loss on redemption of securities treated as capital loss. The CIT (Appeals) confirmed the additions, while the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal in part. The Revenue framed substantial questions of law seeking to reverse the Tribunal on (i) depreciation on current securities and (ii) broken period interest, and questioned the Tribunal’s interference with gratuity disallowance under section 40A(7). The High Court, applying its precedents in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. and South Indian Bank Ltd., held that questions 1(a) (revaluation of current securities) and 1(b) (broken period interest) should be resolved in the assessee’s favour. On gratuity, the Court found that the provision for gratuity payable under LIC, supported by actuarial valuation, cannot be disallowed under section 40A(vii)(a) when the liability has crystallized; hence the disallowance is reversed. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. The Tribunal’s findings in favour of the assessee on these issues are upheld, and the overall appeal is disposed of in favour of the assessee on the specified points.
This is a Criminal Misc. Case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the petitioners, Sreekanth and Kuttisankara Guptan, challenging Annexure-F final report in C.C.No.1339/2015 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Ottappalam, arising from Crime No.136/2015 of Sreekrishnapuram Police Station, Palakkad. The final report indicts offences under Sections 420 and 506(i) IPC, read with Section 34 IPC, and under Sections 13 and 17 of the Kerala Money Lenders Act, 1958. The prosecution’s version traces a loan taken in 2006 of Rs.1 lakh secured by documents including signed blank cheques and papers; the borrower allegedly paid some but the loan documents were retained and a 2013 lawyer’s notice demanded a large sum. A complaint was lodged in 2015, resulting in Annexure-F. The petition contends mala fide, abuse of process to derail proceedings under Section 138 NI Act (S.T.No.1/2014), and lack of corroborative material. The respondents argue the complaint is capable of sustaining offences and that invoking 482 Cr.P.C. would prejudice the prosecution. The High Court, invoking cautious review, notes substantial delay, lack of specific material, and concludes the proceedings amount to abuse of process. Consequently, Annexure-F and further proceedings are quashed and the CRL.M.C. is allowed.
