## **`IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM`**
## **`PRESENT`**
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THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A. BADHARUDEEN
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MONDAY, THE 8[TH] DAY OF NOVEMBER 2021 / 17TH KARTHIKA, 1943
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MACA NO. 1224 OF 2012
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AGAINST THE AWARD IN OPMV 84/2009 OF DISTRICT COURT &
SESSIONS & MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, KASARAGOD
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## **`APPELLANT/2ND RESPONDENT IN O.P(MV):`**
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BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSRANCE CO. LTD
FINANCIAL TOWERS, LISSIE JUNCTION, KALOOR,
ERNAKULAM.
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BY ADV SRI.LAL GEORGE
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## **`RESPONDENTS/CLAIMANT AND 1ST RESPONDENT IN O.P.(MV):`**
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1BHEEMA `
S/O.PUTTAPPA, GUTHANAD HOUSE, GUTHAL VILLAGE,
HAVERI DISTRICT, KARNATAKA STATE.
NOW RESIDING AT RING WORKS, THALAPPADY (PO),
THALAPPADY VILLAGE, MANGALORE, D.K.DISTRICT,
KARNATAKA.674184.
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2BAIJUMON
S/O.ABDULRAHIMAN, CHVAKKAL MANZIL, THUMMINADU,
KUNJATHUR (PO), KASARAGOD TALUK,
KASARAGOD DISTRICT.671 121.
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BY ADV SRI.T.B.SHAJIMON
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THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING BEEN
FINALLY HEARD ON 28.10.2021, THE COURT ON 08.11.2021,
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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2
## **`“CR”`**
## **`JUDGMENT`**
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Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.
Ltd, who is the 2[nd] respondent in O.P.(M.V)
No.84/2009 on the file of the Motor Accidents
Claim Tribunal, Kasaragod, is the appellant
herein. The respondents are the original
petitioner as well as the original 1[st]
respondent before the Tribunal.
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2.TheInsuranceCompanydisputed
liability and sought exoneration from
liability raising contention that the 1[st]
respondent/injured was a gratuitous passenger
in a goods vehicle viz., Goods Autorickshaw
bearing registration no.KL-14G-3792. Though
the appellant sought for exoneration, the
Tribunal did not allow the same.
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3.Heard the learned counsel for the
appellant.
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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4.It is argued by the learned counsel
for the appellant that the Tribunal negatived
the contention raised by the Insurance Company
to grant full exoneration without rationale
though the 1[st] respondent/original petitioner
was travelling in the goods autorickshaw
involved in the accident after sharing the
seat of the driver where driver alone was
permitted to travel. According to the learned
counsel the finding of the Tribunal giving the
1[st] respondent/petitioner the status of a
person accompanying the goods carried therein
is unsustainable. The learned counsel for the
appellant placed decision reported in United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh K.K and
another : 2008 (12) SCC 657; 2008 KHC 4602 in
support of this contention. In this decision
it was held that if the claimant had not been
travelling in the vehicle as owner of the
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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goods, he shall not be covered by the policy
of the insurance. In any view of the matter in
a three wheeler goods carriage, the driver
could not have allowed anybody else to share
his seat. No other person whether as a
passenger or as a owner of the vehicle is
supposed to share the seat of the driver.
Violation of the condition of the contract of
insurance, therefore, is approved.
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5.To be on the facts of this case, in
order to answer the challenge raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant, on
23.01.2008 at about 14:30 hours, while the
injured was travelling in a Bajaj Goods
Autorickshaw bearing registration no.KL-14G-
3792 along with construction goods to the work
site by sitting near the driver of the vehicle
and transporting the construction goods, he
met with an accident when the said
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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Autorickshaw suddenly turned by its driver.
The injured being the original petitioner/1[st]
respondent herein claimed Rs.1,50,000/- as
compensation.
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6.1[st] respondent, the owner-cum-driver
was set ex-parte by the Tribunal.
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7.The 2[nd] respondent - insurer/appellant
filed a written statement disputing the
negligence and denying liability raising
specific contention that the injured/1[st]
respondent was a gratuitous passenger in a
goods vehicle. But the Tribual disowned the
contention and found liability on the part of
the insurer.
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8.Now, the learned counsel for the
appellant canvassed exoneration of liability
fastened on the appellant Insurance Company.
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9.In order to resolve the question,
reference to Sections 147 of the Motor
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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Vehicles Act is necessary and the same is
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## `extracted here under:`
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"147. Requirements of policies and
limits of liability. (1) In order to
comply the requirements of this
Chapter, a policy of insurance must be
a policy which-
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a) is issued by a person who is an
authorized insurer; and
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b) insures the person or classes of
persons specified in the policy to
extent specified in sub section (2) -
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i) against any liability which may be
incurred by him in respect of the
death of or bodily injury to any
person, including owner of the goods
or his authorized representative
carried in the vehicle or damage to
any property of a third party caused
by or arising out of the use of the
vehicle in a public place;
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(ii) against the death of or bodily
injury to any passenger of a public
service vehicle caused by or arising
out of the use of the vehicle in a
public place:
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Provided that a policy shall not be
required -
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(i) to cover liability in respect of
the death, arising out of and in the
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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course of his employment, of the
employee of a person insured by the
policy or in respect of bodily injury
sustained by such an employee arising
out of and in the course of his
employment other than a liability
arising under Workmen's Compensation
Act, 1923, (8 of 1923) in respect of
the death of, or bodily injury to, any
such employee -
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(a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or
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(b) if it is a public service vehicle
engaged as a conductor of the vehicle
or in examining tickets on the
vehicle, or
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(c)if it is a goods carriage, being
carried in the vehicle, or
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(ii) to cover any contractual
liability.
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Explanation. For the removal of
doubts, it is hereby declared that the
death of or bodily injury to any
person or damage to any property of a
third party shall be deemed to have
been caused by or to have arisen out
of, the use of a vehicle in a public
place notwithstanding that the person
who is dead or injured or the property
which is damaged was not in a public
place at the time of the accident, if
the act or omission which led to the
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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accident occurred in a public place.”
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10.After reading Section 147 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, it is necessary to have a
glimpse on judicial pronouncements relevant on
this question, while interpreting Section 147
of the Motor Vehicles Act. InNew India
Assurance Co. Ltd v. Asha Rani : 2003 (1) KLT
165 (SC) the question raised was whether the
insurer is liable to pay compensation to the
dependents of a deceased passenger while the
deceased was travelling in a goods vehicle. In
that case the vehicle met with an accident, on
account of which the passenger died. The
Supreme Court after considering the relevant
issues held as under:
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“In Satpal's case (AIR 2000 SC 235)
the Court assumed that the provisions
of S.95(1) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
are identical with S.147(1) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood
prior to its amendment. But a careful
scrutiny of the provisions would make
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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it clear that prior to the amendment
of 1994 it was not necessary for the
insurer to insure against the owner of
thegoodsorhisauthorized
representative being carried in a
goods vehicle. On an erroneous
impression this Court came to the
conclusion that the insurer would be
liable to pay compensation in respect
of the death or bodily injury caused
to either the owner of the goods or
his authorized representative when
being carried in a goods vehicle the
accident occurred. If the Motor
Vehicles Amendment Act of 1994 is
examined, particularly S.46 of Act 6
of 1994 by which expression 'injury to
any person' in the original Act stood
substituted by the expression 'injury
to any person including owner of the
goods or his authorized representative
carried in the vehicle' the conclusion
is irresistible that prior to the
aforesaid amendment Act of 1994, even
if widest interpretation is given to
the expression 'to any person' it will
not cover either the owner of the
goods or his authorized representative
being carried in the vehicle. The
objects and reasons of Cl.46 also
states that it seeks to amend S.147 to
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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include owner of the goods or his
authorized representative carried in
the vehicle for the purposes of
liability under the insurance policy.
It is no doubt true that sometimes the
Legislature amends the law by way of
amplification and clarification of and
inherent position which is there in
the statute, but a plain meaning being
given to the words used 1 in the
statute, as it stood prior to its
amendment of 1994, and as it stands
subsequent to its amendment in 1994
and bearing in mind the objects and
reasons engrafted in the amended
provisions referred to earlier, it is
difficult for us to construe that the
expression 'including owner of the
goods or his authorized representative
carried in the vehicle' which was
added to the pre-existed expression
'injury to any person' is either
clarificatory or amplification of the
pre-existing statute. On the other
hand it clearly demonstrates that the
Legislature wanted to bring within the
sweep of S.147 and making it
compulsory for the insurer to insure
even in case of a goods vehicle, the
owner of the goods or his authorized
representative being carried in a
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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goods vehicle when that vehicle met
with an accident and the owner of the
goods or his representative either
dies or suffers bodily injury. The
judgment of this Court in Satpal's
case, therefore must be held to have
not been correctly decided and the
impugned judgment of the tribunal as
well as that of the High Court
accordingly are set aside and these
appeals are allowed It is held that
the insurer will not be liable for
paying
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compensation to the owner of goods or
his authorized representative on being
carried in a goods vehicle when that
meets with an accident and the owner
of goods or his representative dies or
suffers any bodily injury.
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The changes made by substitution of
S.147 of the Act by S.46 of the Act 54
of 1994 (w.e.f 14.11.1994) was
considered by the Supreme Court in the
above decision.”
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11.The Apex Court in National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar and others : AIR 2003
SC 3093 also considered the ratio in New India
Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh : AIR 2000
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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SC 235 and found that it has no application
after the amendment of S.147 of the MV Act. In
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chinnamma :
2004 (3) KLT 397, three bench Judges of the
Apex Court, considered the question as to
whether the owner of goods travelling in a
trailer attached to the tractor was entitled
to the insurance coverage before the amendment
of S.147 of the MV Act. It was answered that
an insurance for an owner of the goods or his
authorized representative travelling in a
vehicle became compulsory only with effect
from 14.11.1994, i.e., from the date of coming
into force of amending Act 54 of 1994. The
Apex Court considered the question whether a
person who hired a goods carriage would come
within the purview of S.147(1) of the MV Act
although no goods as such were carried in the
vehicle at the time of accident. Though this
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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Court had taken a view in this case that such
a person also will be covered under S.147(1)
of the Act, that decision was challenged
before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court
held as stated in paragraph 4 of this
judgment.
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12.Again inUnited India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Suresh : 2008 (4) KLT 552 (SC) when
the Apex Court considered the question whether
a person who hired a goods vehicle would come
within the purview of S.147(1) of the Act,
although no goods were being carried at the
time of the accident. In this decision the
Apex Court reiterated the legal position as
laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Baljit Kaur :2004 (1) KLT 938 (SC) = 2004 (2)
SCC 1 that the term "any person” envisaged
under S.147(1)(b)(i) shall not include any
gratuitous passenger, it was held that if the
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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**==> picture [13 x 9] intentionally omitted <==**
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claimant had not been travelling in the
vehicle as owner of the goods, he shall not be
covered by the policy of insurance. To put it
differently, no gratuitous passenger can be
allowed to travel in a goods vehicle and not
even the owner of the vehicle can share the
seat of the driver in a goods autorickshaw.
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13.Thus, law in no more res integra on
the point that, if the claimant had not been
travelling in the vehicle as owner of the
goods, he shall not be covered by the policy
of insurance. Further in a three wheeler goods
carriage, the driver could not have allowed
anybody else to share his seat. No other
person whether a passenger or as a owner of
the vehicle is supposed to share the seat of
the driver and any such action is violation of
the policy conditions. Here, the case put up
by the appellant/insurer is that, the injured
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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was accompanying the Goods Autorickshaw along
with construction goods to the work site after
sharing the seat of the driver and met with an
accident during this course. Ext.B1 policy
would show that the seating capacity of the
vehicle involved in the accident is one person
and nobody is permitted to travel in the said
Goods Autorickshaw, other than the driver.
Dealing with similar case as discussed the
Honourable Supreme Court held that no other
person whether as passenger or as owner of the
vehicle is supposed to share the seat of the
driver and the said action is violation of the
condition of the contract of insurance.
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14.In the three bench decision in
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur :
AIR 2004 SC 1340 also while summarizing the
legal position, the Honourable Supreme Court
held as under:
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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“21. The upshot of the aforementioned
discussions is that instead and in place of
the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall
be liable to satisfy the decree. The
question, however, would be as to whether
keeping in view the fact that the laws was
not clear so long such a direction would be
fair and equitable. We do not think so. We,
therefore, clarify the legal position which
shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal
as also the High Court had proceeded in
terms of the decisions of this Court in
Satpal Singh ((2000) 1 SCC 237). The said
decision has been overruled only in Asha
Rani (2003 (1) KLT 165 (SC)). We,
therefore, are of the opinion that the
interest of justice will be sub-served if
the appellant herein is directed to satisfy
the awarded amount in favour of the
claimant if not already satisfied and
recover the same from the owner of the
vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery,
it would not be necessary for the insurer
to file a separate suit but it may initiate
a proceeding before the executing Court as
if the dispute between the insurer and the
owner was the subject matter of
determination before the tribunal and the
issue is decided against the owner and in
favour of the insurer. We have issued the
aforementioned directions having regard to
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M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012
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the scope and purport of S.168 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 in terms whereof it is
not only entitled to determine the amount
of claim as put forth by the claimant for
recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or
driver of the vehicle jointly or severally
but also the dispute between the insurer on
the one hand and the owner or driver of the
vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch
as can be resolved by the tribunal in such
a proceeding.”
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To sum up, it is held that the
contention raised by the appellant urging full
exoneration is to be allowed and contra
decision entered into by the Tribunal stands
set aside. Resultantly, it is ordered that
the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the
amount and the liability is upon the owner of
the vehicle. Accordingly, the pay and recovery
right ordered against the appellant Insurance
Company is set aside and the appellant is
exonerated from liability. Thus it is held
that 1[st] respondent, the owner of the vehicle
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## **`M.A.C.A No.1224 of 2012`**
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is liable to pay the award amount granted by
the Tribunal in this case.
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In the result, this appeal is allowed
as indicated above.
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Sd/-
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A.BADHARUDEEN, JUDGE.
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