BAIL APPL. NO.4238 OF 2023 Muraleedharan Unni K.N. (accused no.1) challenges the denial of post-arrest regular bail in NDPS proceedings arising from seizure of 18,029.85 grams of heroin/pyschotropic substance, allegedly concealed in his baggage at Cochin International Airport in August 2022. The prosecution claims the accused, who travelled from Harare via Doha to New Delhi, transported contraband worth around Rs. 18 crore with knowledge of its nature and intended delivery to a co-accused in Delhi. The charge sheet cites offences under sections 21, 23, 28, 29 and 30 of the NDPS Act, along with other provisions (including Section 8(c) read with Section 23) and Section 67 of the Act for statements. The petitioner maintains innocence, contending he was merely following his employer’s orders and acted unknowingly; he also argues for medical reasons, seeking bail for surgery. The Special Public Prosecutor argues against bail, emphasizing the large commercial quantity and the need to satisfy Section 37(1)(b) prerequisites. The High Court recalls the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) — reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and likelihood of non-recurrence on bail — and reiterates that ‘reasonable grounds’ entails more than prima facie grounds. It also notes that medical urgency cannot dilute the Sec. 37 rider, directing treatment within jail medical facilities, and orders expeditious trial within six months. The bail application is dismissed, with a direction to expedite the trial.
This is an original criminal petition (OP(Crl.) No. 404 of 2023) before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, filed by Baiju, the sole accused in Crime No. 812/2020 of Vellikulangara Police Station, Thrissur, arising from alleged offences under IPC Sections 376-AB and 354-B and various provisions of the POCSO Act. The petitioner sought to recall and re-examine PW6, the child victim (then aged 4 at the time of the incident, now 7), through recall of witness examination under Section 311 Cr.P.C. and related procedural provisions, arguing that omissions and contradictions could be confronted via cross-examination (including under Section 164 Cr.P.C.). The trial court dismissed Crl.M.P. No. 223/2023, citing the statutory bar under Section 33(5) of the POCSO Act and the extensive cross-examination already undergone by the child, and held that there was no sufficient cause to recall. The High Court scrutinized the power under Section 311 Cr.P.C., emphasizing that recall must be judicious, not used to prolong proceedings or prejudice the accused, and that the court must act to discover the truth while protecting rights. It noted that recalling a child witness requires careful balancing of truth-seeking against potential prejudice and inherent delays. The petition was dismissed, upholding the trial court’s order. The decision reiterates that recall is available only when essential to reach a just decision, and it should not be used as a dilatory tactic. The oral record cites several precedents to underline the proper exercise of recall powers and the special protections afforded to child witnesses under the POCSO framework.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 2056 OF 2008 This is a criminal revision petition filed by Vazhayil Mani @ Viswanathan challenging the conviction and sentence under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act by the Special Court (Session Court) at Manjeri in SC 308/2006. The prosecution alleged that on 17.12.2004, at about 6:30 pm, the accused was found transporting 10 litres of illicit arrack on a public road near Anappara, which violated the Kerala Abkari Act. The trial court convicted him to six months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with an additional three months’ imprisonment in default, and allowed set-off between seizure and conviction dates. On appeal, the Sessions Court dismissed the appeal, sustaining the conviction. The revision challenges these findings on several grounds: (i) discrepancy in the evidence about the sample collected; PW1 and PW2 differ on the sample size; Ext P7 shows 375 ml, undermining PW2’s claim of 200 ml. (ii) Delay in filing the complaint (filed 19.04.2006, though detection was 17.12.2004) without adequate explanation. (iii) Noncompliance with Section 53A of the Abkari Act regarding disposal of seized liquor. The court, emphasizing Baburaj v. State of Kerala and Sathi v. State of Kerala, analyzes chain-of-custody, mandatory 53A procedures, and delay. The High Court ultimately allows the revision, acquitting the accused, and cancellation of bail. This reflects a stringent requirement of statutory compliance and strict scrutiny in Abkari Act prosecutions.
This is a Kerala High Court writ petition (WP(C) No.17266 of 2023) by Ramesh E challenging the Tirur Municipality’s decision to re-tender the annual maintenance contract (AMC) for street lights for 2022-23. The tender notice dated 14-12-2022 incorporated standard e-tendering clauses; notably, it included a clause disqualifying bidders in arrears to the Municipality, though none of the standard clauses defined arrears as disqualifying. Petitioner participated in the 26-12-2022 bid and was found technically and financially eligible, and was the lowest bidder. By resolution dated 19-05-2023, the Municipal Council rejected the petitioner’s bid and decided to re-tender. The counter-affidavit claims the petitioner owed arrears on other contracts and was thus disqualified; it also explains that an appeal challenging the arrears was pending, and that the AMC could be extended by one month under Ext.P2. The petitioner argued that his award was effectively in place and any arrears had not crystallized at the time of tender; if there was disqualification it would have shown during evaluation. The respondents argued fairness and the tendering authority’s prerogative to reject bids. The court held that the re-tendering was arbitrary and illegal, quashed Ext.P8, Ext.P8(a), Ext.P9, and directed the Municipality to execute the agreement expeditiously, with the petitioner’s undertaking to pay any final arrears.
This criminal miscellaneous case before the Kerala High Court challenges an order under Sections 107 and 111 CrPC issued by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Fort Kochi, directing the petitioner to show cause and to execute a bond for keeping the peace for one year with two sureties for Rs 1,00,000. The petitioner's counsel argues that the order is unsustainable as there was no material before the magistrate to justify the invocation of Section 107 CrPC and the subsequent Section 111 notice, and that the grounds for predicting disturbance of peace are vague. The State and Police contend that the information from the Sub-Inspector of Police, Aluva West, demonstrates a real threat to public peace, and that Section 107 is preventive, not punitive. The High Court scrutinizes the statutory framework, emphasizing that a magistrate must be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, and that the grounds must be recorded in writing under Section 111. It notes the absence of material detailing the nature of the crime or the likelihood of disturbance in the impugned order and relies on authorities such as Moidu, Peethambaran, Santhosh M.V., Bejoy K.V., and Madhu Limaye to stress safeguards and procedural compliance. Ultimately, the court quashes the Annexure-1 order and extinguishes all further proceedings in MC 27/2023, safeguarding the petitioner’s liberty against improper preventive action.
This is a revision petition under Section 125 CrPC filed in the Kerala High Court by Velayudhan Nadarajan (revision petitioner) challenging a Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram, order directing him to pay maintenance to his wife and three daughters. The Family Court, after considering pleadings and evidence, held that the petitioner, a former Assistant Executive Engineer in the PWD, had a substantial monthly income (the Court accepting Rs. 30,000 as his salary despite his claim of only Rs. 4,355 with no supporting documents) and that the respondents—his wife and four daughters—were dependent on such maintenance. It was found that the marriage to the 1st respondent had been established by long cohabitation, a sufficient basis for assuming marriage in a summary proceeding under Section 125 CrPC, and the petitioner’s conduct—living with other women and misappropriation of property—was seen as matrimonial cruelty justifying maintenance. The Family Court directed maintenance at Rs. 3,500 per month for each of the four respondents from 02.07.2008 until the first respondent remains his wife and until the daughters complete their graduation. The petitioner sought remand, arguing lack of opportunity to contest and the respondents’ alleged majority; the respondents defended the order as just and long overdue. The High Court, noting no illegality in the order and the extended period since the order, dismissed the revision petition, while leaving open the possibility of modification under Section 127 CrPC upon a future application. The decision cites Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the protective purpose of maintenance and the duty of an able-bodied husband to support his wife and children.
This Regular First Appeal arises from a suit for the return of advance sale consideration under Ext A1, dated 14.07.2008, in respect of a property described as 81.16 acres. The plaintiff, P.C. Joy, contends that the defendants, 1 to 4, executed Ext A1 on behalf of the 5th defendant, with a total advance of Rs. 5 Lakhs paid against a sale consideration of Rs. 25,000 per cent. The husband of defendant 1 originally owned the property; the 5th defendant was not present, yet the agreement purportedly bound him as well. After the plaintiff learned that defendants 2 and 3 were allegedly mentally incapable of executing a conveyance, he demanded that another property be offered as security or indemnity to safeguard his interests, failing which he claimed the agreement could not be performed. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff breached the contract and that the advance amount could be forfeited under the default clause. On appeal, the High Court noted the guardianship/incapacity of defendants 2 and 3, and that the 5th defendant had not appeared, though the agreement was signed on his behalf. Citing Kailash Nath Associates v. DDA, the court held damages require proven loss; there is no windfall. Consequently, the suit was decreed for return of Rs. 5 Lakhs with interest, and liability for the amount was shifted to defendants 1, 4 and 5. The appeal was allowed and the trial court’s decree set aside.
One Karthik Constructions (borrower) obtained credit from Union Bank of India by creating an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds on 04.09.2010 in respect of several parcels in Puthenvelikkara. SARFAESI proceedings were initiated after default, culminating in an auction and sale certificate Ext.P3 issued in favour of the 6th respondent Noorjahan on 24.04.2023. When the purchaser sought registration, the Sub Registrar refused, citing revenue recovery attachments under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and other government dues. Ext.P4 (09.03.2017) and Ext.P5 (07.03.2018) correspond to VAT and Motor Vehicle Tax recoveries by the Commercial Taxes Department and the Regional Transport Office, respectively. The Bank contends these attachments post-date the mortgage and must be effaced from the encumbrance certificate (Ext.P2) so sale and mutation can proceed under SARFAESI. The Tahsildar counters that the attachments, created under statutory revenue recovery, are lawful and must remain; Section 36 notices were issued to attach the mortgaged property. The Court cites a Division Bench decision in Tahsildar (RR) v. Nizamudeen holding that KVAT charges created before mortgage survive and must be cleared before encumbrances are discharged. The court ultimately directs effacement of the revenue attachments, registration of Ext.P3, and mutation in Noorjahan’s name, disposing of the writ petition with directions.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a partition suit relating to property once belonging to Sri Arumughom Achari, who died intestate in 1975. The Plaintiffs contended under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) that they are entitled to an equal share in the plaint schedule property, including a building, with the HSA Section 4 giving overriding effect to the statute and Section 8 governing shares among heirs. The Defendants argued that the plaintiffs belong to the Hindu Malayala Kammala community and that, under the customary kudivaippu form and after sthreedhanam, female heirs have no right to the parental property, and that the property was coparcenary in character. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a share due to the custom, while the First Appellate Court reversed, directing partition in favor of the plaintiffs. The High Court reaffirms the overriding effect of Section 4, holding that for self‑acquired property, any customary rule conflicting with the Act is abrogated. It also addresses abatement: non‑impleading of a legal representative of a deceased plaintiff does not automatically abate the appeal if the impleaded reps sufficiently represent the estate, citing Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari and Hameed v. Sumithra. The court concludes that the property was self‑acquired by Sri Arumugom Achari, and thus the daughters are entitled to a share. Result: Regular Second Appeal dismissed; interlocutory applications also dismissed.
This is an appeal under Section 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule 1(j) CPC, challenging an order of the Sub Court Pathanamthitta dismissing E.A. No. 42 of 2023 in E.P. No. 29 of 2018. The respondent decree-holder sought to realise Rs. 35 lakhs against the 2nd judgment debtor’s property, which had been attached and sold by auction on 23.01.2023 after obtaining permission under Order XXI Rule 72. The appellant, mother of the 2nd judgment debtor and guardian, challenged the sale on grounds of fraud and illegality: that the property was not properly attached, the proclamation schedule failed to mention the building, the mortgage in favour of KSFE was not described, the upset price was reduced without notice to all parties, and that the 2nd judgment debtor had attained majority only during the proceedings. The Execution Court considered E.A. 42 along with E.A. 40 and 41 and concluded there was no fraud or irregularity. The appellant argued she had locus standi to seek setting aside under Rule 90, relying on guardianship and minority status. The Division Bench disagreed, holding the appellant had no locus standi as the 2nd judgment debtor had attained majority before the filing of the Execution Petition and the sale steps were taken with notices to the 2nd debtor. Citing precedents, the court distinguished some authorities and upheld the sale, dismissing the appeal without costs.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 732 OF 2011 This is a criminal revision petition challenging the concurrent conviction of the petitioner under Section 420 IPC by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No.261/2009, arising from a loan fraud at Syndicate Bank, Pallikara Branch, Kasaragod. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner pledged gold ornaments in collusion with the bank’s appraiser, presenting them as gold when they were copper and silver coated, enabling loans of Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 10,000. The trial court convicted the petitioner under 420 IPC and sentenced one year’s imprisonment with a fine. The appellate court, after reappreciation, affirmed the conviction and sentence. The petitioner invoked revision, arguing that discrepancies between the weights recorded in pledge registers (Exs.P6-P8) and the seizure mahazar (Ext.P12) and the chemical report Ext.P20 created a reasonable doubt; that the prosecution should have charged Section 120B IPC given there were two accused; and that the evidence does not prove the offense beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court, appointing Amicus Curiae in line with Muruganandam K. and others v State (2021 (5) KHC 363) due to the age of the revision petition, heard submissions and ultimately rejected the challenge. It held that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, with dishonest intent and in collusion with the bank’s appraiser, obtained loans on the basis of spurious ornaments. The revision petition was dismissed, with the Court confirming the concurrent judgments and directing transmission to the Trial Court.
This writ petition arises from two elderly petitioners seeking exemption from wearing protective headgear while riding two-wheelers, on medical grounds, in the context of new AI surveillance cameras being installed on Kerala roads. The petitioners live in Marady near Muvattupuzha and contend that, due to chronic headaches and eye conditions, wearing a helmet aggravates their condition and affects treatment. They rely on the practical difficulty of travelling to town with limited public transport, and assert that representations (Exhibits P4 and P5) requesting exemptions were not considered. They prayed for an order exempting them from helmet use within the territorial jurisdiction of the fourth respondent to avoid penalties based on AI camera footage, as well as an opportunity to be heard on those representations and a health-based exemption. The respondents argued that Section 129 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rule 347 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 mandate helmet use for drivers and pillion riders; no general exemption is permissible. The court, citing Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala and other authorities, emphasizes helmet safety and public interest and holds that compulsory helmet wearing is the binding norm; it notes AI cameras are a novel enforcement mechanism but finds no legal basis to grant exemptions. The petition is dismissed, though the court acknowledges potential procedural or technical improvements in implementation and suggests separate avenues for challenge where warranted.
This Kerala High Court revision petition under section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 challenges the Family Court, Irinjalakuda’s order in MC 214/2012 (maintenance under Section 125 CrPC). The revision petitioner, Helvin K. Davis, contends that the quantum and tenor of maintenance awarded to the wife (respondent 1) and the two minor children (respondents 2 and 3) are unsustainable in light of his actual income and the enduring circumstances of the case. The respondents allege that despite the petitioner’s substantial salary (variously stated as Rs. 25,000/month in some pleadings, with Ext. P7 showing Rs. 7,500- Rs. 7,800 at different times), maintenance is warranted so that the wife and children do not fall into destitution. The Family Court, after hearing, ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 2,000/month to the wife from the date of application until June 2014, and Rs. 2,500/month to each child until June 2014, thereafter Rs. 2,000/month for each child until further order. The High Court partly allows the revision: confirms the wife’s maintenance, but reduces the child maintenance to Rs. 2,000/month per child from the date of application until further orders, with liberty to revisit under Section 127 CrPC. The judgment underlines maintenance as a social-justice measure supported by leading authorities and acknowledges the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The order emphasizes that the marriage was dissolved by mutual consent prior to the impugned order, and cites jurisprudence affirming the social-justice basis of maintenance, including Rajnesh v. Neha, Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal, and Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena.
WP(C) No. 15880 of 2021; WP(C) No. 24915 of 2022 (consolidated) This judgment disposes of two writ petitions, WP(C) 15880 of 2021 (P.A. Nizar Palachuvattill and Abdul Azeez Palachuvattill) and WP(C) 24915 of 2022 (Hisham Transports and others), by a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court. The petitions challenge communications: Ext.P5 dated 14.01.2021 reporting that a water sample did not meet drinking water standards under IS 10500:2012 read with Regulation 2.10.9 of the Food Safety and Standards Regulations, 2011, and Ext.P13 dated 17.03.2021 showing 240 MPN/100 ml of Coliform in another sample. The petitioners claim the well water is not prescribed under the 2011 Regulations; thus the designated officer had no power to demand sampling or invoke sub‑section 4 of Section 46 of the 2006 Act or trigger an appeal. The respondents contend that the Food Business Operator must comply with the Act, Rules and Regulations at all stages of production, distribution and sale; Regulation 2.10.9 (introduced in 2019) and related provisions, along with 2.12.1 and 2.3.14.174, apply to water offered for sale as a food product and empower action. After hearing, the Court holds that absence of an explicit definition for water drawn from a well does not annul the respondent’s actions; the writ petitions are dismissed, though directions are issued to publish notices to well owners and food operators to obtain licences and conform to standards.
BRD Securities Ltd., an RBI-registered NBFC engaged in asset financing, faced a show cause notice from SEBI alleging violations of the Companies Act, 1956, SEBI (Issue and Listing of Debt Securities) Regulations, 2008, and SEBI (Disclosure and Investor Protection) Guidelines in the issue of debentures/bonds during 2003–2017. The petitioner challenged SEBI’s quasi-judicial proceedings, contending that the Board’s functions under the SEBI Act are non-delegable and that delegation of quasi-judicial powers to officers (CGMs/EDs) via the Delegation of Statutory and Financial Powers Order, 2019 (as amended on 25.07.2022) is ultra vires and undermines due process. It asserted that the Board’s quasi-judicial decisions must be made by the Board itself, and personal hearings were to be conducted before higher authority, not delegated officers. The respondents argued that Section 19 of the SEBI Act authorizes delegation to Board members or officers, and the Delegation Order legitimately extends quasi-judicial power to senior officials to reduce pendency, while interim/confirmatory orders remain with Whole Time Members. The High Court undertook a detailed analysis of statutory language and jurisprudence on delegation (statutory vs quasi-judicial), citing several precedents to delineate when delegation is permissible. Ultimately, the court held that the delegation is valid under the statute and that the petition lacks merit, dismissing the writ petition and upholding the ongoing proceedings.
This is an original petition under the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) jurisdiction challenging the promotion list for the post of Motor Vehicle Inspector. The petitioner, Sreeshan P.S., joined service as Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in 2006, his probation ended in 2008, and he proceeded on leave without allowance from 01.06.2008 to 01.03.2013. A Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) convened on 12.03.2013, publishing a list on 20.03.2013 wherein a junior officer, Nobi P.M., was promoted to MVI while the petitioner, having rejoined after a long leave, faced non-availability of a confidential report for that year. The KS & SSR rules require that when confidential reports are unavailable due to the one-year post-rejoining period, the select list is provisional for juniors and reviewed once reports become available. The Tribunal had held the DPC correct in promoting the junior and allowed promotion with a review after one year. The Kerala High Court disagrees with a blanket forfeiture of seniority and holds that the petitioner, whose confidential report was subsequently verified, should be placed just above Nobi P.M. in the 16.03.2013 select list. The petition is allowed and disposed with directions reflecting this placement. The matter clarifies seniority rights after rejoining from LWA in the absence of immediate confidential reports.
Cont.Case(C) No.1929 of 2019 This Contempt of Court Case (Civil) arises from WP(C) No.20911/2015 and related matters. The petitioners, a large group of retired employees of HMT Machine Tools Ltd., allege willful disobedience by the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) of directions contained in Annexure I of the Kerala High Court’s 12.10.2018 judgment in WP(C) 20911/2015 and connected matters. The petition was filed under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 seeking enforcement of pension-related directives following amendments to the EPF pension scheme via G.S.R. 609(E) (2014) and the 2014 amendment to the 1995 pension scheme, including enhanced pension entitlements. The respondents (EPFO) contend that the matter requires reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions, particularly the 2022 Judgment in Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B. which upheld the legality of the 2014 notification and directed certain implementation steps, including extensions and options for employees. In view of the 2022 Supreme Court judgment, the Kerala High Court holds that the petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension needs reconsideration by the EPFO in accordance with law. The contempt petition is closed, while preserving EPFO’s right to re-evaluate and disburse higher pension as directed by the Supreme Court’s 2022 judgment.
Ravindran Nair filed OP(C) 731/2023 challenging Exts.P8 and P9 orders in I.A Nos. 8/2022 and 9/2022 in O.S. No. 392/2016 before the III Addl. Munsiff's Court, Thiruvananthapuram. The plaintiff seeks to reopen evidence and to appoint a survey commissioner after his cross-examination in 2022 in a long-pending suit filed in 2016 for boundary fixation and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property. The trial record already included an Advocate Commissioner’s report (Ext.P3), and the plaintiff was examined as PW-1 and PW-2; the respondent produced documents. Following cross-examination, the plaintiff moved to reopen evidence; the earlier request was dismissed. He then changed counsel and filed Exts.P4 (reopening) and Exts.P5 (survey) in 2022, which the court below rejected via Exts.P8 and P9. The respondent opposed, contending that there is no automatic right to reopen evidence and that discretionary powers under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC must be sparingly exercised, especially after a suit began in 2016. The High Court, citing Ram Rati v. Mange Ram (2016 KHC 6187), held that reopening evidence is not a right; discretionary powers should be exercised sparingly and that, given the prolonged pendency, the petition was merit-less. The original petition was dismissed under Article 227 of the Constitution.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 495 OF 2011 Ravi, S/o Kannan, the revision petitioner, challenges the conviction under Section 498A IPC and the accompanying sentence recorded in C.C. No. 145/2005 by the Judicial First Class Magistrate-I, Mananthavady, and upheld by the Additional District Court (Adhoc)-II, Kalpetta in Criminal Appeal No. 182/2007. The prosecution alleged that the 1st accused and his brother subjected PW3, Devi, to cruelty and dowry harassment after their 1989 marriage, including misappropriation of 15 sovereigns of gold and a 2004 assault in the bathroom. Evidence comprised PWs 1–8 and Exts. P1–P6, but several witnesses turned hostile and the medical certificate Ext.P6 reportedly showed no external injuries. The trial court convicted the 1st accused; the appellate court affirmed. The revision petitions contend misreading of the record and lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, noting the long gap (about 15 years) between marriage and the alleged cruelty, the absence of visible injuries, and inconsistent testimonies. The learned counsel relied on Supreme Court decisions emphasizing caution in 498A prosecutions (Rajesh Sharma; Arnesh Kumar; Preeti Gupta) and later Kahkashan Kausar to argue against misuses. The High Court reviews the record and ultimately allows the revision, acquitting the petitioner and setting him at liberty, while directing the cancellation of bail bonds.
This is a criminal revision petition by the petitioner, R. Prakash, challenging a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Trial Court at Paravoor had convicted him for issuingExt. P1, a cheque, in discharge of a debt to the first respondent, S. Latha, with notes of dishonour (Ext. P2) for insufficient funds. After service of a lawyer notice (Ext. P4, Ext. P6), the accused did not pay, resulting in a conviction and a combined sentence of imprisonment and compensation. The Sessions Court, on appeal (Crl.Appeal No. 49/2009), confirmed the conviction but altered the sentence to 15 days’ simple imprisonment and increased the compensation to Rs. 2,75,000 with an additional 2 ½ months’ imprisonment on default. In revision, this Court examined the record de novo and found that Ext. D1, a purported agreement, was not executed by the first respondent, and Ext. P1 cheque was issued after Ext. D1, undermining the alleged legally enforceable debt. While emphasising the reverse onus principle under Sec. 139 NI Act, the High Court concluded there was no illegality in concurrent findings but modified the substantive sentence to one day’s imprisonment until the rising of the court and Rs. 3,00,000 as compensation, with further default imprisonment. The order also defers execution to 18.11.2023 and commends the Amicus Curiae’s assistance.
