WA Nos.1498/2022, 1808/2022, 1807/2022 and W.P.(C) Nos.4646/2022, 6955/2023, 19871/2022, 20313/2022, 26745/2022, 32204/2022, 36142/2022 This Kerala High Court judgment deals with a batch of writ appeals and writ petitions challenging the recruitment process for Police/Armed Forces (CAPFs, NIA, AR, etc.) pursuant to the SSC notification dated 21.07.2018. The petitions focus on a stay-direction that had kept apart a substantial number of vacancies (243 posts and other ‘odd’ posts) from the pool for consideration, in the wake of earlier rounds of litigation. The petitioners, i.e., candidates declared merit lists or in rank lists, contended that the interim orders and the subsequent directives denied them fair, merit-based consideration and that the vacancies should be filled in a manner consistent with the notification and recruitment rules. The respondents, led by the Union of India and other agencies, argued that including the set-apart vacancies would derail a concluded selection process, disrupt vertical and horizontal reservations, and contravene the practice of not forcing a completed process to undergo retroactive revision. The court undertakes a careful analysis of the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit, the discretionary nature of recruitment, and the need to balance fairness with practicability. It ultimately modifies the earlier judgment’s paragraph 25.4, directing the SSC to complete the selection for 73-83 short-listed candidates within eight weeks, while permitting the remaining vacancies to be carried forward to future rounds and preserving the seniority of those already appointed.
The appellant, Unnikrishna Pillai, was convicted under sections 8(1), 8(2) and 55(a) of the Abkari Act for transporting illicit arrack, and sentenced by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (Adhoc), Mavelikkara to 3½ years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 with a default term of one year. The prosecution relied on a 24.03.2001 seizure by an Assistant Excise Inspector and witnesses PW1–PW4 with Exts. P1–P7; the defence challenged two points: (i) the forwarding note marking was not proved, a fatal defect in abkari prosecutions, since the forwarding note links seizure to analysis by the laboratory; and (ii) the detecting officer (Assistant Excise Inspector) was not empowered under the Abkari Act at that time. The High Court held that non-marking of the forwarding note is a fatal link and that the Assistant Excise Inspector’s lack of authorization at the material time voids the prosecution’s case. Relying on decisions such as Gireesh @ Manoj, Bhaskaran, Subrahmaniyan, and Sasidharan, the Court ultimately allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and released the appellant, with any existing bail bonds cancelled. The judgment underscores the necessity for proper evidentiary links and authorized officers in abkari cases.”
The appellant Mohanan @ Maillappara Mohanan was convicted under Section 8(2) of the Abkari Act for possessing 4 litres of arrack and a glass tumbler at his residence in Thannithodu. The trial court relied on seized contraband and sampling evidence to convict and sentenced him to 1 ½ years’ rigorous imprisonment and a Rs. 1 lakh fine. On appeal before the Kerala High Court, the core issue was whether the prosecution could prove the chain of custody to establish that the sample tested in the Chemical Examiner’s laboratory was indeed the sample seized at the place of occurrence. The appellant argued that vital link evidence was missing: the seizure mahazar did not describe the seal; no specimen seal was produced; no forwarding note was forthcoming to confirm tamper-free transfer to the Chemical Examiner; and the officers who handled the sample were not examined. The court reviewed established authorities (Sasidharan, Sathi, Ravi, Bhaskaran, Rajamma, Ramachandran, Baburaj, Vijay Pandey) emphasizing strict compliance with sampling/sealing formalities and tamper-proof despatch from place of occurrence to laboratory. The prosecution failed to prove that the contraband sample analysed matched the sample drawn, or that it remained tamper-free through custody. Consequently, the conviction could not stand and the appeal was allowed with acquittal and liberty to the accused.
The appellant, K.M. Kunhambu, challenged a conviction under Section 55(a) of the Abkari Act for possession of 3 litres of arrack seized on 05.05.2000 at Perol. The trial court convicted him and sentenced three months’ imprisonment and a Rs. 1 lakh fine. On appeal to the Kerala High Court, the counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove that the contraband was subjected to chemical analysis in a Chemical Examiner’s Laboratory, and that crucial custodial safeguards were not established: Ext. P2 (the seizure mahazar) did not describe the seal, PW1 did not testify about the seal, several officials who handled the sample were not examined, and there was an unexplained delay before analysis. The court underscored that, in Abkari cases, the chain of custody and tamper-proof handling are essential to link the seized substance to the laboratory test. It noted delays in analysis and lack of proof of tamper-proof dispatch as fatal to the prosecution’s case. Relying on Sasidharan v. State of Kerala and Sathi v. State of Kerala (affirmed by Ravi v. State of Kerala) and later rulings such as Bhaskaran, Krishnadas, and Vijay Pandey, the High Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the sample tested in the laboratory originated from the seized contraband, rendering Ext. P6 of no evidentiary value. Consequently, the conviction could not stand, and the appellant was acquitted; the appeal was allowed and the appellant set at liberty.
This is an original petition (Article 227 of the Constitution) challenging the order in O.S. No. 41 of 2019 of the Additional Sub Court, Palakkad, regarding a suit for partition filed by Dr. P. Raghusankar through a Power of Attorney. The petitioners (defendants 2 and 3) challenged maintainability, contending the Power of Attorney was not properly stamped and that the Sub Judge’s appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to identify the property and assess profits during trial was impermissible at this stage. They relied on Kathirukunju v. Mohammed Kunju (1992 KHC 474) to support their view that maintainability must be decided first. The court examined these arguments and held that a defect in the Power of Attorney is a curable irregularity and need not automatically non-suit the plaintiff; if the Power of Attorney is defective, the plaintiff may proceed personally or by appointing another Power of Attorney after paying stamp duty and penalty. The judge also noted that in partition actions, rights of the parties are determined first, with identity, separation, and profits to be dealt with in the final decree. It was further argued that authenticity issues could be resolved by the trial court and that an Advocate Commissioner can be appointed to assess profits during the trial. Ultimately, the Original Petition was found meritless and dismissed without admission.
This writ appeal challenges Ext.P7 University Order issued by Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU) which raised the maximum marks for the interview for the post of Assistant Professor in Hindi from 20 to 50 and prescribed heads for the interview such as teaching aptitude, research aptitude, domain knowledge, presentation/communication, and innovative teaching skills. The vacancy was notified under Ext.P4 and the selection was to be conducted under the UGC Regulations, 2018 on Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of Teachers and the Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2018, including Appendix II Tables 1–5. The petitioner contends that the Regulations mandate short-listing based on Table 3B and that the final selection must be based on the interview performance; Ext.P7 alters the evaluation after the process has begun, violates the Regulations, and thus is impermissible. The University contends that the Regulations allow institutions to adopt their own credible, transparent procedures under Clause 6.0 and that Ext.P7 merely codified pre-existing norms; it argues the process is contractual and permissible. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The Division Bench, after detailed analysis, held that Ext.P7 is not in conformity with the Regulations, particularly because it fixes predetermined criteria for assessment during the interview and alters the scoring after notification. The Court quashed Ext.P7 and the selection of the eighth respondent, and directed the University to formulate fresh norms in line with the Regulations and to conduct fresh interviews within a month, with further steps to complete the process. The appeal was allowed and the writ petition disposed of accordingly.
This criminal appeal challenges a conviction under the Abkari Act. Accused No.2, Aji, along with co-accused, was found storing 109 litres of spirit in the dicky of a car in the courtyard of accused No.1’s residence on 07.08.2004. The material was seized; Aji was arrested; the trial court convicted accused No.2 under Section 58 of the Abkari Act, while Accused Nos.1 and 3 were acquitted. The High Court scrutinises the admissibility and integrity of the investigation, focusing on whether the arrest was properly established, whether the seized contraband reached the Chemical Examiner, and whether samples and seals were properly documented. The appellant argues that the arrest memo (Ext.P9) bore a crime number, suggesting the FIR may have been registered before the recovery or that the number was inserted after registration, thereby casting doubt on the genesis of the prosecution case. He also contends that there is no credible proof of laboratory analysis, unexplained delay in producing properties, and lack of a verifiable seal specimen. The appellant anchors his challenge on several precedents, including Santhosh v. State of Kerala, Ravi v. State of Kerala, Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, Rajamma v. State of Kerala, and other cited authorities. The court ultimately finds fatal gaps in linkages, delays, and documentation and allows the appeal, resulting in acquittal and release of the appellant with deposited amounts to be disbursed.
Krishnan, the appellant, challenges a conviction under Section 8(2) Abkari Act imposed by the Fast Track Adhoc-1 Court Kozhikode in SC No. 471/2006. The prosecution case recounted that on 11 October 2002, 3 litres of arrack were found in a 5-litre can at Chembrapatta. After investigation, a charge under Sec. 8(2) Abkari Act was framed and the accused convicted after trial. The High Court examines the admissibility and evidentiary value of Ext.P3, a Certificate of Chemical Analysis, and the chain of custody of the sample. The court notes that Ext.P3 states the sample was forwarded on 11-10-2002 and reached the laboratory on 16-10-2002, but no prosecution evidence establishes custody of the sample between forwarding and laboratory receipt. Citing Viswanathan v. State of Kerala and other authorities, the court holds that failure to prove tamper-proof custody in transit undermines the lab report, depriving it of evidentiary value. The court emphasizes the 'chain of custody' obligation, citing Sasidharan, Sathi, Ravi, and Daulat Ram, and Vijay Pandey, and concludes that without link evidence linking the seized contraband to the tested sample, the prosecution cannot sustain the conviction. Consequently, the appellant is acquitted and set at liberty, and the appeal is allowed.
This writ petition challenges two orders under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (Ext.P6 dated 25.02.2020 and Ext.P8 dated 06.01.2022) passed by the Controlling Authority and the Appellant Authority, respectively. The petitioner, a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literacy, Scientific and Charitable Society’s Act, 1955, challenged the gratuity claim of the 3rd respondent, who was engaged as Assistant Project Coordinator for Kerala State Literacy Mission Authority on a contract basis since 2003. The petitioner contends that the 3rd respondent’s service was contractual, with no five years of continuous service, and that the establishment did not fall within the ambit of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The respondents argue that the petitioner’s contract regime and subsequent renewals amount to employment as an establishment under Section 2C and that gratuity cannot be denied. The court analyzes whether the petitioner falls within the Act’s establishment scope, citing Seetha K v. Managing Trustee and Others (2016(5) KHC 479 (DB)) to illustrate that temples can be treated as establishments under Section 1(3)(b), and State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur and Others to support applying Section 1(3)(b) to all establishments under the relevant state law. On the facts, the court finds that the petitioner’s and the 3rd respondent’s contractual framework culminated in long service sufficient for gratuity; hence the writ petition is dismissed and the authorities’ orders stand, allowing gratuity to the 3rd respondent.
This Writ Appeal challenges the Kerala High Court's 2019 decision in W.P.(C) No. 8447 of 2019. The appellants (State of Kerala and the Senior Town Planner) sought quashing Ext. P4 (communication dated 07.03.2019) and a mandamus directing grant of a building permit based on a 12.04.2016 application, with an affidavit to demolish the construction when Ext. P3 scheme is implemented. The Writ Court relied on Division Bench precedents including Vinod’s case, Antony Joseph, and Muhammed Rasheed, to hold that a purchase notice under Section 67 of the Kerala Town and Country Planning Act, 2016 must be served and the Government must act within prescribed timeframes; otherwise, plans may be varied or building permits refused. The Division Bench here reconsiders those principles, citing Pradeep Kumar v. Maradu Municipality and Art. 300A to emphasize a balance between development schemes and individual property rights. It notes that Section 67 enables a landowner to initiate a purchase notice if acquisition isn’t timely, and that reliance on obsolete DTP schemes cannot bar redevelopment, provided due process is observed. The court ultimately allows the Writ Appeal, sets aside the single-judge judgment, and directs the Secretary, Maradu Municipality, to reconsider the building-permit petition under the applicable statutes (Kerala Municipality Act 1994, Building Rules 1999, and Town & Country Planning Act 2016) within a month, bearing in mind constitutional protections.
WA Nos. 244 of 2021; 246 of 2021; 248 of 2021; WP(C) 7804 of 2021 These writ appeals concern gratuity payments under a special scheme between the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Bank) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). The petitioners, employees of the Bank, retired after long service and challenged the gratuity paid to them, arguing that under the scheme they were entitled to gratuity without the ceiling fixed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, as invoked by Chandrasekharan Nair G. & Others v. Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (2017 (4) KLT 276 FB). The Bank and LIC contended that from 2006 the scheme incorporated a ceiling for gratuity that mirrored the Act, with amendments in 2010 raising the ceiling to Rs. 10,00,000; thus the ceiling applied and no higher gratuity could be paid. The Single Judge had directed payment of the differential amounts with interest, relying on the Full Bench decision. On appeal, the Division Bench held that the facts show the scheme ceiling and statutory alignment meant there was no legal basis to pay the excess gratuity; parity with the earlier employee’s benefit could not override the statutory ceiling. It set aside the impugned order and dismissed the writ petitions. The judgment clarifies the interaction of statutory ceilings and higher benefits under a private scheme and confirms that the ceiling governs gratuity unless a higher benefit is legally available under the statute.
WP(C) Nos. 5303/2020 & 9137/2021 The Kerala High Court, before Justice V.G. Arun, heard two connected writ petitions challenging the Bank of India’s one-time selection process for the post of Safai Karmachari-cum-Sepoy. Petitioners alleged nepotism, favoritism, and procedural violations in the recruitment, pointing out that 4 to 21 of the selected candidates were relatives of bank employees and that no rank list was published. They also pressed concerns that the Interview Committee was improperly constituted and that reserved-category candidates were improperly treated, with age relaxations granted in breach of guidelines. The Bank argued that the process followed Ext.P7 guidelines and the Ext.R3(a) Memorandum of Settlement, which required a one-time selection and regularisation of casual/contract employees; Ext.R1(f) allegedly showed the rank list had been published. The respondents contended that settlement under the IDA is binding and places recruiting decisions on a higher pedestal than Awards (as per P. Virudhachalam and Lotus Mills), that the process conformed to rules, and that non-publication of a rank list or minor procedural deviations do not fatally vitiate the selection. The court reviewed the material and the authoritative precedents, held that the Bank’s action complied with Ext.P3 and the memorandum of settlement, and declined to interfere. Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed for lack of grave illegality or mala fides influencing the selection.
This Kerala High Court judgment by Justice Kauser Edappagath concerns a criminal miscellaneous petition filed by the de facto complainant challenging an anticipatory bail order passed by the Sessions Court, Ernakulam, in Crime No.83/2022. The petitioner alleges rape under IPC 376(1) committed by the second respondent, who had sought anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. The factual matrix spans a matrimonial website liaison, the accused presenting himself as a divorcee, promises of marriage, and a sexual assault in a hotel room in Kadavanthra on 25 August 2020. The petitioner points to alleged coercion, threats to publish her photos, and a live-in dynamic with another woman, while noting discrepancies in the narrative, including a court finding that her marriage had not been dissolved. The Sessions Court granted anticipatory bail on 14 February 2022 after hearing both sides. The petitioner argues that discretionary relief under 438 Cr.P.C. must be exercised cautiously, with cogent reasons and consideration of relevant factors, and that the order may be perverse or based on irrelevant materials. The respondent contends there was no error, the accused cooperated, and the order was properly reasoned. On scrutiny under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court finds no perverse or unjustified exercise of discretion and dismisses the Crl.M.C., allowing the bail to stand.
CRL.R.P Nos.160, 161, 162 of 2022 This is a set of three connected Criminal Revision Petitions filed by Renjith Pannackal challenging orders of the SPE/CBI Court, Trivandrum, in proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the IPC. The core issue is whether the proceedings under Section 240 Cr.P.C culminate in an order framing a charge before the plea of the accused is taken. The High Court reviews orders dated 31.01.2022 (framing of charge alleged) and subsequent orders disposing of discharge petitions. The petitioner contends that there was no meaningful opportunity of hearing and that framing of charge occurs only after the accused’s plea is recorded, whereas the respondents argue that once the Court forms an opinion that there is ground to presume commission of an offence, framing of the charge is complete and the subsequent step is recording the plea under Cr.P.C. Section 240 is interpreted in conjunction with Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. The Court, after analyzing the provisions and records, holds that the proceedings did not culminate in a valid order framing the charge and directs disposal of discharge applications within two weeks. The decision cites HDFC Bank Ltd. v. J.J. Mannan to support the interpretive view.
This is a criminal appeal by Renjith challenging the III Additional District Court Kollam's judgment in Cr.1 4/2012 convicting him of uxoricide under Section 302 IPC and sentencing him to life imprisonment. The prosecution's case rested on circumstantial evidence and a chronology: a quarrel between husband and wife just before the incident, a substantial purchase of kerosene shortly before the crime, the accused's presence in the house, and the recovery of a ration card scene-wise. The postmortem recorded extensive burns (about 85% of the body), but the doctor admitted uncertainty about the precise manner of injury; there was no direct testimony of murder. The defense contended the death could be suicide by the wife, aggravated by neglect, and criticized police investigation, including lack of probe into mobile call details and the provenance of the ration card. The Kerala High Court scrutinized the chain of circumstances and found the link to the accused not airtight; it questioned the motive and noted contradictions in witnesses’ accounts and the rent deed not confronted to witnesses. It also rejected exclusive reliance on Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act to draw an adverse inference. The court reiterated that the burden remains on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, due to absence of a complete, credible chain, acquitted Renjith with a direction for immediate release.
This writ appeal concerns an challenge by Mahesh Nambiampurath (3rd respondent in WP(C) No.4589/2022) to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal’s interim orders directing the Regional Transport Authority (RTA), Kozhikode, to issue certain timings for a stage carriage service on the Pantheerankavu–Malabar Botanical Garden–Ramanattukara–Medical College route. The learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition and quashed Exts. P9 and P10 of the Tribunal, directing a fresh timing conference and outlining provisional timings (Ext.P6) as interim arrangements until final settlement. The appellant contended that Exhibit-P9 was misinterpreted and that Exhibit-P4 (31.12.2021) judgment directing issuance of timings within ten days must be honored; he argued that the timing conference was scheduled to settle timings and was not meant to perpetually alter the grant of permits. Respondents urged that the Tribunal’s interim directive to issue timings was warranted to prevent unhealthy competition and to safeguard public safety. The Division Bench ultimately disposed of the appeal by partly allowing it, vacating the impugned judgment’s directive to convene a timing conference and directing the State Transport Appellate Tribunal to decide the revision expeditiously after hearing all parties, while keeping the interim timings in view.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (CRL.MC No. 2019 of 2020) before a Kerala High Court Single Judge, challenging an FIR in the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau case and the final report under Section 482 CrPC. The petitioner, K. Deleepkumar, a former Motor Vehicle Inspector, faces proceedings arising from CC No.11/2018 before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance), Thrissur, and the connected FIR VC 04/2014/SCE. The allegations apply Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, contending that during 01.01.2006 to 28.02.2013 the petitioner amassed assets worth Rs. 19,12,505 disproportionate to his known income. The petitioner challenges both the FIR and the final report, arguing mala fide calculation, a methodology for valuing gold ornaments with no scientific basis, incorrect assessment of a building allegedly built by the petitioner’s wife, inclusion of assets of wife and other family members as his income, and omission of major assets by the investigation agency. The respondents' counsel maintains that VACB applied a methodology anchored in judicial precedent to determine disproportionate wealth, and that the court at the 482 stage should consider records to determine prima facie grounds to proceed. The High Court declines to quash at this stage, directs the trial to proceed, and dismisses the petition with a six-month timeline for completion of trial.”
Praveen, the petitioner, is the accused in Crime No. 1156/2021 of the Kollam East Police Station. He moves under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and all proceedings arising from it (CC No. 78/2022) on the basis of an amicable settlement with the informant Lithin, who does not retain any grievances. The offences involved are under IPC sections 294(b) (obscene words), 323 (hurt), 324 (voluntarily causing hurt) and 326 (grievous hurt). The petition notes that the parties have resolved their dispute and do not wish to pursue prosecution, arguing that quashing would promote peace and mutual respect and avoid a fruitless continuation of proceedings. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about relying solely on a settlement to invoke the High Court’s inherent powers and stresses that serious or private-public crimes should not be quashed merely on compromise, although no other serious crimes against the petitioner are noted. The judge surveys controlling precedents, including State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, as well as Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, to delineate when quashing is permissible for non-compoundable offences that are private in nature and resolved by settlement. Ultimately, after weighing gravity, antecedents, and the settlement’s authenticity, the court holds that quashing would not harm public interest. The petition is allowed, FIR 1156/2021 and CC No. 78/2022 are quashed.
The appellant, Gopi, was convicted under Section 58 of the Abkari Act by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Adhoc-III, North Paravur, for possessing two 1-litre bottles of illicit liquor detected on 09.11.2004. The detection was by PW1, an Assistant Excise Inspector, who seized the contraband and produced it before PW3, the Excise Range Officer. The trial court sentenced the appellant to one year of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000 with a default term of six months. On appeal, the appellant, represented by an Amicus Curiae, argued that detection by an officer not authorised under the Abkari Act invalidates arrest, seizure and sampling, thereby vitiating the prosecution and entitling acquittal. The Public Prosecutor contended that there was no prejudice and that the evidence—oral and documentary—proved the case. The High Court, relying on Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, Subrahmaniyan v. State of Kerala, and Sasidharan v. State of Kerala, held that PW1 was not empowered as an authorised officer at the material time; hence the arrest, seizure and sampling were without jurisdiction. Since the offence was detected prior to the 2009 notifications, those later provisions could not rescue the prosecution. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the conviction and sentence and directing the appellant's liberty.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC challenging a trial court conviction under Sections 8(1) read with 8(2) of the Kerala Abkari Act. On 14 December 2011, around 12:15 pm, a patrol party of the Excise Range Office, Peravoor, intercepted the accused and recovered 6 litres of arrack from a 10-litre can, allegedly establishing possession of contraband prohibited by the Abkari Act. The case was tried by the 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Thalassery, who after recording evidence, convicted the appellant and sentenced three months’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with a default term of three more months. The defence contended that the recovery and tamper-proof production of the contraband were not satisfactorily established because the inventory report Ext. P7 was prepared on the date of recovery but only reached the court on 06.03.2012, after a delay of over three months. It was argued that tamper-free collection, forwarding and examination of the sample, and examination of the property clerk, were not established. The State relied on PW3 and independent witnesses to prove recovery. The High Court relied on Vijayan v. State of Kerala to emphasise tamper-proof handling and chain of custody, and held that the lacunae render the prosecution unreliable, allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellant.