Aishwarya Mohan, a law graduate, challenged NTPC’s selection process for the post of Assistant Law Officer, contending that Ext.P3, which restricted shortlisting to CLAT-2021 PG participants, violated Article 16 of the Constitution. NTPC announced the post in December 2021 with a qualification of LL.B. and barred non-CLAT-2021 PG candidates by tying the shortlisting to CLAT-2021 PG performance; the CLAT is conducted by the Consortium of National Law Universities. The petitioner argued that the requirement disproportionately excludes a large pool of law graduates who pursue 2-year or other post-graduate studies at non-NLU institutions due to higher costs, thereby denying equal opportunity in public employment. An interim order directed the respondents to accept the petitioner’s application pending final resolution. The Division Bench directed a final decision in the writ petition. Counsel for the petitioner emphasized that the restrictive criterion constitutes indirect discrimination and undermines equality of opportunity, while the Respondents argued the clause reflects a rational, commonly adopted filtering mechanism used by PSUs and aligns with their prerogative to fix eligibility criteria, citing precedents. The court examined indirect discrimination, relying on Lt.Col. Nitisha v. Union of India for the doctrinal framework. Ultimately, the court held Ext.P3 to be violative of Article 16, disposed the petition with directions to NTPC to accept the petitioner’s application and conduct a fresh selection test/interview within one month, aiming to restore a level playing field.
Zakeer Hussain, the 20th accused, moves this criminal miscellaneous case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash all further proceedings in Crime No. 619/CR/91 (CBCID Palakkad) and in C.C. No. 346/2022 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Palakkad. The petition traces to a 14.12.1991 incident at Pezhumkara junction where BJP/RSS workers allegedly attempted to disrupt a meeting; it is alleged that Muslim youths conspired with others to incite communal tension, hurled stones at police, and obstructed pedestrians. The accused were charged under IPC sections 143, 147, 148, 151, 341, 152, 153, 153A r/w 149. The trial history is that 25 accused faced trial in C.C. No. 154/1994 with Annexure-3 recording acquittals; subsequent trials in C.C. No. 299/1998 and C.C. No. 537/2011 also ended in acquittals, with many witnesses turning hostile and official witnesses unable to identify the accused. The petitioner, who was absconding, was later refiled and rejoined in the present proceedings. The core argument is that after co-accused were acquitted, the substratum of the prosecution is lost and continuing would be futile and wasteful of judicial time. The State contends that acquittals do not warrant quashing. The High Court, after examining the judgments and the hostile-witness evidence, agrees with the petitioner and invokes Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police to grant relief, quashing all further proceedings. The outcome is a quashing of the ongoing proceedings against the petitioner.
DBP No.69 of 2022 is a suo motu proceeding initiated by the Kerala High Court in response to a devotee’s complaint dated 31 October 2022 about difficulties faced by devotees at Thriprayar Sreerama Swamy Temple in the context of Annadanam. The complainant, Padma K.N., a 62-year-old devotee, narrated lack of drinking water for devotees waiting in the queue for Annadanam, unhygienic conditions, and inadequate sanitation. On 8 November 2022, after considering the complaint and submissions by the Standing Counsel for the Cochin Devaswom Board and the Senior Government Pleader, the Court directed the concerned officials to provide drinking water to queue devotees, enable hand washing facilities, and ensure proper seating in the Annadanam hall, along with regular cleaning and hygiene of the temple premises. By 15 November 2022, affidavits from respondents 2 and 3 were placed on record, admitting that drinking water facility had been provided since 09 November 2022, and that hand washing facilities exist outside the hall. The affidavits also claimed seating, cleanliness, recent painting, and that fans, urinals, sign boards, and two parking areas were provided. The Court disposed of the DBP by directing the Assistant Devaswom Commissioner and the Devaswom Officer to maintain the hall and premises in clean and hygienic condition, with seating and hand-washing facilities, to be overseen by the Board and Temple Advisory Committee.
CON.CASE(C) NO.2399 OF 2022 The matter concerns review petitions filed against a common Kerala High Court judgment (WP(C) No. 22754 of 2020) relating to the disciplinary proceedings against the Accountant of Ollur Town Co-Operative Society. The original proceedings led to dismissal; arbitration confirmed it, while the Co-operative Tribunal subsequently set aside the enquiry report and directed a fresh verification. The employer moved for review, bringing in connected petitions. Counsel for the Society argued that the memo of charges was issued by a Sub-Committee, not the appointing authority, rendering the charge-sheet vitiated in light of jurisprudence such as Kodanchery Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Joshy Varghese. They urged that back wages be decided only after a de novo enquiry and according to law, citing eclicitations from Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha and related cases; they contended for conservative reliefs and adherence to statutory procedure. The Respondents-Employees urged full back wages in case of gross violation of statutory provisions or natural justice, rely on Deepali Gundu Surwase and other precedents, arguing prolonged unlawful suspension and dismissal should attract substantial relief. The bench analyzed the precedents, noted the irregular appointment of the memo of charges, and directed a de novo enquiry from the memo stage with a tight timeline (three months from certified copy) while revising the back-wages directive. The contempt petition was closed, and the petitions were allowed to the extent prayed. Analysis emphasizes de novo enquiry, natural justice, and proportional back-wages.
This appeal under Section 14A of the SC/ST (POA) Act challenges a Special Judge’s order denying pre-arrest bail in Crime No.596/2022 of Valappad Police Station, Thrissur. The appellant, an employee of a bank, is accused of offences under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (POA) Act for allegedly referring to the defacto complainant’s caste in public, thereby abusing him. The defacto complainant is the husband of a bank employee; a parallel set of Annexures reveals a prior complaint against the bank’s Secretary for sexual harassment and subsequent internal inquiries. The defence argues that there is no prima facie case under the POA Act; it points to Annexure III (Local Complaints Committee) and Annexure II (FIR relating to the sexual harassment) to show ulterior motives and that the current complaint is being used as a tool against the appellant. The prosecution contends that the FIS discloses a prima facie case and that, under Sections 18 and 18A, anticipatory bail is barred. The High Court, applying principles of pari materia and relying on Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. UOI (2020), holds that where there is no prima facie case, anticipatory bail can be granted even after 18A, and sets aside the impugned order, granting pre-arrest bail to the appellant on conditions including surrender within ten days, bond and sureties, cooperation, and no witness intimidation. The judgment emphasizes preventing false implication while ensuring fair investigation.
The appellant, Anvar, is the father of a four-year-old victim who was charged and convicted under sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) and section 23 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ(CPC) Act) by the Additional Sessions Judge - I (Special Court for Trial of Offences Against Children), Thiruvananthapuram, in S.C. No.1934/2014. The prosecution case is that on 23/08/2014 the accused sexually assaulted the minor at their home in Kudavoor village; the mother (PW3) and the victim (PW4) testified to details of the offence, corroborated by medical evidence (Ext. P1) showing vaginal congestion and hymenal tear, and by Ext. P3, the victim’s mother’s statement to the police. The trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹10,000 (in default, two more years) for the POCSO offence and six months for the JJ(CPC) offence. The appellant challenged the conviction, contending that the court erred in appreciating the evidence and that there was insufficient corroboration. The High Court, after evaluating the credibility of PW4 and the corroborative medical and parental testimony, rejected the appeal, holding that a child’s testimony in sexual-offence cases deserves great weight even without corroboration. The court relied on the principle that child witnesses should be scrutinized with care and caution, citing Hari Om v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The appeal is dismissed, and the conviction and sentence are upheld.
This writ appeal challenges a learned Single Judge’s order in which a writ petition by Geetha S. was allowed and directed the Revenue Divisional Officer to consider the applicant’s (Ext. P1) application under Section 27A of the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 within one month. The appellant, Nissamudin, owner adjacent to the petitioner’s land, contends that a boundary dispute and the pendency of related civil suits should not impede the statutory process under the Act. The High Court notes that the property is not included in the data bank under the Act and that the 2008 Act provides a self-contained mechanism for conversion of paddy land, with Section 27A read with Rule 12(1) guiding such consideration. The appellant argues suppression of material facts and relies on a Supreme Court decision (Moti Lal Songura) to counter such pleas, while the other side maintains that the 27A remedy should be available notwithstanding ongoing litigation. The court discusses whether pendency of civil suits bars the invocation of 27A, and whether the reviewed facts warrant the writ petition’s directions. Ultimately, it holds that there is no jurisdictional error in the Single Judge’s ruling and dismisses the writ appeal, while clarifying that pending suits shall be decided on their merits in accordance with law, unfettered by observations in the judgment.
The petitioner, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Maniyoor Sree Subramanya Swami Temple (a temple listed under the HR&CE Act, 1951) challenges a sequence of orders starting from OA 19/2000 under Sec. 57(e) of the HR&CE Act, which culminated in a 2001 ex parte order (Ext.P1) declaring the right of kazhakam in favor of the Vadakke Veedu family, and later extensions/restorations culminating in the 2014 order Ext.P6. The petition traces back to the mother of respondents 5 and 6, Padmavathy Varisyar, who claimed kazhakam rights and arrears of salary dating back to 1986. After several procedural steps, including dismissal for default, restoration, and appeals, the matter reached this writ petition. The petitioner argued that the HR&CE Act provisions (Section 95 and Rule 4) render Limitation Act applicable to inquiries/hearings; hence delay could be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Malabar Devaswom Board contends that Limitation Act has no application to HR&CE proceedings; it urged resort to Section 62 of the Act as the proper remedy. The High Court, applying the Ganesan framework and Sakuru v. Tanaji, held that Limitation Act does not apply to such statutory proceedings and that the Deputy Commissioner lacked power to condone delay. It dismissed the writ with liberty to challenge Ext.P6 via a Section 62 suit.
This writ appeal challenges Ext. P4, an order of inspection issued under Section 66(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, to inspect the books and affairs of the Payangadi Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. The petitioners, who serve as Chairman and General Manager of the society, contend that the complaint triggering the inspection concerns appointments and promotions within the bank, a subject they assert falls under Section 69(1) and its allied provisions, not under Section 66(1). They additionally argued non-compliance with Rule 66 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969, particularly the failure to specify the exact points of inspection and the absence of costs provisions in Ext.P4. The respondents, led by the Government Pleader, argued that Section 66(1) empowers the Registrar to inspect the society’s affairs, including appointments and promotions, and that nothing in Section 69(1) precludes such an inspection; Rule 66 requirements can be satisfied by the order itself. The High Court held that the inspection relates to the society’s affairs and not barred by Section 69(1). It noted that Section 69(2) merely deems certain disputes to be covered thereunder, and Section 66(1) can operate in such contexts. The petition was dismissed; the court refused to quash Ext. P4 on grounds of lack of costs or lack of specificity, distinguishing earlier cases while upholding the Registrar’s prerogative to order inspections. The decision thus preserves the Registrar’s power to order inquiries into the society’s governance where allegations concern appointments and promotions.
WP(C) Nos. 27781/2019 & 30243/2021 Two connected writ petitions challenge disciplinary actions by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL), Kochi Refinery, against employees including P.N. Surendran Nair and M.K. Gopinathan, culminating in two CGIT proceedings. In WP(C) No. 27781/2019, BPCL assailed a CGIT award that set aside the punishment of withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect, despite the enquiry being found fair. In WP(C) No. 30243/2021, BPCL challenged a CGIT/ID award directing reinstatement of the workman with 75% back wages after dismissal, arguing proportionality and past conduct justified dismissal. The court examined whether Labour Court interference is permissible where the domestic enquiry is fair and whether Section 11A of the ID Act governs such interference. It relied on established precedents, including Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management, to emphasize that when an enquiry is fair, Labour Court should not substitute its view absent perversity; it also discussed the proper use of 11A and the non-applicability of fresh evidence. Ultimately, the court held: (i) the 2019 award is unsustainable and set aside; (ii) the 2021 order requiring reinstatement with 75% back wages is unsustainable and should be replaced with a one-time compensation of Rs 25,00,000 with no back wages or reinstatement. The writ petitions are allowed in part with modified reliefs.
This Original Petition (KAT) arises from a Kerala Administrative Tribunal (KAT) order and the Government’s subsequent orders concerning the appointment process for a vacancy reserved for persons with disabilities. The petitioner, Renjith K.R., contends that the Government’s G.O. (MS) No. 27/2021/SJD dated 24.11.2021, cancelling an earlier favourable order (Ext.P3) and directing the PSC to refrain from implementing the Tribunal’s directions, is in violation of constitutional writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act (RPWD Act), and that Ext.P3 was issued in compliance with the Tribunal’s Ext.P2/Vision that the Government itself should decide the matter expeditiously. Ext.P3 had directed fixation and appointment of the petitioner to a post under the Locomotor Disability/Cerebral Palsy category within Harbour Engineering Department, in a vacancy previously reserved for a blind candidate. The Government later cancelled Ext.P3 through Ext.P10, invoking KS&SSR procedures and seeking to avoid setting a precedent. The Kerala High Court notes that the Tribunal’s order did not adjudicate merits, but directed the Government to consider the issues and decide thereafter. The court disposes of the petition with liberty to the petitioner to challenge Ext.P10 in the manner known to law, and directs that the remedy lies in appropriate independent proceedings before the Tribunal, thereby closing the O.P. while preserving the petitioner’s rights to challenge Ext.P10.
This writ petition (C) challenges Exhibit P9, the assessment order dated 02.07.2014/ demand notice under the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, for a building within Thrikkakara Municipality. The petitioner, Arya Vaidya Sala, a charitable trust established by a will dated 30.10.1939, seeks exemption under Section 3(1)(b) on the ground that the building is used for charitable purposes via its Ayurvedic hospital and research facility. The trust contends that the entire income generated should be spent on charitable activities as per the will, and cites various judicial precedents supporting the interpretation of the Will and exemption for charitable activities. The Government pleader counters that, even if some income is used for charitable purposes, the building is not used principally for charitable purposes and is thus taxable. The court examines Section 3(1)(b) and its Explanation, clarifying that exemption is based on the building’s principal use, not ownership, and that “charitable purpose” includes relief of the poor and free medical relief. It references earlier Kerala cases (St. Mary’s Church; St. George Orthodox Church; Sacred Heart Hospital) and the Supreme Court’s Government of Kerala v. Mother Superior Adoration Convent on the meaning of “principally.” Ultimately, the court holds that the petitioner does not establish that the building is used principally for charitable purposes, dismissing the petition.
The petitioner, P.K. Sosamma, was employed as a Lower Primary School Assistant (LPSA) at MDLP School, Thazhathangadi. She challenges the fixation of her pay and seeks to quash communications Ext. P1 and Ext. P3, arguing that provisional government service rendered between 23.09.1985 and 19.04.1986 should be counted towards the 18-year period for eligibility to the senior grade, with consequent benefits from 17.11.2005 and beyond. She initially joined a government school and later moved to an aided school under a corporate management, with promotion to the junior grade on 01.07.1998. She contends that, if the provisional service is reckoned, she would have attained the senior grade earlier and would be eligible for the 23-year/8-year time-bound promotion as per the relevant rules. Exts. P1 and P3 allegedly exclude the provisional service; Exts. P2 and P4 contain her representations highlighting the Government orders, Exts. P5 (Circular 3/95(35)/FIN, 1995) and P6 (Circular 6/3/1998), which she relies upon for the counting principle. The respondents argued that provisional government service cannot be counted for higher grade. The High Court relied on a 2009 Government Order clarifying that aided service prior to entry into Government Service can be reckoned for time-bound higher grades, subject to verification, and observed the Government’s intent to grant provisional service benefits in both sectors. The petition was allowed: Exts. P1 and P3 were quashed, and a direction issued to pass consequential orders within six months.
OT.Rev Nos. 84/2018; 75/2018; 78/2018; 77/2018; 79/2018; 80/2018; 82/2018; 81/2018; 86/2018; 91/2018; 92/2018; 94/2018 (and connected cases) This batch of OT.Revisions in the Kerala High Court challenges a common order dated 5.3.2018 of the Kerala VAT Appellate Tribunal, Ernakulam, in T.A. (VAT) No. 564 of 2014 and related cross-objections. The proceedings arise under Section 25 of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and concern the legality of reassessment when a dealer has opted for a compounded rate of tax under Section 8. The matter was referred to a Full Bench due to differences of opinion among Division Benches on the scope of reassessment and the relationship between reassessment under Section 25 and compounding under Section 8. The Full Bench, in its 31.03.2022 order, held that reassessment power under Section 25 covers multiple contingencies: escaped assessment, under-assessed turnover, under-rate taxation, improper deductions, and erroneous input tax credits; it also rejected a narrow construction based on A M Muhammed Ali, holding that the powers under Sections 25, 56 and 66 are independent. The court emphasized that compounding is an alternate tax mechanism but does not immunize reassessment when misrepresentation or fraud is involved and that deemed assessments under Section 21 interact with reassessment provisions. Consequently, the revisions are allowed and remitted to the Tribunal for fresh merits adjudication, with an expectation of disposal within four months. The decision is delivered by a Division Bench comprising S.V. Bhatti, J., and Basant Balaji, J.
The Kerala High Court, in WP(C) No. 29024 of 2021, deals with a challenge by three owners of contract carriages to the State Transport Authority’s (STA) decision to implement a uniform colour code for contract carriages plying in Kerala. The petitioners allege procedural illegality and discriminatory effects of the colour scheme, which prescribes a white body with a violet ribbon of 10 cm and a metallic gold ribbon of 3 cm, among other markings. They rely on prior judgments (notably the 2020 quashing of an earlier colour-code decision due to lack of quorum) and argue that Rule 264 of the KMV Rules permits paint standards but does not justify a unilateral, compulsory scheme. Respondents contend that the colour code is a safety measure and within the STA’s powers under Rule 264, citing CMV/KMV rules and a longstanding practice to regulate vehicle aesthetics for safety and visibility. The court references Jijith and Others v. State of Kerala (2019) to underscore the need to regulate LED lights, signage and vehicle appearance, and cites earlier writ decisions (WP(C) 6345/2020 and WP(C) 6680/2020) to emphasize lack of quorum in prior actions. Ultimately, the court holds that the order aligns with Rule 264 and dismisses the petition. The decision is by a Single Judge, AMIT RAWAL, on 20.09.2021.
This writ petition, filed by Lijo A Anil, a 19-year-old with 58% benchmark intellectual disability, challenges the non-observation of reservation for persons with disabilities in the recruitment process for the post of Assistant Cook under the Kerala Tourism Development Corporation (KTDC). The petitioner, who has already completed a Food Production course and is employed as a cook-trainee, sought quashing of KTDC advertisements (Exhibits P7 and P8) under Section 34(1) of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and, in the alternative, a direction to appoint him to the post. Respondents argued that the post of Assistant Cook is not identified for disabled persons and that the petitioner’s disability—58% intellectual impairment—would hamper performance of the duties; they also challenged the cut-off marks (40) based on management policy and the absence of a government exemption. The court examined Sections 32–34 of the RPWD Act and held that reservation cannot be denied for lack of post-identification and that a person with benchmark disability cannot be denied employment merely because certain duties may be difficult for him. The petitioner had participated in the selection and was near the cut-off, and the court directed appointment within one month, relying on established jurisprudence that reservation is not contingent on post-identification. The judgment cites Union of India v. National Federation of the Blind and Kerala decisions to illustrate the protective mandate of the Act.
Sreejaya K.R., an Operation Theatre Technician employed at the Regional Cancer Centre (RCC), was terminated by Ext. P8 (20 April 2019). She challenged the termination, contending that the order was issued without prior notice or opportunity to explain. In Ext. P9, the court directed that the termination be treated as a show-cause notice and permitted the petitioner to submit a detailed explanation, with the respondents to consider it and pass orders in accordance with law. The petitioner’s explanation led to Ext. P11, terminating her service. She argued Ext. P11 violated Ext. P12 Rules, and that the alleged acts of indiscipline—disobeying directions and dereliction of duty in the operation theatre—were either unproved or misconstrued (notably incidents on 31.01.2019 and 28.03.2019 related to CO2 cylinder replacement). The respondents argued the OT technician’s duties require continuous presence in the theatre and that the conduct amounted to grave disobedience justifying termination. The court referenced Allahabad Bank Officers’ Assn. v Allahabad Bank and the tests in Pavanendra Narayan Verma to frame stigma and punitive termination. It held Ext. P11 to be stigmatic and punitive, requiring a regular inquiry, and thus set it aside. The writ petition was allowed with directions to conduct an impartial inquiry within six months, highlighting the constitutional safeguards against punitive termination and the need for natural justice in service proceedings.
Ashy Mathew moves a criminal revision under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. against concurrent convictions for an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arising from a ₹10.55 lakh borrowal by a proprietary business arrangement, where the second accused issued a cheque drawn on his account. The trial court convicted the 2nd accused and imposed three months’ simple imprisonment and a ₹12 lakh fine, with the fine payable as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) Cr.P.C. The appellate court affirmed these judgments. The petitioner challenges the firm’s liability, contending the firm’s name was incorrectly stated and that the cheque was issued from a proprietary account. The Courts below had relied on decisions holding that a proprietary concern is not a separate legal entity and that the proprietor can be held liable. The High Court, while acknowledging the revisional limits (not reweighing evidence except for miscarriage of justice), examined the scope of its revisionary power and cited several Supreme Court and Kerala High Court precedents. It held that the concurrent verdicts do not suffer gross miscarriage of justice, but found the sentence excessive and modified it. Consequently, the conviction stands, but the sentence is reduced; timelines for appearance and payment are fixed, with deferment of execution until specified dates. The judgment also reinforces the operation of presumptions under the NI Act and the burden on the accused to rebut them by preponderance of probabilities.
BAIL APPL. NO. 5496 OF 2024 Ali, a 62-year-old resident of Chevayoor Kozhikode, files BAIL APPL. NO. 5496 of 2024 seeking pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC in Crime No. 508/2024 registered at Chevayur Police Station for offences under Section 354 IPC and Section 10 read with Section 9(m) of the POSCO Act. The prosecution alleges that on the evening of 19 June 2024, around 18:00 hours, a minor girl aged 11, while playing in the courtyard of the accused’s rented premises, was subjected to sexual assault—pressed genitals and grabbed breasts—constituting outraging modesty. The accused contends innocence, and that the father of the victim, who is his former tenant, had rented the property for 11 months ending in 2023; after expiry, the accused asked him to vacate, and the father allegedly prompted his daughter to lodge the complaint. He argues custodial interrogation is unnecessary, is 62, has no criminal antecedents, and seeks protection from harassment in a tenancy dispute. The Public Prosecutor opposes bail, pointing to a 164 statement indicating molestation and the need for investigation. The court notes tenancy disputes and the victim–tenant dynamic but finds some defense merit; nonetheless, it holds custodial interrogation unnecessary and grants pre-arrest bail with conditions, while allowing post‑bail recoveries as per Sushila Aggarwal, and clarifies the order does not express Merits."
This intra-court appeal arises from an interim order in WP(C) No.27742/2020 under challenge to a Labour Court award (I.D. No.27/2014) directing reinstatement of the workman (R2) without back wages. The writ petition filed by the management seeks to quash Ext.P3, the Labour Court award, and challenge the subsequent order granting Sec.17-B wages to the workman during pendency of proceedings. The Single Judge’s interim order stayed the operation of Ext.P3 and, on 22.11.2021, granted Sec.17-B wages to the workman. The appellant-management contends that the workman was gainfully employed elsewhere—in his wife’s optical shop—and earned rental income, which, under Sec.17-B, would disentitle him from wages during pendency. The workman maintains that there is no establishment employment during the pendency and that his last drawn wages were Rs.8,500 per month; he filed an affidavit to this effect. The Kerala High Court, in a Division Bench, reiterates the legal framework of Sec.17-B, citing precedents (Jayaraman; Hindustan Machine Tools; Ch. Saraiah; CDS) and discusses the distinction between establishment employment and avocation, while emphasizing the Act’s protective purpose. The Court ultimately upholds the interim order’s benefit to the workman and dismisses the appeal, directing final disposal of the main matter before the Single Bench within weeks."