Rajeevan, the appellant/petitioner in MACA 2199/2012, challenged the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Irinjalakkuda's award in OP(MV)214/2007 arising from a June 7, 2006 motorcycle accident in which his bike collided with a car (KL-08 Q 9039). The Tribunal found joint negligence, attributing 50% to the appellant and 50% to the car-owner, and awarded Rs 45,278; the insurer was directed to deposit 50% with interest. The appellant contends the finding of contributory negligence is erroneous; Ext A5 final report implicates the first respondent as the accused in the crime; therefore the appellant cannot be held contributorily negligent. The Insurance Company argues no challenge to the finding was raised. The High Court, applying welfare legislation principles and relying on New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniyammal, holds that where contra evidence is absent, the police conclusion in the crime report should be accepted for determining negligence, and that a mahazar alone cannot decide liability. Thus, the 50% contributory negligence finding is set aside. On quantum, the court accepts Rs 3,000 monthly income, fixes disability at 5%, resulting in Rs 28,800 for loss of earning capacity, and increases compensation by Rs 39,800 over the Tribunal’s award for losses such as loss of earnings (three months), pain and suffering, and loss of amenities. The insurer is ordered to deposit the enhanced amount with interest at 7.5% per annum within three months, excluding 41 days when calculating interest.
Sheeba Kunnel Philip, the 5th defendant in O.S. No.724 of 2015 on the file of the First Additional Munsiff’s Court, Ernakulam, filed OP(C) 275/2017 challenging an order on valuation under Section 40 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act. The suit, instituted by the wife and children of the late John Paul, seeks cancellation of Settlement Deed No. 5247/2007 and related Sale Deeds Nos. 4234/2008 and 1823/2010, on grounds of fraud and exploitation of John Paul’s diminished mental capacity. John Paul, who had been bedridden and chronically ill, allegedly signed documents under duress; the Will and subsequent transfers are claimed to be void ab initio. The trial court treated the composite relief of cancelling three documents as ancillary, valuing the suit on the first document (Settlement Deed) at Rs. 6,00,000 under Section 40. The petitioner argued the value should be based on the last document (Rs. 31,68,000) since the relief extends to later deeds and possession is sought against the purchasers under those deeds. Respondents contended that court fee is correctly assessed on the value of the subject matter of the first document and that cancellation of subsequent deeds is a consequential, ancillary relief. The High Court allowed the petition, set aside the trial court’s order, and directed fresh consideration of IA 366/2016 in light of precedents, notably Suhrid Singh, Satheedevi, and Niyas, with a view to proper valuation and fee computation.
Appeal on hand is filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S. No.292/04, a suit for partition before the Subordinate Judges (Additional) Court, Palakkad. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaint schedule property is not partible because the deceased Narayanankutty executed a will (Ext. B1) in favour of his wife, the 1st defendant, and the will was acted upon on his death. The appellant contends that under Hindu Mitakshara Law, on the death of the intestate son, the mother is entitled to a 1/4 share and that Ext. B1 is shrouded in suspicion; the testator allegedly was 45 years old at execution, raising doubts about genuineness, and the attestation and the role of the scribe are questioned. The counsel for the appellant argues the trial court failed to appreciate evidence and that the plaint did not properly plead forgery or challenge theWill’s genuineness; he cites Apoline D’Souza to urge that the scribe must be examined. The respondents contend Ext. B1 is genuine, supported by DW2’s testimony that the testator signed and attested the document; they rely on Sec. 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and Sec. 63 of the Indian Succession Act, along with case law insisting that a scribe need not always be examined. The High Court, however, upholds the trial court’s findings, holding the will properly executed and partition not permissible, and dismisses the appeal with costs.
RP No. 973/2023 in O.P.(Crl.) No. 288 of 2023 This is a review petition filed by N. P. Abdul Nazer challenging the dismissal of his O.P.(Crl.) No. 288 of 2023 under the SARFAESI Act. The original petition concerned a bank action against the petitioner’s account and related sale notices issued by the Union Bank of India (erstwhile Corporation Bank) and the State of Kerala. The petitioner contends that his business entity, Panakkad Agencies, though described as a proprietary concern, was treated as a partnership in the judgment under review, creating an error apparent on the face of the record. He further argues that the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act (MSME Act) is benevolent, remedial and preventive legislation, and that a notification under section 9 obligates the bank to identify measures guided by the Act. The respondent counters that the review petition is essentially a reiteration of grounds already raised in a writ appeal under section 5(2) of the Kerala High Court Act, and that it does not fall within the limited scope of review. They also contend that the MSME Act’s applicability was not pleaded or proved and that SARFAESI proceedings take precedence in the absence of a clear exclusion. The bench emphasizes that review cannot function as an appeal and notes a cited precedent (Shri Ram Sahu) for context. Ultimately, the court allows the review petition in part by deleting a mistaken sentence in paragraph 22 of the prior judgment, with the rest of the judgment remaining intact.
CON.CASE(C) NO. 293 OF 2020 This Contempt of Court case, arising from W.P.(C) No.10043 of 2017, is filed by petitioners (petitioners 1–7, 9 & 10) against the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (EPFO). The petitioners allege willful disobedience of directions contained in Annexure A1 judgment dated 25 February 2019 in W.P.(C) No.10043/2017, which itself followed Annexure A2 judgment dated 12 October 2018 in W.P.(C) No.13120/2015 and connected matters. The Supreme Court’s subsequent detailed judgment dated 04 November 2022 in Civil Appeals Nos. 8143–8144 of 2022 and connected matters, reported as SUNIL KUMAR B. (AIR 2022 SC 5634), upheld the legality and validity of Notification No. G.S.R. 609(E) (2014) and laid down directions for implementing amendments to the pension scheme. It directed application of the amendments to exempted establishments, extension of options under paras 11(3)/(4), and reconsideration of pension entitlements. The Kerala High Court, referencing the SC judgment and the 2014 amendment, holds that petitioners’ entitlement to higher pension requires reconsideration by the EPFO and, accordingly, closes the contempt case, while preserving EPFO’s right to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court’s directions. The judgment discusses read-down of provisions, ultra vires questions, and Article 142 jurisdiction.
BA 9834/23; BA 9428/23; BA 9432/23 These connected bail applications arise from Crime No. 38/2021 of the Ernakulam Excise Range Office, Ernakulam, in which 1.085 kg of MDMA was seized. The petitioners — Muhammed Ajmal (2nd accused, BA 9834/23), Shabna Manoj (3rd accused, BA 9428/23), and Shamsudheen Sait (8th accused, BA 9432/23) — seek regular bail under the NDPS Act (Sections 22(c) and 29). The prosecution opposes bail on grounds that the quantity involved and the accused’s roles warrant continuing custody. The petitioners contend that the second crime (36/2021) registered on the same premises and the subsequent 38/2021 seizure relate to the same contraband, and that the two separate crimes amount to fabrication by the Excise department; they also point out long custody, filing of a charge sheet on 15.10.2022, and that the case has not been numbered. The prosecution argues that the accused are connected with importing and handling substantial contraband, with multiple accused on bail in related cases. The court acknowledges delay and custody but relies on Supreme Court jurisprudence to balance liberty with investigative integrity. Citing Mohd. Muslim and Rabi Prakash, the judge grants bail to the petitioners with stringent conditions, including bonds, monthly reporting, trial postings, passport surrender, and prohibitions on leaving the state or India, subject to further orders, to secure a fair trial.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case concerns the challenge to the ongoing prosecution in CC No.1530/2022, arising from Thiruvalla Police Station Crime No.860/2022. The petitioner, Soji P Varghese, faces offences under IPC Sections 452 (house trespass), 294(b) (obscene language), 506(ii) (criminal intimidation) and 427 (mischief). The petition is filed under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the proceedings, contending that the dispute between the parties is private and has been resolved by a settlement supported by an affidavit from the victim; the victim’s counsel also confirms consent to quashing. The Public Prosecutor expresses reservations about quashing solely on the basis of settlement but concedes that the matter is settled. The court places reliance on Supreme Court precedents in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) and Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) to articulate the test: quashing under S.482 CrPC is permissible where the dispute is private in nature, the entire dispute is resolved, and the offence is not heinous or part of special statutes. Reading the facts, the court holds the dispute private, accepts the settlement, and quashes the proceedings in CC 1530/2022, thereby terminating all further proceedings against the petitioner.
BAIL APPL. NO. 4558 OF 2024 The petitioners, Ashik Kozhiparambil Sasidharan and Sakunthala Sasidharan, seek pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC in Crime No.576/2024 of Kodungallur Police Station, Thrissur, alleging forgery of the de facto complainant’s signature and theft of gold ornaments from a locker. The prosecution alleges that the couple forged the complainant’s signature and removed gold from a locker, constituting offences under Section 420 read with Section 34 IPC. Matrimonial disputes between the parties have been ongoing since 2022 before the Family Court, Ernakulam. The petitioners argue innocence, contend the case is a harassment tactic connected to the unresolved marital discord, and maintain that custodial interrogation is unnecessary and no recovery is expected. The Public Prosecutor opposes pre-arrest bail, citing ongoing investigation and potential interference. The High Court, noting the Supreme Court’s guidance in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat (anticipatory bail in family disputes) and the principle that bail should be tailored to the facts, considers the petition on exceptional grounds and grants anticipatory bail with conditions. The order requires surrender within 10 days, bond of Rs.50,000 with two solvent sureties for the same amount, cooperation with the investigation, refraining from tampering with evidence, surrender of passports, and abstention from new offences. The Court emphasizes the order is interlocutory and not a merits determination, and may be modified or canceled on violation.
WP(C) Nos. 10612/2024 & connected cases This is a batch judgment of the Kerala High Court (single-judge bench of Justice T.R. Ravi, dated 26 March 2024) disposing of WP(C) No. 10612 of 2024 and a large number of connected writ petitions. The petitions challenge police/cybercrime notices and freezing orders on the petitioners’ bank accounts in the wake of alleged online financial fraud. The Court examines a common set of issues across petitions arising from cybercrime investigations involving the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (IC3), Reserve Bank of India, and various banks (Federal Bank, ICICI Bank, South Indian Bank, Canara Bank, Axis Bank, etc.) across different states. A key thread is the banks freezing accounts following police/intimation by cybercrime cells, sometimes for extended periods. The Court issues uniform interim- and final-directions aimed at preventing excessive, blanket or prolonged freezing, while allowing investigations to proceed. It directs banks to confine freezes to the amounts specified in police requisitions, to seek/obtain police information before extending freezes, and to enable petitioners to transact beyond the frozen sums once information is not supplied. The judgment relies on the principle laid down in Dr. Sajeer v RBI (2023 KHC Online 661) and references a prior order in W.P.(C) 28155/2023 for interim relief. The petitions are disposed of with directions to that effect, and the Court preserves liberty to approach again if needed.
BAIL APPL. NO. 939 OF 2023 This is a regular bail application filed by the sole accused, RIYAS S/O MUHAMMED KUNJI, in Crime No.747/2022 of Bakel Police Station, presently in custody since 29.9.2022. The investigation followed a tip leading to a search at Room No.301 of Sreego Resort near Bakel Fort, where 25.33 g of MDMA and 6.380 g of hashish oil were recovered from a bag in the accused’s room, and a body search recovered 49.430 g of MDMA. The offences alleged are under Sections 22(c) and 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The petitioner contends procedural irregularities: (i) non-compliance with Section 42(1) since the information was recorded only in the General Diary rather than in writing, (ii) body search conducted without compliance of Section 50. The Public Prosecutor defends that recording in the General Diary suffices and that Section 50’s formal compliance could be addressed during trial. The court analyzes Section 42(1) and clarifies that information from another person must be reduced to writing, but a GD entry may suffice. It also notes that Sections 50(5) and (6) permit a non-Gazetted search in emergencies but that the record does not show such compliance, leaving that for trial. Crucially, it holds that even if Section 50 is not complied with for body search, the recovery from the room remains; however, given the commercial quantity, Section 37’s rider applies. After reviewing case law on “reasonable grounds,” the court concludes it cannot grant bail and dismisses the petition. The decision anchors bail denial on the conjunctive requirements of Section 37(1)(b) and the presence of a commercial quantity.
CON.CASE(C) NO. 2279 OF 2019 This Contempt Case, arising out of W.P.(C) No.37945/2016 (and connected matters) before the Kerala High Court, concerns alleged willful disobedience of the directions contained in Annexure I judgment dated 12.10.2018 in the related writ petition. The petitioners—eleven individuals who were petitioners in the earlier W.P.(C) No.37945/2016—allege non-compliance with the 2018 directions and insist on enforcement of the pension-related orders. The Supreme Court’s later judgment dated 04.11.2022 in Civil Appeals Nos. 8143-44 of 2022 (and connected matters) in Employees Provident Fund Organisation v. Sunil Kumar B. held that the Notification No. G.S.R.609(E) (dated 22.08.2014) is legal and valid, with down-reading of certain provisions and specific directions concerning the pension scheme (including paragraphs 11(3) and 11(4)) and the extension of options for employees. The Kerala High Court acknowledges these apex directives and notes that the petitioners’ claim for higher pension requires reconsideration by the EPFO in light of the 2022 judgment. On 25.10.2023, after hearing, the court closed the Contempt Case, with the caveat that EPFO may reconsider entitlement to higher pension consistent with the Supreme Court’s 2022 judgment.
This Division Bench of the Kerala High Court adjudicates a Divisional Petition (DBP No. 8 of 2023) arising from an Ombudsman’s complaint (TDB Report No. 43 of 2022, Complaint No. 72/2022) concerning alleged encroachment of temple land by the Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) for a police station. The petitioner, Secretary of the Temple Advisory Committee of the Sree Karthiyayini Devi Temple, Aroor, contends that the temple land—46.9–47 cents in Sy. No. 13/5B/1-63 at Aroor—constitutes Devaswom property and should not be encumbered. Annexures show correspondence among the Devaswom Commissioner, Land Special Officer, and the District Collector, highlighting statutory mandates under the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950, including provisions for vesting, management, and disposition of Devaswom lands and properties (Sections 3, 4, 15, 15A, 24, 27, 31) and related proclamations. The court recalls an interim order prohibiting construction on the disputed land without court permission. Authorities rely on various statutory clauses and precedents such as A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board and Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair to emphasize protection of temple properties and the guardianship role of courts under parens patriae. Ultimately, the court disposes of the petition by directing a state-government decision on land status within three months, with a reasoned order, and with notice to the TD Board and temple authorities; the challenge to the land transfer remains open pending that decision.
Angel Thomas, a petitioner in WP(C) No.4962/2023, challenged Question No.70 in Ext.P5 (SET-C booklet) of the Kerala Teacher Eligibility Test (K-TET) conducted on 03.12.2022. She scored 89 marks out of 150, below the minimum qualifying mark of 90, and argued that Q.No.70 was incorrect and its answer incorrect as per official publications. She sought a mandamus to award one mark to all candidates for the wrong question, declare the question and answer as incorrect, and issue a certificate that she passed the K-TET. The petition relied on Ext.P2 notification (18.10.2022) and Ext.P7 guidelines, which suggest a process for objections but do not provide for revaluation or scrutiny. The respondent contended that the question was referred to a subject expert who confirmed its correctness. The court examined the bilingual versions of the question, and despite the exam-related facts, found issues with the question’s framing: the Malayalam-English versions and the dates related to Kerala Panchayati Raj and Municipality Acts. It observed the Assembly passed the Act on 22.04.1994 and noted the answer options did not contain an exact date, potentially misleading examinees. The court allowed the petition and directed the first respondent to reconsider Question No.70 within one month and, if found improper, to allot marks to the applicant and others in accordance with Ext.P2 guidelines.
Mahesh Mohan, applicant, sought admission to the Ph.D. Practice Track Programme (Ph.D. PT) in Humanities and Liberal Arts in Management Areas at IIM Kozhikode after completing an MBA from the same institute in the OBC-NC category. He contends that admission was denied due to erroneous application of reservation policy, with the institute allegedly adopting a 10% cut-off at the interview stage and fixing a cut-off in a manner that disadvantaged reserved-category candidates. Exts P1–P6 show the admission notification, online application, OBC-NC certificate, interview notice, and communications requesting compliance with reservations. The petitioner argues that under the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation and Admission) Act, 2006,Reservation of seats for SC, ST and OBC categories must be observed, and that the institute’s practice effectively defeats 27% OBC reservation, given the reported distribution of 24 seats (18 general, 3 SC, 3 OBC) for the year. He asserts violation of statutory prescriptions and constitutional mandate. Respondents contend that fixing minimum marks and cut-offs at the interview is permissible and consistent with precedent, relying on Indiresan and other cases; they insist on applying the statutory framework to preserve reservations and that the process itself was not to be disturbed. The court identifies two defects: non-adherence to the reservation policy and changing selection criteria post hoc. However, it allows the petition and directs the respondent to admit the petitioner to the Ph.D. PT programme, directing compliance within two weeks.
CRL.A Nos.277 & 676 of 2019 This is a Kerala High Court judgment disposing of two connected criminal appeals filed by Prathibha (Crl.A.277/2019) and Bashdev (Crl.A.676/2019) arising from a sensational infant death case in which Sivani, aged about six months, was found dead in the Arabian Sea near Azheekkal in 2015. The Special Court for Trial of Offences under the POCSO Act and the Children’s Court (Additional Sessions Judge I), Alappuzha, had convicted the appellants under sections 302 read with 34 IPC and 201 read with 34 IPC, while a third accused faced related charges. The core issue before the High Court is whether an act performed on a body that the actor believed to be lifeless would attract culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC. The court reviews the evidence, including autopsy findings (Ext.P19) showing death due to the combined effects of drowning and head injury, and testimony suggesting the infant sustained injuries prior to death, culminating in the body’s disposal. The bench emphasizes that the knowledge or belief regarding whether the victim was alive at the time of disposal governs culpable homicide under Section 299, not merely the fact of death. The High Court ultimately sets aside the Sessions Court’s verdicts under 302/201 and 201/34, and, applying established precedents, acquits the appellants, clarifying the mens rea required for Section 299.
This Kerala High Court criminal appeal arises from an acquittal in a defamation case. The appellant, Neelamkavil Jacob Johnson, a lawyer, alleged that a written statement in civil proceedings contained a defamatory imputation accusing him of gambling and dishonesty, and that a police officer acted under colour of his official functions to arrest him. The trial court held that although the imputation was defamatory per se, it fell within the Ninth Exception to Explanation 4 of Section 499 IPC (defamation) on the ground of ‘good faith’ for the protection of the maker’s or another person’s interest or for the public good. The trial court thus acquitted. The High Court analyzed the scope of “good faith” under Section 52 IPC and relied on precedents from the Supreme Court, notably Harbajan Singh v. State of Punjab and S.K. Sundaram, to emphasize that good faith requires due care and attention and a rational basis for belief, not mere belief. It further clarified that under Ninth Exception, the three contingencies—protection of the maker’s or another’s interest, or public good—must be connected to the assertion and supported by the circumstances, absence of malice, and necessary enquiry. In the instant case the court found that the pleading in the civil suit was closely connected to the dispute and the officer’s official function, satisfying the exception. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld, with no interference.”
This Original Petition (Article 227) challenges the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thodupuzha, order dated 09.05.2022 in I.A.No.2 of 2022 in O.P.(MV) No.155 of 2022, which directed Shameer, owner of the offending vehicle, to furnish security of Rs.9,91,000 under Order 38 Rule 5 CPC. The accident occurred on 16.10.2021 at Urakunnu junction, when claimant Joshy Lavyson, riding a scooter KL-38-J-1292, collided with a goods van KL-38-B-2142, causing deformity in the left leg and other injuries. The claimant sought Rs.9 lakh as compensation and argued the vehicle was uninsured; the MACT’s order premised on securing potential payment before final award. The petitioner contends that the MACT did not await service of the application, and that Order 38 Rule 5 CPC is inapplicable to MACT proceedings under Rule 391A and Rule 395 of the Kerala MV Rules, 1989. Respondents rely on several authorities, including Jai Prakash, Usha Devi, Vasukumar Pillai, and S.P. Vasukumar Pillai, to justify attachment before judgment and the broader approach to securing compensation. The Kerala High Court, however, holds that Rule 391A precludes release of an uninsured vehicle and that the Tribunal cannot exercise Order 38 Rule 5 CPC; consequently, the impugned order is set aside. The petition is allowed. The court leaves the question of security submission under Rule 391A open and notes that state-level reforms and directives concerning uninsured vehicles remain to be implemented, per Jai Prakash and related authorities.
This Kerala High Court bail application concerns how to handle bail for offences alleged under both the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) in a single crime. The petitioner, Renoj R.S., aged 18, was arrested in July 2022 for offences including POCSO-related acts and alleged abuse toward a 15-year-old victim. Bail was initially granted under section 439 CrPC, but the court reserved its decision on the crucial question of which statute governs bail when both Acts are implicated, and through which procedural route—CrPC bail before a Sessions Court or an appellate remedy under the SC/ST Act—should be exercised. The judge surveys competing override provisions: POCSO Sec. 42A provides overriding effect over other laws; SC/ST Act Sec. 20 also provides overriding effect; POCSO Sec. 31 applies CrPC to proceedings before a Special Court, making CrPC bail available; SC/ST Act Sec. 14A confines appellate remedy to the High Court. The court cites Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd, KSL and Industries Ltd v. Arihant Threads Ltd, and Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi) to frame the rule that when two special statutes with non-obstante clauses conflict, the later statute prevails. The court concludes that POCSO prevails, permitting bail under CrPC, and ultimately makes the initial bail order absolute, clarifying the procedural path to avoid future confusion.
This writ petition challenges the refusal by the respondents to approve the appointment of the petitioner as Sewing Teacher at St. Joseph Convent Girls High School, Kottayam, with effect from 01.06.2017. The petitioner asserts that a Sewing Teacher post existed in the school, evidenced by staff fixation orders for 2017-2018 and earlier years, and that the Manager had earmarked a post for a Sewing Teacher while seeking a qualified incumbent from the authorities. A Government Order (G.O. P. No. 4/2021/G.Edn) dated 06.02.2021 prompted a fresh proposal, but the 4th respondent rejected it on the ground that Jeena Jose, who was working as a Specialist Teacher, was protected and continued on a clubbing arrangement following a past reduction of the Art post in 2015-2016. The 2nd respondent (Director of General Education) and the 3rd respondent (DEO) upheld Exts. P3, P8, P9 and P11, thereby rejecting the request. The petitioner relies on Rule 6(4)(c) of Chapter XXIII KER, which provides for one full-time Sewing Teacher post if there are not less than 200 girls in the High School, and argues that a post existed and could be sanctioned even if a post of Art Teacher co-existed, provided the requisite girl strength is met. The Court observes that the scope of Rule 6(4)(c) was not properly considered and issues directions to quash the challenged orders and re-consider the revision petition under Rule 6(4)(c) within two months, ensuring compliance with this judgment.
W.P.(C) Nos. 23186 of 2022 & connected cases These batch writ petitions challenge Government Order GO(MS) No.121/2022 dated 7 July 2022 and the associated Plus One admission prospectus for 2022-23, seeking to quash or restrain a policy that reduces Private Aided Higher Secondary School (PAHS) management quota from 30% to 20% and to reserve 10% of the management quota for the community to which the school’s management belongs. The petitioners, Managers of PAHS, contend that this policy violates fundamental rights and the constitutional guarantees of equality (Articles 14 and 15) and, by requiring schools to declare their community allegiance, introduces an arbitrary, discriminatory regime that undermines merit and creates a caste/religion-based reservation for admissions. The State defends the policy as a valid executive decision aimed at correcting historical anomalies, enhancing transparency, and ensuring merit in admissions through CAP (Centralized Allotment Process). The court traces the history of admissions quotas since 1991, highlighting prior orders and judicial interventions that treated community quotas as impermissible. It ultimately upholds the 20% management quota but strikes down the 10% community quota as unconstitutional, directing that the former community seats be treated as open merit seats to be allotted strictly through CAP. The petitions are disposed of accordingly, with guidance on continuing compliance with CAP and the earlier governing orders.