This Criminal Miscellaneous Case arises from a final report in VC 02/2013 of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau and CC 3/2016 before the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge, Thrissur, concerning a disproportionate-assets case against P.A. Dinesh Babu, then a Motor Vehicles Inspector. The accused is charged under Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for possessing assets worth Rs. 70,21,823.38 and 360.100 gms of gold, along with expenditures of Rs. 26,02,671.26, during 01.12.2004 to 09.01.2013, exceeding his known income of Rs. 66,87,369.75 by Rs. 29,37,124.89 (plus gold), a disproportion of 43.92%. The accused challenges the final report on grounds including inclusion of assets of his mother and wife as his own, omission of pre-check-period assets, and the valuation date for a residential building. The prosecution responds that those are triable issues. Relying on Kerala and Supreme Court authorities, the High Court holds that Section 482 Cr.P.C. relief is not warranted to quash the report, and that the proper arena for these questions is trial. The court dismisses the petition, but directs expeditious trial within six months and notes the petitioner may move for extensions if needed. It is emphasized that the court will not re-evaluate evidence at the quashing stage, and the petitioner may produce evidence at trial.
This is a Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 4624 of 2022) filed by Mariyamma, the accused, before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam seeking to quash the further proceedings in CC No. 403/2021 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Aluva. The offences alleged are under Section 324 of the IPC and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The prosecution’s case is that on 17 February 2021, while teaching Mathematics to Class X-B, the petitioner allegedly assaulted a student with a cane for a classwork mistake, resulting in a purported fracture; the FIR was lodged on 22 February 2021. The petitioner contends the act was a small, good-faith disciplinary measure in a remedial class for 16 weak students preparing for the Board examination, and that she had no malicious intent to cause injury. The Public Prosecutor argues that the allegations, if accepted, may constitute offences and that Section 482 Cr.P.C jurisdiction cannot be invoked. The court notes that medical certificates did not conclusively prove a fracture and that witnesses largely describe a minor, non-malicious act in the interest of discipline. Relying on Jaya v. State of Kerala, Rajan v. Sub Inspector of Police, and Nirmala K. v. State of Kerala, the court accepts that proportional, reasonable discipline by a teacher in good faith falls outside criminal liability. Consequently, the Crl.M.C is allowed and all further proceedings in CC 403/2021 are quashed, ending the case.
WP(C) No. 10612 of 2024 & connected cases The judgment consolidates WP(C) Nos. 10612 of 2024 and numerous connected petitions challenging freezing of bank accounts in cybercrime investigations. Petitioners, including individuals and corporate banks, alleged that their bank accounts were frozen based on notices from police authorities and disclosures on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, causing substantial hardship. The court notes that, at admission, interim directions were issued to restrict freezing to the amount clearly in dispute as per police intimations and to prevent blanket freezes that paralyze legitimate transactions. Relying on the earlier decision in Dr. Sajeer v RBI (2023 KHC OnLine 661), the court prescribes proportionality and balance: respondent banks are to confine freezes to the disputed sums, while police authorities must inform the banks whether continued freezing is warranted and for what period (extending up to eight months from the date of judgment if information necessitates). If no further information is supplied, petitioners may approach the court again with their contentions preserved. The order applies to all connected petitions, reflecting a unified approach to ensuring due process while safeguarding assets.
BAIL APPL. NO. 5407 OF 2024 This is a pre-arrest bail application under section 438 CrPC before the Kerala High Court by Salman Faris V.K., the sole accused in Crime No. 789/2024 of Valanchery Police Station, Malappuram. The accused is charged with offences under Section 379 IPC and Sections 20 and 23 of the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulations of Removal of Sand Act, 2001, for transporting river sand without permit in a lorry KL 35-5902 on 23.06.2024. The petitioner contends innocence, arguing there is no material to substantiate the charges and that Annexure 2 order of this Court had held that Section 379 IPC may not be attracted in such a context, making custodial interrogation unnecessary and no recovery to be effected. The petitioner’s counsel seeks parity with the Annexure 2 order, asserting the availability of pre-arrest bail. The Public Prosecutor opposes on grounds that investigation is ongoing and granting bail could impede it, though she concedes the petitioner has no prior criminal antecedents. The Court notes that Sections 20 and 23 of the Act are bail-able and that when a special law governs river sand theft, the IPC offence may not apply. Referring to the Annexure 2 order and the principle of parity, the Court holds that valid grounds exist for discretionary relief under Section 438 and grants pre-arrest bail with conditions (surrender within 10 days, bond with two sureties of Rs.50,000 each, cooperation with IO, no inducement or tampering, surrender of passport, no additional offences, and possibility of cancellation for violation). The order also cites Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another to justify allowing investigation during bail, and it cautions that observations are not merits determinations.
Mary Jose, the second accused in Crime No. 313/2024 of Angamali Police Station, Ernakulam, seeks pre-arrest bail under Section 438 CrPC before the Kerala High Court. The allegations under Section 498A read with Section 34 IPC involve the de facto complainant—the wife of the first accused and the daughter-in-law of the petitioner—being abused in obscene language and assaulted, with acts such as tearing of garments. The petitioner contends that the FIR contains no specific accusation against her to attract Section 498A, that custodial interrogation is unnecessary, and that she is a lady with matrimonial disputes with the complainant. The Public Prosecutor opposes, asserting that custodial interrogation is required and that there exist incriminating materials linking the petitioner to the crime, and that granting anticipatory bail could hamper the investigation. The court extracts principles from the Supreme Court in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat and another (2015 KHC 4579) regarding anticipatory bail in family-dispute contexts, emphasizing examination of the complaint, gravity of the charge, cooperation with investigation, and precautions against misuse. On balance, and noting the petitioner’s lack of necessity for custodial interrogation and the matrimonial dispute context, the court concludes exceptional grounds exist to grant pre-arrest bail under Sec. 438 CrPC. The order conditions include surrender within 10 days, bond and two sureties, appearance for interrogation, non-tampering with witnesses or evidence, passport surrender, and continued cooperation; it remains without a merits ruling on the case.
This first appeal under Section 104 read with Order XLIII, Rule 1(d) CPC arises from an application I.A.8 of 2020 filed by the defendants to set aside an ex parte decree in O.S. No.270 of 2018 on the file of the II Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam. The appellants—defendants 1, 2, 5, 6 and 7—contend that they did not intentionally default and that the 5th appellant, who conducted the case for others, could not appear due to practical constraints, including financial ones. An earlier I.A.6 of 2020 was allowed, directing payment of Rs.5,000 as costs within three days; the amount was not paid, and the trial court dismissed I.A.8 for setting aside the ex parte decree. The respondents/plaintiffs contend that the explanations for non-appearance are not credible and that the delay shows laches, warranting dismissal of the application. The High Court acknowledges some laches but, noting that I.A.8 was filed promptly and guided by decisions of the Apex Court on setting aside ex parte decrees, adopts a lenient approach. It holds that the appeal is to be allowed on the condition of paying Rs.7,500 in costs within one week, with I.A Nos.6 and 8 allowed, and directs the II Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam, to proceed with the suit on merits in accordance with law.
This Regular Second Appeal arises from a partition suit concerning the ancestral property described in Ext A1, originally in the joint possession of Bava, his wife Kochuparu, and their daughter the defendant Devaki. The plaintiff Ponnu contends that she is a daughter of Bava and Kochuparu and, therefore, entitled to a share in the property. The trial court and appellate court held that Ext B4, a decree in a prior partition suit, did not bar this suit, and that Ext B1, a 1983 settlement deed by Kochuparu transferring her rights in the plaint schedule property to the defendant, is not conclusive unless properly pleaded. The defendant and appellant argues that the Ext B1 deed affects the shares and requires consideration; however, the trial court did not rely on B1 for want of pleadings. The High Court acknowledges that Ext B1 is crucial to determine the shares and that the leading question is the status of the plaintiff and the partibility of the plaint schedule property. It notes conflict between the earlier fact pattern and the Chokkanatha decision; the court reasons that the facts of this case permit reliance on Ext B1 and remands for a fresh finding on Ext B1’s impact on shares, allowing amendments and additional evidence. The decision ultimately sets aside the trial court’s decree to the extent of shares and remands for expedited disposal, with a hearing date fixed.
Jacob C.L, owner of 3 Acres 43 Cents of land in Survey No. 900/2, Kumbalanghi, seeks direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer to consider Ext. P4 (application filed on 24/07/2022) and pass orders, without delay, on his attempt to strengthen bunds on pokkali paddy land for cultivation and related aquaculture. The petitioner contends Ext. P3 Stop Memo (dated 16/07/2022) issued by the Village Officer is arbitrary, as his activity involves strengthening bunds for beneficial agricultural and aquacultural use; soil is drawn from his own fields, and there is no violation of the Kerala Land Utilisation Order or the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008. Respondents counter that the activity violates the PLDA Order and the Act, as it would facilitate new bund construction and could negatively impact pokkali cultivation and ecosystem; the 4th respondent alleges the strengthening is primarily for aquaculture, not farming. The High Court examines the legality of Ext. P3, the nature of bund strengthening, and whether soil extraction amounts to unlawful activity. It concludes Ext. P3 cannot stand, finding no convincing basis to disallow bund strengthening when soil is not removed for commercial exploitation, and that pokkali cultivation remains feasible with properly strengthened bunds. Ext. P3 is set aside and the petition is disposed, with Ext. P4 to be considered in light of these observations.
The petitioner, Thrissur Diary of the Ernakulam Regional Co-operative Milk Producers’ Union Ltd., filed a writ petition under Article 226 challenging a demand notice (Ext.P1) dated 24 June 2016 for electricity arrears running from March 2001 onward, totaling Rs 1,15,834 with interest. The notice pressed imminent actions including prosecution, revenue recovery, or disconnection under Section 45 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and Regulation 12 of the Kerala Electricity Supply Code. The petitioner argued that the arrear statement (Exts.P2–P5) lacked precise breakup and contained vague or arbitrary entries; bills produced (Exts.P6–P8) showed no outstanding arrears in the relevant periods. The respondents contended that the billing system was computerized from April 2001 and that default occurred earlier; they invoked the continuing-liability concept and relied on precedents like Abdul Nazar and Southern India Marine Products to justify recovery, asserting the petitioner had remedies such as the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum. The court examined Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (disconnection for default and two-year cap under Section 56(2)), the lack of substantiating material, and the absence of a continuing-liability finding prior to 2003, ultimately holding the notices an excess, without jurisdiction, and quashing the demands. The petition is allowed.
This appeal under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 arises from an order of the Industrial Tribunal and Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Kozhikode, dated 14 February 2020 in ECC No.68/2017. The claimant, Ravi, the driver of an auto-rickshaw owned by the first respondent, suffered injuries in a motor accident on 05 October 2015 during the course of his employment. The Commissioner found him entitled to compensation under Section 4(1)(c)(ii) for permanent disablement and ordered the second respondent, The National Insurance Company Ltd., to pay Rs 2,61,173 with interest and Rs 16,514 for medical expenses. The applicant challenged the award arguing that he was also entitled to compensation under Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 (temporary disablement), and cited Mohammed v. Cochin Port Trust to support this. The respondents argued that the evidence did not establish permanent partial/total disablement and that Section 4(1)(d) does not apply; the insurer's liability existed but the relationship with the employer was not disputed. The High Court discusses the statutory definitions of permanent and total disablement under Section 2(1)(g) and (l), and the role of Part I/II of Schedule I, and the requirement to prove disability by a 'qualified medical practitioner.' The court ultimately confirms the Commissioner’s award under 4(1)(c)(ii) in light of the evidence and holds that the appellant is not entitled to 4(1)(d); the appeal is dismissed.
W.P.(C) No. 26215 of 2018 Kanbros Distributors N.S.S. Building, a KVAT/CST dealer, filed a writ petition challenging Ext.P1 notice under Section 25(1) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, and Ext.P3 assessment order issued by the Agricultural Income Tax & State Tax Officer, State Goods and Service Tax Department, Ranni, under the Kerala State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (KGST Act, 2017). The petitioner contends that Clauses (a)-(e) of subsection 2 of Section 174, and Sub-section 3 of Section 174 of the KGST Act, and the saving of the KVAT Act under Section 4 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, violate Article 246A and Article 19 of the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, 2016, and are ultra vires the Constitution. It is further alleged that the Ext.P3 order is non-speaking, violation of natural justice (no cross-examination opportunity, no reasoned consideration of objections, and lack of hearing), and that the five-year limitation period has been breached. The court noted a prior decision in Sheen Golden Jewels (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. State Tax Officer (2019 KHC 205) and held the constitutional challenge against the 101st Amendment untenable. On merits, Ext.P3 was found to be non-reasoned and the petitioner’s contentions not properly considered. The writ petition was disposed of by setting aside Ext.P3 and directing the third respondent to re‑examine the issue on merits after providing a hearing, within three months, with the petitioner to furnish a certified copy of this judgment.
WP(C) Nos. 22001/2021 & 24732/2021 These are two connected writ petitions challenging orders of the Revenue authorities refusing reassessment of basic tax and reclassification of land under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order, 1967 (KLU). The land, totaling 164.01 ares in ReSy. Nos. 53–58 & 66 in Block No.58 of Perumbavoor, originally belonged to Abdul Salam and was classed as paddy land. Abdul Salam obtained an order dated 14.02.2005 under Clause 6(2) of the KLU enabling cultivation of crops other than paddy (Ext.P2) after reports that the land had remained uncultivated for about eight years and would not affect neighboring lands. The petitioners, Rajesh M.R. and Ameera Ahamed P.M., purchased portions of Abdul Salam’s land and sought reassessment of basic tax by reclassifying the land as purayidam/dry land under Form A, arguing that Ext.P2 created a dry-land status prior to 30.12.2017 and that the land is not part of the data bank as paddy land. They relied on several Kerala High Court decisions (e.g., Shameem P.K. etc.) holding that pre-2017 dry-land conversions under KLU order fall outside 27A. Respondents contended Ext.P2 is not a KLU order permitting such conversion and that 27A remains applicable where Town Planning Scheme restrictions apply. The High Court ultimately allowed the petitions, quashed Ext.P6, and directed reassessment and reclassification without 27A payment, with revenue-record corrections and possession certificates to be issued promptly.
Ansar, the third accused in Nadapuram Police Station Case No. 715/2010, seeks to quash all further proceedings now pending as SC No. 352/2021 before the Additional Sessions Court-III, Kozhikode. The prosecution alleges that on 17 December 2010, at about 11:30 PM, an unlawful assembly formed with 12 unidentified persons to promote communal discord between Muslims and Hindus; the accused allegedly assaulted CWs with iron rod and reaper, shouted anti-Hindu/ Muslim threats, and intended to commit culpable homicide. Offences charged include 143, 147, 148, 341, 324, 427, 153A, 308, and 395 read with 149 IPC. Initially, the trial proceeded as SC 66/2015; the 2nd accused was found not guilty and acquitted; the petitioner’s case was split and later refiled as LP 14/2018, and ultimately as SC 352/2021. The petitioner contends that the dispute among the parties has been settled, with affidavits from respondents stating no grievance; the Public Prosecutor verified the settlement. It is argued that sanction under Section 196 Cr.P.C. for Section 153A prosecutions is mandatory, and since that sanction was not obtained, the proceedings under 153A cannot stand. The court considers Annexure-III’s observations and the lack of corroborating evidence beyond PW3 and PW5; relying on Moosa v. Sub Inspector of Police, it concludes that continuing proceedings would be futile in light of the settlement. The court allows the Crl.M.C., quashing the final report and all further proceedings.
This petition, filed by occupants of shop rooms in the Padanayarkulangara Devaswom Shopping Complex (owned by the Travancore Devaswom Board), challenges a series of notices (Exts. P3, P3(a)–P3(h)) issued by the Assistant Devaswom Commissioner demanding rent and security deposits at an enhanced rate under a redetermination exercise based on Delhi Schedule of Rates (DSR). The petitioners contend that the rent hike is inconsistent with the Court’s earlier order allowing only a 10% annual increase and seeks to quash the notices, receive rent at the existing rate with annual 10% hikes, and renew lease deeds while resisting a shift to licensing. The respondents explain that the TD Board must protect and maximize revenue from Devaswom properties, rely on the Travancore-Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950 and various Board decisions, and implement redetermination in line with DSR. The Court undertakes a broad review of fiduciary duties of trustees, the protection of temple properties, and the Board’s obligation to ensure income generation, citing several precedents emphasizing guardianship of sacred properties and prudent financial management. The judgment directs refixation of market rent by the Devaswom Commissioner, with opportunities for hearing, ensuring rent is not below prevailing market rates, and obtaining Board approval, disposing of the petition without costs.
OT.Rev Nos. 29/2022 to 44/2022 This batch of OT.Rev petitions before the Kerala High Court concerns CST/CVAT exemptions in inter‑state sale of natural rubber and tread rubber under the KVAT and CST regimes. The core issue is the interplay of three government notifications under Section 8 of the CST Act, 1956: the first notification exempted CST on inter‑state turnover to the extent tax on such goods had already been paid under the KVAT Act; the second notification, issued later, restricted the exemption to sub‑section (1) of Section 8; and the third notification introduced an option for dealers to pay tax under CST. The Tribunal upheld remand to the Assessing Authority to decide relief consistent with these notifications, and the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) had also remanded the matter. The State contends the first notification should prevail and that the dealer cannot derive a double exemption; the dealer’s advocates argue that the second notification correctly limited exemptions and that the dealer may elect between exemption and tax payment under the third notification. The court cites Hi‑Tek Traders v. Commercial Tax Officer and agrees the second notification fixes the defect in the first, with the Tribunal’s remand justified. Ultimately, the court confirms the remand and directs the Assessing Officer to decide relief in light of all three notifications. Revisions are dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Bail Application No.4975 of 2024 Anupama Padmakumar, the third accused in Crime No.1596/2023 of Pooyappally Police Station, Kollam, seeks bail under Section 439 CrPC. The prosecution alleges a grave conspiracy to kidnap a minor for ransom by three family members (husband, wife and daughter). On 27.11.2023, the accused allegedly abducted CW No.2, a six-year-old girl, near her home, confined her at their residence, and communicated a ransom demand before abandoning her at Asramam ground, after which the child was recovered; the car used allegedly had a fake number plate; a notebook recovered in the course of investigation is said to show planning; CCTV footage and the victim’s statement are argued to substantiate involvement. Annexure-2 final report was laid on 29.01.2024; the petitioner has been in judicial custody since 02.12.2023, over seven months. The petitioner contends innocence, arguing that the overt acts are attributed to her parents, not to her; the identification parade was claimed to be flawed; she is a 22-year-old student with no criminal antecedents. She relies on Supreme Court bail jurisprudence that emphasizes that bail is not punishment and that the end of the trial must be reached fairly. The State strong opposed bail, characterizing her as a mastermind, and citing the notebook and CCTV as indicia of mens rea. The court, applying the guideline in Satender Antil and other decisions, finds that though the offences are serious, there is no immediate need for continued detention and grants bail with conditions.
This is a Kerala High Court criminal miscellaneous case under Section 482 Cr.P.C. concerning Crime No.584/2020 of Vadakkencherry Police Station, Palakkad, and its continuation in S.C. No.655/2020 before the Fast Track Special Court, Pattambi. The petitioner, accused of offences under IPC Sections 450 and 376(1) and under the POCSO Act (Section 4(i) r/w Sections 3(a) and 6(i) r/w 5(j)(ii)), seeks to quash the pending proceedings. The prosecution alleges that the petitioner, while in a relationship with a minor, engaged in sexual acts; later, the victim attained majority and the couple married on 23.12.2021, now living together with their child. The petitioner contends that the proceedings should be quashed in the interests of justice since the parties subsequently married and are living as husband and wife, arguing that continuing proceedings would be contrary to the victim’s welfare. The court canvasses a line of precedents—starting with Vishnu v. State of Kerala and various Supreme Court and High Court decisions—holding that, in exceptional circumstances where a marriage has occurred and the settlement promotes family welfare, the High Court can exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash non‑compoundable offences, provided the compromise is voluntary and not a device to escape punishment. After hearing the parties, the court concludes that continuing the proceedings would not serve public interest and quashes the proceedings against the petitioner in SC 655/2020, illustrating the flexible, justice‑oriented use of 482 powers in protecting the victim and child’s welfare while preventing undue harassment.
The Kerala High Court, in a writ petition filed by Hillwood Home Work, challenges the applicability of the Kerala Head Load Workers Act to its Edappally showroom, arguing the establishment is a display showroom and does not involve headload duties. The petitioner asserts that the furniture displayed is sourced from its Feroke workshop and is used solely for display, with loading and unloading being casual, occasional activities not triggering the Act’s item No.5. It relies on a pronouncement by a larger Bench in Teresa Jose v. Sub Inspector of Police (2015 KLT 485) to contend that the premises fall outside the schedule’s item 5. Respondents contend the area is a scheme-covered zone where loading/unloading must be performed by registered headload workers, and that the petitioner lacks registered workers. The DLO had not received a dispute from either side. The court noted the dispute as to the establishment’s nature and, acknowledging the possibility of Section 21 disputes, disposed of the petition with a direction for police protection against any unlawful obstruction by the union or those claiming through it. The merits of the establishment’s classification are left to be decided in appropriate proceedings, not in this writ petition.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 987 OF 2011 This Kerala High Court Criminal Revision Petition challenges the concurrent convictions of four accused persons for offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 323 and 324 read with Section 149 IPC, arising from a 3 March 2002 incident at Thalassery. The trial court found them guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment, with a maximum term of 18 months for the 324 IPC offense, all to run concurrently. The appellate court confirmed the conviction and sentence, and the revision petition was filed seeking relief under the court’s inherent power to quash proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in light of a settlement between the petitioners and respondents 2 and 3. Affidavits from respondents 2 and 3 indicated willingness to settle, and the State indicated no objection to compounding. The court traverses the evolving jurisprudence on quashing criminal proceedings in cases of compoundable offences, citing Soban v. State of Kerala and Supreme Court precedents including Joshi v. State of Haryana, Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, Bitan Sen Gupta, and Renjith v. State of Kerala, to emphasize that, where ends of justice and prevention of abuse of process demand, Section 482 CrPC can permit quashing even after conviction, provided the offence is not categorically prohibited from being quashed. Ultimately, the court allows the revision, setting aside the conviction and sentence, quashing final reports, and cancelling bail bonds, in the interests of harmony and justice.
Oceanus Estates India (P) Ltd, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, petitions under AR 38/2020 for reference of disputes arising from a 2009 contract for a multistoried building at Alappuzha to arbitration. Annexure I sets the contract terms, and Annexure II lists disputes the petitioner claims remain unresolved due to total non-cooperation by the respondents. Clause 61 purportedly requires disputes to be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, with a sole arbitrator to be appointed by the respondent bank. The petitioner contends that despite Annexure II, the respondents have not engaged substantively, and the dispute should be referred to arbitration. The respondents, however, assert that the CAPE report indicates the disputes have been amicably settled and have forwarded Annexure II to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, with a Board decision anticipated based on CAPE’s findings. The court examines whether arbitration is mandated and whether the clause can be disregarded in light of Perkins Eastman Architects DPC & another v. HSCC (India) Limited (AIR 2020 SC 59). It ultimately holds that while clause 61 contemplates arbitration, Perkins Eastman prevents a party from appointing or nominating an arbitrator. Accordingly, the court allows the arbitration, appoints Justice C.N.Ramachandran Nair as sole arbitrator with seat in Kochi, orders disclosure under the Arbitration Act, and fixes an appearance date, thus initiating arbitration while retaining the parties’ consent to Kochi as the seat.