RCREV. Nos. 60, 61 & 62 of 2018 These Rent Control revisions under Section 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 challenge the common judgment dated 21.06.2016 in RCA Nos. 73/2009, 74/2009 and 75/2009 (RCAA, Thalassery) against the order dated 07.03.2009 in RCP Nos. 25/2008, 26/2008 and 27/2008 (RCC, Taliparamba). The revision petitioners, tenants by status, contend that Ext. B1 (the 1995 lease/development agreement) evidence supports a permanent tenancy over the premises and thus eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(ii) is unwarranted. The RCC had found the permanent tenancy claim bona fide, while the RCAA reversed, holding the tenancy claim not bona fide and remanding for adjudication on eviction. The revision petitions argue illegality in those findings and urge relief on the basis of the second proviso to Section 11(1) and related registration requirements. The Respondents-landlords emphasize that Ext. B1 is an unregistered document, cannot establish a perpetual lease, and can only serve as collateral evidence; reliance on Registration Act s.17(1)(d) and s.49, and Transfer of Property Act s.107 is argued to bar a perpetual tenancy. The High Court ultimately holds Ext. B1 insufficient to establish a perpetual tenancy, sustains the RCAA’s conclusion, and directs the RCC to decide eviction within one month, dismissing the revisions.
RP 458/2022 in RSA 644/2021 This is a review petition filed by defendants 1 to 4 and 6 against the judgment in R.S.A. No.644/2021 (dated 25.10.2021) which upheld a decree in O.S. No.256/2011, and the subsequent appeals, directing eviction from the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff purchased the property from defendants 9 and 10 and sought eviction of defendants 1 to 6 who were residing in the house, asserting that the sale required them to vacate and that compensation and a permanent injunction should issue. The trial court held that the plaintiff had ownership and possession and that defendants 8 to 10 vacated the house by 31.08.2010; it also held that defendants 1 to 6 occupied the house with only a permissive, gratuitous occupation without title or lease. The first appellate court affirmed, concluding that the defendants were in permissive occupation, not tenants or licensees, and that a suit for mandatory injunction was maintainable. The High Court, in reviewing the petition, relied on established review principles (notably Kamlesh Verma and precedents) and found no error apparent on the face of the record, dismissing the review petition. It emphasized that gratuitous occupancy does not confer title and that the court's discretionary relief can be exercised to prevent breach. The petition was therefore dismissed.
This Original Petition under Article 227 challenges Ext.P6, the Family Court's order in IA 5 of 2022 in OP 840 of 2020, whereby interim custody of Aron S. Abraham (14) was not granted to the father. The petitioner, Abraham Joseph Samuel, contends that the child's education prospects and the opportunity to relocate to Bangalore justify custody in his favour, given the child’s academic brilliance and the potential for better schooling and future prospects there. The respondent, Shamarin Abraham Joseph, currently residing with the child in Thrissur, argues that the child is well settled at Bharatheeya Vidya Mandir, Thrissur, and that stability, continuity of education, and proximity to maternal support are essential for the child’s welfare. The Family Court, after counselling and interaction with the family and a counsellor’s report, declined interim custody to the petitioner, allowing only limited interaction and the possibility of vacation custody. The petitioner urges relying on Hirosh Joseph v. Tina Kalayil to emphasize the weight of the child’s preferences and future prospects, while the respondent emphasizes the best interests and welfare of the child. Citing Rohith Thammana Gowda v. State of Karnataka, the judgment clarifies that the child’s wishes are relevant but not determinative, and welfare must prevail. The High Court finds no illegality in the Family Court’s order and dismisses the petition, while leaving room for future custody considerations during vacations.
W.P.(C) Nos.23186 of 2022 & connected cases These writ petitions challenge Government Order GO(MS.) No.121/2022/G.Edn dated 7 July 2022 and the Plus One admission prospectus for 2022-23, which fix the management quota in Private Aided Higher Secondary Schools at 20% and introduce a 10% community quota allocated to the community of the management. Petitioners (Managers of Private Aided Higher Secondary Schools) contend that the 10% community quota and its implementation breach Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution and violate Kerala Education Rules, particularly Chapter VI Rule 11; they also argue there is no vested right to a 30% management quota. Respondents defend the policy as a reasonable executive decision to curb malpractices, promote merit via CAP (Centralized Allotment Process), and harmonize quotas across government and aided schools, citing older orders (1991, 1999–2005) and judicial pronouncements on policy review. On 27 July 2022, the Court (Single Judge) held that GO’s 20% management quota is permissible, but struck down the 10% community quota as arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 15. The 10% seats must be treated as open merit seats and allotted through CAP. Admissions already made under the declaration are not to be disturbed. The petitions are disposed of accordingly; the 20% management quota remains, with 30% open merit via CAP for the remainder.
The Kerala High Court, sitting in a Criminal Miscellaneous Case under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the prosecution in CC 564/2018 arising from Crime 896/2009 registered at Cheranalloor Police Station. The four petitioners, Binu, Jithin (also styled as Kannan), Deepu, and Sanu, faced offences under Sections 323 and 325 read with Section 34 IPC. The alleged offences were committed during a dispute involving injuries to the victims; one of the injured persons died after recording evidence, and the current submission is that the dispute has been settled by the legal heirs of the deceased and other injured parties. The petitioners, represented by counsel, argued that the parties have resolved the entire dispute and do not wish to pursue prosecution; affidavits from victims in support of settlement were produced. The Public Prosecutor acknowledged settlement but expressed reservations about quashing solely on this basis, though not opposed to quashing given the settlement. The court relied on Supreme Court authorities, particularly State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and Others, 2019 (5) SCC 688, which holds that CrPC Section 482 power can quash non-compoundable offences in private disputes once settled, with caveats for heinous offences or offences under special statutes, and after evaluating the antecedents of the accused. Applying these principles, the court found the dispute private in nature, accepted the settlement, and quashed the proceedings. The order emphasizes assessing circumstances such as antecedents and conduct before exercising power under 482 CrPC.
RP 821/2022 (OP(CAT) 102/2020) This is a Review Petition filed under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC by Union of India and others challenging the High Court of Kerala’s judgment in OP(CAT) No.102 of 2020. The matter traces the path from the Kerala High Court’s 8.4.2021 decision in WA No.133/2021 (and related proceedings) through special leave petitions before the Supreme Court, which on 28.3.2022 declined to grant leave and dismissed the SLPs. The Supreme Court’s dismissal was cited by this Court in RP 503/2021 as part of the jurisprudence on entertainability of reviews after a SLP dismissal. The present Bench reiterates that, following Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries, the review petition is not maintainable where the SLP has been disposed of, and where no liberty to file a review petition was reserved. It also cites the doctrine that orders refusing leave may be either speaking or non-speaking and, depending on circumstances, merger may or may not apply. The Court ultimately holds that the review petition filed by the Union of India and others is not maintainable and is dismissed, emphasizing the principles of repose and judicial discipline in finalizing litigation.
The appellant Sebastian, 2nd defendant in O.S.836 of 2011 before the First Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam, challenges an order dated 05 March 2016 in I.A.5350 of 2015, which dismissed his application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC to set aside an ex parte decree in a partition suit brought by respondents Margaret Mary alias Beena and Elizabeth alias Seena (plaintiffs) and Charlose alias Charly (3rd defendant). The suit had earlier produced two ex parte decrees against him; one decree was set aside by IA 1563 of 2015, but another ex parte decree was issued on 17 November 2015. The appellant contends IA 5350/2015 was filed within the statutory period and should have been allowed to enable him to participate in proceedings. The respondents contend that, given the second ex parte proceedings against him, the Sub Court rightly refused relief, and point to ongoing final decree proceedings in which an advocate commissioner has been appointed. The Kerala High Court, applying liberal construction of “sufficient cause” to do complete justice, cites G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada, Peeves Enterprises v. Muhammed Ashraf, and Shivananda M. v. M. Susheela to hold that where absence was not mala fide and the application is timely, relief should be granted subject to costs. The appeal is allowed, the 2016 order set aside with Rs.15,000 costs, the ex parte decree set aside upon payment, and the Sub Court directed to proceed with the suit expeditiously, with appearance fixed for 15.06.2023.
Tr.P(C) Nos.430, 442, 443 & 450/2022 This is a common order of the Kerala High Court, Ernakulam, disposing of four Transfer Petitions (Civil) under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, filed in relation to matrimonial proceedings between Sruthi Thereeshia George and Bobby Joseph. The petitions seek to transfer O.P. Nos. 643/2020, 721/2020, 722/2020 and 723/2020 from the Family Court, Malappuram to the Family Court, Kozhikode, so that related matters including maintenance, divorce, restitution of conjugal rights and/or other ancillary relief including a custody dispute can be consolidated and heard at a single forum. The petitioner-wife resides in Kozhikode and alleges practical difficulties in traveling to Malappuram; a child (in some petitions represented by the mother) also resides in the Kozhikode jurisdiction. A parallel custody proceeding, O.P. No. 702/2022, has been filed by the respondent in Kozhikode, further contextualizing the welfare considerations. The court relies on Supreme Court authorities that transfer should be guided by the convenience of the wife and child and that consolidation serves efficiency and consistency. Exercising its discretionary power under Section 24 CPC, the Court allows the transfers to Kozhikode, directing records be transmitted and permitting consolidation/joint trial.
The Nediyirippu Service Co-operative Bank, Kondotty, challenged Ext.P7, a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies order directing payment of gratuity to the bank's former employee (the 5th respondent). The bank argued lack of jurisdiction and that Ext.P7 improperly enabled recovery of gratuity beyond liability and without an adjudicated liability. The 5th respondent contended Ext.P7 was illegal since larger gratuity amounts were paid to the plaintiff under the Group Gratuity Scheme, and argued that any liability must be adjudicated before deductions. The Government Pleader submitted Ext.P7 merely allowed recovery of amounts due and did not mandate payment beyond adjudged sums. The court relied on established High Court authority: Chandrasekharan Nair.G & others v. Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. & others (2017) and Jayarajan v. Kozhikode Co-operative Bank (2019), which hold that employees are entitled to higher gratuity benefits under a Group Gratuity Scheme and that additional amounts cannot be retained by the Bank absent adjudicated liability. In light of these precedents, the court concluded that only amounts adjudged as liability may be retained; the balance must be paid, even if it exceeds a statutory cap. Accordingly, Ext.P7 was set aside and directions issued to pay the eligible gratuity within four months, with liberty to approach an Arbitrator to quantify liability.
This writ petition (WP(C) No. 27341 of 2022) filed in the Kerala High Court seeks relief against taxation and records alteration for land in Kannadi-1, Palakkad. The petitioner contends that the land was converted to non-agricultural use under a pre-1967 order issued under the Kerala Land Utilisation Order (KLU Order) and that the land has long been fallow with no irrigation. She argues that the land is not paddy land and that its exclusion from the Data Bank and prior conversion order obviate the need to pursue the more onerous procedures under the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (2008 Act), specifically the proviso to Section 27A(3) and related rules. Relying on Iype Varghese v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Idukki and Others (2020) 5 KLT 403, she contends that once a conversion order exists, reassessment of Basic Tax and entry changes should be permitted without re-running the entire 2008 Act process. The Government Pleader counters that the predecessor’s application under Clause 6(2) of the KLU Order was considered under the Jayakrishnan framework, which requires determination of whether the land is paddy land or wetland before invoking Act 28 of 2008 or the LOU. The High Court ultimately holds that Ext.P2 has the force of an order under the proviso to Section 27A(3) of the 2008 Act and directs the 2nd respondent to process the petitioner’s Form-A (Ext.P6) for Basic Tax fixation within two months, disposing of the petition in the petitioner’s favor.
WP(C).No. 37639 of 2010 (D) & WP(C).No. 18179 of 2011 This is a Kerala High Court writ petition challenging the disciplinary actions taken against a teacher of an aided school (the petitioner, P. Radhakrishnan, then Head Master of Narikatteri LVLP School). The core dispute concerns the power of educational authorities to initiate and complete disciplinary proceedings against teachers and the necessity of intimating and involving the manager before proceeding under Rule 75A of Chapter XIV A KER and related provisions. The petitioner faced a charge framed by the Assistant Educational Officer (AEO) for allegedly fabricating a bank receipt to obtain excess salary; after initial notices and replies, a charge memo was issued by the Manager and eventually led to proceedings that culminated in a punishment of permanent reversion from the post of Manager (head of the school) upon consideration of the manager’s findings, and subsequent enhanced punishment on appeal to the Director of Public Instruction (DPI) and Government. The petitioner contends that the disciplinary process violated natural justice and essential procedural requirements, arguing that the Manager did not properly initiate, conduct, or complete a formal enquiry as mandated by Rule 75 of Chapter XIV A KER and that there was no valid basis to enhance the punishment. The learned Judge found that the procedures prescribed in Rule 75 and Rule 75A were not followed in full, and that a major penalty could not be imposed without proper due process, per Seetharam Upper Primary School v. State of Kerala. The Court quashed the challenged orders (Exhibits P15, P19, P21 and P24) and directed fresh, formal procedures in accordance with law, with a four-month timeline for compliance.”
This is an appeal under Order XXXIII, Rule 1(c) CPC, challenging an order of the Sub Court, Kottarakkara dated 15.07.2015 in I.A. Nos.1411 and 1412 of 2014 in A.S. No.126 of 2004, which dismissed readmission applications for the appeal that had been dismissed for default. The appellant, C. L. John S/o Levi, had filed O.S. No.439 of 2001 before the Munsiff’s Court, Punalur, seeking a declaration and related reliefs; the suit was dismissed on 28.05.2004. He challenged that decree by filing A.S.No.126 of 2004, which was later dismissed for default on 28.06.2014. The interlocutory applications for readmission, filed on grounds of medical treatment for rheumatic illness and distance from court, were opposed by the respondents. The Sub Court did not find sufficient cause to condone the delay. The High Court, noting statutory provisions and the liberal principles laid down by Katiji and refined by Esha Bhattacharjee, examined whether the considerable delay (418 days) could be excused in the interests of substantial justice. The court observed that the delay was not merely technical and that the respondents faced inconvenience if the appeal remained dismissed. Ultimately, the High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Sub Court’s order on payment of Rs. 2,500 as costs, directed deposit within three weeks, and ordered readmission of the appeal with a mandate to dispose of it within three months of appearance of both parties. The decision embodies a balanced, justice-oriented approach to condonation of delay.
This Regular Second Appeal challenges a partition decree arising from a suit filed by Elizabeth Pious (plaintiff) and Princy (second defendant) seeking a partition of plaint schedule property left by their father Pious Sebastian. The property originally belonged to Pious Sebastian and was assigned in 1988; after his death in 2004, the plaintiff claimed a one-third share and mesne profits from a building on the schedule property, the building having been rented to the third defendant. The trial court held that the first defendant, guardian of the plaintiff and power of attorney for the second defendant, transferred the property to the third defendant and that such transfer was voidable rather than void; it allowed partition and fixation of shares. The first appellate court affirmed, upholding the partition and the plaintiff’s entitlement to 1/3 share upon payment of court fee and mesne profits to the third defendant. The appellant argues the transfer was bonafide and binding; that a natural guardian’s sale does not require sanction under Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act; and that the suit for partition cannot proceed without a prayer to set aside Ext.B1. The respondents contend the transfer was not for the minor’s welfare, lacked court sanction, and should be set aside. The High Court deliberates on HM&G Act provisions (Sections 28–30), the Guardians and Wards Act, and jurisprudence (Soosa Anthony Decosta Nicholos Decosta; Jince Mary Johns; Ramadas Menon; Vishwambhar; Patil Exhibitors; Veevi Ummal) to determine whether relief can be moulded. It ultimately holds that the lower courts erred, sets aside their judgments, allows the Regular Second Appeal, and dismisses the suit with no costs remedy.
The petitioner, Sheeba Elgin, served as Head of School Assistant (English) in various schools under the 4th respondent Corporate Manager, initially on leave vacancies and later in regular posts. She challenges the refusal of the District Education Officer to reckon her broken service in leave vacancies for purposes of declaring probation and refixing the time-bound higher grade with effect from 10 November 2014. The facts trace multiple appointments from June 2007 through 2009, including leave vacancy placements, relief postings, and subsequent reaffirmations of appointment. The Corporate Manager initially declared the petitioner’s probation in 2009 and sanctioned a time-bound higher grade from 2015, but later re-declared the period from 2008, counting a broken service of about one year and three days. The petitioner sought re-declaration and refixation, arguing that broken service should be counted for probation and for increments under the relevant Kerala Education Rules (KER). The 3rd respondent directed reconsideration after Ext.P7 and Ext.P8 and the Government Order GO P 145/2019/FIN dated 31 October 2019 was invoked to argue limitation. The court surveys decisions allowing counting of broken service for probation and increments (Kadeeja A., Ushakumari, and W.P.(C) No.351/2018) and holds that broken periods can be reckoned for time-bound higher grade. It finds GO 145/2019 cannot operate retroactively and allows the petition, quashing Ext.P7 and Ext.P8, directing sanction of the higher grade from 10.11.2014 and payment of consequential benefits.
This appeal arises from an ex parte decree in O.S. No.118/2017 before the I Additional Sub Court, Kozhikode, for recovery of ₹90 lakhs with interest. The defendant, Mohammed Shameer, was abroad during the relevant period, and summons was served by substituted service under Order V after the process server reported the defendant’s absence. The suit was decreed on 09.03.2018 in the plaintiff’s favor. The appellant moved I.A.1325/2019 and I.A.1326/2019 seeking to condone delay and set aside the ex parte decree; these applications were dismissed by a common order on 02.08.2019. The High Court stayed execution proceedings from 26.08.2019 and, during arguments on 03.12.2021, inquired whether the respondent was an income tax assessee (ultimately clarified as not an assessee). The core dispute concerns service of summons: the appellant contends substituted service did not satisfy Order V, Rule 20 (and Rule 15), since he was abroad and the affidavit/attestation of affixture by his mother was unreliable; he asserts the newspaper publication in Pradeepam had insufficient local circulation. The respondent argues the process server’s report, affixture, and publication sufficed, and the defendant had actual knowledge. Relying on Auto Cars v. Trimurti Cargo Movers Pvt. Ltd. (2018) 15 SCC 166, the court emphasizes the threefold object of summons. It ultimately holds there was no due service, allows condonation of delay, and sets aside the ex parte decree, restoring O.S. No.118/2017 with directions to reappear on 14.02.2022.
This High Court of Kerala decision deals with a criminal miscellaneous petition (Crl.M.C. No. 8834 of 2019) filed by the accused, Kanakam, seeking to quash proceedings in Crime No. 15/2019 of Vanitha Police Station, Kozhikode, for offences under IPC sections 353 and 294(b). The de facto complainant, Nisha P.N., who is the confidential assistant to Kozhikode Corporation Secretary, alleged that the petitioner visited the corporation office to meet the Secretary and, on those occasions, used abusive words against her, obstructed her official duties, and on 20.11.2019 at 1:30 pm, trespassed into the corporation office and abused her. The petitioner contends that even if all allegations are true, no offence under 353 (assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of duty) or 294(b) (obscene words in a public place) is attracted, and the case should be quashed under the inherent powers of this Court (Section 482 Cr.P.C.). The respondents argue that the allegations satisfy the ingredients of both offences and that the High Court should not interfere. The court carefully examines the statutory ingredients: 353 requires assault or use of criminal force to deter a public servant; the absence of such elements leads to no offence. For 294(b), obscene words in a public place causing annoyance must be proven; the office inside a corporation is not a public place, and the words do not appear to arouse sexual thoughts. The judge concludes that neither offence is attracted, and quashes all further proceedings; Crl.M.C is allowed.
The Kerala High Court, in OP(KAT) 167/2021, heard by a Division Bench comprising C. T. Ravikumar and Murali Purushothaman, deals with the State's challenge to the Kerala Administrative Tribunal's order in TA 3792/2012. The original applicant, Shyni Eapen, a casual sweeper in Krishi Bhavan, Thalavady, was engaged since November 1994 and sought regularization under the Government Order Ext. P4 (G.O. 501/2005 Fin), following Mercy v. State of Kerala. Ext. P2 certified a sweeping area of 106.12 sq m, making her eligible for a regular post of Part-Time Sweeper and regularization along with pay protection. The Tribunal found Ext. P4 applicable and directed regularization, arrears, and fixation of pay; it held that later G.O. 378/2008 (Fin) was prospective and could not deprive the applicant of the benefit. The Government argued that the later clarification excluded certain areas from the measurement, producing a 58.02 sq m figure, and that Ext. P4 could not override changes. The government contended the Tribunal erred in giving relief. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's approach, holding Ext. P4 applicable to employees on its date of issue; it rejected the challenge and dismissed the petition, while directing the government to finalize regularization within two months and to pay arrears within two months thereafter.
W.P.(C) Nos.38632, 38633 & 37030 of 2018 Three writ petitions filed by teachers of High School Pengamukku challenge a staff-fixation revision order issued by the Deputy Director of Education, Thrissur, based on audit objections raised by the Accountant General for the years 2007-2008 to 2009-2010. The petitioners contend that the impugned revision, premised on audit objections, cannot be sustained under law in view of established rulings (Usuvathunnisa v. Asst. Educational Officer and Somanatha Panicker v. State of Kerala) and the principle from Aleyamma v. Deputy Director that orders of competent authorities deserve deference unless vitiated by fraud or third-party interests. They further argue that the original staff fixation orders were acted upon and a retroactive revocation would disrupt service and salary payments, contravening Chapter XXIII of the Kerala Education Rules (KER). The counter-affidavits explain that audit findings disclosed bogus admissions and irregular student roll reporting, suggesting excess staff and recoverable salaries if revisions are made. The court, applying the cited precedents and the KER framework, holds that audit objections cannot automatically nullify fixed staff orders and that corrective action must follow through the statutory channels (appeal/revision). Consequently, the petitions are allowed, the impugned orders are quashed, and the petitioners are to receive due salaries/benefits within three months.
This is a matrimonial appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging an ex parte decree passed in OP No.117 of 2014 by the Family Court, Chavara. Shibu, the appellant in the Mat.Appeal No.5 of 2020, seeks to set aside the ex parte decree dated 30.10.2015 and condone a delay of 828 days in filing I.A. Nos.240 and 241 of 2018. The Family Court had dismissed these applications on 29.10.2018. The respondent-wife, Sreevidhya, and the 2nd respondent Vijayamma had participated in mediation but remained ex parte for the decree. The appellant explained that he had to go abroad for employment and his mother, who was his co-defendant, could not obtain timely information from the lawyer; she fell ill, and only upon notice of EP No.48 of 2017 did he learn of the decree and move the applications. The court surveys precedents on condonation of delay, including Katiji and Esha Bhattacharjee, emphasizing a liberal yet reasonable approach, balancing prejudice and substantial justice. The Division Bench holds that the delay is excusable and condonable with costs, directs restoration of OP 117/2014, and orders disposal within three months, subject to a Rs.2,000 cost payment to the respondent.
This original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenges an order dated 11.10.2022 in I.A. No.3/2022 in O.S. No.1356/2019, pending before the 1st Additional Munsiff, Ernakulam. The petitioner, Thykoodam Edavaka Christeeya Sangam, seeks permanent prohibitory injunction against eviction from the plaint schedule property and restoration of electrical connection (Consumer No.1155560000939). Respondents include St. Raphael's Church, Thykoodam, Vyttila, and the Kerala State Electricity Board Limited. The sequence of events began with threats of demolition of the school building and escalated to alleged destruction of the plaint schedule property by henchmen of the 1st respondent, followed by disconnection of electricity. I.A.7632/2019 sought interim prohibitory relief; I.A.9146/2019 and I.A.3/2022 sought amendments to pleadings and reliefs. The trial court dismissed the amendment as changing the character of the suit, prompting the present challenge under Article 227. The High Court discusses amendment principles under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, citing Life Insurance Corporation v. Sanjeev Builders (distinguished) and Muhd. Sultan Wani ( Positive mention) to analyze whether amendments are permissible and whether reliefs can be revised in light of changed circumstances. Ultimately, the petition is dismissed and the impugned order sustained, holding the amendments infructuous and refusing to restore the demolished property.