The petitioner, Sukumaran K.N., who joined the Kerala Gramin Bank in 1982, sought to treat his resignation as retirement and to secure pension benefits under the Kerala Gramin Bank (Employees) Pension Regulations, 2018. After submitting Ext.P1 (20.04.2016) requesting resignation and Ext.P2 (30.05.2016) seeking retirement under Clause 11, the petitioner was relieved on 09.08.2016. He later sought pension under the 2018 Regulations (Ext.P8) but Ext.P5 (2019) and Ext.P7 (2020) rejected his claim. The core issues were whether Ext.P1 constituted a resignation, whether his case could be treated as retirement under Regulation 11 of the Service Regulations, and whether the 2018 Pension Regulations could apply to his earlier service. The Bank contended the petitioner’s request was a voluntary resignation and not retirement, arguing Regulation 11 vests power to retire only in the Chairman based on a Special Review Committee, and requires 55 years of age or 30 years of service; additionally, the Pension Regulations apply only to those who retired after 1-4-2018, with voluntary retirement and premature retirement defined therein. The petitioner relied on cases such as Shashikala Devi, Asger Ibrahim Amin, and Kunnath Chandrasekharan to argue for treating resignation as retirement. The Court ultimately dismissed the petition, holding that Ext.P1 was a notice of resignation and that the 2018 Pension Regulations could not retroactively convert pre-2018 resignation into retirement; the judgment left open the possibility of pursuing Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 before the respondents, and recorded that delay in filing and the absence of a pension scheme at the relevant time weighed against the petitioner.
This High Court of Kerala, in a Criminal Misc Case under Section 482 CrPC, examines quashing of proceedings in S.T. No. 536/2020 before the Grama Nyayalaya, Vadavucode, Kolenchery. The accused (petitioners) faced offences under IPC Sections 143, 147, 341, 447, 294(b), 506 read with Section 149. The petition asserts an amicable settlement between the parties, supported by affidavits (Annexures A3–A6), and seeks to terminate the criminal proceedings in the interest of peace and justice. The investigating officer was asked to verify genuineness of the settlement and any prior criminal antecedents. The Public Prosecutor, while acknowledging no ongoing grievances, raised reservations about quashing non-compoundable offences purely on settlement. The court recalls Supreme Court precedent from a series of decisions, notably State of MP v. Laxmi Narayan and the accompanying line of cases (Gian Singh; Narinder Singh; State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat; Deepak; Manish; Ramesh Kamath; Rajveer Singh; Parbatbhai Aahir; Kalyan Singh; Dhruv Gurjar), to outline the governing principles: quashing is permissible when non-compoundable offences that are private in nature are settled, but not for heinous or public-interest offences or certain statutory offences. After weighing gravity, injury, and antecedents, the court finds the settlement genuine and in the ends of justice, and accordingly quashes Annexure-A2 Final Report and all further proceedings in S.T. No. 536/2020.
This intra-court writ appeal challenges Ext. P-15, dated 14.02.2018, issued by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (Kottayam), rescinding the appointments of the appellants as Attenders in the Kanjirappally Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. The impugned order followed Exts. P-3 and P-4, whereby the appellants were appointed to Attender posts in 2016 from Ext. P-1 rank list (29.06.2013). The selection process and the rank list had a limited two-year validity (as per Ext. R-3(a)); the bank intermittently extended the rank list by one year, and the two sanctioned posts were said to be exhausted by the time the appellants were appointed. The Joint Registrar invoked Rule 176 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules to rescind the resolutions of the bank on grounds of illegality and ultra vires actions — including appointments to non-sanctioned posts and beyond vacancies. The learned Single Judge dismissed WP(C) 6166/2018, holding the Joint Registrar had jurisdiction under Rule 176. The appellants contend lack of jurisdiction and violations of natural justice. The High Court, after surveying authorities on the scope of Rule 176 and the interplay with Section 69 of the KCS Act, upholds Rule 176 power, distinguishes contrary precedents, and ultimately dismisses the WA, upholding Ext. P-15 and the termination of services. The court emphasizes that direct-recruitment irregularities are not adjudicated under Section 69 but can be tackled via Rule 176, with fair hearing where applicable.
The Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 638 of 2009) before the Kerala High Court challenges the trial court’s decree in OS 439/2007 for specific performance of Ext.A2 and setting aside Ext.A9. Ext.A2 (dated 30.03.2006) contemplated sale of 13.19 ares for a total of 15 lakhs, with 13 lakhs paid as advance. The first defendant executed Ext.A2, while Ext.A9 purportedly conveyed the property to the second defendant. The trial court found Ext.A2 genuine and that the second defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of Ext.A2, thus denying specific performance and ordering return of the advance. The appellant contends for specific performance, arguing the agreement was executed by the plaintiff through his power of attorney holder, Anil Kumar; the entire transaction occurred abroad, and the plaintiff has demonstrated readiness and willingness. The court notes that the power of attorney holder was later replaced by Mariamma Alex as per an order dated 02/02/2023. The State of law requires personal proof of readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, but in cases where the entire transaction is managed by an attorney, the attorney’s evidence may suffice. Relying on Man Kaur (2010) 2010 (10) SCC 512, the High Court held that the attorney holder can speak to the principal’s readiness and willingness when the entire deal was handled by him. The appeal is allowed: specific performance is granted, with deposit of the balance sale consideration within one month, and an obligation on the defendants to execute a sale deed and pay costs.
OP(KAT) Nos.380-385 of 2022 This common judgment addresses six Original Petitions (OP(KAT) Nos.380-385 of 2022) challenging a common interim order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal (O.A. Nos.1601/2022 etc.) dated 16.11.2022. The core dispute concerns a Kerala Public Service Commission (PSC) notification dated 29.07.2022 issuing an eligibility list for the category of Sub Inspector of Police (Trainee) in respect of the main examination notified on 30.12.2019, with the main examination scheduled for 22.11.2022. The petitioners contended that the Tribunal’s interim order, which deferred the main examination, violated the notification terms and that those who responded to the notification were entitled to participate in the physical/mains process; they sought provisional participation for themselves and others similarly situated. The Tribunal, while considering the interim prayer, held that extending provisional appearance to all similarly placed candidates was impractical, and thus deferred the examination. The High Court, however, balanced convenience and hardship, noting potential prejudice to candidates who were provisionally found eligible and yet faced delays. It held that, in the circumstances, the PSC should be allowed to proceed with the main examination, scheduled for 22.11.2022, but that such conduct would be subject to the Tribunal’s final orders in the pending original applications. Pleadings should be completed within three months, and no finding on merits was made. The bench comprises Justices A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar and Mohammed Nias C.P. The judgment disposes of the petitions while preserving the merits for later adjudication.
This First Appeal from Order challenges an ex parte partition decree in O.S.No.32 of 2001 before the Sub Court, Sulthan Bathery. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 sought a partition; the suit was decreed ex parte on 28.03.2011, with 2/10 share to them and the remaining shares allotted to other defendants. The appellant, the 4th defendant, filed I.A Nos.508 and 509 of 2012 seeking to set aside the ex parte decree and to condone a delay of 333 days. The Sub Court rejected both applications, holding no sufficient cause and noting appellant’s non-appearance on 28.03.2011 and 04.03.2011. The appellant contends illness, supported by Ext.A1 (medical certificate dated 25.03.2012), and that the treating doctor was unavailable for examination. The respondents counter that the appellant had earlier been ex parte and failed to pay costs, pointing to a pattern of lethargy and lack of bona fides. The High Court, applying Supreme Court precedents on liberal condonation of delay, recognized that “sufficient cause” is elastic but not unfettered and distinguished between inordinate delay and short delay. It found the 333-day delay inordinate and prejudicial to respondents, and, considering conduct and chronology, refused to interfere with the Sub Court’s order. The appeal was dismissed. A final decree followed on 09.12.2016, and subsequent sales are noted in the record.
This High Court of Kerala, in a consolidated matter comprising WP(C) Nos. 25878/2022 (KSRTC-SWIFT Ltd. petition) and 26484/2022 (KSRTC petition), disposed of a challenge to an Industrial Tribunal’s order permitting impleadment of a third party. The Union KSRTC Workers Federation filed a petition under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act concerning irregularities in regularization of empanelled employees, while KSRTC objected to the proposed impleadment of KSRTC-SWIFT Ltd in the earlier reference. The matter revolves around the special nature of KSRTC’s operations, long-standing regularization claims, and the legality of adding KSRTC-SWIFT Ltd as a party given its status as a separate SPV created for fleet operations. The court reaffirmed that the crucial question in an impleadment application is whether the proposed party is a necessary or proper party to decide the lis, citing Globe Ground India Employees Union v. Lufthansa German Airlines (2019) and emphasizing careful scrutiny of the lis. It held that KSRTC is neither a necessary nor a proper party to adjudicate the dispute, and the Labour Court’s impleadment order was illegal and perverse. Accordingly, the writ petitions were allowed, and the impugned order set aside, clarifying the scope of third-party impleadment in industrial disputes.
WA No. 34 of 2021 & WA No. 1365 of 2020 This High Court of Kerala writ appeal concerns the maintainability and jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) over exhibits filed under the Companies Act, 2013 in proceedings involving Union Christian College and allied parties. The appeals challenge an order dated 1 July 2020 that admitted the writ petition’s challenge to NCLT action and a separate order dated 24 September 2020 which held that the Kerala Non- trading Companies Act provisions (as amended by the Companies Act, 2013) apply to non-trading corporations to the extent of the Act’s applicability. The court addresses two core issues: (i) whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against an NCLT order, and (ii) the jurisdiction of the NCLT to entertain Exhibit P2 under the 2013 Act. Both sets of appellants contend on jurisdiction and maintainability, whereas the respondents argue lack of maintainability under Article 226 against tribunal orders and highlight Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction and absence of a remedy under Section 5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. The bench ultimately disposes of the writ appeals without interfering with the impugned orders and directs the writ court to determine maintainability expeditiously.
Royal Sundaram General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sudheesh Chandran V., MACA No.405 of 2019, is an appeal from an award dated 29 June 2018 of the II Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Palakkad, in O.P.(MV) No.866/2015. The claimant sustained serious injuries in a road accident on 27 January 2015. The insurer contends that the tribunal erred in calculating compensation, particularly in applying 40% future prospects for a 20% permanent disability, and seeks to delete this component because the evidence shows the claimant remained employed in the same job. The appeal also challenges the assessed loss of earnings for six months as excessive given the nature of the injuries; questions the grant of Rs.50,000 for future medical expenses and the necessity of penal interest at 11% if the award sum is not deposited within a month. The High Court examined the evidence, confirmed that the 40% future prospects were not justified, and held that the award should be recalculated without that component. It found the six-month loss of earnings not unreasonable and supported the record supporting future medical expenses due to planned plastic surgery, permitting Rs.50,000 for such costs. The court also held that penal interest is unsustainable, following the decision in Suvija, and directed payment of the revised total amount of Rs. 9,57,238 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of award and NEFT/RTGS transfer within one month.
This Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case arises from a petition to quash a final report in Crime No. 507/2018 and the proceedings in CC No. 482/2018 concerning alleged offences under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. The first accused, BINOY (corrected to BIJOY J. JOSE), challenged the proceedings initiated at Erattupetta Police Station, alleging that the building where the incident allegedly occurred was not used as a brothel and that two adults engaged in sexual activity in a private premises cannot constitute prostitution. The Act, as cited, includes sections 3 and 4, defining the offence of brothel-keeping or permitting premises to be used as a brothel, and the definition of prostitution under section 2(f). The petitioner claimed that the second accused was not a prostitute and that the conduct, if proven, would at most be private sexual activity not amounting to an offence; more critically, there was no independent local witness as required by Section 15(2) of the Act. The court examined the case diary and charge sheet, noting the absence of independent witnesses (CW1–CW6 were police or officials) and the lack of credible evidence that the premises were a brothel. It held that non-compliance with Section 15(2) is fatal to the prosecution. The court ultimately allowed the petition, quashing the final report and CC proceedings, exonerating the petitioner. It also refers to Radhakrishnan.K v. State of Kerala as authority in the argument.
This Regular First Appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 CPC arises from a judgment and decree dated 24 June 2003 in O.S. No. 41/1999 of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Vadakara. The plaintiffs are aggrieved by the trial court’s partition decree in a family-property dispute. The plaint schedule property belonged to late Krishnan, with the first three plaintiffs being his children and the fourth and fifth plaintiffs being Damayanthi’s children; Narayanan’s share passed to the sixth and seventh defendants, Narayanan’s children with the first wife. The eighth defendant purchased a portion and built thereupon. According to the plaintiffs, Krishnan’s estate devolved on his children; each of plaintiffs 1–3 claimed 1/5 shares, with plaintiffs 4–5 also entitled to a 1/5 share in the residential building, while the defendants allegedly held rights under a 1963 Will Ext. X1 in favor of Narayanan. The defendants denied the Will’s validity and claimed it was executed with testamentary capacity. The trial court partly decreed, granting 1/5 to plaintiffs 1–3 and 1/5 to plaintiffs 4–5 with the house allotted to defendants 1–2, and the rest to be valued for distribution. On appeal, the High Court examined the Will Ext. X1 under Section 90 of the Evidence Act; it upheld that presumption and ultimately dismissed the appeal, sustaining the trial court’s decree. The court observed the delay in filing and discussed the Will’s execution and attestation, ultimately holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a share in the residential building, but the appeal is dismissed. The decision preserves the trial court’s distribution and orders.”
This is a Kerala High Court Criminal Miscellaneous Case (Crl.M.C. No. 5554 of 2019) filed by accused Nos. 1 to 9 challenging the final report (Annexure-2) and the continuation of proceedings in CC No. 61 of 2018, arising from Crime No. 700 of 2017 of Wadakkanchery Police Station, under Sections 406 and 420 read with Section 34 IPC. The core allegation concerns an agreement dated 31.03.2014 for sale of 7 acres 21 cents of land at Rs. 44,000 per cent, with Rs. 21,00,000 received as advance. The sale deed was to be executed by 30.11.2014. Respondents 3 to 5 filed a civil suit (O.S. No. 177 of 2017, Thrissur) for specific performance and refund of the advance; the balance court fee remained unpaid, and the suit is pending. The petition contends the dispute is civil in nature and the final report lacks any materials showing dishonest intent; there is no allegation of wilful misappropriation, and the mortgage of the property occurred after the agreement period. The State counters the maintainability of the criminal proceedings. The court notes the civil nature of the dispute, the pending civil suit, and lack of evidence of fraud, and relies on Govind Prasad Kejriwal v. State of Bihar to hold that, where disputes are predominantly civil, the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C can be invoked to quash proceedings. Consequently, the petition is allowed and the Annexure-2 final report and CC 61/2018 are quashed.
Aneesh, the first accused in Crime No.481/2022 of Kayamkulam Police Station, challenged a common order dated 25.11.2022 extending the detention beyond 180 days and dismissing his statutory bail application under the NDPS Act. The Special Judge, NDPS, Alappuzha, had invoked Section 36-A(4) to extend the period of investigation up to a year and rejected Crl.M.P.No.4512/2022 (default bail). The petitioner contends that Annexure A1, the Public Prosecutor’s report, fails to disclose the progress of investigation and the specific reasons for detention beyond 180 days, violating the proviso to Section 36-A(4). He argues that the order allowing Annexure A1 is wrong and infringes his indefeasible constitutional right to bail. The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor, contends Annexure A1 demonstrates compliance with the statutory mandate and that the Court can extend the period on the basis of the Public Prosecutor’s report. The High Court examines the statutory language and precedents, especially Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, Sanjay Kumar Kedia v. Intelligence Officer, NCB, and Sanjay Dutt v. State (in the light of 36-A(4) and the TADA analogies), along with later authorities such as Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat. It holds that the Public Prosecutor’s report must independently show progress and the reasons for detention; failure to do so vitiates the extension. Consequently, Annexure A2 is set aside and the statutory bail is granted on conditions, emphasizing liberty protections and the accused’s cooperation with investigation.
This writ petition, WP(C) No. 32658 of 2019, filed in the Kerala High Court, challenges Ext. P5, a Government order under the 10th Pay Revision, which confines the benefits of the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS) to six Government departments and excludes Assistant Engineers in the Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit (University). The petitioner, employed as an Assistant Engineer in the University’s Public Works Department, completed 15 years of service and contends that Ext. P5 illegally denies her CAS benefits on the ground that the University posts are not covered by the policy, notwithstanding parity with Government posts that perform similar duties. The petitioner also cites Ext. P8, which denies her request, arguing it reflects the same illegality. The University and Government contend that Ext. P5 reflects policy decisions and that the University constitutes a separate service with distinct duties to be considered within the policy domain, with pay revisions guided by the Pay Revision Commissions. The court acknowledges the Government’s policy framework but emphasizes that no rational basis was offered for excluding University engineers from CAS, given the apparent similarity of duties and responsibilities. The bench directs the Government to consider the petitioner’s representation for CAS within a month and issue a reasoned order within three months after hearing the University, without entering into the merits of the dispute at this stage.
This MACA arises from O.P.(MV) No.1006 of 2003 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, seeking compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act for the death of Wilson in a self-accident on 17 November 2003. The motorcycle was owned by the 1st respondent (the deceased’s wife Mary) and driven by Wilson with her consent. The MACT dismissed on the ground that a petition under Section 163A is not entertainable where the deceased was the driver, arguing Ningamma’s ruling that the driver steps into the owner’s shoes and cannot claim. The appellants/petitioners (mother and minor children) contended that if the policy contains personal accident coverage for the owner-driver, benefits can extend to claimants under 163A, citing Ramkhiladi and Rajni Devi. The High Court distinguished Ningamma, noting that later Supreme Court decisions permit extension of personal accident coverage to the driver who steps into the owner’s shoes, subject to policy terms. It found the Ext. B1 policy provides Rs. 1,00,000 for personal accident coverage and, following Ramkhiladi, held liability on the insurer to pay the amount to the appellants. The appeal was allowed in part, directing deposit of Rs.1,00,000 with 7.5% interest from the petition date and costs within three months.
CRL.REV.PET NO. 254 OF 2016 K. P. Mohanan, the first accused, challenges the conviction under Sections 8(1) and 8(2) of the Abkari Act for possessing and transporting 30 litres of illicit arrack in an autorickshaw at Kozhikode. The trial court convicted him and the appellate court dismissed his appeals. The High Court, sitting in revision, reaffirms the concurrent judgments, concluding there is ample evidence from official witnesses that the contraband was seized from Mohanan and the co-accused, despite independent witnesses turning hostile. The investigation was conducted by PW1 (detecting officer) and PW2 (accompanying officer); though PW3 and PW4 were hostile, their hostility does not undermine the trustworthy testimony of the official witnesses. Seizure Exts. P3 and P8 reflect seal impressions, and Ext. P10 (chemical analysis) confirms ethyl alcohol in the seized substance, establishing illicit nature. The defense argument about the absence of a specimen-seal impression in the copy of seizure mahazar Ext. D1 is found immaterial since the specimen impression existed in the seizure mahazar and property list. The court finds no material deficiency in the chain of evidence, upholds the conviction and sentence, and dismisses the revision, directing transmission of records to the trial court for execution of the sentence.
W.P.(C) Nos. 7138 & 10541 of 2021 The consolidated writ petitions challenge a Kozhuvanal Grama Panchayat resolution Ext.P10 (dated 15.2.2021) prohibiting the plying of heavy vehicles on the Maduraparampu-Chempilavu road. The petitioners run a metal crusher unit (since 2003) and a concrete bricks manufacturing unit (since 2009); they allege the Panchayat lacked authority to regulate traffic under Section 170 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, and that traffic control falls under Section 115 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Ext.P5 is the Panchayat’s resolution based on Ext.P10. The petitioners say the Panchayat acted after elections and did so without proper notice or agenda, and that Section 170 contemplates road maintenance, cleanliness, and protection from encroachment, not traffic prohibition. The Panchayat counters that Section 166(2) and Entry 14 of the Third Schedule empower protection of roads and mandatory functions, with traffic restrictions possibly incidental to road maintenance; it relies on 166(2) and Section 191/276 as avenues of remedy. The State, insisting on the MV Act scheme, argues Section 115 explicitly authorizes government or its designees to prohibit or restrict vehicle movement. The High Court held that traffic prohibition is a specific power under Section 115 of the MV Act, not available to the Panchayat under Sections 166/170; Ext.P10 is ultra vires and the writ petitions are allowed, with a note that maintenance contributions may be amicably considered.
Omana C.K. v. State of Kerala concerns a request by a senior teacher for release of annual increments in April 2018 and April 2019, calculated on a pay fixation approved earlier (Ext. P2). The petitioner joined service as UPSA at Vannery H.S.S., Punnayurkulam in 1989, saw a brief termination for vacancy, and was reappointed in 1990; promoted as High School Assistant in 1993. She contends that the 2016 Government Order (Ext. P1) and Annexure II confer fitment benefits and service weightage that must include full-time regular service, including broken periods of service qualifying for normal increments, and even prior regular service in aided institutions. In particular, she asserts that a 24-year broken period from 24.08.1989 to 27.10.1989 should count toward weightage, consistent with the Note to Clause 6 and with decisions in Khadeeja A v. State of Kerala and Ibraheem Vadakkekara Thazhath v. State of Kerala. Respondents argue that only regular service (uninterrupted and broken) can be counted and that leave vacancies must be excluded; audit objections demanded recovery of excess benefits. The court, relying on the note and earlier judgments, held that the petitioner’s leave-vacancy period is computable as service for fitment and weightage. Consequently, increments arising in 2018 and 2019 must be released, with quashing of recovery steps and full consequential benefits.
The Writ Appeal arises from WP(C) 37246/2022 challenging the denial of registration as attached head load workers at the Urban Wholesale Market, Maradu. The appellants, head load workers employed in market shops, had submitted 125 applications before the Assistant Labour Officer, Ernakulam, seeking registration under the Kerala Head Load Workers Act, 1978. Their prayers sought (i) immediate consideration of Exts. P1–P21 within a time limit, and (ii) a direction to respondents 2–4 not to deputize head load workers in the market till registration was processed. The learned Single Judge directed the first respondent to consider the 125 applications within one month after hearing, in accordance with law. Dissatisfied with the refusal to grant the second prayer (status quo), the appellants contended that a decision on registration should be expedited and that operations in the market should not be disrupted. The Division Bench, citing Kerala Head Load Workers Welfare Board v. Hishad M.B. & Others (ILR 2022 (3) Kerala 688), held that an attached worker need not initially be registered as a headload worker and may be engaged in headload work in the employer’s establishment, with registration to follow under Rule 26A; it further clarified that the 1983 Scheme does not cover such attached workers. On these grounds, the court allowed the appeal to the extent noted.
This is an appeal under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, filed by the appellant Sathyabhama against the order dated 22.04.2024 passed by the Special Court for the trial of offences under the SC/ST (POA) Act, Nedumangad, in CMP No.171 of 2024, rejecting anticipatory bail. The appellant, aged 65, is accused (Accused No.1) in Crime No.335/2024 of Cantonment Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, along with other accused, of offences under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act. The prosecution case is that the de facto complainant Ramakrishnan, a member of the Scheduled Caste, was humiliated by remarks made by the appellant during a 30.59-minute interview with DNA YouTube in March 2024; the video was uploaded and circulated online. The remarks allegedly insulted and humiliated him on account of his caste, and the appellant was aware of the complainant’s caste status. The appellant’s counsel contended that the evidence does not prima facie establish the ingredients of Section 3(1)(r) and that no caste-name was used; hence no offence. The respondents contended that the remarks were intended to humiliate the complainant and that the act occurred in public view via online platforms. The High Court held that the prosecution materials prima facie reveal the ingredients of the offence, and that the bar under Section 18 of the Act is applicable, rejecting anticipatory bail. The court directed surrender within one week and stated that upon surrender, regular bail would be considered on the same day in light of Satender Kumar Antil. The court also underscored that the goal of the Act is to address atrocities against SC/ST communities and emphasized the need to enforce its provisions in letter and spirit.